Thanks, CONF_iture and mm43, for the schematics.

Yes, they both confirm that Spoilers 1 perform as Speedbrakes as well as Ground Spoilers − clearly disproving my contrary suggestion. Sorry if I put the cat among the pigeons, but we now have some useful extra material to refer to. (In the cockpit, if selected, the F/CTL page of ECAM would clearly show this during Speedbrake operation.) It seems the air-braking capability of this A330/340 wing is quite powerful.

Chris

Bearfoil,

the flipping over of the Spoiler is an interesting theory.
However, in that case I would expect upward bending / buckling of the trailing edge.
You would neet a fixed point around which the spoiler would create a lever to tear off the actuator. That would have to be the trailing edge.
Hiowever in the pictures, the trailing edge looks pristine compared to the rest of the device.

Hello,
What precipitated the loss of the lateral control [the VS] seems to be impact with water.
At least, there is no clue that it happened between 02.10 and 02.14. Such a loss would trigger critical Hydraulics faults and all the relevant ACARS are missing. As none were received, it may be reasonably pointed that VS was not separated or badly damaged until ACARS stopped.
What happened later is still unknown but in flight separation would have certainly caused another kind of impact that what the investigation described. Now, one may want to be convinced that the BEA is bullying everybody but it would have to be done in collusion with NTSB and other bureaus working with it.
S~
Olivier

henra

The trailing edges are in no way pristine. They (corners) have failed down, the entire trailing edge has folded backward (from overloading), and the leading edge has failed from the middle (as a result of the hinges popping loose. At this point, all the airstream needs is a "peek" underneath, and the game is over The airflow is directed under the popped leading eedge, and fills the unprotected bottom surface with extremely energetic air. Meanwhile, the spill from the trailing edge has gotten mixed with other symmetrical spill and creates a local tornado of randomly blended vortices.

It is this folding of the panel back that precipitates failure, as it puts an enormous load on the center hinges, those in front of the actuator. The next stage is a rocking back and forth of the panel alternately loading either trailing corner. It is this undesigned for load that attacks the unengineered for weaknesses of the a/c that push the otherwise capable airframe into uncharted regions. Using an additional actuator might be one approach; bear in mind, this a/c is capable for all use as intended, it is not some exotic fighter that carries a single occupant. Aviation has categories and the 330 is a well made machine.

I think it is clear that the spoilers were deployed, and that some air loads were beyond design. As for the Flaps, they are inordinately robust as designed, but they were not meant to be a stand-in Hull for a water landing.I do think they separated, however, and if the Spoilers did not shear off in flight, they may well have been taken off with the Trailing edge of the wings.

takata

bonjour. I think no one is bullying anyone. A different point of view is not aggression. ACARS had one message left to send, as we know, there is that delay in transmission. You speak of loss of Lateral control, but all that has been shown is Lateral failure of the VS mounts. When the mounts broke and when or if the VS was lost in flight has not been established. Just as the spoilers were deployed as a result of some effort to gain stable flight, (an opinion), the VS may have stayed on.

It also may have separated. I have a theory as to what occurred, and it is based on what is publicly known.

I do know what happens to control surfaces when their mounts are broken. After mount failure, there is a lack of direct response, and depending on circumstances, control is compromised in vibration, loss of rigidity, and ever increasing play. It is this play that needs to be handled with great care. Just as more control is desired, there is degraded performance, and the temptation is to regain the control provided by increasing input. It is a cycle that has befallen uncounted aircraft

au demain,

bear

Impact Load on spoiler
 

If the aircraft impacted the sea more or less wings level with significant downward speed, is it that clear how the wing structure would respond dynamically (flexing) and the consequential loads that would have been imparted to the spoiler, actuator and supporting structures ? Add in a bit of roll with one wing impacting first and the analysis gets even more complex. Think I'd want an FE model before I tried to assess the remains.

Greetings
What about the Engines, dont you think they will touch the water first and subsequently take the maximum load :confused:

Program on BBC 2 now in the UK if anyone is interested

"Lost : The mystery of Flight 447"

First thing they're doing on the BBC programme is eliminating the possibility of in-flight break-up.

Did the production team read the interim reports? Would have saved them the effort.

