...thought we were on the subject of an abort well below V1... or is poor old Empty missing something here???

No-one seems to disagree on what kind of % runway length should be consumed to reach V1 and Vr respectively. And yes, with de-rate & everything, we normally rotate within the first 65% of TODA on a runway limited departure.

The q still is - do people think it's wise to stop or to go when the incap has been confirmed at V1-30?

Thanks Empty!!!
 

Ah the voice of reason.....

ssg,

Yes :).

NO :ugh: :=

These are 2 very different things. Have you ever flown a heavy? I see your profile shows you're on the G-IV. Twins usually get airborne earlier than the tri/quad engine aircraft but not always. Look it up!

As for the stop/go - every time is different with too many variables to list, but here are some (in no particular order):-
Day/Night, Dry/Wet/Contaminated, Calm/X-wind, Alert/Tired, Circadian time, Experince total, Time on type, Training, Company policy, SOP, Area weather (CB's), Local terrain, Area familiarity, Control restriction/obstruction, 2 crew/Flt Engineer or augmented, Shock etc, etc.

PF's looking out, PM's looking in.

PF's looking out, PM's looking in.

Flaps? Config warning sounds and why there's a pre-takeoff checklist. Blockage? One reason for the airspeed callout on TO. Not enough thrust? PM will notice. TR/spoilers? PM notices, config warning sounds. Tyre burst? Actions covered in the takeoff brief.

You can't know the numbers were bad. The situation you describe is perfectly possible. In these cases, V1 will be less than Vr.

Someone is looking outside and both pilots are monitoring performance.

Haven't come across that. Or if I have, it's by a different name.

Rgds,

B&S

I think that we could be a little more reserved in the discussion, folks ... no need to get hot under the collar ..

It's just a discusion...no worries..
 

You got me Helen....I don't fly for the airlines....Dual Rated, 10,600 hours and 7 type ratings wasn't enough to convince the chief pilot of Alaska Airlines,(two months ago) that I could be an airline pilot....I remember him asking me this right off..

'Why now?' and the HR lady saying....'What would you do if you were offered a better job?....that's how the interview went for about an hour....

But hey I guess the good news is...they liked my resume, the line pilots interview went good, the hotel was nice, and I passed all the psyche quizes....

Sorry for the thread creep...but I think what posters in here are trying to convince me of is this very simple concept.

Airliners burn up 65-75% of the runway to get to V1, and it might take another 3-4000ft to accelerate to VR with a thousand ft to go...

So be it...but honestly guys, accelerating another 3000+ ft trying to get to VR(were going no matter what!!!), with the fence coming up, knowing that I could suck a bird, blow a tire, and just not make it, doesn't seem like a safe way to spend the next 30 years of my life....

Call me silly....

Trying to find another way to put it...
 

With the correct numbers, if you call stop before the V1 call you will definitely stop.

If you call continue after V1 and you ingest a pheasant into number four, as long as the FADECS or you ensure that flex thrust goes to max, you'll make it.

Keep using the correct figures, and all 30 years on a heavy will be safe.

If you useing assumed temp/flex you do not need to go to full power to mack it. You may well feel its a good move and I wouldn't disagree but the numbers assume you leave the thrust levers were they are.

If you've used a fixed derate (ie go into the FMC and derate the engines from 22k to 20k of thrust) and then flex on top of that then I think you can run into snags with VMCG if you go to max chat. I'm not 100% on that as we don't do it but dim and distant and all that.

While the discussion started off around the 80kt call there is no reason why the Capt might not fall over with a heart rending plea for help just prior to V1 so its as well to think about the high speed case too.

ssg,
Nothing wrong with not being in the bigger iron, sorry it didn't work out for you so far (keep trying?).

Life is risk management. A tire or a bird by themselves shouldn't cause the carnage you seem to worry about.

Back to the thread..........

