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Retired F4
My last post mentions nothing of any disintegration or even a dropped gerkin fork. It could easily have ended as BEA would have it. Without questions, the temptation is to let others think for us. As you say, BEA makes no conclusions. why not challenge each other with possibilities. I know, wait for the final report. I'm going Phishing, Phor Phlounder. bear |
@ bearfoil
sorry, my post didn´t adress you or your last post (we probably wrote them same time) at all, it was more a common question in view of recent posts. franzl |
Stall Warning
I wonder, did they mention stall warning, and why it was ignored? HN39 If so, the pitot tubes were already declared unreliable. With the computers deciding the pitot tubes were malfunctioning (unreliable air-speed) would they immediately trigger as stall warn just in case, or suppress the stall warning because they're 'not sure'? TK |
Stall Warning
TiberiusKirk;
I was asking about the content of a BBC program that I was unable to see.
Originally Posted by TiberiusKirk
What generates a stall warning? Is it low air-speed detected?
In alternate or direct law, the angle-of-attack protections are no longer available but a stall warning is triggered when the greatest of the valid angle-of-attack values exceeds a certain threshold. In clean configuration, this threshold depends, in particular, on the Mach value in such a way that it decreases when the Mach increases. It is the highest of the valid Mach values that is used to determine the threshold. If none of the three Mach values is valid, a Mach value close to zero is used. For example, it is of the order of 10° at Mach 0.3 and of 4° at Mach 0.8. HN39 |
I would hazard a guess that the stall protection will be based on alpha provided by the AoA vanes to the Adirs.The QRH states that with a triple ADIRS failure stall warning is lost.The QRH continues by requiring use of the standby altimeter/ASI but if these are unreliable as well you are rapidly into unreliable airspeed territory which the x-list fails to mention!This x-list does appear next in the QRH.
The x-list for unreliable airspeed is quite long and initially requires a number of memory items.Pitch and power settings for level flight do not appear until the fourth page. Did anybody else notice the sim in the BBC programme was an A320? |
Originally Posted by HazelNuts39
(Post 5726765)
...The angle of attack is obtained from AoA vanes located on the nose of the airplane.
HN39 Would still have pitch from gyros? |
Attitude plus power equals performance.
Never forget the basics. |
tubby linton;
Did anybody else notice the sim in the BBC programme was an A320? mm43 |
Originally Posted by Wilyflier
Can any one equate the design strength of the VS with the max possible deceleration "G" in any sort of flat ditching, and the forward "G" required to permit a fin and rudder to rip clean off its fittings?
I have no idea though, what decel 'g' in a flat ditching situation would fail the fin as suggested by the BEA report... other than more than 3g |
Originally Posted by HazelNuts39
(Post 5725316)
In your account of the BBC documentary on AF447:
I wonder, did they mention stall warning, and why it was ignored? HN39 No mention of stall warning specifically. I can imagine it would be quite easy to ignore stall warning if you already believe the plane doesn't have a clue how fast it's going anymore. The BBC had limited time, to go into everything, particularly when trying to get in as much dramatic commentary as possible... :) They may well have filmed discussion on stall warning and then cut it. There was very little on the VS also - basically taken as read the BEA conclusion that it was still attached at impact. There's probably enough material on the VS on this thread to make an hours television just on that subject - however the interested audience would then be a bit more limited! :8 Not a bad program at all (certainly not full of hype or innaccuracies), but equally it doesn't bring anything new if you've already read this thread (for instance). |
ACARS transmitted
Hello mm43,
Originally Posted by mm43
In a reply to Bearfoil you wrote:- Quote:
