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Purely as a SLF,what would this 'ride' to 38,000 ft feel like? Climbing,but slowing rapidly. Floating,climbing or falling? Is this what deceived them?
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thank you, Admiral
He was truly humbled and conceded that there were combinations of failures that are almost impossible to handled when one is caught unaware with not much time on one's side. So, sky gods hold your peace. Thank your lucky stars that it did not happened to you. Hope that the manufacturers come up with equipments without all those design flaws; get the designers to think like average sensible pilots, not anal retentive hardnose savants who think that handling an inflight emergency is as easy as having brainstorming piss up in some soothing sequestered karaoke joint. I'll simply stand by my own experiences and reactions to the malfunctions that "could never happen". "Luck is when preparation meets opportunity". So the LEF assymetry detection and brakes didn't work. Doggone LEF folded up when the drive tube disconnected from the drive motor.. Could never happen, and max delta right to left would only be 6 degrees. WRONG!!! http://i120.photobucket.com/albums/o.../rightwing.jpg The next guy with the problem had to eject. As I have iterated, the FBW system saved me from an ejection and I managed to get the thing back on the ground for the picture. later, as I am about to join Amos and his opinions of the discussion. I only hang around to provide anecdotal evidence and some " academic" crapola to help folks understand the FBW systems. I'll let the second-guessing about pilot/crew reactions to others. |
So, sky gods hold your peace. Thank your lucky stars that it did not happened to you. Hope that the manufacturers come up with equipments without all those design flaws; get the designers to think like average sensible pilots Having said that, I also agree with the assertion that they AF447 crew SHOULD HAVE NEVER GOTTEN THEMSELVES into that situation. Avoid ITCZ type weather like plague, never try to outclimb CBs. Avoiding situations that calls for superior skills is the key to survival. This strategy will never get one into the headlines as heroes saving a crippled plane but keeps one flying smoothly and cooly into quiet retirement. |
Mainstream Media Coverage
So how would you grade mainstream media coverage of this crash - and aviation in general? Examples (good and bad) would be appreciated. Since I anticipate a lot of criticism, how can we make it better? How does social networking, blogging and other wholesale changes in the way news is shared change the dynamic? Why are so many pilots loathe to speak with an MSM reporter? Discuss...
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One generally can pick out a character flaw in others that he himself owns.
MOF, It is almost exclusively the case. The time may be near to lose this "Sky God" mentality, and its corollary, the "Sky God" by critical proxy. There never should have been an Ivory tower, least of all these days. No one is well served by ignorance of the fundamentals, nor does it further the industry to pretend "complexity" to keep hidden the foibles that we all are entitled to know. I've known a few "Four Bars" that were guilty of visiting that many watering holes prior to push. It is a human endeavour, and to pretend that the BEA are engaged in some hideously complicated endeavour keeps all of us in thrall to the sheepherders. Knowledge is power, and refusing to embrace it leaves the power to others. that's two on ignore. |
Sim-aces
In another life as a checker, after completing the sim check of a super ace to a very high standards we used the remaining time to conduct some extra excercises on really unusual attitudes with combinations of other failures...the plane went belly up, ace or no ace. We repeated it twice, same results. 2 years later, another sim check and super ace asked for another go at that exercise...he managed to save the plane but barely. He admitted he thought long and hard about it coming out with all the possible solutions in his head before the session. He was truly humbled and conceded that there were combinations of failures that are almost impossible to handled when one is caught unaware with not much time on one's side. - NOW - thats the kind of simulator training all pilots should have before they're alowed to become captains. I'm impressed by that ace that came up in his mind with a theoretical solution - and managed to "do the impossible". The publix / PAX expects (perhaps naively?) the captains to be able to handle the plane from all kind of situations - even it it takes unusual flight maneuvers - like useing the rudder to drop a wing during stall-recovery. The issue is not only be able to handle the initial failure /situation- so to stabilize flight without further or minimal harm- but also to practice sim-scenarioes where everything is suddenly - totaly critical - catastrohpic - Like the the situation the captain found himself in when returning to the cockpit. Just for curiosity - how many -sim hours are required to become a captain? How many of them will be spent training actual catastrophic scenarios? (not only avoidance of them). The issue is not only what to do correctly at a high altitude stall warning - but what to do when the things you have done so far has actually made the situation worse - eg the situation between 30000 and ground in this flight (the fully developed flat-stall variant: 40deg AoA - 15 deg pitch - 10000f/min sinkrate)). It would also be interesting to know at what altitude it was "to late to recover" this sad situation. Assuming you still had pitch authority - or assuming not sufficient pitch authority) - any guesses - 6000 feet? |
pull back on controls
with a plugged pitot, in a updraft (climb) the IAS would increase. If the increase was shown on the ASI, the tendency would be to pull back to reduce the speed, perhaps?? It must have been very confusing for them during those last minutes.
