Dear Bear, sorry for my late answer... Was busy with other things...
What I meant to say all the time with the faulty switch of state (imo), is that the "reminder" given by Direct Law to use manual trim could have given a hint to the pilots about their attitude... And therfor: act as a protection...
If you don´t have any indication about your speed... What is the best action?
TO/GA?
Well, I don´t think so...
For me would be IDLE and trim-out to best gliding speed (AoA). Then pay attention to the blaring show...
If that switch of state (Direct Law thus), would have helped the pilots or not is at this stage irrelevant (or not). I think everybody were very busy during this years trying to solve this event and I´m almost certain we all will do their best to improve whatever went wrong. And as I said before.. I hope pilot unions will be there to see that safety recommendations (as issued by BEA), are implemented in a very near future.

@ JcJeant
 

I believe that the stall warning has nothing to do with the mental problem of the PF : whatever the stall warning, the PF wanted to nose up and didn't understood why the PNF and the Capt asked him not to.

Abstract :

2 h 13 min 40
PF : But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while
Capt : No no no don’t climb
PNF : So go down


2 h 13 min 45
PNF : So give me the controls the controls to me
PF : Go ahead you have the controls we are still in TOGA eh

2 h 14 min 05 4,024 The pitch attitude is 14°.
Capt : Watch out you’re pitching up there
PNF : I’m pitching up?
PF : Well we need to we are at four thousand feet :ugh:

(My) Conclusion:

The Capt. didn't knew how much the PF was nosing up but knew he shouldh't have.

The PNF knew he had to nose down but his fear prevented him from a strong forward stick;

The PF has alway wanted to nose up except when asked by the PNF or the Captain not to do.

The actions of the PF have been unbelievable / misunderstood by PNF and the Captain.

Not only the PF has created the stall by a stupid nose up but he has commited "a crime" when at 02:11:39 he took the controll back from the PNF without annoucement and continued to nose up against PNF and Capt.

@DozyWannebe
 

Thank you :

Your observation is of such an importance regarding the debate with JcJeant and in France that I prefered to have you repeted it.

No Dozy, the PROBLEM has always been to know IF and HOW your partner makes flight control inputs.

But what do you know about flying a multi crew aircraft after all ... ?
Do you only know about flying ?

Sorry, but just getting tired of hearing you talking as even a 30000 hours retired Captain with 25 years on FBW Airbus would not dare to.

Please, let others talk if you don't know, or at least, let room for healthy reserve or doubt in your talking.

Not a pilot or even from the industry but I think the issue is that the stall warning activates if the plane gets close to a stall and STOPS once it is in the stall. So, imagine middle of the night, bad weather, some weird faults, suddenly stall warning. As someone pointed out (by whatever reason if I hit quote I do not get the quoted text) nose down gave stall warning, in nose up it stopped - not because the stall situation is gone but quite the opposite. If that is not confusing under normal circumstances how would it be in their particular situation...?

@JJFFC : I'm not saying I'm right, but I'm saying that there is certainly room for debate. This wouldn't be the first time that interested parties have used the press to push their case while only providing the details that supprt their side of the story...

CONF, we've been *well* aware of your position on non-backdriven sidesticks versus interconnected and/or backdriven yokes for over half a decade. I'm not saying your opinion is without merit - it has plenty, in a theoretical sense. But there are thousands of Airbus FBW pilots around the word that do not consider it a problem - this is not about *my* opinion, this is about *theirs*.

Given that we've had at least one similar incident where having an interconnected yoke made no difference whatsoever to the outcome (Birgenair), surely you must therefore consider that the theory which supports your personal preference may not necessarily be the solution in all cases?

Hi,

And those who maybe had a problem with are no more there for give theirs opinion ... sad ...
Only people alive can give theirs opinions

DWBirgenair was different, because the lower ranked FO knew what was happening, and was emotionally powerless to correct the Capt. . The FO could have overpowered Capt. by pushing harder on the yoke. Could he have done that with a joystick?

As for your argument that the 777 backdrive can fail: it's built to the same safety standards as the Cat IIIc autoland, i.e., 10 -(7?) probability of undetected failure.

http://i1088.photobucket.com/albums/...fdr-att-sw.png

2:10:12 - *bang*

2:11:55 - *bang*

2:12:08-10 - *bang*

2:12:28 - *bang*

2:12:33 - *bang*

2:12:40 - *bang

2:12:48 - *bang*

2:13:52 - *bang*

2:14:20 - *bang*

I rest my case.

OK, after reading the English version:

1 None of the pilots are even looking at the attitude indications OR

2 The PF is ignoring the stall warner because of the unreliable speeds, and

3 The PF is flying the stall warning / unreliable airspeed procedures for the Take-Off/Go-Around phase of flight, i.e. aiming for 15 degrees Nose-Up attitude, not the high altitude procedure.

Look at the stick input and pitch attitude after 2:11:00. The PF is trying to maintain 15 degrees pitch attitude. He states "I'm in TOGA".

At only one point, before 2:11:00 when the PNF insists, does the PF consistently apply Nose-Down controls. After that I think it's clear he's convinced they have a high speed situation because of the buffet, and thus completely fails to spot the stall.

I think it's possible that the PNF does think they are stalled when the Stall warner sounds at 2:10:51. The power comes up and he warns the PF about lateral stick. But the PNF either doesn't realize or doesn't see a problem with the PF trying to maintain 15 degrees NU.

No emergency procedures are verbally identified. No drills are done. No cross-checks of Attitude, or anything else, are called.

