poor safety record
 

Air France is going to have a very hard time explaining this one and I am sure the victim's Lawyers are going to have a field day at the Courts.
If the Air France "Juggernaut" was not one of the "heavyweights" of Europe and if it's safety standards were appraised by the same criteria as the smaller airlines it would definitely be included in the infamous European "Black List".
This airline has the worst safety record in Europe.

It happened at Roselawn as well (ATR-72).

I'd like to see the data for roll angle. At Roselawn the stall was coupled with wild, violent roll oscillations. The pilots did not recognize a stalled condition.

In Air France's case, with that kind of sink rate their pitch angle was 16 degrees or less, and roll was tossing through 40 degrees each way. They were sitting at 100% thrust. Perhaps they were thinking of structural problems or something else - but they must not have recognized the stall....

Whatsalizad: it would appear that the aircraft was stalled for most (if not all) of the descent, so maybe it wasn't a dive. With the THS (as reported) remaining a 13 deg nose up, how do you dive? :confused:

Huck:
Is this a symptom of a deep stall?

15 deg nose up and falling at 10,000 fpm strikes me as an extremely uncomfortable, and disorienting feeling. Does Unusual Attitude training cover this case?

(Hmm, from what folks have posted in the other threads, Sims probably don't have the data points for it ... )

Could it be possible that the pilots thought they were in a nose-down attitude?

They probably had no external visual reference, and with the deceleration of the plane, even with the slight nose-up attitude, it would have felt like they were in a nose-down attitude. Faced with an altimeter spinning backwards, and thinking that they were in a nose-down attitude, the last thing on their minds would have been to push the nose down any further...

Sorry if this is a silly suggestion, but as a non-pilot I am struggling to understand how three pilots could not figure out that their plane was stalled.

Don't know anything about flying an Airbus or anything above 5700kg for that matter..so happy to be told to to poke off.
However, it's dark, turbulent and something frighteningly strange is happening to a 42 tonne aircraft that is causing a rapid descent. Maybe it just doesn't feel natural to take a deep breath and shove the joystick forwards..

The Ancient Greek writes:

I agree with this assessment. I think it nullifies the idea that there was a "startle" factor due to "bells and whistles". A professionally trained pilot is not startled for four minutes. A few seconds, yes; four minutes no.

The critical question that now needs to be answered. For essentially four minutes he rode the stick right into the ocean. Why? Something caused him to do that. Training? Confusion?

Another poster:

If they did not know the plane was stalled, why?

or

If they knew the plane was stalled and handled it wrong, why?

The report as it stands doesn't answer this questions (nor should it).

strake, you may be right ... but if the attitude reference system (attitude display) is still working, your primary scan first goes to attitude gyro/attitude reference/artificial horizon, and you set an attitude.

I would think that's pretty basic "unusual attitude" instrument flight training.

Two incidents worth reading in light of this report

L1011 Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 in 1972 - CRM

Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

B727 TWA Flight 841 in 1979 - Recovery from rapid uncontrolled rate of descent

TWA 727

Regarding the attitude - one would hope at least one of the pilots ignored his senses and trusted the instruments. It seems from the report that (from the lack of reference otherwise) all three ADIs (both PFDs and ISIS) were reading very similar values, so regarding reference to level flight, they shouldn't have had a problem.

Knowing the aircraft to be reasonably upright, but with a screaming altimeter, knowing you are over the ocean with nothing to hit, a pitch-over would seem a far better alternative to not trying stall recovery at all?

As was written above: maybe there was some conflict in data resulting in the pitch-up action?

We need the complete FDR data - too many questions, so few answers.

ECAM Actions.

Thing is we now know in hindsight that the altimeters and VSI were ( apparently) working correctly so full stall recovery is a "no brainer" to us, right? But the AF crew had already lost IAS and now the altimeters was winding down at a rate they'd probably ever seen in a simulator reset. OTOH the aircraft is rocking and rolling, buffeting, but in a vaguely sensible attitude and with full power applied...added to which they're being bombarded with compelling electronic warnings demanding immediate attention......

Human beings like you and me, not perfect, short of reliable information, overloaded, at saturation point and in some form of denial?

Northwest 705
 

Probably very similar:

Northwest 705 air crash

Regards,

GCGB

Did anyone spot an over-speed alert at any time (I could not) ?