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More Basic Observations
At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again. |
Ask21 - Just for curiosity - how many -sim hours are required to become a captain? How many of them will be spent training actual catastrophic scenarios? (not only avoidance of them).
Upgrade program had 24 hrs of sims. Normal emergencies(fire, engine failures, brake problems, flap problems, bleed problems, etc, etc). Not sure what you mean by "catastrophic". Some 'extra' stuff, nil braking, extra low vis, etc. Line experience was 21:04 and 11 flights. For my company I was a relatively inexperienced upgrade. At time of upgrade I had 7350 hrs TT, 200 hrs sim, 900 hrs in type, 3300 hrs w/company, 6.5 yrs with the company. Upgrade was my third type rating at the company. Minimum upgrade experience now is probably 12,000 - 15,000 hrs TT. So when some people say "experienced" others think "maybe not that much". :ok: |
Media and Air Safety
Mr. O'brien, your question is a good one. Given the very good quality of the PBS special NOVA on this accident, I'd have to rate the coverage as high. But I'll withhold judgement until I see a follow up program. I believe that the factors that fully explain this accident are complex and varied. A media presentation that could identify and explain those factors would be most useful. Things like automation, aircrew training, corporate cultures, and the like probably all had a role in this accident. A media analysis that identified all these factors, their interrelationships, and how helpful changes could be made would be excellent. Thanks for your great work in this area.
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Stall warning enhancement idea
I've been reading this section of the forum over the last few hours with great interest.
What strikes me as a defining moment is when the nose was pushed down and the stall warning was reactivated. This apparently caused the PF to pull the nose back up, sealing the fate of everyone aboard. One major problem, as I read it, was the stall alarm came on as the plane slowed and then shut off as the airspeed dropped below a minimum threshold. Then the PF pushed the nose down which brought the airspeed back up, causing the stall warning to appear again. In the confusion maybe everyone had it backwards - that the plane was OUT of stall when the alarm first stopped, and was BACK in stall the second time. This might have caused the startled PF to pull the nose back up in a WTF moment. There is no "begin stall warning" or "end stall warning" sound effect, correct? If this is the case, I think a simple doppler-type sound could be superimposed on the warning as a "directional" enhancement. As you go INTO a stall, a high frequency sound slowly drops to a lower frequency (tied to airspeed/pitch etc) and could be heard under the stall alarm. When the airspeed drops to the minimum threshold the warning stops as it did. As the plane regains airspeed and the stall warning reactivates, the doppler sound resumes, going from a low to high frequency until the craft recovers from the stall and the alarm shuts off. The fact is the pilot now has a direction tied to the stall, where he/she is in the stall, and the progress being made to recover from the stall. The doppler sound would be dynamic, that is it would be a real-time sound that would reflect actual conditions. If the plane touched on stall conditions and dipped slightly lower before recovering, you would hear the high freq drop slightly, then rise back up until the stall alarm stopped. With this aural clue, there would be no mistaking where the stall is occurring, and if you are going deep into one or recovering from a stall below the alarm's threshold. I apologize in advance if I offend anyone here with my ignorance - I'm a platinum flyer and just self-loading-cargo, that's all. I appreciate all that I read here - you good folks are just trying to understand this and I thank you for caring enough to try and figure this out. It's comforting to me and for all of the other "pax" reading this :D |
Major Pacific Rim carriers are looking for skippers with 500 PIC hours on type for the big jets! So they have hordes of " adventurers " knocking on their doors with " parker penned " hours or from " airline pilot mills " that have sprouted up in recent years. Minimum sim training, mimimum sectors on line training. Lo and behold you have el capitanos with 4 shiny bars on big shiny jets.