If you have pilot incapacitation high speed rejects should not pose a problem because you're not going high speed. 80kts is a first check. If there is no response, you are in your mind already stop minded. If he doesn't answer your second inquiry (100kts ie), you stop. In most aircraft you are even below Vmc at this point. 1...2 seconds reaction time gives an extra 7-8kts acceleration. Let's say 110kts max at the point of reject. On the 737 Vmc is around 110kts. This means you're at the edge of its "controlled flight" envelope, and since you were stop-minded from the very first 80kts call, in most cases you will not even be at 110 upon initiation of the reject. Stopping at this point should not pose any problem at all. You are FAR FAR away from a high speed reject which, I agree, isn't the most fun thing to do with an airliner.

At high speeds it's designed to fly, you are go minded, at low speeds it cannot even control it on the runway if you were to continue and have an engine failure. There is indeed the "grey" area in between low and high speeds, but that's why the 80kts check IS a pilot incapacitation check as well, to PREVENT you go into the grey zone. So simply be ready for it.

SSG, V-speeds are not all based on runway numbers. Vr and V2 are weight based and because V1 cannot be greater than Vr, it is in a lot of cases weight based as well. It's not because you have a balanced takeoff performance, you're using all the runway available. It fits "into" the runway, yes, but you'll have extra room. If the runway in it's current state doesn't fit, you need to change something (bleeds off, higher flap setting, another runway for better wind conditions or longer length,...). V1 is something you can play around with, and runway length can be a factor.

There are some exceptions, ie improved takeoff where you use as much runway as possible (keeping in mind tire limits etc) to have a better climb performance when you are ie obstacle limited. It's the only case where I don't like the V1 numbers (sometimes very high on long runways), but I trust a very high speed reject can be done. With all the consequences: hot melting tires, probably a fire, maybe you block the runway, maybe you end up in the grass because life is not perfect (or the water). I've talked to people who have rejected takeoffs, and they all say: "the braking is hell, nothing you've ever experienced before". And RTO tests were performed with degraded brakes during testing, so in the end I presume it will work although some V1 values don't really give me a comfortable feeling.

Wet or contaminated runways? Well, V1 is reduced as well, and on contaminated runways pretty much based on Vmc. Things can be tricky because controllability is an issue for every speed. But 100kts is still a reject because it's below Vmc. You really need to be prepared for it in these cases.

Cheerz...

Ps: the 60/40 rule is a guideline for small single engine props where you simply have no decisions speeds. If you encounter a problem before using 60% of the runway, stop. Don't try to stop a little prop on less than 40% of the runway available. Funny someone claims a "PPL-we-have-no-rule-for-it-so-use-this-guideline" to be used on commercial jets as a governing rule...

ps2: heavies are usually runway or even "braking" limited, but the story remains the same: pilot incapacitation and high speed rejects should not come together. Either you reject low speed, or next calls are V1 and Vr, and it's a go anyway if he doesn't respond.

Thought about this last night, I was flying out and the Capt back. I fly a 738. So we get to 80kts, he calls, our SOP's require I look inside call 'Cross Checked' then back to the action, still below 90kts, even with a light load. If there is no response pnf has time to call 100kts, and still has time to reject quite safely. no drama, same on the return leg, fully loaded, no problems stopping if needed.
As to using up 75% of the runway, sorry not sure where that comes from, we don't.

well...
 

Brace - Its all about putting the plane in the particular place on runway, at a particular speed...to either stop, or go...

If you find yourself at 75% of the runway, still chasing V1...remember this thread...

Something to read...

-----------------------------

LEXINGTON, Kentucky (CNN) -- Why would an experienced pilot take off on a runway too short to accommodate his commercial jet -- rather than the longer one he told air traffic controllers he planned to use?

That's one of the questions federal investigators are trying to answer Monday as they dig into the data on Comair Flight 5191, which crashed Sunday morning about half a mile past the end of a runway at the Lexington airport, killing 49 of the 50 people onboard.

