Thanks Mutt...I had a feeling this would come up..
 

I wonder how many guys in here reduce power to extend balanced field numbers to fit long runways, then come in here and try to say that every take off is a nail biter 'because that's how it's done in the airlines"

Well yeah...I could take off with 50% power too, burn up 12000 feet of runway, rotate a thousand feet off the end and say...'I had the numbers", then wipe my brow...look back at the passenger, 'whew...just made it by the skin of our teeth'...

In corporate if you crash the plane at the end of the runway..then tell the boss you were trying to save engine overhaul costs, ... won't quite do it.

The engine saving argument is a tough sell. Having put a few engines through hot sections and overhauls, personaly going through the bid process, inspections ect, test cells....having run them easy, then harder, then right to the edge,...I didn't see a cost diff.

Here's what I want to know...does a 737 at Sea level, max weight, burn up 7000 feet of runway using max power?

V1
 

Is ssg for real? V1 means V1. Why bother determining a V1 figure if there is any doubt about your actions in the event of it being a consideration.

You can safely abort, all other things being equal, before V1. Above V1 you must GO. Many more people have died as a result of attempts to abort above V1 than have than when the aircraft is flown off and the emergency is handled airborne.

That's not true
 

Take a look at the guys that tried to go around vs the guys that ran off the end of the runway......now see who walked away..

Usualy when a plane skids off the end of a rejected take off roll (probably too heavy), they just slide into the grass..might make a mess of the landing gear but people walk away...

But when those guys try to fly a defective aircraft up into the wild blue...well, just google ' airplane crashes on take off' and see all the nice pics...

Guess that there exists a variety of considerations here ..

(a) the basic requirement is that the takeoff meets the Type Certification and, by inference, the relevant Design Standard

(b) rated thrust is fine, and available for those who want to use it

(c) derate/flex is fine, and available for those who want to use it when it is available from a certification (AFM) point of view

(d) no matter how anyone might want to skew the story, jets don't like the high end of the temperature range .. a few degrees cooler reduces maintenance/operating costs. I am sure that Mutt can comment on this ad infinitum

(e) use of derate/flex is only available when rated takeoff is not limiting ... otherwise rated is mandatory

(f) use of derate/flex doesn't have to be taken to the point of making a non-limiting takeoff limiting (which appears to be what is upsetting some of the posters). Although I don't know what they do now, in the early days of flexing, Qantas imposed an arbitrary 1000 ft pad to the figures to keep the crews happy (at least that was Wal Stack's story at the time ..) Similarly, any operator can impose whatever fat it may choose corporately. I did the sums for one operator for many years and the Chief Pilot and I, in co-operation, applied a variety of considered pads to various runways with corporate blessing .. the corporate side was quite comfortable with the idea of balancing the mighty dollar against maintaining a good argument for any legal conflict.

(g) equally, an operator may run the derate/flex to the nth degree to squeeze the last bit of advantage out of it .. so long as the TC/design requirements and any operational restrictions are met. Many of the posters whom we read in PPRuNe work for operators who do just this.

(h) would I have a problem paxing on an operator which scheduled limiting derate/flex ? .. Certainly not just for that reason .. provided the overall operational risk philosophy was reasonable ...

(i) certification doesn't address a bunch of multiple failures .. in the event of such a circumstance, the crew is called upon to exercise its great knowledge, experience and skill at a moment's notice (not too sure where this leaves a minimally experienced crew .. but that is the way it's going these days) .. and then the Captain has to try and justify these decisions at the eventual enquiry in painfully slow and intricate detail ... For those who have had no experience of such inquisitions, the recent Australian military BoI into the Nias mishap makes good bedtime reading. Another which comes to mind was the KingAir 200 (?) crash at Sydney years ago ... an Ansett captain operating into Sydney at the time (and patently unrelated to the crash) sustained a very lengthy cross examination at the enquiry. I am sure that most of us can cite numerous such cases.


I suspect that ssg may not have had any/much experience with derate/flex takeoffs.