For the "creative" team doing the "production", facts are irrelevant. It's audience and sponsor appeal that supports their lifestyle.

So...nothing new, then.

Just a recap of the same theories. I like the way the in-house investigation 'discovered' things which the BEA publicly listed months ago.

"Our independent team believes . . . ."
May as well believe most of you lot :) :ok:

Bearfoil;

I found another image showing the topside of the spoiler. It clearly shows that the damage caused was puncture pressure from the underside. Note the neat rows of holes where the actuator attachment pad bolts have been dragged through. The other damage is self explanatory.

http://i47.tinypic.com/2yl19tw.jpg

However, when referring to the BEA Interim Report, the caption associated with their published image - see Post #1253 doesn't make sense. It says, "Lower surface of left-hand spoiler No.1, with a piece of the fitting attaching spoiler No.5 to the wing aft spar: failures due to the bottom upward loads on the spoiler".

From my perspective, if it was the right-hand spoiler No.6, then "with a piece of fitting attaching spoiler No.5 to the wing aft spar" would make sense. Any comments?

Starboard Nos.2 and 3 in ground mode, showing fittings.

http://i45.tinypic.com/5bqmaf.jpg

mm43

I'd like to congratulate the bbc for a very good program. The media rightly comes in for a lot of stick on this forum for sensationalist rubbish it normally produces but this was well researched, accurate and non sensationalist. As some say maybe not ground breaking news but the general public probably haven't read the bea's report.

Yet again, it seems that basic flying skills were not sufficient to mitigate an accident on a highly automated aircraft after a series of failures - failure to avoid the storm and failure of the pitot static heat to keep the probes de-iced.

BBC2 prog. wasn't as bad as it could have been....
 

Yes much has been said before and by the expert reports. However, their mention of previous Pitot failure incident reports and how some other A330/340 crews took up to 60 secs to apply the 5 deg pitch and greater manual thrust (point and power) technique is still quite astonishing.

I agree - the documentary was unremarkable, but welcomely unsensationalist.

One thing I find truly remarkable was the chief pilot's statement that transport pilots nowadays don't undergo stall training. Can anyone confirm this?

I find it quite incredible. As a student glider pilot, I have to do stall and spin recovery training, learning to recognize the symptoms and recovery procedures for both. To me it seems like a very important component of core flying skills, and I'd be really surprised if transport pilots don't do this.

The Beeb experts seemed to say Speed would have been reduced from M0.82 to M0.76 and then be only 10knots above stall speed?

They also blamed super-cooled liquid for pitot freezing.

Back on thread they also reckoned stall from high level, near recovery, then low altitude stall - which would suggest the search has been too far North?

But then we have recent news reports in which the BEA have been attributed with saying, "AF447 never went south".

Someone must be wrong! http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...lies/sowee.gif

mm43

mm43

This looks definitely like a different spoiler than the one in the sea (your image post #1253). I agree wholly that the caption must be in error relative to the outer. It matches number one with number five, (?).

I must say this spoiler exhibits a failure consonant with a great load from underneath, but it also shows that the TL and LE have failed upwards. This is not what is seen with the other spoiler. It may be that the panel is so trashed that its edges articulate in both directions; note it is not leaning against the ship's cabin here.

Thank you for your reply, I think this may lead into a more prolonged assessment, I hope you will stay with us, your work is exemplary, and much appreciated. The landing photos are supreme, they give an excellent view of the strength and the vulnerability of the spoilers . I agree the fasteners remained with the mounting bed, pulled through as the panel left under great duress. A large fracture is seen on the outer edge of the mount, the energy was most profound. This discussion is most instructive on the strengths/weaknesses of materials.

be well

bear

BBC Investigative Documentary
 

The theory the producers chose to go for was roughly as follows.

A US meteorology specialist suggests that the main line of Cbs might have been behind, and in the wx-radar shadow of a relatively moderate shower... Thus, having successfully avoided/penetrated the first shower, the crew is unprepared for the severe line of wx just beyond it.