The Delta Air Lines commuter flight to Atlanta, Georgia, had been cleared to take off from the 7,000-foot Runway 22 at Lexington's Blue Grass Airport, said Debbie Hersman, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board. (Watch the NTSB describe the evidence found -- 1:27)

Based on the cockpit voice recorder and tapes from the control tower, "there were planning discussions, both by the air traffic controllers and the crew, conversations with each other, about using Runway 22 for departure," Hersman told CNN on Monday.

"We do know from the information that we have obtained on scene, gathered evidence, documentation and from the flight data recorder, that the runway that the crew used was Runway 26," which is about half as long as Runway 22.

Hersman would not say whether the Canadian-built Bombardier CRJ-100 would have been able to take off successfully from a 3,500-foot runway. (Watch the results of an early NTSB review -- 3:27)

But former NTSB Vice Chairman Bob Francis said that the twin-engine jet would have needed about 5,000 feet of runway for a successful takeoff.

"It sounds like it got barely airborne and came back down, but there isn't really enough evidence yet to draw that conclusion," Francis said. "I can speculate; they cannot."

The Associated Press reported that the short runway had less lighting than the one the plane should have used, and severely cracked concrete -- not the type of surface typically found on runways for commercial routes.

Hersman said the NTSB probe will look at recent construction work at the Lexington airport, the lighting and the markings on the taxiways and runways.

Investigators also will study what went on in the tower, how many controllers were on duty and whether they saw Flight 5191 head down the wrong runway.

It's rare for a plane to get on the wrong runway, but "sometimes with the intersecting runways, pilots go down the wrong one," St. Louis University aerospace professor emeritus Paul Czysz told the AP.

The sole survivor of the crash, first officer James Polehinke, was in critical condition at a Lexington hospital, and was not able to be interviewed at this point, Hersman said.

The plane was carrying 47 passengers and three crew members. One of the passengers was an off-duty crew member sitting in the plane's jump seat, Blue Grass Airport Director Michael Gobb said. (Honeymooners among victims)

------------------------

Enough Said.....

Pilot Incapacitation.
 

The original question. What will the F/O do if he gets no response to an 80 Kt and 100 Kt call when he is the PNF. Seems pretty darn simple to me, regardless of what the company SOP says regarding who can call for an ABORT. Any Company which dictates that only the Captain may command an ABORT and that he must conduct the ABORT, would surely do so on the assumption that the Captain is not incapacitated. What any F/O should be aware of is that his/her backside is as precious as any other on the aircraft and if he/she determines that the handling pilot has become incapacitated then he/she has no option but to assume command. That is why there are two pilots, each qualified to fly the aircraft. All the rest of the myriad of postings are academic. Obviously, if the handling pilot becomes incapacitated well below V1, as I would believe the original question indicates, the F/O should ABORT. If above V1, GO. Any pilot who thinks otherwise should think seriously about another career path.

Even if you want to go into this case, you don't know the reason why they used that runway, or what they saw and experienced, when they realised something was wrong.

737, between 80 and V1, you only stop for any fire or smoke, engine failure, predictive windshear or aircraft unable to fly. Here you have to consider the last item, this would depend on your speed primarily as stated before. Low speed it's better to stop, high speed you better continue. If I were to be at 85%, not knowing if I'm going to make it but in the high speed region, I would still continue (firewall the engines if necessary). Because this would be an indication my performance calculations were wrong, making my V1 doubtfull as well. If I'm high speed, I should be pretty close to the flying envelope. And probably far away from the required stopping distance as well. If I would be around 80-100kts, yes I would stop. Both cases will take some sweat though... but I don't see why you should doubt current airline procedures.

There are plenty of other situations where you need to decide quickly and most airlines train the pilots to slowly become go-minded above 80kts, and the higher the speed, the more go-minded you should be. All because the airplane will fly even at speeds slightly lower than Vr/V2, and is hard to stop. This training does not rule out the stop option at low speeds. A nice example is the pilot incapacitation check at 80kts (to stay on-topic).