I never read something about that. Reports are saying that all ACARS transmitted by AF447 were received. I think that Bear is referring to the following detail from page 36 (English version) of the BEA Interim Report No.2. The PRIM 1 and SEC 1 faults below are possibilities, but the MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR2 would have been sent (if possible to do so). F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT (2 h 13) This message indicates that FCPC1 (PRIM 1) has stopped functioning. This shutdown may have been commanded or be the result of a failure. In the absence of an associated fault message, it is not possible to command a shutdown. However, a fault message that had not had sufficient time to be transmitted can not be excluded. Indeed, this message was received at 2 h 13 min 45 and the last message at 2 h 14 min 26, whereas the fault message could have appeared up until 2 h 14 min 45. F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT (2 h 13) This message indicates that FCSC1 (SEC 1) has stopped functioning. This shutdown may have been commanded or be the result of a failure. In the absence of an associated fault message, it is not possible to command a shutdown. However, a fault message that had not had sufficient time to be transmitted can not be excluded. Indeed, this message was received at2 h 13 min 51 and the last message at 2 h 14 min 26, whereas the fault message could have appeared up until 2 h 14 min 51. MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR2 (2 h 14) This message was received at 2 h 14 min 14 and a class 2 fault message should have been received between 2 h 15 min 00 and 2 h 15 min 14. All cases discussed above are linked to ACARS sequences interrupted which relevant part missing were actually NOT sent by the systems but which fault msg had not reached their time limit before being possibly triggered. On the other hand, Hydraulics faults messages are completely missing and it is consequently possible to point out that no hydraulic fault occured between 02.10 and ~02.14. If one hydraulic fault ever occured without being tansmitted, it would be at the very very end when ACARS were shut down. Then, if one want to explain an upset between 02.10-02.14 with problems triggering hydraulic faults, he should be able to explain why it would take 4, 3, 2 or 1 minute for such an ACARS to be sent and to verify if such a case is possible, which is not. My point was that investigation pointed that all ACARS sent by AF447 were received. There was no imaginatory sent ACARS missing as Bearfoil was suggesting and possible delays for such hard fault are only in the order of few seconds. S~ Olivier |
Icing conditions
Originally Posted by Loose rivets;#1306
The program gave a mini-course on supercooled water and pitot heads, but said little or nothing about airframe icing while encountering the phenomenon.
Severe icing from supercooled droplets can be astonishingly sudden, and flying an aircraft in turbulence, with the added burden of ice, could be one reason the crew had difficulty in staying inside the envelope. ... the presence of super cooled water at FL350 is not very probable and would necessarily have been limited to small quantities. It seems that the relatively recent icing problem at high altitudes with pitots (and perhaps also engines) is not caused by liquid water but by fine ice particles which present no particular problem for the airframe. From BEA report no.2: Examination of reported UAS events in cruise has shown that the majority of them occurred outside of the envelope defined in Appendix C. In fact, the certification criteria are not representative of the conditions that are really encountered at high altitude, for example with regard to temperatures. In addition, it appears that some elements, such as the size of the ice crystals within cloud masses, are little known and that it is consequently difficult to evaluate the effect that they may have on some equipment, in particular the Pitot probes. In this context, the tests aimed at the validation of this equipment do not appear to be well-adapted to flights at high altitude. |
BBC Video
Although I am a hard defender of the need for commercial pilots to keep proficient and skilled in manual flying, it was sad to see that the "investigators" and "experts" interviewed by BBC, have passed to the general public, the idea that the Air France pilots were unable to recover from stall, because they were not trained (and not used to fly manually)...
To compare the ability of that military pilot, to recover from stall, without mentioning that there was a huge difference between doing it in a flight simulator, with available speed information, and trying to recover a stalled heavy bird without speed info, is intellectually dishonest. := That colonel has lost almost half of his altitude to recover from stall. I'd love to see him talking, after a couple of attempts in a heavy jet, with almost 5 tons of fuel in the trim tank and without proper speed read-outs, in turbulence and dark... |
BBC Programme
One thing that was never mentioned was the supposed location of the Captain, not on the flight deck !
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BBC docu
Yes I noticed too, it was two first officers. Was that an intentional supposition?
