So at what altitude do you suggest I stop thinking and just land?

200ft, because that is Alert Height for an Auto Land?
100ft, even if there is a runway incursion?
50ft, even though I over flared and will not touchdown within landing zone triggering a long landing event?
10ft, after I slam in on and have a high bounce, even though Airbus say in that event I should go around?

My manual says I can Go Around up until I select REV THR.

It's in the 737 FCTM as well.

That said, I agree with FullWings. This accident has been done to death. Everyone has learnt something. It was a good recovery after the engine failure(s) and none was killed.

Not sure what alpha floor, or autopilot mode, discussions will further lead to.

Yes, it is *now* but to quote from the official report:
It may seem a bit nit-picky but it is easy to revisit past occurrences using contemporary knowledge and not what people had available to them at the time. Otherwise I agree with you. ;)

Alright, didn't know that was the result of that accident. thanks!

I think you misunderstood my point. I am talking about events like an engine fire /failure/smoke below 500 feet or even two hundred feet would you go around to do the procedure? Or even birds after this discussion. I am sure you won't. Every one knows you go round after bad bounce or any of those things you mentioned.

Towards what vilas is trying to say: there's the 400 feet no action rule too...

Thanks FD. May be I should have written my post differently. What you said already exists, add even birds sighting to that.

The so-called "Startle Effect" is insidious and has been known to cause a pilot to make an instantaneous decision that can go either way.

As an example: A 737-200 crew experienced a flashing of the Wing Body Overheat light while taxiing for take off on a short (5600 ft) sea level tropical island in the Central Pacific region. The WBO light extinguished three minutes before the takeoff roll commenced. The captain briefed that if the WBO light came on again below 80 knots he would abort and above 80 knots the take off would be continued according to the FCTM advice and the problem would be sorted out in the air. There was no runway end safety area - only a cliff into the sea 30 metres off the end of the runway.

At approximately 10 knots below V1, the Master Caution light illuminated along with the WBO annunciator light. The captain immediately rejected the takeoff catching the first officer as PM by surprise. Such was the drama, the captain not only forgot to manually select spoilers up but the first officer was so startled (horrified is a better description) he forgot to warn the captain of no speed brakes. Full reverse had been applied by the captain. The aircraft stopped right on the end of the runway and after regaining his composure, the captain taxied to the tarmac and shut down the engines.

The F/O then asked the captain why he, contrary to his earlier takeoff safety briefing, had aborted the take off. The captain was perfectly honest in his reply, saying " I haven't got a clue - it was an instantaneous knee-jerk decision made when the Master Caution illuminated directly in front of my eyes."

The second example of startle factor was a Viscount taking off on a long runway. The aircraft was light but the runway was damp from recent rain. On line-up the crew saw hundreds of birds on the runway apparently feeding off tiny worms. The crew delayed the departure while fire and rescue crews hosed the birds off the runway. During the takeoff run and at V1 many birds were seen to arise from the grass adjacent to the runway edges and fly directly into the Viscount. Multiple bird strikes occurred. The pilot immediately aborted the takeoff fearing the possibility of bird ingestion into the engines. With ample length of runway remaining the Viscount was stopped without heavy braking and taxied to the tarmac.

Engineers inspected the aircraft discovering evidence of bird strikes. The engines were ground-run and found serviceable. The aircraft then departed. Earlier, 24 dead birds were found on the runway. In his statement, the pilot said he was aware that the runway was twice the length needed for takeoff and this influenced his decision to reject the takeoff at high speed above V1 as he had no knowledge of any damage caused by the multiple bird strikes or if birds had been ingested by the engines which may fail seconds after lift-off.