I had been augment crew to some of these newbies and some have no clue as to how to operate a modern weather radar properly! Flying through the equator through ITCZs invariably becomes a free roller coaster ride. Avoid, avoid, avoid. Not detracting Sully from his superb handing in the Hudson River thingy, it would have been sublimely great had he been able to avoid hitting the birdies. It would have been no headlines if the Air Transat A330 superglider crew nipped the fuel leak in the bud and diverted safely without the drama. Then again, they live to receive accolades. These AF447 crew unfortunately did not live. Had they made it through and nursed their crippled plane ( I would suspect some damage after the hair raising plunge ) to a landing somewhere they would have been amply rewarded with publicity and possibly some French aeronautical awards. To all out there, if you think your airlines have trained their pilots sufficiently for the most complex failures you are sadly mistaken or kidding yourselves. In the corporate, commercial environment accidents like these are at best " acceptable " damage ( one in 10 million chance, or one in 100 million chance ratinale ). Anything you hear about safety from airline higher ups are nothing but posturing, outright lies and utter baloney. |
Avoidance
Ricky Billy
You are so right. Thank you for those comments, my sentiments exactly. Flying through CBs at high altitude, near the "coffin corner" at night is simply crazy. That's why we have weather radar. |
Flying through CBs at high altitude, near the "coffin corner" at night is simply crazy. That's why we have weather radar. Had they then encountered mod or severe turb in the top of a Cb, I'm sure the BEA would have mentioned it. |
A GPS cannot do this. It only reports how fast the plane is actually moving, which says nothing directly about how much airflow the pilot has to work with. In addition, it figures in wind effects, which also have no direct usefulness in controlling the plane. Pop quiz: You are at 35,000 feet. The GPS says you are traveling at 400 kts due north over the ground, decreasing at 1 kt per second. There is a 60-kt jet stream blowing from the southwest (217°). Your stall speed (no flaps) would be 167 kts INDICATED, but your airspeed indicator isn't working. Your heading is 356°. Barometric pressure is 29.75 (but your altimeter is set to 29.92 as in all flights above 18,000 feet.) The air outside is -42° C. for a given configuration, GPS(s) systems can be used as a sole source to give attitude and performance data, including AoA. (20 years ago... in experimental testing, nowdays my cat has a GPS...) In fact they can even be used to track wing bending/fuselage torsion etc... if you use the carrier wave rather than only the signal directly. At least on the B777 TBC came out with a simple switch, the FPV which just gives the derived FP, and is a ready indicator of AoA for a... er..."crosscheck". (S&L it is a great analogue of AoA, but in high bank angles it takes a little more thought to determine the AoA from the display). The underlying source is hybrid AoA/ADC through the ADIRU, which of course removes the opportunity for redundancy.... maybe next time. The question is how conditions that were encountered by a first world operator, operating state of the art technology, all generally conforming with the structured, bloated,bureaucratic, costly guidelines of EASA/JAA defeated all the safety protocols so spectacularly. AF447 crew response is not isolated, and that should cause concern for those passengers that consider dummying down aerospace to a commodity product as packaged and sold by M.O.L., Safety is expensive, but the public pocket has driven the industry to the point where it is argued that a MPPL is a good thing, that pilots are operators not pilots. Next time you fly, look out the window, that thing out there is a wing. XBox, MS FS etc don't usually employ such things. Using a computer simulation, normally you don't end up dead, as the m.v^2's are generally of a much low order of magnitude. There is nothing trivial about the kinetics of an aluminium tube stuffed with assorted people moving in 3d space (4d... avoids MAC's) at high speeds, with lots of hydrocarbons, yet, as indicated elsewhere