Uncommanded thrust reverser deployment in flight
What would you do if you encountered this situation?
Have you trained for it (procedures or simulator)? Has anyone here experienced it? I was reading a very interesting and sad NTSB report about a Lear 35 which had this problem last year. The crew apparently was clueless and had a lot of doctored logbooks and certifications, so their fate was sealed, but I still wonder how the average crew would handle this situation if it happened to them. In your aircraft, are there definite indicators that the reverser has deployed, or do you have to hunt down what may be causing the problem? |
Maybe shut down the engine?
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How could you practice for a catastrophic event in a simulator?
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a very interesting and sad NTSB report Occurrence date/time - November 19, 2013, at 1956 eastern standard time. https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.a...14FA045&akey=1 Multiple Failures Put Learjet into the Atlantic | Business Aviation content from Aviation Week |
For the B737 Classics, the thrust lever for that engine will close to idle immediately without pilot action. This takes place so that only idle reverse is experienced and is easily countered. There will be some buffet. Follow the QRH once you have the aircraft under control. If roll is severe due to high power on the good engine, immediate closing of the thrust lever on the "good" engine should minimize the severity of the roll
I understand in the B737 NG series the engine also automatically goes to idle reverse but the thrust lever doesn't move until you go through the QRH and take the published action. I recommend you Google the report (see link) on the Lauda Air Boeing 767 that experienced an uncommanded in flight thrust reverser during climb. On that accident the aircraft rolled rapidly and control was lost. I recall reading that investigation showed the crew had four seconds to take corrective action before loss of control would occur. That corrective action was not specified but I presume would have included immediate closing of both thrust levers and knowledge of unusual attitude recovery on instruments. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lauda_Air_Flight_004 How could you practice for a catastrophic event in a simulator? |
I still wonder how the average crew would handle this situation if it happened to them. Lauda Air B767 Accident Report Since then, we have always had a QRH / ECAM procedure. Basically it says to reduce thrust (Idle), Reduce Airspeed, Shut the engine down, control the aircraft with full rudder trim and sufficient bank to maintain heading. |
Also happened to a Fk100 (Brazil I think). Affected side thrust lever automatically slams closed (will take your fingers off if in the way). Believe the crew were unaware of this function with disastrous consequences.
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So do all boeing and airbus aircraft have reliable indicators that the reverser is indeed the problem?
The reason I asked this question is because the problem-solving you have to do is nightmarish if you don't have any clear cockpit indicators of what is happening. The big trouble is if you or the other guy shuts off the engine and that turns out not to have been what was causing the problem. I suppose that is why the checklists say to return the suspect engine to idle rather than shut it down, as I have seen some people do in incident reports. Imagine you've just taken off, a little bit beyond V2 maybe, flaps start coming up, then BAM you experience severe yaw or roll and your airspeed starts decreasing. Is a thrust reverser the first thing that comes to your mind? What other possibilities are there that could cause this state? Severe flap asymmetry and/or uncommanded spoiler deployment? |
Airbus FBW have a boxed "REV" indication that appears on the respective N1 or EPR gauge - amber while reverser is travelling, green when in correct position.
The FADEC will command idle thrust in the event of one or more reverser doors unlocked in flight or not in commanded position, and/or will command auto restow. You might also get a ENG 1(2) at IDLE message and ENG 1(2) SHUTDOWN command on ECAM. It tells you to set thrust to idle and engine master off, along with speed limit, max rudder trim, and LAND ASAP amber. . |
those appear when you command reverse thrust, but i think the most common situation this is going to happen is when maintenance does sloppy work and something goes awry. in this situation, are your indicators still going to show up? and if you've got no indication, are you going to be able to diagnose what the problem is without that indicator?