In the past there were a lot more RTO's that went wrong, than cases like the one you mentioned. Don't make the past come back please.

SSG, because I'm polite I won't say what every is thinking about you. What if they used the wrong runway? What if they input the BS figures you're so keen on? What if they burst a tire, lack of thrust, etc etc?

Here in the professional world, we work with the facts. Not making stuff up and then just crossing our fingers hoping it all works out - which seems to resemble a take-off roll on your G4.

So if no communication, challenge and response by 100kts:

In A340-600 at 380 tons, the F/O will take control and stop by 100kts. The problem getting airborne and flying it around again and dumping 115 tons. MLW 265 tons The complications gather at a rapid rate of knots once airborne and even then, the incapacitated pilots needs urgent medical attention.

However, at 380 tons, there would be a double crew (leg distance is ULR), but the other captain from crew B, sitting in first observers seat, (an Airbus term) is not at the controls and I am sure he would also tell the F/O to stop by 100 kts. Autobrake is working so don't touch the brake, unless autobrake is not working. Reverse thrust is not considered for rejected take-off anyway, incase the engine had failed and was the reason for the rejection. The F/O is welcome to use what he needs and what he has at his diposal, but thrust reducton is a must, in line with directional control.

The rest will be history and remember "PARK BRAKE SET", otherwise nothing like doing 15 kts in cirlces while you're trying to pay attention to other things in the cockpit. Work load has to be at it's highest form on this one, for a single crew.

I think overall it best in any aeroplane to stop in that situation at that sort of speed.

It is, of course, possible SSG does not ACTUALLY fly, let alone fly a GIV, and even if he/she does, then presumably has never been onto a short strip where less than 1000' to go is not unusual with the nosewheel still on the ground.:mad:

what´s so hard about this scenario...
u call 80 kts..or let´s say 100..no reply....call it out loud...100 kts still no response? grab the throttles before those already 115 kts become 135. bring them back and then continue the takeoff rejection depending on the a/c u fly...is there any doubt about this?

We routinely see red lights at the end of the runway on takeoff. Late in the takeoff, I'm not sure that I want to be attempting to get stopped while looking at the red lights. whatever lays beyond them isn't in my favor, though returning to land with the full runway ahead of me certainly is.

Can I fly it around and get it landed by myself? Without question. There's no question I'd much rather do that, than attempt to do a high speed rejected takeoff.

The original question involves an incapacitation at 80 or 100 knots. We generally brief such that any problem up to 80 knots merits the rejected takeoff. After that, it's controllability issues or clear safety of flight issues; the other pilot incapacitated isn't one we brief, or one I'd consider necessarily significant enough to perform a high speed reject. Does the other pilot being unavailable preclude the airplane getting into the air or affect directional control? No. We're probably going flying.

When asking if the takeoff should be rejected at that point for an incapacitated pilot, one may be asking the wrong question. Perhaps a better question is who is going to take the airplane into the air. If the other pilot is truly incapacitated, then clearly the takeoff (and subsequent return for landing) will be performed by the one who isn't incapacitated. However, if it's a matter of a full-functioning pilot who didn't hear the challenge, or wasn't heard (I've had ICS failure at that inopportune time...we were both talking, yelling even, but couldn't hear each other over the increadibly loud radial engines)...book says if no response the second time, take control. Nobody was incapacitated. Just deaf.

High speed rejected takeoffs present a multitude of hazards, often far less than continuing the takeoff.

Simply because the performance data says the airplane can be stopped aproaching V1 doesn't mean that one should without just cause; an aircraft under control and accelerating properly is not necessarily just cause to reject the takeoff.

Here's another take off crash...
 

I guess these guys thought they had the numbers too...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wj8UPEfO1Oo

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHqz4...eature=related

Try reading the original question - and then post

No we are still on track...
 