If not I really can't understand their insistence to keep the nose up - there is no way they could not feel the stall.

Very perplexing...

Just to add - surely the aircraft isn't capable of maintaining attitude with the trim at +13 degrees if it is *not* stalled?

ECAM Actions.

Looks like the aircraft was held in the stall, for over 3 minutes; question is, why?
Fitting an AoA gauge seems like a good idea.
I await more info on whether the AH, VSI, altimeter etc were displaying correctly.
Do you airline types get taught/practise limited panel anymore?

I don't think vast numbers of hours help. My IF1 in the RAF was in wave activity in the Vale of York. Max rate climb selected and going down 1 minute, power off glide and going up the next minute - you just need an excellent instructor (mine was ex-CFS A1).

Official AF reaction to today's news -- the aircraft's instruments failed and the pilots reacted completely professionally.
Air France - Corporate : AF 447 - Air France

AF 447 - Air France’s reaction to the BEA’s information report
Friday 27 May 2011

On the eve of second anniversary of the AF447 tragedy, Air France and its staff are turning their thoughts to the families of the passengers and crew and wish to express their full solidarity.

The perserverance of the authorities, Airbus and Air France has led to the flight recorders and parts of the aircraft being found after a two-year search. The French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) is now able to reveal the sequence of events leading to the crash of flight AF447 from Rio to Paris on 1 June 2009.

This description of the facts therefore replaces the assumptions that have been made over the past two years.

It appears that the flight deck crew was monitoring the changing weather conditions and thus altered the flight path, that the initial problem was the failure of the speed probes which led to the disconnection of the autopilot and the loss of the associated piloting protection systems, and that the aircraft stalled at high altitude. It also appears that the flight captain quickly interrupted his rest period to regain the cockpit. The crew, made up of three skilled pilots, demonstrated a totally professional attitude and were committed to carrying out their task to the very end and Air France wishes to pay tribute to them.

All the data collected must now be analyzed. It will only be at the end of this complex task, which requires patience and precision, that the BEA will be able to establish the causes that led to the disaster.

We can already see that the authorities, the manufacturer and the airline have taken measures to avoid the repetition of such an accident.

Air France hopes that everyone has the patience to wait for the interim report that the BEA will publish in a few weeks, no doubt along with additional recommendations. The safety of the global air transport industry will be even stronger.

Questions regarding disintegration
 

Dear ppruners,

from early reports after the incident,
I remember indications of disintegration
of parts (tail) - from the location pattern
of the debris found.

If, in the middle of a heavy thunderstorm
with massive alternating +/- G forces
(updraft/downdraft, compare Northwest 705)
working on the airframe, what would you think
what the PF would notice if some tail parts
are gone?

(I'm only an "armchair pilot", sorry if the
question doesn't make sense.)

Thanks & regards

GCGB

It's called a mind-set, a good example of that is the pilots of a Boeing freighter who's pitoheads froze and the air speed started to increase so they pulled the nose up, the speed continued to increase so they pulled it up some more and some more again, by this time common sense should have been screaming at them that you cant just keep pulling the nose up and continue to speed up, eventually they pulled once to often and stalled with fatal results.

GC Graybeard

The Tail detachment was probably a function of the aircraft striking the ocean in a nose high attitude at a high rate of vertical speed ( 10,000fpm)

Chris VJ

No you do not use rudder to control roll in an airliner. The rudder pedals are, in effect, footrests apart from crosswind landings and engine failure. In fact, if you are in a stall the use of rudder will be a singularly bad idea as it may lead to a spin. A planned spin entry involves approaching the stall and inputting full aft stick and full rudder. The consequences of the incorrect use of rudder to correct roll were demonstrated when an airbus and its fin seperated over New York.

Of course if you fly air comat or aerobatics then rudder at slow speed to augment roll can be very usefull.

AoA indications valid
 

If you're level but descending at over 10,000ft/min (c 110kts) is a vane on the side of the fuselage going to give a meaningful AoA anyway?

If the VSI is buried in the floor and the altimeter is spinning faster than a fair ground ride, then I think measuring AoA is pointless!

Still, it seems they missed it.

ECAM Actions.

The stall warning is based on AoA so even with unreliable airspeed it will activate correctly. So the stall warning was telling them their AoA was too high. That indication was correct even if their airspeed indications weren't. Its also why you always honour a stall warning with unreliable airspeed.