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Humble SLF question here.
It's been suggested that digital displays are hard to read if everything is vibrating in extreme turbulence. If the conditions are that rough, how easy is it to actually get your fingers onto a button or dial to change settings? Is it easier to have throttles to physically hold onto while you're trying to change engine settings, than tweak a smallish dial? If these are dumb questions, I apologise. I'm just wondering if this kind of situation has been factored into Airbus design? |
overthewing,
I think you have already guessed the correct answer. Other than a short play in the simulator, I haven't flown the 'Bus but with Boeings, one would also normally make selections via the Mode Control Panel or Flight Management System keyboard. In moderate turbulence, on occasion, I've had to use both hands to make selections, one to steady the other. Turbulence also makes instrument interpretation a little more difficult. IF those guys flew into a Cb then, clearly, things would be a deal worse than I've described. Over my aviation career, even mechanical instruments became smaller in order to fit more onto a finite panel space. If I had to make a choice between 1980s mechanical instruments and a glass cockpit, I'd have to say that maintaining situational awareness is much easier with glass. Perhaps someone with a few thousand hours on each of Airbus and Boeing could comment further. (or give the posting number if it's been mentioned already :O ) |
FBW. It is not "state of the art", it is old. Likewise, it is dependable. No authority would allow skimping on Stall Recovery training without unquestionable confidence in it. When I fly, I yank the straps tight, just short of pain. As a student, a defective seat rail slid me back full on take off. Luckily I am tall, and didn't need to squirm forward while flying solo at launch.
Throttle manipulation? Panel reads? Bouncing about when called upon to start reading a book through page four to find out life saving instructions isn't old, it is stupid. Likewise, when a specific throttle position is do or die, and you can't scratch your ass let alone smoothly caress the power, something is terribly wrong. Look for Voice recognition commands to the controls in the future. ACARS is a maintenance option, something to cut the costs for big carriers. It is not intended to substitute for FDR. It logs and sends information so the Mx crew at the next shop can prioritize their work and have a lead on important parts. Just because a message wasn't received certainly does not mean it was not sent. It takes the pilots out of the Mx equation as well, someone whose input will be included at the next stop. I think the VS failed laterally while in flight, as a result of the fractures seen in the mountings in BEA's photography. This does NOT mean a failure of hydraulics, necessarily. My estimate of the lateral play in this control is 1-2 feet at the tip, post fracture. Obviously, if the VS failed flat (the photography does not show this), it would have been lost. So the cracks in the female bracket (tower) allow dangerous play, but suggest no loss (departure) of the VS/Rudder in flight. Some combination of lateral rods, remaining integrity of the lugs, and lack of overwhelming deflection argue that the VS was hobbled, not missing. At impact? Severely compromised lateral strength and a weakened bed may not have required much more than 2-3 g's for forward separation at water entry, (impact). A sharp pilot might read lack of crisp yaw control as a breaking or broken Stabilizer or Rudder, and laid off, or tried spoilers? Perhaps asym thrust for yaw control? Or was it RTLU at ~8 +/- ? bear |
Originally Posted by bearfoil
(Post 5728561)
Look for Voice recognition commands to the controls in the future.
But I DO wonder how your system would respond to ... "Oh, feckin hell... now why did it do THAT?" "So sorry Sir, error 404" , maybe? CJ |
"......I can't do that, Dave......."
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voice controls
Nice one, bear. But I DO wonder how your system would respond to ... "Oh, feckin hell... now why did it do THAT?" Interestingly enough the more technical and complicated the subject the better voice recognition performs, one of the first commercially succesfull aplicatiosn was medical notes. Of course being better than doctors handwriting is not all that difficult. |
The BBC program commented that with lack of airspeed information a setting of throttle to (75%) thrust and the elevator to (15) degrees would maintain safe speed.