Here are some more examples of pilots not looking outside who also did thier 'numbers'

At least 75 people were killed in an April 26 Indian Airlines crash that occurred near Aurangabad in western India when the pilot failed to get an overloaded Boeing 737 into the air and hit a truck loaded with bales of cotton.

20 MAR 2004 UTA B727 crash possibly caused by overloading [to table of contents]
Preliminary investigation results indicate that the UTA Boeing 727 that crashed on takeoff from Cotonou, Benin last year may have been caused by overloading. The plane was carrying about 10 tonnes of excess cargo and the weight was badly distributed. (BBC)

--------------------

The Point: The captain is out, the FO is trying to take over, and he see's 1000 feet of runway left...ect ect ect....

Personaly I see three major points that came out of this thread...

- There seems to be a total lack of understanding on how much runway a plane should use up getting to thier V speeds.

- There seems to be major disagreement on what an FO should do when the Capt is out.

- And probably most disturbing...many posters in here, seem to have an aversion to a high speed take off rejection, regardless of the numbers, and will just go...

Anyway...it's all educational....I will take the bus on my next trip....:)

Ssg,

After reading your posts throughout this thread, I see your name by a post and it only brings question marks. Put down the helium, man, and come back to earth.

If an aircraft is ten tonnes overweight, then the performance numbers for that aircraft aren't valid. Neither are the stopping parameters, distances, or even the brake energy potential. Taking off that overweight is a train wreck already in motion, whether the aircraft gets off the ground or not. It's an idiotic argument.

One might debate the merits of lighting the airplane on fire and then attempting to takeoff, departing with spoilers deployed, flat tires, or any other wild scenario.

Yes, one needs to be aware of one's stopping distance, but when one throws the numbers so far out as to make them entirely meaningless (ten tonnes over may not fly, but may not be stoppable, either...the flight is doomed regardless of what they do), then all bets are off.

This is entirely meaningless in the face of the present topic; pilot incapacitation in a multi-pilot crew. You've come up with illuminating, but entirely irrelevant examples of departing the wrong runway using a crew that isn't incapacitated, and departing grossly overweight with a crew that isn't incapacitated to help address the topic of rejecting a takeoff for a crewmember incapacitation? Exactly why?

The Comair example used an airplane which departed an unlighted runway which was too short, for which they were not cleared, and which wasn't even parallel with or aligned with the cleared runway; numerous mistakes made before ever pushing up the thrust levers. Same for the Cotonou mishap.

Your assertion here is that the crew should be keeping track of their progress down the runway and make a decision to reject based on the percentage of the runway flow. You've even introduced a Part 135 guideline to emphasize the point. No doubt events such as the infamous Air Florida trip into the Potomac River wouldn't have occured if the crew had been better aware of their progress on the runway and acted accordingly. Are you suggesting that at the moment of pilot incapacitation the monitoring pilot evaluate the remaining runway and make a decision based on his evaluation on the fly to either continue or reject?

This is established before departure. Crews know and understand that high speed rejected takeoffs have a very high potential to end badly. During a high speed rejected takeoff, much, if not most of the runway is behind. Continuing the takeoff, especially when the aircraft is functioning well and has the performance and capability to do so, makes a lot of sense...particularly when returning to land will magically put the entire runway in front of the airplane for stopping distance.

Throw out all sorts of wild and irrelevant scenarios if you like...these only serve to cloud the topic under discussion, which is rejecting a takeoff for an incapacitated pilot. Departing unlighted, closed, wrong runways in the dark, taking off grossly overweight, or any other irrelevant example doesn't help address the question at hand, and it's really starting to make you sound rather foolish. Let's try to keep on track.

Our performance calculation system, the ONLY data we are authorized to use, does not provide distance information to V1, and doesn't even tell us what the distance is to stop from V1 or go...what it does do is tell us what distance will be remaining if we elect to reject. Even if the data we have popped out a number that told us at V1 we had 63.3% of the runway behind, there just isn't any data alongside the runway (say, a big square black sign with a white border that says "63.3%) on it to use...nor would we be authorized to use it, nor does Boeing provide it, nor does Part 121 authorize it, nor does...anybody use it.

