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I stayed current on hand flying by hand flying. That is the only way you can do it and not just 30 minutes in a sim. I practiced using standby instruments only and not looking at the standard panel. If you rely totally on automation, good luck with your career. If you are very lucky it might work but don't count on it. If the stall warning ever goes off just nudge the nose down and add a little power like you did in the Cessna 150. We learned that in lesson 3 remember?
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Post of the century mate.
From pointers to drums... From dynamics to numbers... Tiny observations large outcome... When I started flying ‘digital’ I missed and preferred the ‘old’ familiar dynamic moving pointers on the Airspeed indicators and Altimeters, rather than the relatively ‘dumb’ moving number-tapes and/or drums on the flight displays. And my ‘emotion’ is not limited to Airspeed indicators and Altimeters only. Of course, as with all sort of changes, I was told that I “just have to get used to it!” OK... Fair enough... But, although I am getting more and more used to ‘flying digital’ by now, on occasion, I really sense the lack of instant dynamic ‘speed and altitude situational awareness’ that the ‘old’ analogue Airspeed indicators and Altimeters with their moving pointers will give us more or less instantly. Looking at the tapes I have to figure out: Are the changes going up or down? Moving Fast or slow? Is it an increase or a decrease? What’s the trend? Things, that I would instantly be aware of with the analogue indicators. With digital indicators, however, I need more of my brain capacity to ‘translate’ the sheer changing of numbers on the rolling tapes (or drums) into dynamics. |
Many thanks to those who posted/sent me the full link to the EA401 report.
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Originally Posted by Lemain
If the instrumentation did not present accurately the status of the aircraft then it was an instrumentation problem -- not the crew.
If the instrumentation did present the information accurately but the crew had not be trained to determine it, then it was an operational problem -- not the crew. I find it hard to believe that the crew were so deficient -- and if they were, the 'blame' should rest with those who selected them, trained them and signed them off as fit. Bottom line, whatever happened, the pilots can never be blamed! That maybe be a popular view in a pilots forum, but ....:oh: And not necessarily meant to be linked in any way with AF447, if you have problems to believe, why even highly regarded professionals suddenly act like absolut amateurs who have no clue whatsoever, it does happen. Sudden momentarily "incapacitation" happens. Humans are like this. |
If the instrumentation did not present accurately the status of the aircraft then it was an instrumentation problem -- not the crew. |
Ihg
And not necessarily meant to be linked in any way with AF447, if you have problems to believe, why even highly regarded professionals suddenly act like absolut amateurs who have no clue whatsoever, it does happen. Sudden momentarily "incapacitation" happens. Humans are like this. Regards, ihg crew errors are typically Knowledge based skill based or rule based need facts to decide |
Originally Posted by airtren
Have you read the BEA Report? Its analysis and CVR transcript are quite clear. Isn't that a enough "real base" for you?If you read the BEA Report it states clearly that the PF and PNF had no Stall Approach, or Stall at High altitude training.
Is that enough? So, no 'high altitude' approch to stall / stall training? The 'ordinary' approach to stall training would have done: nose down. No difference at high altitude. |
The BEA press meeting Q and A from 29 July2011 is very interesting .. maybe more interesting than the interim report N°3
It's show the feelings of the BEA (at least those of the director Troadec and the chief investigator Bouillard) Many disturbing questions (journalists are good at the task to ask disturbing questions) are not directly answered .. not because no infos .. Some answers are evidently not honest ... but I let you only judge on this subject French: Transcription de la conférence de presse du 29 juillet 2011 English: Transcription de la conférence de presse du 29 juillet 2011 |
Ihg
Is it really that easy as you say it? What was then the reason for doing wrong?