For those who have, and seek to champion its benefits .. please keep in mind that folk like ssg's operator are perfectly OK to operate at rated thrust if they wish. Many years ago I worked for a government operation which, amongst other Types, operated a Dart powered bird .. which they operated wet takeoff routinely .. often running up to takeoff power on the brakes .. even when empty from long runways. Didn't do the maintenance/operating costs much good but that was their choice .. our taxes at work. Centaurus could add much comment to this as he was a Captain for that operator at the time and did his best to inject a bit of commercial commonsense into the operational philosophy .. with not a great deal of success.

John...
 

Thanks for the primer on flex power...

Just because I am not one of those operators that uses flex power to 'fly it to the fence' every time, doesn't mean I don't understand how unsafe it is.

Flex power is always a choice...a choice to put 200 people as far down the runway as possible, accellerating the slowest, v speeds as close to the fence, the obsticles as near as possible, and giving the crew the least time to stop, or go, or make a decision. Flex power is a intentional way to decrease all safety margins to nil on take off to save for the intangible and hardly quantifiable benefit of saving on engine overhaul cost through operator imput.

It's no wonder that all these airline guys have a 'go' mentality...they are so close to edge, that should they lose and engine they can go, but also add 10-50% more power on thier last good engine...

Simple, because it costs too much. We try to keep our engines on the wing for over 40.000 hours on the shorthaul fleet and we have succeeded a couple times allready. That alone saves several hundred million dollars over the lifetime of an airplane in maintenance costs. Besides, we are told (as a pilot i cannot prove or disprove that) that reduced power take offs save quite a lot of fuel, which becomes more important with higher fuel prices.

We are free however to give us safety margins if we deem it necesarry, for example we often calculate the performance figures for an intersection take off instead of full length simply because it gives us more flexibility in take off points to choose from. Or we can deselect certain things in the performance tool, some captains dont like to use improved climb so we dont use that in those cases. I can understand that, running into the red red lights before you rotate at 175kts is not really fun (boeing classic/NG).

However i would still be interested in real comparable figures about take off accidents between GA and airline business per 100.000 sectors and operating hours. Single cases as the ones you mentioned don't prove or disprove anything if you cannot set them in a statistical significant perspective of overall operating hours and sectors flown.

SSG,

Please tell me you're not basing your arguments on google images.

Anyone remember the Thomson Fly birdstrike at MAN. They continued, flew a perfect vectored circuit to land single engine, vacated the runway and after an inspection by fire crews, taxied to stand. No drama, no heroics, just did what they were trained to do, and what they briefed to do. Had they rejected, I suspect many injuries, if not fatalities. Then, factor into the equation the ensuing evacuation, thus causing more injuries.

There's a great video on you tube and other sites of the whole event.

Add 10-50% more power on their last good engine
 

Having read ssg's posts it seems he is unaware that there are aircraft out there with more than two engines. Regardless, it seems he/she is unwilling to accept that you must Go if above V1, that derated/flex thrust take-offs are safe and that they add to engine life. There again, I suppose that the wealth of information available is somehow unable to penetrate every cranium out there.

The 10 seconds that you sit on your hands could cost you your life. You have no idea of the severity of the fire - it could even be a false fire warning. But you simply do not know. The advice in the Boeing 737 FCTM is all you can go by and that says:
"Indications of an engine fire, impending break-up or approaching engine limits, should be dealt with as soon as possible."

Don't purposely build in breathing space just because you fear you may stuff things up. There is no shortage of advice from well meaning simulator instructors or other pilots when it comes to defining engine fire action drills.

Old Fella

Every situation is different and every aircraft is different. 999 times out of a 1000 by the book is the best way but very occasionally by the book will kill you.

I used the example of a few years ago where an aircraft aborted after rotation at Leeds because of a massive fire from the engine which was burning through the wing.

Had the Pilot continued all would have perished. The Pilot and that is what we are sussed up the situation quickly and made the right decision.

The beauty of human beings is that we can think unlike computers or set procedures. With that ability to think also is the ability to make the wrong decision hence why most accidents are pilot error. To reduce that we are trained to react in a set manner which most of the time works.