Here a UK-based Airbus training pilot (Capt Martin Alder), and an American ex-Airbus captain/safety analyst take up the story. Belatedly realising the problem, the crew select turbulence-penetration Mach (stated to be M0.76 − that's good for an A320 but I don't have a figure for the A330). The current speed being M0.82, the A/THR reduces the N1 (thrust) considerably for the deceleration. Entering the wx, the A/C encounters super-cooled rain at –40C. Pitots freeze, leading A/THR to disengage at a very low thrust setting, as A/C still slowing down. Pilots slow to take throttles out of CLB gate, so thrust does not increase in time to stop the A/C stalling. Their presumed failure to establish a Thrust/Attitude technique is partly due to non-driven throttle levers (lack of tactile cues).
Situation allegedly exacerbated by: (1) too much reliance by today's airline pilots on AP and other automation; (2) absence of stall-training (meaning as part of type-rating?); (3) plethora of warnings causing excessive work load. A/C may have recovered from first stall with wing-drop, but − if so − probably stalled again.

Little acknowledgement by the producers of the fact that nearly all the aircraft data and photos used must have originated from the BEA and Air France. Knowing Martin, I doubt he would have gone firm on one theory, to the exclusion of others. But, as these shows go, it was a pleasant surprise. The sim. footage was clear, relevant, and fairly well in context with the theory (which has some merit).

In haste (prior to travel),
Chris

AF 447 nearly intact wreckages
 

Nearly a year later,more questions than answers.Just saw again the section of the aft galley(correct me if wrong) and sorry could not paste the link but i`m sure many of you had already seen it ,which seems very intact and also the vertical stabilizer + rudder.Still leaves me baffled if the plane really disintegrated in the air or not.What are the chances of such two parts of an airplane remaining nearly intact after such a massive G load impact.....would it be a airborne disintegration or a particular angle of impact on the water,that would lead parts of an aircraft no to be severely distorted ,let alone mainly intact in composition.Remember that the initial impacting on water at such high speeds is like impacting on solid rock,no difference.Would love to hear your views.

Bearfoil;
All the photographs in post #1253 and post #1290, including that in the BEA's Interim Report are all of the same spoiler. Check all the pics carefully and the damage and tell-tale marks all match.

Other than the BEA photograph, all the other images were supplied directly to me from the ship which picked the spoiler up. My only problem is establishing exactly what spoiler it is, as my initial impression was that it was the Starboard Outer, and I had recorded that in some graphics posted to the AF447 thread many moons ago. The BEA have since confused the issue with their caption.

mm43

Chris Scott;
The Airbus recommended turbulence penetration speed for the A330-200 at FL350 is M0.80 in ISA conditions; TAT -54.1°C. The forecast temp at FL350 was -46°C and probably rose considerably, so the -40C they mentioned was still a bit "low"!

mm43

Hello,
Added to that both Airbus/Air France recommended turbulence penetration mode is Autothrottles OFF while AF447 A/T was kicked OFF by systems at 02.10, consequently, she was certainly not in turbulence penetration mode/speed until this point. Moreover, at 02.10, more than half of the CB system was already crossed, they were not just penetrating it.
S~
Olivier

However, from BEA's 2nd report:
HN39

Hi HN39,
You are right about its inferred speed, but it may be also due to other factors like weather avoidance as she was 3 nm west off track (going away or returning to flight plan). Nonetheless, ATHR engaged is possibly ruling out severe turbulences, IMHO.
S~
Olivier

kijangnim
 

fair point but does it alter the point that dynamically the forces acting on any component at failure may not be as first motion ?

Chris Scott;

In your account of the BBC documentary on AF447:
I wonder, did they mention stall warning, and why it was ignored?

HN39

The program gave a mini-course on supercooled water and pitot heads, but said little or nothing about airframe icing while encountering the phenomenon.

Severe icing from supercooled droplets can be astonishingly sudden, and flying an aircraft in turbulence, with the added burden of ice, could be one reason the crew had difficulty in staying inside the envelope.


I thought the program was quite good. It did have periods of the daft background noises that they seem to think makes things a tad more dramatic, but I noticed this was cut to zero when something important was being said.

I still find it hard to see why we're relying on Black Boxes. Given the amount of data being sent to 'Company', I can't help feeling that total monitoring could be done via satellite these days. While in America, I spend ages chatting to people on Skype. I share this with 20+ million people - many enjoying modest video. If this can be done as a give-away, surely something as important as crew well-being and aircraft integrity could be transmitted in real-time.