(Forgive me if I have the figures wrong, someone give correct figures for airbus) They claim that the crew should have set these parameters fairly quickly. These settings are obviously right to MAINTAIN straight and level flight but would the same settings get an aircraft BACK to level flight from a near stalled or just after stalled position i.e. nose down and possibly accelerating? |
As it's one year to the day since this accident, I wonder if we'll be any closer to an answer in another year.
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Who in their right mind would build a aeroplane where the power changes without the visual cue to the pilots of the throttles moving in response to this power change ?
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Hi,
Who in their right mind would build a aeroplane |
I cant quite believe it
Originally Posted by Wilyflier;#1312
Can any one equate the design strength of the VS with the max possible deceleration "G" in any sort of flat ditching, and the forward "G" required to permit a fin and rudder to rip clean off its fittings?
Just a crude layman’s attempt to relate aerodynamics, structural strength, and crash deceleration: Aerodynamic load. The area of the VT is estimated as 44 m^2, and the max. rudder angle is 35 degrees up to 150 kt CAS. Assuming cL=2, the sideforce on the vertical tail is 30 t. Vertical loads on VS attachments. If the VS bending moment is distributed equally over the six attachments, each receives a vertical load of 44 t, tensile on one side, and compressive on the other. Inertial load compatible with attachment strength. The forward inertia force results in a vertical pull force on the two aft attachments. A pull force of 2*44 t corresponds to 73 t at the c. of g. of the vertical tail surfaces. In his post #1116 (p.56) “cc45” gives the VT a mass of 1800 kg, resulting in an acceleration of 41 g. Graphic: A ‘back-of-the-envelope’ sketch illustrating the above is available here: https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0B0C...MmZhNDI4&hl=fr |
NTSB'ear "theory"
Hello Bear,
In summary, as nothing will change your point anyway, I'll consider that you are either a so damn good expert capable of dismissing field investigation work by looking at a couple of pictures and telling us they are totally incompetent about this matter, either that you are stretching all evidences in order to fit your pre-conceived theory already made before a single piece of this aircraft was actually recovered.
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
ACARS is a maintenance option, .. Just because a message wasn't received certainly does not mean it was not sent.
Originally Posted by BEA 2nd interim report
1.16.2.4.3. Interruption of the messages
The last ACARS message was received at 2 h 14 min 26. The traces of the communications at the level of the satellite show that the ACARS acknowledgement from the ground was effectively received by the aircraft. No trace of any attempted communication by the aircraft with the ground was then recorded, although there was still at least one message to be transmitted (see above). In absolute terms, there are several reasons that could explain why communications stopped. ¤ no message to be transmitted: as explained above, the “MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR2” message should have been followed, one minute later, by the transmission of a class 2 fault message. The aircraft therefore had, at 2 h 15 min 14 at the latest, one message to be transmitted. ¤ loss of one or more system(s) essential for the generation and routing of messages in the aircraft: • ATSU / SDU / antenna: none of the maintenance messages sent is related in any way whatsoever with the functioning of these systems. A malfunction of this type should have occurred after the transmission of the last message and without forewarning. • loss of electrical power supply: this would imply the simultaneous loss of the two main sources of electrical power generation. ¤ loss of satellite communication: • loss of data during transmission: the satellite’s quality follow-up does not show any malfunction in the time slot concerned. • loss of contact between the aircraft and the satellite: • • unusual attitudes: given the relative position of the satellite with respect to the aircraft and the aircraft’s tracking capability, the antenna would have to be masked by the aircraft’s fuselage or wings. Examination of the debris showed that the aircraft hit the water with a bank angle close to zero and a positive pitch angle. The aircraft would therefore have been able, in the last seconds at least, to transmit an ACARS message. • • end of the flight between 2 h 14 min 26 and 2 h 15 min 14.
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
I think the VS failed laterally while in flight, as a result of the fractures seen in the mountings in BEA's photography. This does NOT mean a failure of hydraulics, necessarily.