we are happy to pay the taxi driver more for 15 minutes, or the terminal company more for 1:00 hr of parking than we pay for the opportunity to dance around the sky. As Feynman said in '86, "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled." PS: the impact of auto trim from erroneous speed information, and the control law reversion needing the cognitive engagement of the crew to the dynamics of the situation in a highly stressful sudden onset event, that is additionally time critical is much easier to quarterback later, with the benefit/certainty of hindsight. (AI products have had numerous events and disasters where the trim system has resulted in an out of trim condition). I do not criticise the crew, I criticise the bureaucratic system and public apathy that results in conditions precedent where lives are needlessly lost in the pursuit of cheap travel. Pay in cash or blood, simple choices. |
MSM Coverage
Glad to see you're still/back with us Mr. Obrien. I enjoyed the CNN bit you did with your plane a couple of months ago. While I don't follow every MSM report, and turn off Fox/WSJ, I've tended to find Bloomberg more rational than most. Here's what I posted on the Techlog back on April 24:
-------- Just last night I got around to watching PBS NOVA "Crash of Flight 447," which aired on 20 Feb. There seems to have been considerable discussion of it, judging by snippets, but there must have been a lot of it at the time, (now page 138 of prior thread) censored by the mods, as there are incomplete references and very few posts from about then. That is disturbing. Nova tried to explain the events leading up to the crash. I'll address only the Wx radar here. Their expert, from NCAR part of NOAA, said the Wx radar on AF447 had only 50 mile range. Strike one. It's 320 miles, if the storm is dense enough to matter. Nova showed a small/medium sized cell in the plane's track toward the major line of storm. Nova said the small cell would obscure the radar view of the major storm, causing them to stumble into it. Poppycock/BS/Hogwash! The Wx radar on 447 returns were calibrated for rainfall intensity. When the intensity of return is high, an algorithm called "Path Attenuation Compensation" kicks in to assure calibrated display. When the storm is too intense for penetration without reserve to see the full picture of the "storm behind the storm," the Wx radar puts up a yellow band, called PAC Alert, at the outer range ring of the display. I have great respect for Public Broadcasting in the US, but this program failed miserably. I wonder if major sponsor, billionaire David H. Koch, didn't have too much editorial input? -------- PS: Why did they choose to interview a radar guy unfamiliar with that specific airborne Wx radar? The least the guy could have done would be to study the Pilot's Guide in NCAR's own C-130, which is operationally just like the WX radar that was in AF447. Was this pgm just a re-badge of the BBC pgm from last summer, or a real update? |
Wouldnt it be additionaly tragic if the stall warning reactivated as a result of the correct application to nose down pitch, thus further confusing the crew.
Probable unrecognised spatial disorientation ( somatogravic decelleration illusion) |
FS, the only way I can see them going to idle is they got a false overspeed warning because they climbed 3,000 ft with blocked pitot tubes which would give an overspeed warning with static pressure reducing in the climb. The 32 year old in the right seat, PF, had less than 3,000 hrs and 800 in type, probably 798 hrs monitoring the autopilot so he probably didn't stand much of a chance of hand flying it at night with no airspeed in moderate turbulence. The full up control in a stall is an Airbus thing I guess. Nobody else does that. Apparently the computer will protect you in normal law but they went to alternate law so from what I hear you are not stall protected.
Magic airplanes like Airbus take the pilot out of the loop and make them monitors and eventually they will lose their basic flying skills if they ever had them. This pilot was probably for the first time in his life hand flying an Airbus 330 in unfavorable conditions he couldn't handle. |
Tip of the iceberg...?
From pointers to drums... From dynamics to numbers...