We see red lights during a normal takeoff, regularly. Aversion to high-speed rejected takeoff? You bet. You should educate yourself a little on the subject, but suffice it to say, a high speed reject is a risky endevor. As the size of the aircraft increases and along with it the mass, reduced stopping power, and rapidly rising brake temperatures and reduced stopping ability, control ability, etc...high speed rejects are far more risky than simply going airborne and coming back to put the entire runway ahead of you...with the situation under control and planned in advance.

Our fo's are trained to take over to make decisions and fly the a/c in case of emergency. If an fo can not be trusted to take off, dump fuel in emergency and then return, perhaps he shouldn't be in the seat.

Some more guys that decided to just go...
 

Congo plane crashes at end of runway; 85 aboard
Charles Ntirycha / Associated Press
GOMA, Congo -- A Congolese jetliner carrying around 85 people failed to take off Tuesday from an airport in this eastern town, crashing at high speed into a busy market neighborhood at the end of the runway, officials said.

Government officials initially said there were only six known survivors but later in the day an airline official said 60 people had survived. Local officials said dozens of bodies were pulled from the wreckage, though it was unclear if they had been passengers.

Smoke and flames engulfed the charred ruins of the aircraft, which appeared to have broken in two when it slammed into the rooftops of about 10 cement homes just outside the airport, destroying them instantly. Soldiers kept onlookers away after U.N. peacekeepers helped douse flames at the crash site.

"Smoke was rising from the plane," said Christian Kilundu, a spokesman for the Goma office of World Vision, an international aid group that has an office less than half a mile from the crash site. "As fire extinguishers were trying to put out the flames, I spoke to a priest who had been pulled from the wreckage. He was disorientated and had no idea what had happened."

Officials said they had no information on casualties among residents of the area.

The plane was operated by the private Congolese company, Hewa Bora, and was headed to the central city of Kisangani, then the capital, Kinshasa. Hewa Bora's Dirk Cramers said 53 passengers and seven crew were taken from the site and were at local hospitals.

Julien Mpaluku, the governor of the province, said there were 79 passengers on board and six crew members.

"We have already picked up many bodies -- dozens of bodies. There are a lot of flames, which makes it difficult to know if the bodies we are picking up are those of passengers of the plane or else passers-by or people that lived in the area where the plane crashed," Mpaluku said.

Employees at World Vision said the plane "failed to leave the ground," plowing instead "through wooden houses and shops in the highly populated Birere market."

The plane appeared to have been "totally flattened" by the impact, said Rachel Wolff, a U.S.-based spokeswoman for the organization who has been in contact with her colleagues in Congo.

World Vision employees who visited the scene of the crash said they saw at least eight bodies. Hours afterward, the market stalls where women had been selling their wares earlier in the day were still in flames, said Wolff.

A former pilot who survived the crash, Dunia Sindani, gave a similar account in an interview broadcast over a local U.N. radio station. The plane suffered a problem in one of its wheels -- possibly a flat tire -- and did not gain the strength to lift off, Sindani said.

-------

Just fly it to the fence and go...right guys....

I'm a long time reader of pprune and rarely get as tempted to post as this thread has made me, so I gave in.

SSG, it is obvious from your rantings that the only experience of operating big jets is that which you have gained from watching them take off from your own flight deck, or spotters fence.

I will confess to not knowing much about Gulfstreams, but I will hazard a guess that they are overpowered for their size, hence have reasonable acceleration even at high weights, and if operated from long runways will have not very many knots between V1 and VR. Well the larger jets operate differently, and you need to just accept this as fact!