Airbus is so dumb as it does not want to bother pilots/maintenance when some control surface is falling from the sky, like if they needed it for something... And so, the BEA is still bullying us... Where are the evidences (so obvious) of lateral failures here:
Originally Posted by BEA 2nd interim report
1.12.3.5.2 General examination of the vertical stabilizer
The vertical stabilizer was in generally good condition. The damage observed on the side panels and on the rudder was largely due to the recovery and transport operations. The damage due to separation from the fuselage was essentially located at the root of the vertical stabiliser. The vertical stabilizer separated from the fuselage at the level of the three attachments: • the forward attachment (male and female lugs) and part of the leading edge are missing; • the centre and aft attachments are present: male and female lugs and parts of the fuselage frames (frames 84, 85, 86 and 87). 1.12.3.5.3 Examination of the fin structure Rib 1 had almost completely disappeared. Rib 2 was bent upwards with a right-left symmetry. The front of the fin showed signs of symmetrical compression damage: • failure of the leading edge right- and left-hand panels • longitudinal cracking of the leading edge stiffener • HF antenna support (attached to the forward spar): failure of the lower part, crumpling indicating bottom-upwards compression loads 1.12.3.5.4 Examination of the vertical stabiliser – rudder attachments The vertical load pick-up arm in the rudder’s hinge axis (arm 36 g) broke at the level of the attachment lug on the rudder side. The size of this arm is calculated to withstand a maximum load of 120,000 N, corresponding to a relative acceleration of 36 g of the rudder in relation to the vertical stabilizer. Shear cracks, along a top-down axis, can also be seen on the rudder hinge arm attachment fittings close to arm 36 g. These observations indicate that the vertical stabiliser was subjected to a load greater than 120,000 N in the rudder’s hinge axis. 1.12.3.5.5 Examination of the Rudder Travel Limiter Unit (RTLU) The RTLU was found in its place in the fin and disassembled. An examination was performed at the manufacturer’s and showed that it would allow travel of the rudder measured as 7.9° +/- 0.1°. As an example, at FL350, this travel is obtained for Mach 0.8 +/- 0.004, corresponding to a CAS of 272 +/- 2 kt. Note: the maximum travel of the rudder is calculated in relation to the airplane confi guration, its speed and its Mach number. This travel can be commanded between 4 degrees and 35 degrees. 1.12.3.5.6 Examination of the fuselage parts (remains of the skin, frames and web frames) The fuselage was sheared along the frames and centre and aft attachment lugs by loads applied bottom-upwards. The part of frame 87 that can be seen had undergone S-shaped deformation: the left-hand side forwards, and the right-hand side backwards. The horizontal stabiliser actuator supports were deformed and broke in a backwards movement from the front. These observations indicate a backwards movement of the trimmable horizontal stabiliser. Frames 84 and 85 were pushed in backwards in the middle. The deformations observed on the rudder control rod are consistent with this indentation. The deformations of the frames were probably the consequence of the water braking the aircraft’s forward movement. 1.12.3.5.7 Examination of the fin-to-fuselage attachments The centre attachment had pivoted backwards with the parts of the frames and web frames that were attached to it. The aft attachment had pivoted forwards with the parts of the frames and web frames that were attached to it. The aft attachment lugs (male on the fin and female on the airframe) had marks indicating a backwards movement of frames 86 and 87 as a whole. The centre and aft lateral load pick-up rods showed damage that was consistent with this backwards pivoting of frames 84 to 87: • tensile failure of the centre spar at the level of the centre rod attachments; • compression failure of the aft spar at the level of the aft rod attachments and failure of the left-hand rod by buckling. |
sb_sfo mentioned: As it's one year to the day since this accident, I wonder if we'll be any closer to an answer in another year. - Crashed into the Indian Ocean near Mauritius on 28 November 1987 - Abandoned the search on 8 January 1988 when the pingers were known to have stopped transmitting - On January 6, 1989, the cockpit voice recorder was salvaged successfully from record depth of 4,900 metres (16,100 ft), but the flight data recorder was never found. I would imagine that the sonar could be a lot better 20 years later, nearly everything else it. So why not more progress on af477? I found this a good read. Blank Design page I read it a while back and I recall thinking it might be somewhat self-congratulory however I was convinced overall. |
BBC AF447 documentary June 2010 available on the web
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Where?