as you say, the loss of control and utter lack of time you have to solve the situation before it becomes unfixable is a little unnerving. |
In airbus it should not be a problem. There is case from Safety first below, the aircraft was despatched with one reverser deactivated:
the aircraft was dispatched with the thrust reverser unlocked and free to move under aerodynamic forces. Less than 4 minutes after take-off, the engine N°1 auto-idle was activated. It activates once there is more than 10% opening of the reverser, and brings down the TRA to idle based on the initial TRA position. This reverser opening detection also triggered the Auto thrust disconnection. The Auto re-stow which is also normally triggered was not effective since there was no hydraulic power due to the proper de-activation of the HCU. As described in the Flight data analysis, there was very little changes on aircraft flight characteristics. Based on the flight parameters evolution it is assumed that the thrust reverser deployed slowly due to the aerodynamic forces (there was no hydraulic power due to HCU de-activation). The aircraft maintained control with no upset throughout the event. The engine was shut-down, then the Auto thrust was re-engage, and an IFTB was made followed by an uneventful single engine landing. |
The uncommanded reverser problem that most talk about is Lauda (there are others)
The pinch point in control of the aircraft for some aircraft is the climb portion where the wing control surfaces are defeated by the reverser eflux. Yes there are some things that might recover but unless you can act real fast in the right direction ..... I know of one where the PF just continued the aircraft roll through 360 deg and completed the flight without his passengers knowing it happened. The best corrective action is to act as soon as the reverser unlock light flickers and reduce the engine to idle (no need to shut it down in most cases). If the discussion is to be about business jets alone, then my comments above may not apply. |
On a twin with most large turbofan engines, if the reverser deploys in flight your chances of a happy outcome are pretty minimal. I was involved in the Lauda investigation - including wind tunnel testing with a reverser deployed. It's not just the thrust asymmetry - the big problem is that the reverser efflux effectively spoils the lift on the wing and that side drops like a rock.
As a result, the cert basis for all Boeing aircraft has changed from 'it's controllable' to 'it'll never happen (3 independent failures, probability less than 10E-10 per flight hour). It's a regulation that, with the reverser in an uncommanded position, the engine can not provide more than idle thrust. On the pre-FADEC engines this was done mechanically with a fairly complex feedback mechanism that would move the throttle to idle (rather forcefully as sheppey notes - yes it'll break your hand if it's in the wrong place). With FADEC it's all done with electronics and the throttle doesn't move but the engine will still be commanded to idle. The main problem - as Lauda demonstrated - is the transient. When Lauda deployed, the engine was at max climb and the decel characteristics at 24k/Mach .78 meant the aircraft was long since out of control before the engine reached idle. Paradoxbox, Boeing displays an amber/green "REV" above the EPR/N1 display to indicate the reverser is in-transit (amber) or deployed (green) - and it's a robust indication. IF the reverser has in fact deployed it's not likely to help much. |
The C-5 Ramstein crash was attributed to a TR deployment near lift-off. Yes, the destruction of lift by the TR efflux is probably more a factor than just the TR. On aft-mounted engines, the effect is drag caused by the TR panels and reversed thrust without the lift destruction component. Still the highest yaw of all the engine failure modes and add in a crosswind, control becomes difficult. IAS is usually limited at about 200 KIAS, depending on type.
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Back in the day, a particular nasty trainer gave me a thrust reverser deploy (on the sim) at full power at rotate. (Eng remained at full power) Don't think it was even possible on a 737 but my call of feather it (just come of turboprops) ensured it was shut down by the capt. we were 30 deg off heading but back on track by 200 ft. My point being sometimes s** the qrh just do whatsynecessary.(remember full rudder & full aileron)
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During my time on the F70/100, we were sometimes presented this malfunction by the instructor. As has been mentioned by T7A, there is a cable connecting the reverser buckets to the (IIRC) FCU, and on to the power levers, slamming the affected engines lever to the idle position when the buckets open. Although the engine spooled down to a corresponding thrust setting immediately, it was quite a ride and required some work with the controls to keep the aircraft pointed in a good general direction. As soon as the engine was shut down, though, it did not feel much different from an ordinary engine failure except for the affected power lever still remaining stuck in the flight idle position.
I am not sorry I never had to try this in the real aircraft. |
Indications
If I recall correctly, the Lauda 767 did have a number of issues with its reverser on previous flights, indicated by (intermittent?) REV ISLN (reverse isolation) light.
Also on the accident flight, the REV ISLN light illuminated intermittently. Position of reverser is properly indicated on engine instruments, probably on every aircraft type, by "no indication" for stowed, amber "REV" for in transit, green "REV" for deployed. In case of uncommanded deployment, warning display may trigger an alert (depending on aircraft type). For chance of recovery - at low altitude, low speed, high thrust, chances are dim, lack of maneuvering room. At high altitude, improper reaction may come into play: unfamiliarity with unusual attitude recovery (civilian flight training conditions people to maintain positive gee and to pull to get back up to altitude; in case of severe roll this will lead to a pull through the vertical down, which will invariably destroy a jetliner. Proper reaction would be to unload, roll back or roll through, but keep the nose from dipping down too deep). Many informative postings prior to this one, compliments. |
This is turning into a great thread, thanks for the replies everyone.