Hello Bear,
I dont feel aggressed but, I won't pick up each of your previous comment underlying that investigation is not credible or "is trying to suggest such and such scenario" which otherwise main weakness is that it doesn't fit yours. My opinion is that so far, no "scenario" was really pushed ahead by the BEA, only its findings about wreckages and flight conditions without regards if it will make sense or not.
I never read something about that. Reports are saying that all ACARS transmitted by AF447 were received.
I used other poster's words, but so far, I have certainly read that it was established by investigators that the tail was not lost in flight neither any main part of the airframe.
Obviously, it is still the exact same theory I'm reading from you, starting post crash. Whatever was found later about this flight, I'm not sure you'll be able to reconsider your point anyway.
S~
Olivier

I'm no aeronautical engineer, but is it perhaps possible that both theories - in-flight breakup and intact impact with the water - are partly true? Would it be possible for the aircraft to lose the VS and perhaps the HS and some control surfaces due to overspeed or excessive control inputs, and then enter some kind of stall or spin and impact the water in the manner suggested by the report (high vertical speed, but not so high as to completely disintegrate everything)? Or would losing the VS at altitude inevitably lead to an in-flight breakup?

The ACARS messages are actually extremely small in terms of data transmitted. This issue has been discussed elsewhere on this thread and the original AF447 thread. It boils down to this: with the existing infrastructure, it is not feasible to transmit the amount of data necessary to make a continuous recording of the flight parameters recorded by the FDR, still less to stream the multiple audio tracks from the CVR. It is not so much a matter of installing new technology into the airplanes, but of how to transmit the data, which would perhaps require new satellites and other very expensive bits of infrastructure.

Plus, pilots may object to the possibility of being micromanaged from the ground even as they fly, if all that data is being sent in real time to the home office.

BBC scenario, recovery from FL350, terminal conditions
 

Doesn't it seem unlikely that any major control surface failed during a possible overspeed given the conditions of impact ("en ligne de vol", no roll, no yaw, no sideslip, slight nose up) described in the BEA reports ?
If we assume a high altitude upset (which I do), we have to explain why the recovery from cruise altitude has not been possible... and despite this, why the A/C impacted the surface with a terminal velocity mostly vertical (contradictory with a recovery about to be successfull), but not as high as in previous cases of high dive from cruise altitude. Doesn't the possibility raised by the BBC documentary (overcorrection in the recovery at low altitude, possible in the absence of alpha prot and low speed stability => secondary stall at low altitude) have the potential to explain both of these aspects ?
Jeff

Procedures
 

I have read the following in the A330-340 Flight Crew Training manual (perhaps not the latest version?)
"Triple IRS or ADR failure is very unlikely and is not displayed on the ECAM. Should a triple failure occur, two double failures would be displayed, i.e. ADR 1 + 2 FAULT and ADR 2 + 3 FAULT. The subsequent ECAM actions would give conflicting instructions. In this case, apply the QRH procedure for ADR 1 + 2 + 3 failure. This is one of the few cases where the crew will not follow the ECAM procedure."
So the crew is left with conflicting info and have to find the proper document BEFORE they act.

When it comes to the software and hardware used on AF447, the BEA reports are very silent. Why give details about engines and some other hardware, but noting about the FBW-system? E.g. the QF72 accident report made by Australians contain a lot of such inf.

Now I am awaiting the flogging.

Greetings
Mr Optimistic I have great difficulties understanding your sentence :confused:, can you please be kind enough to elaborate a bit more :ok:

There is a VDO about the B767 Ethiopian ditching look at it to see the effect the engines have when ditching. :eek:

I cant quite believe it
 

Can any one equate the design strength of the VS with the max possible deceleration "G" in any sort of flat ditching, and the forward "G" required to permit a fin and rudder to rip clean off its fittings?

Hi,
Well, ADR 1+2+3 FAULT is memory item (ADR DISAGREE). Then, just apply it.
BEA's reports are only "interim" dealing with partial findings while final report will certainly deal with that in details if something relevant is to be said about it.
S~
Olivier

There is also many videos about Hudson's ditching showing that engines, when they hit water with wings level - contrary to this B767 case, are absorbing a lot of forward energy without breaking up the airframe.