Tiny observations large outcome... When I started flying ‘digital’ I missed and preferred the ‘old’ familiar dynamic moving pointers on the Airspeed indicators and Altimeters, rather than the relatively ‘dumb’ moving number-tapes and/or drums on the flight displays. And my ‘emotion’ is not limited to Airspeed indicators and Altimeters only. Of course, as with all sort of changes, I was told that I “just have to get used to it!” OK... Fair enough... But, although I am getting more and more used to ‘flying digital’ by now, on occasion, I really sense the lack of instant dynamic ‘speed and altitude situational awareness’ that the ‘old’ analogue Airspeed indicators and Altimeters with their moving pointers will give us more or less instantly. Looking at the tapes I have to figure out: Are the changes going up or down? Moving Fast or slow? Is it an increase or a decrease? What’s the trend? Things, that I would instantly be aware of with the analogue indicators. With digital indicators, however, I need more of my brain capacity to ‘translate’ the sheer changing of numbers on the rolling tapes (or drums) into dynamics. Oh, yes... We’ve got the ‘speed trend arrow’ to sort the speed thing out... Haven’t we... But, then again, isn’t this turning the things upside down? In every new aeroplane that our company receives, even the ‘last resort’ analogue standby instruments have been replaced by a single digital display. Man tries a lot of things to improve safety. On the other hand, in my opinion, these efforts are broken down again, unnoticed. As for hindsight typing behind the computer: Most of our daily flying ends at a couple of hundred feet going out and starts again at a couple of hundred feet coming in... Almost every flight we are being flown, mostly by the comfort of automation, very near to the ‘coffin corner’... The ‘gap’ being smaller one time than the other. I wonder how many of us really actively realise this... At high altitude in the very thin air, especially in turbulence at night, a cockpit can turn into a relative ‘hell’ very abruptly if the Autopilot kicks off... (LOL most probably from many in here...) Controls will be very sloppy in conventional aircraft. In FBW aircraft this will be even more (un) noticeable, as there is different or no direct feedback. In both cases, while you’re shaking, you need to handle the controls like being a Swiss watch maker. And you are now manually manoeuvring within this tiny confined little gap... If you’re lucky you may have done it may be a couple of times. Even ‘minutes’ would do a great deal of benefit already... But it is something we hardly actually ever do...! Are we stupid, then? We train constantly for all sorts of situations... Or could here be a training deficiency? If you have/were never trained in hand flying close to the ‘edges’ of an envelope (or even outside an envelope), or if you have never actually been hand flying close to the ‘outside’ of an envelope, chances are that you won’t even notice that you’re going out... Whilst thinking you’re ‘hanging in there’... And so far, so good... How much ‘flight time’ were our unfortunate colleagues granted to log in their logbooks on actual hand flying the plane in that tiny little gap, before they all of a sudden were forced and committed to do so in a very, very narrow gap. Whilst probably shaking, vibrating and being bombarded with all sorts of alarms going off... So, whilst trying to analyse, I have learnt to always remain respectful and very humble and do a great deal of effort to see the whole picture... |
Hi,
Shogan 1977 From SLF perspective it would be so much easier to swallow 'human error' as sole/major factor. That means when one flies over the ocean in the dark we can reassure ourselves with the thought that the pilots of this plane won't make the same mistake because... they're smarter/more experienced/not arrogant/not French/will have learned from AF447.... But reading all these posts two things stand out for me: - Yes, clearly this accident COULD have been avoided, if the right action had been taken BUT who is to say any of you pilots would do the right thing? - If the stall warning is (a) intermittent and (b) alarming when you do the right thing and silent when you do the wrong thing, it is human nature to be confused - question your actions, especially under stress. That combined with the statements in this discussion by professional pilots that express arrogance, defensiveness, fear/"there but for..."/lack of trust in aircraft/technology... makes this SLF question the very people in the front seat who we depend on to get us there safely; the training provided by airlines and modern cockpit design. Not a happy place to be The statistics also show that 80 % of the accidents are the result of pilot error So when you take place in a plane .. you know that if thing go wrong .. you have 80 % to go not go out of a survivable accident Or at least .. 20% of the pilots are good in abnormal situations That's the beauty of the statistics Think about ........ |
Learner 001 - I've flown round dials to full glass. Obviously FMC's and EGPWS are light years beyond the 727 for situational awareness. But nothing is as fast for a basic instrument scan as an altimeter pointing at 12 o'clock and the VSI at 9 o'clock. Instant awareness of your altitude and sink rate.