The upset occurred within seconds of the ACARS position report at 0210 (02:10:10 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF). Minutes later, the aircraft reported that cabin pressure couldn't keep up with ambient (02:14:26 - .1/WRN/WN0906010214 213100206ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED). Assume the aircraft was (and had been) falling fast. But not so fast as to exceed V-tears-itself-apart: impacted water intact at high vertical speed in line of flight.
In the earlier thread there was quite a bit of discussion about stalls and spins in an A330. Could a slow, flat spin have occurred after being upset and stalling at altitude? Could the pilot(s) have been working their way out of the spin with inventive ailerons and flaps, elevators and spoilers, getting the nose down and rotation stopped, airflow and nose-up AOA back, finally inching out of dive towards a level flight, degree by degree, deep into g forces. "Stand on the opposite rudder and then pump the elevator forward and hold it," my CFI explained from the right seat many years ago. I'm pretty sure this NASA Standard spin recovery procedure (PARE) wouldn't work in rudder-limited Alt2 law... Don't know that control of AF447 was ever regained following the initial upset. Spin testing of commercial aircraft not part of the certification process nor part of training, as far as I know. Possibly a case of "unrecoverable spin mode" where "there is no guarantee that spin recovery can be effected beyond the first turn in a spin." From the point of upset, and knowing/assuming the aircraft was in the water in less than five minutes, you can draw concentric circles showing the farthest the aircraft might have flown in a straight line at various averaged ground speeds. Thus in five minutes, the aircraft could have traveled as far as 24.9 nautical miles at an averaged ground speed of 300 knots. Could have traveled farther at a constant 400 knots. But forward travel not likely, with the aircraft out of control. See diagram. More likely, all went bad and vertical very quickly. Shedding velocity and motion along the track, unusual attitudes, rapid descent (in a spin?), dark, stormy... Draw that circle maybe ten or fifteen nautical miles radius from the Last Known Position. BEA have not searched there yet. http://i958.photobucket.com/albums/a...shDistance.jpg GB |
Anyone who wants to use Speech Recognition in cockpit is nuts!
Originally Posted by bearfoil http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...s/viewpost.gif Look for Voice recognition commands to the controls in the future. I can categorically state that no one reading this forum would want speech recognition controlling anything at all flight critical. For one thing, any accent is likely to break the recognition completely or at best reduce the word-recognition success rates to pitiful numbers, and secondly stressed, faster speech results in the same reduction in accuracy. I have previously worked on cockpit speech control control systems for aircraft such as the Eurofighter and in that case only non-flight critical systems were capable of speech control. "I'm sorry Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that" :8 - GY |
Height loss
The BBC programme had a military pilot fly a full simulator with a 'commercial jet' profile. Lost 19000 feet in less than 50 seconds and was of the opinion that unless you had been trained in stall recovery the chances of successful outcome were low. From what I have read elsewhere on this thread the chance of significant structural damage following a stall are high. The BBC hedged its bets on this and went with the BEA report, citing the radome and VS as evidence that the aircraft was structurally intact on impact. The programme was quite sympathetic to the crew I felt and was fair to the extent that it didn't pretend to have the final answer or paper over inconclusive/conflicting evidence.
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Stall
Originally Posted by Mr Optimistic;
From what I have read elsewhere on this thread the chance of significant structural damage following a stall are high.