In unusual circumstances you have to throw away the books and get back to being a quick thinking Pilot surely? otherwise we are no more than trained zombies or programmed computers ourselves.

Pace

SSG, the accident you refer to in Goma was actualy an above V1 reject. They got airborne and decided it was safer to "return" from a few feet off the ground.

Your operator might not try to squeeze every cent he can to turn a profit at the end of the year but most do. If they don't save there, they will cheap somewhere else...

Using TOGA every TO will reduce engine reliability thus componding your odds of having and engine failure at TO.

If would push the landing instead of going around, my operator would take care of finishing me off (if,as you believe, I would walk away). Could you tell me of a well executed GA that ended with a prang?

I am happy to flex when I can and I would continue the TO above V1 unless I know for sure the aircraft won't fly! I wish you (and your estate)luck if you ever fly your airplne outside the manufaturer's parameter. The lawyers would have it easy!

Throw away the book
 

999 times out of 1000 doing things by the book is the best way, but very occasionally going by the book will kill you, says Pace. The rejection at Leeds you cite Pace poses another question for me. You state that the aircraft suffered a massive fire which was burning through the wing. Do you honestly believe that the pilot knew the magnitude of the problem at the instant he decided to put the aircraft back on the ground? I seriously doubt that he did. Your statement that 999 times out of 1000 going by the book is the best way says it all for me. Of course we are all capable of making decisions which are not covered by the book however, smarter people than me, and I suspect you too, have determined that if the aircraft has reached the predetermined V1, and you suffer an emergency, your best chance of survival is to take it into the air and deal with it. The decision to abort, even just a Knot or two below V1, can be more likely to end in grief than to keep going. It would seem to me that the Leeds incident outcome was more "good luck" than the result of good judgement based on knowledge of the magnitude of the problem. I have no idea what you fly. I do know that in close to fifty years in the flying game I am still on the side of the "GO" brigade.

I am with a V1 brigade too with a caveat. I do not fly heavies but corporate Citations as a captain.

I had an engine failure in a twin Seneca a few years ago at grosse weight and 200 feet in the climb. Had I followed laid down procedures I know that I would not be here to write this.

Pace

I think the Leeds incident refered to may in fact be the 748 out of STN, en route to Leeds. The Dart engine shed part of its 'internals' (at or around V1) which ended up with an uncontained engine fire/failure. Channex had a similar thing on one of its F27's only in that incident it was at 400'.
Believe the 748 ended up off the end of the runway.

I was going to bring up the incident at Manchester but mini jumbo beat me to it. Anyway here's the link to the video.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9KhZwsYtNDE

Pace, remember a Seneca is not a transport category certified aircraft and therefore has different performance specs. I certainly hope that Citations are certified according to FAR/JAR 25, but as i dont fly them i don't know if that is the case.

We used that thing (seneca V) during training but shortly after i was done my flight school got rid of it due to very poor dispatch reliability and safety concerns (around 40% dispatch reliability). We flew it to full airline procedures, however we knew that there is a certain range during take off where an engine failure is not really survivable if you use balanced field length.

in regards to the training in the sim (type rating), didn't the TRI taught us .. AT or Above V1 we continue take off?....

in case an accident does occur, doesn't the investigating body check your last recurrent or your training?

what does the "book" say?

:ugh:

ssg . . . if ever you transition from the Citation to the B74, your perception of aborting after V1 will quickly evaporate; even when departing at JKF's longest pavement, 13R [4442m/14572'] If you recall when many moons ago a TWA TriStar crew had aborted on 13R after V1 with disasterous consequences. :ooh:

ssg, news for you - history actually knows fatal "airplane crashes on take off" caused by runway excursion due to ill-decided rejection.

"Flex power is a intentional way to decrease all safety margins to nil on take off to save for the intangible and hardly quantifiable benefit of saving on engine overhaul cost through operator imput." - sure, taking off with max power all the time does not decrease safety thru more strain on the engine.

PS. One has to admire how tolerant ppl can be in this thread.

Since when does anybody use flex or reduced thrust to "extend balanced field length?"