IMO the tape display, while nice with the low and high speed buffet tapes on the airspeed, cannot compare to the rapid awareness you have with round dials and moving needles. |
CB or no CB
For the umpteenth time, there is no evidence the crew flew through a Cb. In fact, based on the last BEA report, the crew knew very well what was coming,weather-wise as they turned to avoid and briefed the cabin crew. I concur with woody; I have seen 13000 hour veterans with only 600 hours on type happily flying in vicinity of odd shaped hooked weather radar returns simply because they had plotted a course in the clear a few miles downwind of such a return. Oh, those wonders who were produced fast track through jade cargo, air china cargo, jal express, polar etc then go around blaming everything else for the bone rattling shake they get. |
Tell me one thing :
Loss of airspeed indication happened several if not a lot of times before without a loss of aircraft. Why this time ? The Air Caraïbe incident wasn't exactly a walk in the park, nor the Northwest one. I doubt AF will ever bother to find this crew and ask them how they did it. After all, it's all in a very comprehensive paper they wrote that nobdy bothered reading until......It then almost turned to the New York Times best seller. Training ? A lot has been said about this. Every aircraft I trained on I had to go through the Loss of Airspeed syllabus. Awareness is what it's about. It's been said above by an Aussie 330 pilot who's airline had several incidents of the same kind before 447 ever happened. 1/ Keeps out of the weather 2/ Memorizes pitch and thrust 3/ Briefs F/O and S/O 4/.....could have been 1/ Stays with his bumm in his seat when bad weather forecasted because he knows this is exactly the kind of spot you are likely to lose your speed indication. And this Ladies and Gents gives you................Qantas. These guys get the same kind of training major airlines get and yet everything they've had to deal with in the last 3 years was totally out of the ordinary and they dealt with it superbly. So why is that ? I would say compagny culture, personal ethic and discipline added to a long history of phenomenal track record. |
Interesting stall characteristic most a/c pitch decreases when fully stalled.
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I would say company culture, personal ethic and discipline added to a long history of phenomenal track record. |
misd-agin: But nothing is as fast for a basic instrument scan as an altimeter pointing at 12 o'clock and the VSI at 9 o'clock. Instant awareness of your altitude and sink rate. Kind regards, learner . . .;) |
ice pack
"...Interesting stall characteristic most a/c pitch decreases when fully stalled..." cg? |
Flight through CBs
Capt Bloggs
I take it you haven't seen the satellite photo with the flight path superimposed on It. It shows the extent of the storm system with the route going through the cells. Can you explain to us all just why the A330 went out of control after entering the system? Why did the F/O make a call to the F/As advising them of turbulence ? There are none so blind as those who will not see. Why would the plane go out of control if it hadn't been close to the coffin corner in turbulence? Why would all the ASIs stop working simultaneously and all those warnings begin (some of them false) if there was no supercooled water in the CBs to cause icing of the pitots? Please answer these questions for us. |
I'm not a pilot but just looking logically at the known facts, when descending at 10K fpm at TOGA with the pitch and attitude data available, AND Stall warnings fed from the latter, how could they conclude other than that they were already in a stall? (If it walks like duck......)Were they trying to "Pitch and Power" through the weather with the lack of airspeed data when already in a stall?
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VSI
+/- 0-6K fpm is the typical VSI range on the steam gauges. What is max displayed on AI EFIS? Could the VSI display have flagged or just disappeared, due to out of limit input of 10K and more?
Just asking. |
Push up, push down
Correct me if my question makes no sense. I noticed in the BEA report that is says the PF mostly pushed up. But it did show that he also tried pushing down. The plane was responsive, apparently, so shouldn't that have improved the situation.
It would appear that the PF thought pushing down wasn't improving the situation. Or he wouldn't have gone back to pushing up. Shouldn't pushing down have improved the situation? And shouldn't something have told the PF that it was improving the situation? |
VSI
Graybeard,
short answer is yes. If the needle was beyond 6,000 fpm they may not have realized how fast they were descending. |
Stall warnings
I've noticed different explanations about stall warnings here. So I wonder --- I don't know --- if that's a serious cause of confusion.