From my understanding, in AF447 case, vertical speed would have to be much higher to break it up and for causing so much compression into the lower part of the airframe (including tailfin separation, rudder damages, killing passengers, etc.).

I'm not quite sure actually how to represent accuratelly this kind of impact (a kind of slow flat spin, wings level and tail down? or with high sinking rate, first hit with tail, nose high, killing forward speed then pankaking?)... low end rudder damages are quite serious, possibly caused by tailcone's failure at impact with water. I'm waiting for the BEA's video to figure it out one day.
S~
Olivier

Greetings TAKATA

Huge difference between choosing to ditch and preparing the Aircraft with the right configuration speed and attitude and falling from the sky ......:}

Hello,
Takata;

In a reply to Bearfoil you wrote:-I think that Bear is referring to the following detail from page 36 (English version) of the BEA Interim Report No.2. The PRIM 1 and SEC 1 faults below are possibilities, but the MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR2 would have been sent (if possible to do so).

F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT (2 h 13)
This message indicates that FCPC1 (PRIM 1) has stopped functioning. This shutdown may have been commanded or be the result of a failure. In the absence of an associated fault message, it is not possible to command a shutdown. However, a fault message that had not had sufficient time to be transmitted can not be excluded. Indeed, this message was received at 2 h 13 min 45 and the last message at 2 h 14 min 26, whereas the fault message could have appeared up until 2 h 14 min 45.

F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT (2 h 13)
This message indicates that FCSC1 (SEC 1) has stopped functioning. This shutdown may have been commanded or be the result of a failure. In the absence of an associated fault message, it is not possible to command a shutdown. However, a fault message that had not had sufficient time to be transmitted can not be excluded. Indeed, this message was received at2 h 13 min 51 and the last message at 2 h 14 min 26, whereas the fault message could have appeared up until 2 h 14 min 51.

MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR2 (2 h 14)
This message was received at 2 h 14 min 14 and a class 2 fault message should have been received between 2 h 15 min 00 and 2 h 15 min 14.

mm43

PM1:

"Monsieur, the turbulences are increasing rapidly, what will you do?"

PM2: "I will wait until the auto pilot has had enough and cannot keep to its design limits, then we can catch the controls as they fall into our lap."

PM1: "Oui"

Of course NOT. The pilots were startled at dropout of Auto flight.

What caused the Trip? Was it a roll beyond 45 degrees? Had 447 sliced into a monster up elevator with the tip and then the rest of one wing? What is the definition of the "edge" of vertical development? Had she then recovered level flight upon complete entry into the vertical wind tunnel? Did the pilots reduce a/s to book penetration velocity? At lower mach, did she climb with the monster to 37, 38?

Did she then exit the vertical column into the monster's twin, the down cycle?
At reduced speed, heavy weight, and an AoA adjusted to the climb, did she break?

In the ensuing dive did she pick up sufficient velocity to reach a/s far in excess of critical? Down into thicker air, did the break take her vertical, or past it? This is all a possibility if the weather was dramatic enough. How many more times did she stall, partially recover, then break even deeper?

To me, it is the first transmission of ACARS that may have sealed 447's fate. Upset? By definition, of course. Stall? Certainly.

ICE? What if Ice wasn't involved? What do the pitots and ADIRU do with shear?
Does the computer know the difference between Unreliable AirSpeed and Discrepant readings that mimic it? Better question: had the computer been 'taught' the difference? Is sufficient Yaw possible in recovering from overbanking that engines and pitot(s) can be blanked? Long enough to cause Computer Fault/Fail?

bear (IMO) OTR for now, someone please save my seat.

Can anybody explain the reasons for the ongoing discussion about the possibility of an inflight breakup or a partial inflight breakup?

BEA was in most parts of the tragic events very common, in the part of impact with the water and the probable condition of the hull prior impact very specific. The result had its origin in the found pieces of wreckage and most probably some experts looking at those in person and detail (despite us looking only at pictures) came to strong results, leading to the statement of BEA.

So what is the real sense in turning this result over and over? Would it not be better to accept it for the moment until other information tells otherwise and go on from that point?

franzl