From my perspective as a pilot, we've used reduced thrust where able in most types of aircraft I've flown, certainly most all turbine equipment, including agricultural, corporate/charter airplanes, and airline equipment. It's been a practice in most types of operations I've flown, from firefighting to ambulance to crop dusting/ag, to cargo, charter, corporate, government, and yes, airline. Where it's safe to do, allows ample takeoff and stopping margin, allows adequate obstacle clearance etc, it's perfectly acceptable.

A reduced thrust takeoff means that one always has the option of pushing up the power as required, though all the performance calculations take into account climb gradients, going, stopping, and obstacle clearance without having to do so. This includes an engine failure; when we calculate reduced thrust takeoff performance, the performance data assumes losing an engine and continuing the takeoff...still at reduced power, still able to make the required gradients. Stopping is a no-brainer; the power will be retarded, ground spoilers deployed, and the aircraft stopped on RTO brakes where installed, or manual braking. Not rocket science, and it's all factored in...without reverse I might add. Reverse only shortens that distance.

Our operations manual spells out exactly when a reduced thrust takeoff can be used, and when it can't. Every reduced thrust takeoff is planned with the specific runway and runway conditions in mind, including any appliable NOTAMS such as temporary obstacles or reductions in length. Every takeoff is planned with an engine failure in mind, as is the departure path after takeoff. Nothing is left to chance.

We utilize reduced thrust takeoffs, and reduced power climbs as part of the nearly universal standard noise abatement departure procedures. We also have reduced climb thrust above 10,000'.

From a mechanic's perspective, reduced engine temperatures make for substantial increases in engine and component life. I've been an aircraft mechanic and inspector as long as I've been a pilot, going back to my early teenage years. I've been working on large radial engines, small pistons, turboprops, turbojets and turbofans for several decades now. I've had these engines apart, boroscoped them, handled every internal part as a regular function of inspection and repair. The differences in operating techniques or procedures show up in burned blades, cracked cans, metal creep, etc. A ten percent reduction in power equates roughly to a ten percent increase in engine life. If this can be done safely, all the more power to the operator...increased engine life also equates to improved engine safety, longevity of components, increased mean time between failures for stressed and hard use items such as turbine wheels and blades, etc.

A common method of operating reduced thrust is to use an assumed temperature. This isn't a wild idea made up by flight crews, but comes directly from the engine and airframe manufacturers after ample testing and design. One assumes a takeoff at a much higher density altitude based on a plethora of criteria and data, and determines if the aircraft could be safely flown off the current runway under those conditions. If it could still do so, still meeting all go and stop criteria applicable to each segment of the takeoff, then it can also be taken off at a reduced power which replicates a takeoff at the higher assumed temperature. The performance data is recalculated using the reduced power to ensure it matches, and when all data adds up, the reduced power is established for the takeoff. Nothing precludes pushing up the power at any point in the takeoff where required, nor performing a full power takeoff if required. However, it isn't required, and where a reduced power takeoff is performed based on an assumed temperature calculation, an engine may be lost and the takeoff continued at that reduced power, and still meet all the takeoff criteria.

I would hate to be the captain who aborts after V1 and ends up off the end with hurt pax and a damaged ship. Start typing up a new resume, for a non-flying position, somewhere else.

I aborted a CRJ200 T/O 10 KIAS before V1, at about 48,000 lbs take off weight (53,000lbs max) at an airport with a 13,123ft long runway and 5,000ft MSL elevation and got the BTMS squares from green to white. This was using up all of the remaining runway and normal braking. I was shocked at how much runway we used and still got the brakes hot enough to require a cool down period. Had it been hotter and had we been heavier I think it would've been a more memorable experience. V1 is there for a reason. Once I decided to abort thought I would make it off the runway way before I reached the end.

rcl

Language
 

The more people misunderstand eachother (or feign ignorance to push the discussion), the longer the potential world record length of the thread. For my purpose (which I hope and pray is consistent with the regs) V1, at acquisition, means fly. The alternatives offered so far have to do with circumstances that would preclude flight, regardless. If one has no choice, it is not an "abort", which is a conscious decision, informed by circumstance. V1 is a decision that has been made prior to Brakes off.
Ignoring it is most likely the first blunder in an unfortunate outcome.