You might read in the history of upset and stall recovery procedure development. Since 2004 it changed 2007 and 2009 (after AF447). upsets and stall Those changes and developing and refining the procedures and the asociated recommended (unfortunately only recommended) training would not be necessary according to your saying. Did you do stalls and spins in real aircraft or simulator? No, not approach to stalls, real stalls? I did it in real like some others. It´s a expierience and you dont stay cool when doing it. If you say the upset should not have happened at all, i might agree. But the recognition and the recovery from stall is some different matter. Two years ago when i mentioned the possibility of stall on this forum, it was rebuked as not possible. Probably AF447 thought as well that it was not possible, by the way also the words of the crew on the CVR. Not possible? Any failure is possible with humans, also the misjudgement of 3 pilots. |
Many disturbing questions (journalists are good at the task to ask disturbing questions) are not directly answered .. not because no infos .. Some answers are evidently not honest ... but I let you only judge on this subject |
As I write in my post "but I let you only judge on this subject "
Read the Q and A and maybe you will find some ... this is personal appreciation Not all have the same feeling about honesty |
Is it really that easy as you say it? What was then the reason for doing wrong? You might read in the history of upset and stall recovery procedure development. Since 2004 it changed 2007 and 2009 (after AF447). upsets and stall Those changes and developing and refining the procedures and the asociated recommended (unfortunately only recommended) training would not be necessary according to your saying. Did you do stalls and spins in real aircraft or simulator? No, not approach to stalls, real stalls? I did it in real like some others. It´s a expierience and you dont stay cool when doing it. If you say the upset should not have happened at all, i might agree. But the recognition and the recovery from stall is some different matter. Two years ago when i mentioned the possibility of stall on this forum, it was rebuked as not possible. Probably AF447 thought as well that it was not possible, by the way also the words of the crew on the CVR. Not possible? Any failure is possible with humans, also the misjudgement of 3 pilots. |
Some answers are evidently not honest I'll follow Flydive1's lead - which answers are "not honest"? Since you're prepared to call the BEA liars in public, I think you ought to back up your accusation in public without the snide evasive remark. The only thing which seems evident to me is that you're determined to push your own nonsense about this inquiry. |
I think Airbus convinced Airbus operators it couldn't be stalled so why not pull back on the SS because it can't stall even with UAS. If people took the time and trouble to RTFM they would soon understand the aircraft's FBW envelope protection features and how they are degraded if Normal Law is not available. But no-one pays them to do that, so they don't bother.... |
Why is this allowed?
The authorities certify the aircraft knowing that it is possible that Otto throws in the towel at high altitude and the human has to take over.
So how is it within the rules for Air France to designate an FO with no experience of manual flying at altitude as PF (and as Capt's deputy)? |
Methink it's simple to answer .. AF seem's no have any FO with experience of manual flying at altitude (at least .. no training) .. so the designation for a Capt's deputy is also simple .. no mistake ....
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Automation/Hand-flying
Does the sim provide a good replication for hand-flying skills at high altitude? Obviously this is important to practice in the various degraded laws if so.
I believe from the tone and content of some folk that they see as straightforward hand-flying a heavy A330 in alternate law (without protections) in a jet at night at high altitude in severe turbulence with many distracting and conflicting audio AND visual warnings going off, along with wildly misleading airspeed displays due to ADR faults. This ain't so. I've had this happen in part climbing through FL200 in an A321 in stormy weather (not inside a cb) at night, and it is not easy for the crew to manage. However, I am not implying that a cool head and a competent pair of hands cannot manage the situation, simply that it is far trickier than non-A330 guys may think. Trite remarks about hand-flying and automation are useless. No-one flew the 707 or DC8 in the cruise by hand unless forced to. And that's 50 years back.Incidentally we all hand-fly the 330 when operating; long-haul means we don't do it so regularly as short-haul guys. Twas ever thus. |
RoyHudd -- Surely these are two different issues? Hand-flying skills and instrumentation. From the published CVR evidence the pilots did not know for sure what the aircraft was doing. Something like "but the airspeed is mad, no?" from the PF. The instruments have to work and the pilots need to have training and experience. Neither by itself would have saved the aircraft, it seems....back to the classic "accidents are almost invariably due to a chain of events, not a single cause".
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RoyHudd- are you saying that the Instrumentation interface is poorly suited to hand flying in aircraft upset?
Pilot training aside, are we getting to the nub of the matter now? These desperate situations are survived by those designers, engineers and aircrew who understand the simple, time limited, essence of the problem to be solved. If the behavioural effect of the technology is not directly towards enacting the simple solution to the aircraft upset, then it becomes "The Problem Itself". |
West Caribbean 708 similaritites
Saw an episode of "Mayday" on TV over the weekend concerning West Caribbean 708, an MD-82.
Report: West Caribbean MD82 at Machiquez on Aug 16th 2005, did not recover from high altitude stall Although they got in to the high altitude stall in a different way from AF447, it seems that they also didn't get the nose down to unstall the wing but rode the stall all the way down to impact. Different types and different causes for stall but same pilot behaviour in the stall and same recommendations to improve training in handling high altitude stalls. |
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