The question of whether the pilots could 'feel' the descent of 10,000ft/min is of interest.

In theory one should certainly feel the initialising of the descent but if theory holds good then once you are established in a descent at a steady rate, whether 1,000 or 10,000 ft/min your 'bum' would feel only1G, you could be in descent, level or ascending flight. This effect might be heavily compounded by the wing rocking and buffeting. Pure speculation, of course, but it might be conceivable that after indications of instrument failure you might ride the aircraft all the way to the sea while still thinking you were at 30,000 ft. Dark, no visibility, no horizon, can't trust the Altimeter, AH or ASI?

Just thinking out loud.

Hi,

With provision that all the communications between pilots are not yet reported
From reading the BEA communication I notice that never the pilots communicate about a procedure to follow (a check list) in case of such event (unreliable airspeed)
At the time of the event Air France has a procedure for such event (and this procedure was revised sometime after the AF447 event)
I also notice that the captain come in the flight deck .. but nothing more about what he tell (he tell nothing ??? )

Why not?
I agree nobody would ever have done the flight testing etc. to calibrate the vane to two decimals accuracy at that AoA, but the vane output would still be meaningful, even if not terribly accurate.

CJ

I agree, without all the communication between the crew, and a statement that all the communications are given, what has been given may be someone's idea of a reasonable PR release: not intended to be misleading but not anticipating this depth of analysis.

So far there are no indications that the altimeter (hence VSI) failed (they get their data from the static ports, not the pitots).
Neither are there any mentions of the attitude reference system, hence AH (or standby AH), having failed.
"No horizon ?" Normal situation during instrument flight, at night or in cloud. That's why the "artificial horizon" was invented.....
Let's not confuse the story unnecessarily.

CJ

The fact of the matter is that there IS NO PROCEDURE for unreliable airspeed in the cruise. I fly the 319/320/321, so I am not referring to the 330 but given that they are very similar the guessing the procedures are similar. Airbus have a procedure with how to deal with it, and if you google it you will find it. Fact is, above 10,000 ft the procedure is 5 degrees pitch with CLB power. In heavy turbulence when the aircraft is pitching allover the place then you can forget about holding 5 degrees pitch!
Not to mention the fact that 5 degrees pitch with CLB power is certainly not the best thing to do with unreliable airspeed in the cruise. Most Airbus guys now have their own pitch/power settings memorised for this - only because of AF447, and before the accident the majority of guys would have said "well, I guess its 5 degrees with CLB power as technically that is what the QRH says". All of this is not forgetting that there still is NO procedure from Airbus, the procedure in the QRH is suited to unreliable airspeed much lower down.

For those who says "why didn't the Captain take control"? Well, given the aircraft may have been out of control by that point it must have been difficult in getting to the cockpit alone, let alone getting someone who is handling the situation (badly or not) out of their seat and you strapping in. He probably decided that the two people in the seats had the best idea of what was happening as they had seen all the evidence and he had entered later on.

Sorry but I think you got it wrong here...

The procedure on the 320 family says:

If the safe conduct of the flight is impacted :
-A/P and F/D off
-A/THR off
-Pitch thrust:
.Below Thrust Reduction altitude 15° Toga
.Above Thrust Reduction altitude 10° CLB.
.Above 10.000ft 5° CLB.
-Flaps Maintain.
-Speedbrake retract
-L/G up.
.When at or above MSA or circuit altitude level off for troubleshoot.

Therefore if it happens during cruise, and safe conduct of the flight is impacted you have to go for 5° and CLB, then level off, and go for the pitch power data from the checklist.

If instead the safe conduct of the flight is not impacted (which was definitely not the case for the AF) the memory items can be skipped and the pitch power data used to maintain the level.

I am not accusing the AF pilots involved of not having used the proper procedure (too little details have been released at this moment especially on the intensity of the turbulence ), I am just saying that the procedure for unreliable speed is clearly there..