For us V1 is the go number irrespective

The only time that would differ is when you have lost one (no thrust) and the other is about to vibe itself into orbit and airspeed is decreasing even after hitting the go buttons cancelling any de-rate after collecting a whole squadron of birds.

If I had runway available then yes I will put it down and hope for the best, because its probably better to overrun on a flat area than …….. houses/terrain/water…… pick your poison

IHG
 

The decision is no longer yours, it was made for you by Starlings, Wrens, etc. You are now not Rejecting anything except a high speed Taxi. If it won't fly, don't fly. Now you are a truck driver.

"If I had runway available, yes I would put it down...." Now you are trying to regain "choice". Your posit was clear, you cannot get airborne, then you claim discretion over runway availibility. Maddening. Clear, Out.

Airfoil

Always entertaining when someone with no airline experience & what looks like about 3 years jet experience tells the airlines with over 50 years of operating heavy jets how the job should be done. :D

I guess thats why the Alaskan interview didn't go so well.... :{

To think or not to think as a pilot, that is the question...
 

I find it interesting how many guys in here have just chosen not to think, just do what the company tells them...

Flex Power: I did some research....not all airlines think it's safe, not all airlines think the cost in safety is worth the hopefull engine life extension years down the road. Read Johns T. post for starters. So this isn't 'how it's done' and 'seeing the red lights at the end' is not standard procedure. I knew it was boloney. Derating take off power, purposely burning up more runway, turning every take off into a 'right to the edge nail biter' is a choice...your doing it with people's lives...to save a buck...besides a plane crash is worth about a million engines....

Now I have no problem, if you have a ten thousand foot field with rated power, balanced field is 4000 ft, Flex would be 6000...big deal...but using it to fly to the fence?

Secondly, Airline pilots don't see the engine overhaul and hot section bills, I have been through all that..the bid process, boroscope reports, seen the pics,fod, bearing failures, sufidation, test cell issues...so if you want to beat me up for not being an airline pilot please don't come back and tell me you know anything about engine overhaul and hotsection costs. Getting an email or memo from corporate doesn't count.

Secondly if you go after V1 in all cases in all scenarios, best case is you will get back safely, worst case you don't. Conversely, if you abort, you will stop safely or you will use up the overun, and or/some grass beyond this.

It's simple as pie, not all planes will fly that day, but all planes can stay on the ground and plow through the grass. Do you think a decelerating plane still on the ground, plowing through the grass is more dangerous then a plane, that can't be flown that crashes is more safe?

If you are flying a disabled aircraft around the pattern, screw it up and don't make it...people die...if you do an RTO in a disabled aircraft...screw it up, you're still on the ground, plowing through the grass.

Now we can sit here and talk about airport after airport where you don't plow through the grass at the end, it's a cliff, it's the ocean, it's a burning lake of lava, whatever...we are talking about a right after post V1 cut where you have excess runway...

Time after time I see all these planes that tried to fly it off only to crash..and who knows maybe the plane was heavy, the pilots weak, they screwed up...we all know the results...in that flight, they should have aborted....

All I have ever said is that the situation warrants judgement. Like Pace stated, there are situations where you don't fly a wreck up in the air, and that decision has saved lifes...it's saved mine as well.

We can sit here and debate this ad nauseum, but judgement, or lack there of, and inability to adapt to a situation, especialy if it's not on the check list, seems to catch a pilot or two(and the passengers) every year.

If you guys just hope that all the problems in a plane are in the Sops manual...well that would be nice wouldnt it...how comforting...

Maybe you guys are trained to do what makes sense 80% of the time, they don't want you guys to think...If I was running an airline, I might feel the same way, especialy if my pilots were weak, the FO had 500 hours, the capt was new, the take offs were always derated, so the capt could add power on the last good engine...whatever..basicaly set sops so no one had to think and hire accordingly..

But when I fly I have a choice...Still here....