EDIT:: Stalls are demonstrated from various altitudes, if I remember correctly, from 5000 ft upwards. I heard the BBC person say that a stall is catastrophic, which is somewhat exaggerated. The colonel was clearly hired to demonstrate just that, and made an exciting show of it. HN39 |
I think she didn't spin. Besides the constant com via ACARS, the Vertical Stabilizer could not have sustained that load. A spin would involve too much immediate roll to deal with as well. Level the wings (or at least center the ailerons), stomp the Rudder, and PUSH to break the Stall. 150 tons; wouldn't have entered a spin or recovered if it had. This is what the "Intact at Impact" suggests, deliberately or parenthetically. If the Elevator was used in this fashion, and failed (separated), it would have been "Up".
The same way as the water would have failed it. The airframe was yawing left at impact, and flat, (minor NU), with a left wing low. (BEA). Large Vertical velocity (vertical acceleration at impact). What does that say? If nothing else, it means it was falling, fast, ie, losing altitude at a rapid rate. If she began her descent in the deep vertical, and finished the same way, there isn't much forward progress to send the searchers 70 miles out. (Great Bear). bear |
bearfoil I think she didn't spin. Besides the constant com via ACARS, the Vertical Stabilizer could not have sustained that load. A spin would involve too much immediate roll to deal with as well. In a spin there must not be a lot of load on the VS. In a spin there is a corksqrew flightpath with simultaneous yaw, roll and turn and high descent rate. The uneven stalled wings will produce the yaw, the following load on the VS will cause the rolll, both together keep the system turning. The forces are not hitting it broadside, to tell it simple it is the only part still aerodynamically effective. The load is only higher during entry and recovery. It is also noticable in the cockpit (have done spins myself in T-37 Trainer), the spin itself is not that uncomfortable, the entry and exit is. franzl |
bank
Originally Posted by bearfoil
The airframe was yawing left at impact, and flat, (minor NU), with a left wing low. (BEA).
As expected, you would respond to my casual remark. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to explain.
Originally Posted by BEA's no.1
The distortions of the frames showed that they broke during a forward motion with a slight twisting component towards the left.
HN39 |
Retired F4
The "load" I meant to be the load to stop the spin with opposite Rudder. Ruddering opposite the yaw caused the failure in AA587. (Allegedly).:ouch: If in RTLU at 4 degree limit, will that accomplish recovery? Enough? HazelNuts39 I remembered the first report as left wing low, yawing left. Wrong? This computer does not have BEA reports. thanks, bear |
Is there a recovery procedure with full rudder opposite the turning direction of the spin for airbus?
We had a saying that rudder brings you into spin, but not aut of it. As mentioned before, i didn´t fly it in heavies, we had to unload to the max extent and apply full aileron in the direction of the spin / turnneedle and keep the rudder neutral. When the aircraft unloaded, rudder and ailerons had to be kept at neutral antil flying speed was achieved. The force on leaving a spin is not the sudden stop of turning (because it doesn´t happen that fast), it is the sudden unloading when spin recovery procedure is successful. But again, my expieience is not on heavies. franzl |
@RetiredF4
It was stated in earlier posts that Airbus test pilots have drag chutes to deploy when testing, can't find the reference but AF 447 – What The Crew Did … Maybe Dark Matter states 10. A hazard of large aircraft design is that they can become inertially locked in a developed spin and are unrecoverable without a drag chute, if at all. In your scenario surely South or South East of last position is possible? The flightpath to Tasil was well searched by SAR. Recent searches went right up to the 40NM limit North/ North West, ignoring debris field drift evidence. Why? |
mm43 or takata may have the exact coordinates for the two search boxes flown on June 1, but eyeballing the graphic, it would seem that the search that day covered an area about 20 NM to the left of the track, from the last reported position halfway to Tasil. It is hard to believe that if the plane had impacted within this grid, that evidence of the impact would have been missed. The first bodies and wreckage were recovered on June 6 at about 30 deg 30' N, 3 deg 30' W; an area, where some of which was probably within the search grid flown on June 1.
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