Speevy

Fodder for us more thoughtful types:-
 

"The stall warning sounded twice in a row. The recorded parameters show a sharp fall from about 275 kt to 60 kt in the speed displayed on the left primary flight display (PFD), then a few moments later in the speed displayed on the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS)."
This is what I'd expected and earlier predicted here in this thread as being the "onset" (an eventual total pitot clog - see explanation at post 335 (page 17) on this thread ). The DFDR was of course recording exactly what the pilots were seeing but meanwhile the aircraft's autothrust had actually been increasing power to maintain that programmed speed (and as a result of the gradual ice-crystal pitot blockage, actually exceeding that programmed speed by a considerable margin, whilst headed towards Mach Crit). But what triggered the autopilot disconnect? Was it a Mach Crit encounter or was it that the autopilot couldn't hold the increasing elevator force gradient of a system-driven mis-set THS (hoz stabilizer)? Or was it the sudden total clog of the pitots (see hail formation "exponential" analogy at my previous post).

"At 2 h 10 min 51s, the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs. The recorded angle of attack, of around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight." Over time, as they cruised in the ice crystals of Cirrus cloud (a known "pitot heat capacity" anomaly for that mark of pitot tube), the gradually clogging pitot system resulted in the autothrust incrementally applying power to stop the "apparent" speed decay. Similarly, the auto-trim maintained the nose-up trim for that programmed speed - and the autopilot offset the elevator (via "fwd stick") to hold height - as the aircraft was actually flying faster than shown. When it reached its design pitch-holding limit (i.e. the max nose-down force gradient it could hold), the autopilot gave up, and the handling pilot now had an instant unalerted surprise handful of an aircraft in Direct Law with nearly full nose-up trim and near to full power. So did the DFDR faithfully record this or did the BEA just construe (and misrepresent) it as the pilot's aft sidestick input? i.e. in the absence of any better/more logical explanation?

When it comes to high speed protection, should this crew have received wrong airspeed info indicating a high speed situation, you have protection where, once Mmo + few kts has been exceeded, you will get an auto pitch-up to try and maintain Mmo + few knots, so should this happen at slow actual airspeed, it will not be too hard to see why the pilot may have continued to pull back and continue increasing the acft's pitch angle. But my theory was that they were actually at an initially higher speed than indicated. Here (most importantly) we have to consider that after their involuntary zoom climb (due trim), the static pressure changes would thereafter have had a considerable additive (and further confusing) effect upon the blocked pitot systems and the displayed airspeed/mach. i.e. ( "The speed displayed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees.")

"the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees" later saith the report. You have to close your eyes to this, because it's not anything those AF447 pilots would have known (i.e. no AoA display for them).

"By the time it reached the apex of the ensuing pitch-up and subsequent " bunt" (around 38,000ft), the aircraft was ACTUALLY entering into a deep stall with a forward speed of around 60kts and a high angle of attack...ultimately resulting in the 10,000ft +/minute Rate of descent at high AoA. But they'd initially responded correctly to the stall warning with TOGA power? - however that response was soon to change. Why? In Direct law, which they should now have been in, holding the stick back will maintain that stall. But why would the pilot do that back-stick thing? Perhaps they were attempting to attain level flight - and unaware that they were in Direct Law? But was there another reason and why did they then idle the TOGA thrust? Who knows for sure? But here's a clue. In the subsequent descent with static pressure increasing and the pitots still blocked?, even though the airplane was actually stalled (complete with stick-shaker) the indicated airspeed would be increasing alarmingly - courtesy of increasing static pressure. That's my guess - and it's anyways a physical fact, Been there and done that trick with frozen trapped water in the static lines (i.e. the opposite effect of trapped dynamic pitot pressure). There's also a report on the Irish Accident Board's site about a 747 on a test flight with uncapped static lines due maint error. It's an elucidating gaelic tale that shows just how confusing the pitot-static scenario can be. See below for how much a 1000feet of altitude change is worth in terms of additional "displayed knots". Ask any instrument technician. That's what I did. He'll demo it for you on his test-bench.

As somebody said: "All this will probably come down to crew composition, very high workload, in adverse weather conditions, having to manually hand-fly an aircraft which suddenly found itself in alternate law at high altitude due to spurious information being fed to not only the flight display computers, but also the flight control protection and guidance computers, simultaneously." Suddenly? Don't underestimate the power of surprise. Spurious info? Maybe, but when it's what you are taught to believe (your instruments), that's what you react and respond to. You see a high and increasing airspeed and you apply backstick to attempt to control it - and you idle the throttles..... but instead you are (unbeknownst to you) embedding yourself in a deep-stall condition. Will the stall warning cease once embedded in deep-stall at 40 degs AoA?. That's my guess. That they were non-plussed by developments is obvious from the limited dialogue. Even the captain was struck dumb by what he saw. No solution was obvious in the time available - as the airspeed was seen to be much more than just "adequate" (i.e. even high - and even higher as the static pressure increased inexorably upon descent) i.e. so how could they be stalled? Unthinkable - so it wasn't even considered. It was perhaps a meteorological phenomena?). They just ran fresh out of ideas. Freeze-framed twilight zone? Been there and done that too.