The fact is...Pace and I, curiously being corporate pilots...seem to be in disagreement with the airline pilots that having chosen to simply go or not go, at V1, without any consideration to all the possibilites seems silly.. Gee whiz it's a good thing I didn't give a 'would you go before V1 thread' because I could, and there are situations that would warrant this decision as well...anyone ever been commited to a take off?

Hey if you get to V1, the wing falls off, are you going to pull it up?...what if you lose a nose tire, and the plane won't accelerate, what about a catastrauphic controll failure(hard to keep on straight on the runway)...I mean I could sit here and give a hundred situations where your barreling down the runway, and the situation is so violent and nasty, you know you don't want to take it up in the air...or at least this pilot wouldn't. But you guys would and that flight would be doomed.

Personaly, V1 is a start for me...and yes...I stop before V1, and go after V1...untill the situation warrants otherwise...and have done so in both cases.

But one thing is for sure...I won't purposely limit my options by extending my take off roll, V speeds, and rotation, as far down the runway, to try to save a buck...simply put I will have less time to discern the problem, less time to react, I will be closer to those obsticles, and closer to overrunning if I have to stop...I like as much of a margin of safety that I can get...

Here's one for you guys...before deciding to use flex power...address the passengers with this...

'Hey guys, how would you feel if I pulled it off at the fence today, trying to save corporate a buck on engines?'

:)

I'm no airline pilot, I'm barely a third through my PPL but was still fairly startled by that question.
There has been some interesting points in this thread but they're still overshadowed by the question. What is V1 there for? There are 2 sides to it, one side you take off and one you don't. Thats my understanding of it anyway.
So I'm fairly shocked a question like this has been asked but still, I'm only a wannabee lol I'll leave the debate to the drivers of the rune.

SSG,
Its not a big issue. You fly your aircraft as you want & we'll fly ours as we want.

Not wanting to upset your disposition too much, but many Captains I flew with on the 747 , took their hand off the thrust levers at V1-10. :eek:

BTW have you ever seen what happens on a lightly loaded 747-400 on a full power takeoff which suffers an outboard engine failure. Another good reason for derated takeoffs.

Actually foils, in the sim you would not believe how many people try to fly out of the situation and try to keep hope alive rather than accept the reality and close the levers and plant it.

We have conducted this as an advanced loft, with they guys who have got all the competency and boxes ticked and there is a bit of time left in session.

About 70% try to fly it and just relocate the scene of the accident 30% put it back down---- 10% intentionally and its those who manage to plant it call for full flap, brake brake brake, thud, evacuate.

Occasionally we get one starter who manages to pull off a low level circuit on min power and its all hands flying, don’t change a thing in the configuration and turn finals < 100ft…… then select landing flap.

These guys are one offs and all to date come from a rigorous hands on flying environment

ssg,

So, just out of interest, do you calculate the speed you CAN reject at for every takeoff? If you are two feet in the air do you know how much runway is needed to put it down again? You berate Airline pilots for following the rules laid down for us, so what ARE your rules? Do you brief your FO that "V1 is 112 but I KNOW that we can reject at 135".

Or do we just use the "That looks about right" rule....


You're right, we fly hundreds of people around and work for companies who lay down practices, usually in consultation with the people who BUILT the aircraft (do Cessna say to abort above V1? But then, what do they know!).

Do what you like with your coporate toy, we fly commercial aeroplanes for a living.

Hmm
 

That is very compelling, IHG. I'd be interested to know what the parameters are for the challenge. Are you saying 70% try to fly as if busting the Sim was the Risk? Or are they just having a go, attempting to launch to return? Because at the bottom of the matter is the need to contain whatever badness happens on the Aerodrome. It's one thing to risk Pax on an ego driven ride (not to mention A/C), quite another to gamble the lives of the people who complain about your sonic footprint at political meetings. Especially if the proposition definitely includes two failed powerplants. (One cold, the other full of feathers and bones.)
(We're speaking Twinops, here, OK?)

Airfoil

ssg, please givethe link to at least one accident report where an aircraft crashed after contining a take-off after V1, with a failure AFTER V1.

youTube and Google images don't count. Facts please.