But I hope someone will answer my question (perhaps it was not clear enough) I know that under normal circumstances most aircraft (all?) have indicators for thrust reverser deployment -when on the ground-. But.. When you are in the air, and the reverser has deployed, for example by aerodynamic forces, or mechanical failure (parts falling off etc) - will the indicators still appear in your aircraft? Is there some kind of mechanical or electrical sensor that physically or electronically detects that the reverser door or doors are not stowed completely? Does it detect when the door is only open slightly or do the doors need to open to the stops before the sensor detects it? If the cause of the deployment is due to faulty maintenance, will the sensor (i.e. in the Airbus) still be able to detect that the door is open? Sounds like some aircraft have a physical link to the throttles which slams the throttle lever down. That sounds like a nasty hospital bill but certainly better than crashing. What about in the Boeings and others i.e. CRJ? And if for some reason you did not get a cockpit indicator, do you think you would still come to the conclusion that your reverser was stuck open and act appropriately? Or would you be hunting for other possible solutions and miss the obvious as the Lear crew did? |
Originally Posted by IcePack
(Post 9882329)
My point being sometimes s** the qrh just do whatsynecessary.(remember full rudder & full aileron)
Too long ago for me to remember the date (or apparently for Google either), Eastern Airlines had a TR on a DC9(-30 I think) come open right at rotation or immediately after in KATL. They were dispatched with it inop but MTC didn't properly secure it so it came unlocked and fully deployed while at T/O power. IIRC, they immediately closed the throttle and shut off the fuel and lived to fly another day. If they had any advantage, it was knowing that TR had been messed with but mostly it was superior airmanship. IIRC, the reverse component for the -30 was 40% of engine being thrust produced. We tried the event in the sim during recurrent and if you didn't IMMEDIATELY snap the throttle to idle and shut off the fuel…you didn't make it. As you said, no time for any book or even thinking about any book. As for indications, I never flew a TJ airplane where the reverser indications were different air vs ground but I can't speak for all airplane types. |
We tried the event in the sim during recurrent and if you didn't IMMEDIATELY snap the throttle to idle and shut off the fuel…you didn't make it.
As you said, no time for any book or even thinking about any book. This says a great deal about today's training in some airlines. Glad to hear there is some imagination in some airlines. I was so tired and fed up of the repetitive trivia served up in LPC's & OPC's. It was mind numbing and not very educational after the umpteenth time of a mandatory item. RST's tried to inject some variances, but the emphasis was on CRM, QRH, FDM & SOP's. There was not a lot of thinking outside the envelope. Guys are terrified of having to solve a problem without a checklist: terrified of acting immediately, as the scenario dictates, as a pilot. Their first thought is "what does the SOP say?" Then there is a huge ? mark as they realise there isn't one. OMG, what to do. I was in RST's given by 2 year F/O's SFI. They had the script. It was quite interesting to remember the times they commented, "I haven't seen anyone do that before, but it worked. Hm?" That was from the enlightened ones. The others just chimed in, "you weren't supposed to do that." Oh dear. I used to really enjoy the education gained by designing scenarios where there was no checklist; and often derived from real events that went wrong. Sadly, that was stamped out by those who thought it taught a bad attitude. How many accidents have happened because the crew failed to follow the QRH correctly? Not many. It is the WTF factor that fuddles the brain and needs a knowledge of the a/c & aviation to solve the problem that trips up the majority. The NTSB investigators are sometimes quite bemused as to 'why the heck did they do that'. Often it was because they didn't know any better, but they should have. In my some of my previous outfits they had one OPC/LPC program and one RST. You could ask your mates what happened and what the sequence was and what they did. Not very educational or confidence building. RST's should be real training and fun. Find out about yourself & the a/c and the way you behave under certain conditions. Checking should be more realistic and less repetitive trained monkey stuff. Ah, but then too many might fail and need re-training and that is disruptive to the roster, especially in the summer. Tick the boxes and smile. XAA happy, CFO happy. HOT? that depends. |
On Boeing 717, BR715 engines, there is mechanical connection from reverser scoop structure to LVDT via cable. Cannot recall indication as i am not fully certified engineer for that a/c type, might be transit/deployed light on EFIS. Another proxy sensors (unlock?) are located on lock actuators and senses if locking tongues moves out from locked position. This aircraft have full scoop reversers, like old DC/MD-series.