Someone also said (and theShadow said earlier in his 20 May post - and last year): "You are not only dealing with conflicting airspeed info, you are also presented with multiple spurious ECAM warnings and cautions which it is sometimes hard to ignore, also depending on the alternate law protection loss which itself can be further divided in two categories, or even direct law which would mean direct side-stick to flight control input without any load protection - leading to control overload." Isn't automation wonderful?

A pitot-static system's pneumatic airspeed data (the usable output product) relies wholly upon very accurate dynamic pressure and static (i.e. ambient atmospheric) pressure inputs - and the latter changes rapidly during a descent at 10,000fpm. No digitized sourcing of that info, it's all air pressure analogue. Falsify either one (via blockage or leak) and zoom or descend and the story will be ever more confusing. Birgenair and Air Peru 757's found that to be the case. For example, with a snap-frozen static pressure (at FZLVL) the airspeed indication will wind back from 250 knots to zero over as little as 3400 feet of climb at 250kts IAS. I think that the BEA is still trying to wrap their minds around that obscure fact here (Gallic and not Gaelic closed minds). They are also (possibly) assuming that the zoom was a result of pilot input and not an aerodynamic pitch-up..... i.e. as a result of (possibly) hitting Mach Crit with an A/P disconnect and a very nose-down trimmed horizontal stabilizer (@3 degs nose-up but increasing to 13 degs nose-up due to pilot's aft sidestick inputs after top of zoom climb). But do I actually think they hit Mach Crit? No, more likely it was the excessive elevator force gradient that kicked out the autopilot and kick-started the fatal zoom sequence..

Someone also said: "Direct law is there to give the pilot more direct control of the aircraft but it still has some protection to offer - BUT at the same time the protection on offer is only as good and accurate as the information provided to the computers involved. Much more info is needed before one can create a valid picture of what went wrong when it comes to the decisions the pilots made in the last few minutes of the flight." However the change in static pressure resulting from the zoom into ever more rarified air and the instinctive attempt to maintain level flight and use backstick to reduce the ever higher displayed airspeed indicated during the ensuing descent (subsequent to the zoom climb) are key factors dictating an inevitable entry into the unrecognized deep-stall condition. Additive to this was the dearth of info that they had to work with and little prior exposure to degraded flight control laws. And all this in night and in cloud.....

Confirmatory (for me anyway):
Did the pilot zoom climb the acft or was it caused by the automated mis-trimming in pitch? Perhaps this next statement in the report is a clue: [I]"The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs."[/I] Perhaps the left and right roll inputs were his insufficient attempts to get the nose to drop (airline pilots rarely use more than 30 degs angle of bank due to the pax sensitivities - and in an Airbus? Perish both the thought and possibility....). When you've got a stuck elevator, or an aircraft pitching up of its own volition due to a runaway elevator pitch-trim, that's the way to go (i.e. roll the beast onto its wingtip to get the nose to drop - and drop flap). Pity they didn't think of that during the Jan 2003 Beech 1900 stuck elevator take-off accident at Charlotte NC.(52 degs nose-up at 1200feet agl).

So having read all the above, please feel free to shoot it all down. But ultimately, whether it's right or it's wrong, you have to ask yourself: "Is the training to combat automation anomalies and its inherent malfunction complexities adequate?" As someone else said: "In alternate law - is the amount of warning signals inhibited to the bare minimum necessary to keep the tube flying? i.e. you don't need a warning that the lights in the aft toilets aren't working - while busy with a stalling conundrum...?" Note how quickly the situation described above can become completely and incomprehensibly unglued. The debate yet to come is going to be ponderous and inherently evasive. The AF447 crew were caught out by a little known pneumatics phenomenon and reacting understandably to what they saw. They died clueless as to their actual predicament but I cannot bring myself to blame them. As they said: "We have no valid indications". They were right. Man can easily be defeated by automation. It's a burgeoning and futuristic problem. I can't shame them for being cheated of life by a system that's too conscious of cost and inconsiderate of consequence. The engineers and designers? Well they live in Never Never Land. If only the twain should meet....

