A hasty go-around. Easy to be wise after the event
 

https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/...no_Italy,_2008

Sometimes a hasty decision works out OK. Other times it doesn't. This is one occasion when a hasty decision (startle effect is the new buzzword) was wrong. Being wise after the event is another way of looking at it.

Present level of flight safety to some extent is the result of being wise after events so there absolutely nothing wrong with that. If pilots were to learn everything from their own experience they may not live that long. By all accounts the decision to go around at less than 136ft because of birds was without any thought process involved. Call it startle or whatever it goes without saying was inappropriate, even if it would have worked. A slight delay in hitting TOGA would have brought them flare height. It was like reject takeoff after V1. It
​​​can happen lucky to get away. So below certain height if stabilized there has to be a predetermination to land without thinking.

Isn't your question superfluous? Just because you would go around in CAT3 with Flare mode failure you would like to go around in visual with a flock of birds at 100ft? I can only hope I am not among passengers.

I disagree. It's nothing like rejecting take off after V1 - it is a recognised procedure called "Balked Landing".

The guidance mentioned in the report "Birdstrike Threat Awareness" says,
"VII.2 At Landing • On short final, do not go around, if birds are encountered, but fly through the bird flock and land. Try to maintain a low thrust setting. • The use of reverse thrust on landing after a birdstrike should be avoided. It may increase engine damage, especially when engine vibration or high EGT are indicated."

Pity - that crew hadn't read it.

Bear in mind this was from 2008 and there have been many advances in the technical and HP&L arenas since then.

There you are on short finals as captain and PM and you see a massive (>1,000 according to the report) flock of birds. After you’ve made the decision to avoid them, communicated it to the PF (who hasn’t seen them), the PF has overcome his startle reaction and commenced a GA, you fly into it. Shortly after, both engines suffer severe damage making a descent and landing the only option.

This is an unpleasant situation to be in, not least because of the multiple reversals of intent over a short timescale: first landing, then GA, then forced landing. Coordinating something like that is a tricky CRM problem which doesn’t get practiced much, if at all, so it is no surprise that it went a bit pear shaped. That said, the aircraft got a bit bent but everyone inside lived, which for a double engine failure could be said to be a good result.

Yes, you could argue that there might have been a better result if the captain (or FO, had he been PM in a similar situation) had immediately taken control and gone around, then informed the other pilot why but guidance on bird encounters only came out *after* this event.

The accident was severe enough to trigger thorough investigation from all angles, leading to improved/new procedures and training but not so severe as to seriously injure or kill anyone. One might actually call that progress.

Pity the crew hadn’t read the accident report before the accident, either...

Interesting read. How signifiant is it that they had switched off A/T, AP and FD? Would an Airbus 'alpha floor' type of protection have prevented the stall and flop and resulted in a more controlled return to earth after the odd decision to attempt a go around with engines full of dead birds ?

Hi FullWings,
The Airbus document "Birdstrike Threat Awareness" was published Oct 2004.
https://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/181.pdf

Yes but they were in a 737...

Ah. I had misunderstood, thought it gave you full power but also limited AoA to give steepest possible climb.

without thinking???...no thanks...always need to be thinking...

it does, but cannot do so IF THE ENGINES ARE FLAMED OUT

You misunderstood what I stated. I was referring to sudden reaction on impulse. Baulked Landing is not a procedure to fly into two dozen birds. Nor is there any procedure that mandates go around after sighting birds. If you thing they followed baulked Landing then it was as bad as following UAS procedure after takeoff at FL370(AF447). From 120ft by the time engine winds down after damage you will have a residual thrust to take you short of runway. At 120ft you don't need to have read any procedure. It's common sense. You always have some additions to VLS. If you shed that or even go five kts below VLs heaven is not going to come down.

Exactly, so wouldn't have allowed a pitch-up without corresponding airspeed, in Cessna terms would have pitched for an impossible Vx, with a gentle slide onto the runway?

See AF276 at Habsheim...

With engines flamed out in alternate law there is no alpha floor or AoA protection if you pull up you will be in full stall.

A IIIB approach is fail operational by design. A failure to flare may be trained in the sim, however it is by design not expected to be a failure mode that is acceptable. My time on 320/330/340 is limited, but on a B747 757 767 777 787, the system for autoland is not tracking the GS at the latter stages of the approach to land, and the algorithm that the flare is predicated on requires a valid RALT and not much more. In between the tracking of the GS to the flare, the aircraft tracking alters to an inertial biased solution. Now I haven't looked at that since an investigation some years back, but in normal operations a IIIB approach flown in accordance with the FCOM/POH/FCTM/AFM(latter is pretty light on detail..) should not fail. Bus's do pretty well from my limited time on type.