These reversers are locked mechanically by lock tongues, two/scoop, and overcentering links on pivot point. Canīt remember anymore is hydraulic rams pressurized to stowe all the time when commanded stowe. Incidents happens for this a/c when reverser deploys during flight, manufacturer made some modifications to overcome this problem. Like all a/c systems, these gadgets needs lots of maintenance. |
Like all a/c systems, these gadgets needs lots of maintenance. Some fail-safe features have their own hidden faults and since they never get used in most of the life of an aircraft system, you don't know they are at fault or won't work when sorely needed. I have seen too many assumptions in reliability of detection or prevention devices that were never validated during manufacture or installation. Like a "jezzuz bolt we need balances in our attempts to minimize since we can't seem to prevent anything for sure. |
Originally Posted by paradoxbox
(Post 9882355)
But.. When you are in the air, and the reverser has deployed, for example by aerodynamic forces, or mechanical failure (parts falling off etc) - will the indicators still appear in your aircraft? Is there some kind of mechanical or electrical sensor that physically or electronically detects that the reverser door or doors are not stowed completely? Does it detect when the door is only open slightly or do the doors need to open to the stops before the sensor detects it? If the cause of the deployment is due to faulty maintenance, will the sensor (i.e. in the Airbus) still be able to detect that the door is open?
Sounds like some aircraft have a physical link to the throttles which slams the throttle lever down. That sounds like a nasty hospital bill but certainly better than crashing. What about in the Boeings and others i.e. CRJ? IIRC, the F100 crash occurred when the T/R deployed, the crew didn't realize why the throttle retarded and were able to force it back forward (basically they managed to override the safety device). In the aftermath we were tasked to determine if was physically possible for the crew to override the strut drum box on the Boeing aircraft that used that feedback (we determined they couldn't). EMIT, again going by memory here, but I recall for Lauda is that there was a recurring T/R feedback fault to the FADEC, unrelated to actual cause of the deployment (although the troubleshooting of that fault might have contributed - one of the things we discovered during the investigation was the maintenance manual was junk). On the event flight, what we believed happened was the 'reverser stowed' prox sensor was slightly miss-rigged and would occasionally indicated the T/R wasn't stowed - this caused the auto-restow system to open the hydraulic isolation valve which would pull the T/R up tight, the prox sensor would indicated stowed, auto-restow would close the isolation valve. Normal vibration would then allow the T/R to move slightly, the prox sensor would indicate not-stowed and the cycle would repeat. On one of those cycles, when auto-restow opened the isolation valve - for reasons that were never firmly established - the directional control valve changed state to deploy... Whoops:( The FDR was destroyed in Lauda and there was no usable data - so most of what we know is from the Voice Recorder and the non-volatile fault memory of the event engine FADEC. The FADEC was recording a T/R position feedback fault every time the T/R deployed - so there was a list of 'normal' deploy conditions - 500 ft., Mach .23, 800 ft. Mach .25, etc., then 24,000 ft. Mach .78. The first time I looked at that fault dump was one of the darkest days of my life... |
tdracer,
Was it that uncontrollable based on the aero analysis? Why I ask is the C-5 had a TR deploy in cruise and while certainly attention getting, it was controllable and didn't cause structural damage. Yes, at low altitude, not survivable. |
In your aircraft, are there definite indicators that the reverser has deployed, Basically it says to reduce thrust (Idle), Reduce Airspeed, Shut the engine down, control the aircraft with full rudder trim and sufficient bank to maintain heading. |
tdtracer
..... Normal vibration would then allow the T/R to move slightly, the prox sensor would indicate not-stowed and the cycle would repeat. On one of those cycles, when auto-restow opened the isolation valve - for reasons that were never firmly established - the directional control valve changed state to deploy... Whoops Your comment about vibration reminded me of the reverser deployment that turned the aircraft over 360 degrees and was only discovered in the data days later with three of us reviewing the DFDR I still remember the remark by one of us as "holy-****" when the roll passed through 180 degrees Again flickering lights. When we tried to duplicate it it wouldn't deploy on the ground during runups (fail safes worked) until somebody gave a rap to the side of the engine with his hand and it deployed (specific vibration floated a fail-safe spring) lessons learned which I will never forget !!! but now the regs call for three levels of safety .... but it's memories of what we all screwed up that I shall never forget |
Originally Posted by galaxy flyer
(Post 9882592)
tdracer,
Was it that uncontrollable based on the aero analysis? Why I ask is the C-5 had a TR deploy in cruise and while certainly attention getting, it was controllable and didn't cause structural damage. Yes, at low altitude, not survivable. |
Originally Posted by galaxy flyer
(Post 9882592)
tdracer,