Also, you have some weird obsession with "right up to the fence". Where does this come from? Tell me an commercial operator that rotates right up at the fence. You really have no knowledge of Flex or Reduced Thrust ops.

As already said "Do what you like with your coporate toy, we fly commercial aeroplanes for a living."

The question is though, where do YOU decide if to abort or fly it around the pattern? Because at some point you have to decide it, one way or another.

And exactly to give us a formalised tool for that decision process we have a V1, a decision speed at which we have to have allready startet with the stopping process or take it into the air (except if the plane is unflyable, but in that case there is nothing to decide).

Simply put, in a balanced field calculation if you abort your take off 2 seconds after V1 with all engines at full reverse thrust you will depart the runway at 70 kts and come to rest around 600 ft past the end. Not all that bad if there is enough space. Now think of having only one engine and not using reverse on the other as assumed for certification, well you will run over at aroun 90kts and come to rest around 1000ft behind the end. If you decide to abort only one second later it will be around 1100 ft with all engine reverse thrust and around 1800ft for the certification case. You still have enough space to do that? Not to mention that the brakes will overheat considerably and the tires explode shortly after you came to rest puncturing the fuel tanks and making even more of a mess out of it (all values 733).

The alternative is to take it around on a pattern, do the immediate return checklist and plonk it down with a much lower speed at the beginning of the runway.

And people still die!

If the plane couldn't fly, you wouldn't have got airborne, thus there would be no choice but to abandon the takeoff.

In the majority of cases, the aircraft is flyable, therefore if above V1 you continue.

Care to provide a list? a/c type, country, airline nationality. You seem to think you know the reason these crashes happened, but yet you keep failing to provide any factual information.

That would likely end up in a fireball and loss of life whatever happens, so really is irrelevant.

ssg, you fly biz jets? correct? Has it occured to you, that they are light compared to most airliners and accelerate far quicker, rotate at lower speeds, therefore use less runway.

differences between corporate and airline pilots
 

I wonder how much the difference between attitudes of corporate jet pilots and Airline trained pilots comes more from where our backgrounds are different.

A corporate light jet pilot often comes from the route of flying light twins, often single pilot, often off airways down in the weather. He is used to dealing with situations on the hoof and on his/her own.

Airline trained pilots often progress through training straight into the controlled invironment of the airline where the pilot does not think but has to fly to set rules and procedures.

The light jet pilot again tends to have more hands on experience often from having flown dated equiptment which requires more involvement by the pilot.

Then there is the nature of the two animals/or birds. A light jet like a citation is still a light aircraft with slow takeoff and landing speeds.
A heavy has to be different as you are driving tons of hardware down the runway with tons of power.

So maybe the difference in attitude expressed here says more about where we come from and what we fly.

Pace

Pace, I think that is the correct conclusion.

I take offense at the comment "where the pilot does not think but has to fly to set rules and procedures." Either you mis-spoke or are just trying to be rude.

One could say the differing experience and attitudes are reflected in the number of fatalities in the commercial airline industry and the corporate jet, bizjet environment.

I think the differences come from corporate pilots not understanding that flying large jets is different than smaller ones. Many lighter jets are capable of fl500 or near it. Large jets are not at any weight. Acceleration/decceleration take longer in large a/c and v-speeds tend to run higher. The v-1 decision is made by the time you reach that speed not when you reach that speed. It is already a go at that point.

Very interesting...
 

Hog driver..

I was Dallas Simulfite..Citation Ultra Sim..(single pilot).end of session, passed ride, time left on sim...I said 'sock it to me, something devious'

The instructor sat back and said...'ok, here's one for ya...we get alot of guys in here that don't run the numbers right, they like to come in on fumes, so I am going to put you over Missoula, you just missed, you have 500 lbs of fuel'...you see if you can make it back around, 200 overcast, 1/4 mile vis, snow"

Well I knew he was trying to teach me lesson, that 500 lbs wouldn't make it, I would crash the plane trying, lesson learned: "carry more reserve fuel'

He gave a smile, blanked out the screen, and said 'ready?'