I'm not flying Air France again.

Thoughts on this theory anyone?

Microphone strikes wall
 

The PNF insisted 3 times for the PF to descend. Finally PF responds with confusion and finally appears to recognize he has climbed.


Watch your speed (PNF)
Watch your speed
Okay, okay okay I’m going back down (PF)
Stabilise
Yeah
Go back down
(no response recorded)
You’re at go back down
It’s going we’re going (back) down
I’ll put you in in A T T (*)…
We are in yeah we are in climb


IMHO the PF appears to not be aware of his own actions, was he in physiological shock/mentally impared?
I have to say that the informality of the response to the requests is startling. Perhaps something is lost in translation or culture? It's almost like the PF is getting irritated by the request to descend. It is incongruous with the gravity of the situation. It reminds me exactly of the response of a teenager when they are asked to clean their room!
No doubts, he is at the wrong flight level, stall warnings blaring so I would be looking for an immediate roger, descending back to FL350. Due to the gravity of the situation and after 3 failures to descend would it be reasonable to think PF is mentally impared/SS fail and take control?

Hi,

No .. you have a good feeling
This conversation between pilots seem's a extract of a bad Hollywood catastrophe movie .... with Laurel and Hardy

DW
are you saying that the nose ups did not cause the stall warning.
Are you trying to correlate stick inputs to warnings. Remember there is inertia to such a heavy close to max weight. This creates lags in response. The thin air at high altitude makes responses woolly compared with dense air close to the ground.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Fox3WheresMyBanana

OK, after reading the English version

---

The horizon (second) (PNF)

Quote:

---

2 The PF is ignoring the stall warner because of the unreliable speeds, and

---

Ok.

Quote:

---

3 The PF is flying the stall warning / unreliable airspeed procedures for the Take-Off/Go-Around phase of flight, i.e. aiming for 15 degrees Nose-Up attitude, not the high altitude procedure.

---

Good call.

Quote:

---

Look at the stick input and pitch attitude after 2:11:00. The PF is trying to maintain 15 degrees pitch attitude. He states "I'm in TOGA".

---

For me more curious is at the start AP disconnects and PF does aggressive stick back. Zoom climb begins. After 4 seconds the first brief stall warning occurs. It is largely ignored and they continue the climb to FL375. IMHO he PF was in shock and mentally impared by epinepherine surge.

Quote:

---

I think it's possible that the PNF does think they are stalled when the Stall warner sounds at 2:10:51. The power comes up and he warns the PF about lateral stick. But the PNF either doesn't realize or doesn't see a problem with the PF trying to maintain 15 degrees NU

---

Agree.

Quote:

---

No emergency procedures are verbally identified. No drills are done. No cross-checks of Attitude, or anything else, are called.

---

Agree.

A very strong and convincing scenario, Fox 3! I have often had similar thoughts about Colgan Air 3407 (the Buffalo NY crash). Both pilots unexplainably maintained their aircraft in a stalled condition during nighttime adverse wx, with unfamiliar a/s indications.

Flying the stall warning / unreliable airspeed procedures for the Take-Off/Go-Around phase of flight in a simulator, was probably their most practiced of the unreliable airspeed procedures. . .something to revert to when one’s head is locked and “tunneled” in a similar, but very different situation.

This incident certainly dramatizes that verbally identifying emergency procedures, drills, and cross-checks of attitude, ect, is of the utmost importance of such cockpit discipline.

stall, or high speed stall?
 

This aircraft was in a 'normal' not a high speed stall condition? (I'm wondering if the pilots could tell the difference, in the situation as they were experiencing it). http://www.pprune.org/flight-testing...eed-stall.html

Pilots pulling out of the BEA workgroup on AF447
 

Just heard on the french radio Europe 1 that the pilot representatives announced that they quit the BEA workgroup due to profound disagreement with the (quote) biased inquiry (end quote). This comes, of course, after it became public that the recommendation for Airbus to revise the stall warning logic was removed from the 3rd interim report right before publication.

For all the various reasons above, an aggregated international body should do this investigation based on the raw data. I feel there is no confidence in the French investigation , especially amogst pilots and the travelling public. This is one of the most important crash investigations in history, and it requires clearly independant and fearless conclusions...no consideration AT ALL should be given to extraneous commercial factors .

Artificial horizon, altitude and derived groundspeed were all clearly available.The stall clearly warned and occured at the top of a zoom climb of at least 5000 fpm, leaving a persisting unacceptable nose up attitude clearly visible on the AH and a persistent initial stall warning. Airbus has to reprogram the stall parameters to any value that might reliably assist in extreme attitudes. I suppose a clearly visible AoA indication might have helped.

Fox, I pretty much agree with you...PF was impaired, but there is a toxic soup of design (stall programming parameters, non visible control inputs, digital verses analogue style readouts, etc ), Emergency response to aicraft upset and spatial disorientation, major CRM flaws, weather, possible unkown effects of other parties in the cockpit (unclear), the deleterious effects of automation technology on clear thinking problem solving at first principles level......even possible cultural traits affecting handover proceedures and flight discipline.

My favourite training adage was, " when things get really bad, take your own pulse first"

On the Brittleness of Software « Dark Matter

The point, DW, is that the knife cuts both ways. I won't denigrate either your efforts or your opinions. I will say that there are plenty of experts (both pilots and in academia) that disagree with your assessment of the stall warning system and the way it behaved in this particular situation. If you are going to insist that your battery of experts deserves respect then you must also give respect to the battery of experts that disagree with you.