On another subject, my post SR-111 invention in 1998 of satellite-uplinked recorder data is back in the limelight and I hope, with a vengeance. Wish it wasn't. But if you want to familiarize, just Google Iridian/Roadshow. Like all similar solutions to the long-winded AF447 saga, it's not as if somebody somewhere wasn't prescient. If we could just stop those holes in the Swiss cheese from aligning...... or more easily and quickly determine why they did.
____________________________________________________________ ___
Edited to add an afterthought:
a. I've heard two different qualified opinions as to whether the acft would have ended up in Alternate Law or ultimately transitioned to Direct Law. ???

b. "Just 20s after the captain returned to the cockpit, said the BEA, the thrust levers were set to the 'idle' position, with the engines delivering 55% of N1." i.e. Did the captain, upon entering the flight-deck, see the high (but fraudulent) IAS on descent and order the throttles to idle, understandably assuming a LOC existed and everything/anything BUT a stalled condition. You tend to take in and believe what you see on a first scan..... when the matter is urgent.

Air France is a third world airline with 3 hull losses since 2000....


I fly 332/343/345 and if the ride looks bumpy ahead I pull out the QRH and get the required N1 settings. Simple!!!!!! Even better - fly away from the big red bits!!! And - as the skipper - I'll be on the flightdeck for the awkward parts, such as flying through the ITCZ or monsoonal weather!!!!

Never give the aeroplane to the co-jos when it's going to be rough! As skipper you are responsible for the safe operation of the aeroplane. You cannot do this from the bunk!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

A long but interesting input TheShadow!

However what ever happened to Pitch and power???

Speevy, that was my point. 5 degrees and CLB power is certainly not the thing to do at 39,000 in a 320 for example, yet it is the airbus procedure. The procedure was not developed for a cruise scenario... Hence it recommends 5 degrees with CLB power. Totally wrong thing to do, and if you don't believe me go and try it in the sim and see how long you stay above VLS when at max cruising level.

I read the report.
I read most of this discussion.

I don't understand.

There were cases where the pilots confused overspeed buffeting with a stall (or the other way round) which led to stick shakers and pushers. Is there no pusher on the AB? (maybe because the protections in normal law should always prevent a stall?) Hard to believe.

I was expecting to see an increasing IAS as they climbed (static decreasing while pitot remains constant as it is iced shut). The report does not mention that, so there was no indication of overspeed.

Stall recovery is the most basic thing that everybody who flies an airplane gets taught. I can't believe that they had three pilots that were unable to recognize the situation and do anything about it.

Very strage.

Soaringtheskies, go have a go in an Airbus sim (no stick pusher on Airbus), set it to nighttime with moderate/severe turbulence and then unreliable airspeed along with multiple ECAM messages - all at the same time. Given that you know what's coming you should be able to deal with it, however if you don't know it's coming then given those circumstances it certainly wouldn't be an easy job to deal with. People who say "fly the plane" are correct, but flying the plane won't necessarily be a concern if you don't realise there is an issue with it in the first place.

Edited to add: You can stall an Airbus, there have been several cases of people/mother nature doing it. Biggest problem with Airbus is it has lots of lovely protections (I.e. normal law) however whenever anything major goes wrong you lose them! Not a great thing to have happen and in many peoples opinions it is a serious design floor.

White Knight
I am reassured there are still decent hard working responsible pilots like you White Knight. I was lucky enough to be trained by your kind 30 plus years ago and have flown all sorts of small aircraft and helicopters across the world and still live to tell the tale. I know when to turn back.

There are pilots and there are systems managers and we all know what happens when Windows crashes.

In the case of this accident the captain chose to fly a direct route through bad weather and retire for the night.

A bit like the Titanic:ok:

But the Air Caraibes internal "Unreliable Airspeed" incident report (in somewhat similar circumstances to AF 447, though with significant differences, not least the end result) said [in French, mostly]:

Shame White Knight wasn't on AF447 this thread wouldn't exist :ugh:

Hi,

All on the deck .. battle station (not between ppruner posters but between AF and Airbus) :eek:

Le Figaro - France : AF447 : les avis d'Air France, de ses pilotes et d'Airbus

I let for you the translation work if needed.