There is no problem in rotating towards the end of a runway. The fact you seem to be missing (or deliberately ignoring) is that V1 could/would have been passed a long distance prior to the aircraft rotating. Therefore your points about the aircraft not having room to stop are irrelevant as a reject would not be attempted at this point unless the crew like going cross country on the deck!

Also, I'm wondering how the second youtube link you posted is in any way an example to prove your point? :ugh::ugh:

This talk of flying to the fence and pulling back the stick is pure nonsense. If you have that little faith in how the larger jets are operated I am inclined to think you are not a pilot at all.

Back to the topic, I have been flying single aisle Airbus for nearly 2 years, so as an FO feel qualified to comment on what I would do in such a scenario.

If after a second, loud, speed callout there was no reponse, and we were on a short runway, V1 being close (time wise) to our standard 100kts call due to quick acceleration, then I would definitely continue. Assuming CAT1 or better weather then a quick radar vectored circuit would give time for the cabin crew to aid the Captain, the paramedics to be called to a stand, the situation to be thought through, and a nice long runway ahead of me. Another important consideration is that after a high speed abort on a short runway, the brakes will be very hot. Fuse plugs could melt etc and being stranded on the runway will just increase the amount of time it takes to get medical treatment to the capt. If an evacuation is required due to a brake fire then getting a heavy captain out of his/her seat in a hurry is not a task I would relish!

If, however, I was on a ridiculously long runway, Munich for example, where a typical V1 would be in the 140-150 region even at max flex, then by the time incap had been diagnosed the speed would still be way below V1 with maybe 2/3's of the runway remaining. In this case an RTO would not cook the brakes too badly, assuming I would have the awareness to disconnect the autobrakes and reduce the deceleration.

Of course being in a bus with a tiller on the RHS makes this scenario better for an incap captain and definitely leads to a better outcome in the eyes of the airport operater who doesn't have inconvenience of a blocked runway.

SSG, I can't believe you just posted an FS movie and mentioned Hewa Bora...

Do you know what an air data computer is? Clearly not. FO "puts in the wrong numbers?" You play microsoft flight simulator, don't you? It would appear any student pilot would have a better idea on this than you.

Your use of the DC-9 overrun at Goma is another example of introducing irrelevant but dramatic material in an effort to cloud the issue. What you left out is that the runway is in poor condition, six years after being damaged and shortened by a volcanic erruption...and still unrepaired. The runway was wet. No details are provided beyond laymans descriptions of blood and carnage, regarding what actually occured...so it's use in a technical discussion contributes nothing at all. I think you used google and listed the first aircraft mishap you found in the hopes it might prove the unfounded and clouded point you're hoping to make.

Did the crew attempt to reject the takeoff or continue? Do you know? Reports vary, some claiming a blown tire, some claiming an explosion, nobody having an useful information on that event, least of all yourself. And of all the environments you could have picked, you chose Africa, where aviation safety is roughly on par with the price of tea in china, and also just as relevant. You picked the Congo, where fire fatal mishaps have occured in the last year. And where airline flights to the EU have been banned for safety violations. This is what you use to demonstrate a safe operation or make a point?

Perhaps in your microsoft flight simulator.

The videos are clear cut examples? One is a rejected takeoff...which overran the end. You assert that the crew should have rejected the takeoff earlier? Earlier such as when the engine hadn't failed? The crew should have simply elected to reject the takeoff for no good reason? You have no credibility here. Clearly just looking for an arguement that doesn't exist.

The other clear cut example you use...the microsoft flight simulation of a crash that never occured, is imaginary, and cartoonish. Clear cut? No. Example? No. It's a clip from a computer game showing an imaginary airplane and nothing more.

Thus far you've used dramatized examples regarding mishaps for which no information is available, cartoons of imaginary wrecks, and while trying to support the notion of rejecting rather than continuing the takeoff, you provide footage of a 747 that rejects and overruns anyway. Brilliant...you couldn't make a worse case if you tried...and one can't be sure you're not trying hard.

Ok....now I get it..
 