One place said the stall warning sounds once and then stops even though the plane is still stalled. One place I saw it said when the stall ends, the stall warning repeats unchanged. (NOT saying "Stall ended".) If all that is so, what if some part of the flight computer detects a new/second stall before the first stall ends? If the warnings are the same, the pilot has to keep count of whether the number of warnings is odd or even. Another post referred to stall warnings becoming continuous. But that's not how the other posts describe it. |
Weeks back, someone posted a website which showed the tracks of the many flights headed across the South Atlantic that night and every one of them deviated as they came through heavy weather EXCEPT for AF447. It shot straight through into the brightest red weather without so much as the slightest turn.
I can't get the link I have top work but the plot was from a bea.com trajectory plot sometime around April 6th. |
"Why the .... did the stupid automation silence the stall horn ? "A great question. The systems silenced it because the IAS fell below 60 kts for a time. This caused the FWC (Flight Warning Computer) to silence the STALL warning."
From reading all the various posts, I conclude this is the ultimate cause of the crash because it misled the pilots. Wouldn't a quick check by the flight computer have shown the plane was not on the runway but in the air? That should have been done. |
Originally Posted by thermostat
I take it you haven't seen the satellite photo with the flight path superimposed on It. It shows the extent of the storm system with the route going through the cells. Can you explain to us all just why the A330 went out of control after entering the system? Why did the F/O make a call to the F/As advising them of turbulence ? There are none so blind as those who will not see. Why would the plane go out of control if it hadn't been close to the coffin corner in turbulence? Why would all the ASIs stop working simultaneously and all those warnings begin (some of them false) if there was no supercooled water in the CBs to cause icing of the pitots? Please answer these questions for us.
In the meantime it is good airmanship to advise the back crew that we may well still encounter some turbulence. AF447 was nowhere close to the coffin corner. According to the QRH table it was actually around 1500ft below the optimum. The issue is not supercooled water but more probably ice crystals. |
Dart your eyes rapidly in a random fashion through the following list and call out the COLOUR of the word:
GREEN BLUE RED ORANGE YELLOW I think this is a good example of cognitive dissonance, and illustrates that the human brain is not always that great at resolving conflicting information. Try the same exercise at night in turbulence when you are tired and jetlagged with a plethora of warnings and aurals going off - there but for the grace.... |
Maintaining the previous configuration, should maintain the airspeed.
Seems to me if you're at cruise altitude and speed on both AP and AT, then suddenly you loose IAS and both the AP and AT disconnect, you might realize that you're already in the correct configuration at that point. The AT disconnect will leave the engines at the correct power setting they were at, so just maintain wings level, maintain the same altitude, and maintain heading. This would probably work even with moderate ice accumulation (since the AP and AT would have already made this configuration flyable). If the AP disconnect causes an airframe movement, correct it back to the same altitude, heading, and wings level. Once the AP disconnect and hand flying is stabilized, then smoothly transition to the pitch/power settings. Even if turbulence causes you to continually focus on maintaining altitude, heading and wings level, thus preventing you from transitioning to the memorized pitch/power settings, you should still be in pretty good shape while you sort it out, by maintaining the previous configuration. All of the above assumes of course that you can hand fly the airplane at high altitude. Perhaps the PF did not have a good feel for hand flying the A330 at altitude (maybe why he gave the controls up later?), especially with moderate turbulence taking place. The sad thing is, if the PF had just stayed put after the AP and AT disconnected, he would have gotten IAS back in about a minute, and this would have been an incident report rather than an accident. However, then there would have been steps and procedures for systems recovery after IAS return, which would have been a whole other set of problems. |
stall warning deactivated at below 60 kts?
I fail to understand why the stall warning had to deactivate at below 60kts. Wasn't there a ground mode/air mode logic on this wonder bus?
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Captain
I saw a reference in one post to a "panicked Captain shouting commands".
Maybe I missed it, but the transcript I read didn't mention the Captain saying anything. From which I assumed he thought he didn't have any good instructions to give the PF or PNF coopilots. |
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