"Ready' I said...

The Missoula missed was set up to depart the runway environment, fly to a VOR, do a turn, come back around for the ILS...

1,2.3 go....

What I did..I cleaned up the plane, reduced power and climbed up to the GS intercept alt for the ILS in an immediate banking left turn, staying in the protected runway enviromnet (RE-TERPS)...I stayed in tight, turned Base at the GS intercept alt hitting the FAF as the GS was coming in...glided down the ILS staying a little fast incase the engines flamed out, kept the plane clean untill the last minute to keep power reduced to mininum...landed and rolled off on the taxiway...the engines flamed out...

He said 'I've never seen anyone do that before'

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I don't remember any prize that a pilot get's for reading the checklist and still crashing the plane...Yeah Hog, I was a handflyer...flew alot of junk up here in the Pacifc NW before I got into decent aircraft...

To the other posters...you can either be ahead of the aircraft and have situational awareness or not...but one thing is for sure...there isn't a SOPS manual or checklist big enough for all the things that can happen in a plane...very fluid environent. Your either ready for the unexpected or you do what others told you what to do, and hope that it fits the situation.

If you wanna believe that V1 go no go, is all there is to it, I can think of a ton of examples where going after V1 will kill you dead...every situation requires judgement...what makes sense...

OK SSQ,

Lets have your ton of examples then!

Where do you suppose airline pilots come from?

Over the course of my career I've flown more than my share of corporate and charter turbojet flights, special missions flights, utility flights, cargo flights, freight flights, fractional flights, etc. I find that training received from the airline flight training department meets the same standards and procedures and logic that is received from FSI or Simuflite. I was never trained at FSI or simuflite in a type course or recurrent to reject a takeoff after V1, nor would I do so.

Of course, how could a pilot flying for an airline or cargo freight company possibly have the advanced wealth of understanding of how to take an airplane off the ground like a corporate pilot could, right? I started flying ag airplanes and crop dusting as a kid, before finishing high school...and yet by your own assertion, that's probably all been washed away by the evils of the airline training I may or may not have received. You make assumptions aplenty...assumptions which aren't founded in experience to know the difference, or to even know one's target audience.

The truth is that most airline pilots come from one of two routes; military, or civillian. Military training and experience is well known, well documented, and a known quantity. Civillian backgrounds vary, but most civillian trained airline pilots have come up through the ranks instructing, flying freight, some corporate, generally charter, and eventually ended up where they are now.

Among those posting in this thread, for example, are pilots with varying backgrounds including military and civillian. You have experts on performance, aerodynamics, maintenance...all of whom have a very in-depth background in their field as well as a good grasp of aviation knowledge and experience. You have somewhat of a tainted image based on your own imaginings, and your expert background as a Cessna Citation pilot. What you seem to lack is a broad background or experience level. You may find that as your experience and background grows, your attitudes may change. You may also come to realize the ignorance of the statement quoted above.

I don't know about you, but I learned to fly in a 1947 piper cub. I've flown 60 year old airplanes in a hard, working environment, and brand new airplanes with but fifteen hours on the airframe. Again, as you gain more experience you may find that your statement somewhat smacks of ignorance.

Perhaps your citation. A Lear, for example, uses speeds very near that of most Boeing equipment. It's not slow, it doesn't behave like a light airpalne, and it doesn't simply settle down and land like a 172. I flew the Piaggio Avanti...which lands and takes off at similiar speeds to the lear or other corporate aircraft...not a 172 either. Your straightwing citation doesn't necessarily equate to other corporate and business swept wing equipment. Never the less, it's time to learn to fly it like a jet, and not a 172; this includes coming to understand V1 marks the boundary between driving the car and flying the airplane.

Tons of power is relative. Slow acceleration, more mass. A comparison you might understand is the difference in a Cessna 206 between empty, and full. A large airplane when heavy, like most airplanes when heavy, can go from being quite capable to somewhat of a dog. Flying a light airplane is about mass management...which should be the same philosophy applied to a 18,000 lb learjet, too.