If you want to rotate with 9000 ft of runway left, on fire, into the soup...go for it...

if you want to burn up 10000ft slowly accelerating to V1, eyes glued to your AS ind. oblivious to what is happening outside...go for it...

If you want to live in a world where go or no go V speeds will fit just nicely into all take off scenarios without thinking, adapting, or having any concept of being ahead of the aircraft or situational awareness...go for it,..just don't have any passengers that day...

I did a little research...using flex and reduced power, anyone can extend his take distance and V speeds so far down the runway to make a ten thousand foot runway feel like a nail bitter. So I wanna know, using max power, max payload, you guys burning up 8-9000 ft to get to VR..??

SSG,
If my brakes did fail I'd much prefer it to be on landing than at the beginning of an RTO, for reasons that any sane pilot will not require explaining.

A heavy aircraft, using 9000ft of a 10000ft runway to rotate? I don't see anything wrong with that. Maybe his V1 was at 6000ft? You will never know unless you are in that flight deck, This might interest you....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=feGZ4l5fk4Q

please note, this is a real video, not flightsim.

So the pilots in that clip had poor or no situational awareness?

SNS3Guppy, I think the phrase "flogging a dead horse" has never been more fitting.

Why is that policy insane? In fact it makes cold hard commonsense.

Your responsibility as second in command is to advise the pilot in command of the problem and in turn he is entirely responsible for the decision to reject or continue. Any captain who blindly aborts a take off on a "reject" call from the first officer is either supremely over-confident of his first officers uncanny ability to instantly diagnose a serious event during take off -or - he is incompetent. Probably both..

ssg, why are you so adamant about using 8000ft or 9000ft or runway? Can't you use percentages please? It makes no sense to say that using 9000ft of runway to rotate if you don't tell us how long the runway is. What it is 12,000ft? Or 15,000ft? Where is the problem of using 75% of a runway to get airborne? Where is the problem of using the full legal amount? Granted not ideal, but a runway is there to be used and so is an aircraft to its legal and sensible limits.

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Screwball,

Some posters, on this forum kept making the case that airliners routinely hit Vr with a thousand to go...in response to my observation of 737s on my home field, doing just that on a 10,000 ft field.

As I came to become acquanted with Flex power, and those that abuse it, I realized that some guys are pretty much flying it to the fence, under reduced power...and just waiting and waiting on the take off roll, watching he AS indicator, pretty much hoping the take off would go ok...not much room for error...in the confidence that should something go wrong with one engine, they can throw the power up on the last remaining good one...

So when one poster, mentioned hitting V1 at 75% of the runway, on a 10,000 ft field, with Vr another 2000+ ft down, calling it legal...I had a hard to time thinking that was safe..I still don't

It's just guys using Flex power to take it to the edge....

I take it he's still banging on? This 'ignore' is great. Yup, Alaskan have gone up in my estimation. Any more African overruns popped up?

SSG

When will you get it into your thick head that, on a flex takeoff, should you lose 1 engine you do not have to increase power on the remaining engines. You can if you so desire but there is no necessity to do so. You stupid or something?

Still waiting for your answer to my question about the performance rules you follow on Biz Jets that I asked on another thread.

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Part 25 aircraft...adhere to mininum runway and climb requirements, standard stuff...

Thankyou SSG

Hi D&M

"I have control", priority push-button, continue with take-off.

We follow the same procedure close to V1. We guys are trained for low speed as well as high speed RTO's in the sim, if I have the guy, or the lady, on my left quitting on me, the first thing on my mind is get off the ground at high speeds, give a MAYDAY call, and plan for an arrival. My question is, why is the priority push button so important if you're gonna sit there for 40 seconds keeping that button pushed when you have better things to do when you're airborne ?? All he/she's gotta do while falling over is touch the AP disconnect and the priority's lost again ?? We are told the same thing in the sim or otherwise, BUT WHY IS THIS NOT IN THE SOP (FCOM 3) ??