Was it that uncontrollable based on the aero analysis? Why I ask is the C-5 had a TR deploy in cruise and while certainly attention getting, it was controllable and didn't cause structural damage. Yes, at low altitude, not survivable. Initially, the aero analysis said the 767 should be controllable - and in fact they did flight test it during the original aircraft cert - at a stable 200 knots, 10k, engine at idle, they initiated a reverser deployment and were able to control the aircraft. So we went to the wind tunnel - this was during the development of the 777 and they had a half model of a 777 with blown reverser. The 767 aerodynamically looks very much like a 777, just smaller, so we changed the 777 model from the normal landing configuration to a 'clean wing' cruise with a deployed reverser. Before we started the test, there was an aero S&C guy that kept proclaiming it was controllable and the flight crew had blown it - going so far as saying he go on a flight test where they duplicated the in-flight deployment. But as the testing progressed he started getting really quiet. By the time the testing wrapped up a week later he wouldn't talk about it... When they updated the simulation with the updated aero characteristics from the wind tunnel testing, it quickly became apparent the flight crew never had a chance. When they tested the actual deployment scenario, a few pilots could save it when they knew it was coming and it happened during daylight with outside visual queues. When did it at night in the clouds (the actual Lauda conditions), no one could save it even when they knew it was coming :uhoh: When we finished up with the instrumented wind tunnel testing, they did a flow visualization test - and the result was dramatic. Being a propulsion guy, I didn't really understand all those aero S&C coefficients and such, but I could readily understand the visualization of separated flow. Nearly the entire upper wing was separated, along with a good share of the tail surfaces. Yes and the critical valve initially could not be found even among the parts being flogged off at the local flea markets. Later I heard that it was found after having been rebuilt in some native's hut. There are several theories as to what did cause the DCV to change state - one TV show I saw postulated it was a short circuit but most of us involved in the investigation think that unlikely (during testing the circuit breaker always popped before the valve moved). My personal theory is was a hydraulic hammer effect from the repeated cycling of the isolation valve. |
That's very interesting, tdracer. IIRC, they were a former EAL crew on contract to Lauda. Knowing a bit about the efflux problem on the C-5 (engines very inboard compared to the 747) and the mid-ish span location on a twin, I understand what the testing showed.
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Hi sheppey,
I don't understand the "full rudder trim" point. What aircraft type are you referring to? "If Buffet: The warning alone, without buffet or vibration, may be a false warning. MAX SPEED... 240 KT ENG MASTER... (affected engine) OFF If reverser is actually deployed: RUD TRIM... FULL R (L) CONTROL HDG WITH ROLL" In Normal Law, it may be due to fact there is no feed back through side stick of the amount of aileron required and possibility of running out of aileron authority unless lots of rudder is applied. |
Lauda
Very interesting details, tdracer!
As far as training is concerned, when the accident happened, apparently the simulators still had a failure mode of REV deployed inflight. After the modification of the real 767 aircraft system, so that REV deployment inflight was really moved into the 10 to the minus umpteen regime, the failure mode was removed from the simulators. By the time I had a sim session and wanted to "try" whether an inflight deployment would be recoverable, it was no longer possible to have the failure simulated. Reading the replies from tdracer, I assume the simulator fidelity of the REV deployed inflight scenario would not have been realistic anyway. |
We used to train this in the sim on the Lear 45. The thrust lever automatically snapped to idle if the reverser deployed and we were trained immediately to shut the engine down.
The aircraft was marginally controllable and between stick shaker and V2 until you shut it down. You could just about attain a positive rate. One wily TRE also trained knowing the location of and instinctively pulling the deploy CB (4th back on the bottom row since you ask :E) as a backup. It was a good sim exercise, but it was seriously demanding even if you were in "sim" mode, and over beers we wondered whether it would be survivable if it happened for real. |
So do people think it's worth the risk of setting power to idle without knowing for certain if a reverser is the cause?
Some people have mentioned that the vibrations and noise would indicate a reverser problem, but in the aircraft I have flown, spoilers also cause a lot of vibration and noise and yaw/roll action. Without being able to see the back of the aircraft I think it would be hard to differentiate between an uncommanded reverser and an uncommanded assymetric spoiler deployment very quickly - unless you had some kind of experience, sim or otherwise, that let you judge otherwise. I agree with the guy who mentions combat / aerobatic training as being extremely useful in this kind of situation. I think that a typical civilian crew that has "positive g, altitude" on their minds 24/7 may be in trouble. Unloading the aircraft (0g) would probably buy you a lot of time. I wonder how unloading the aircraft (0g / 0 or low AoA) would affect things in a thrust reverser deployed situation. I do not trust sims to get this right but I also do not want to try it in a real aircraft, thankyouverymuch. Any test pilots with parachutes want to give this a shot? |
Interesting. I seem to remember a few aircraft that would use deliberately use the thrust reverse in flight, the DC8? The Concorde to get from SS speeds.
It is commonly used on a few military aircraft, I remember the ride on a C17 diving in...without warning, it does feel as if you have been shot down. you could not do that with paying customers, at least ones you like. |
So do people think it's worth the risk of setting power to idle without knowing for certain if a reverser is the cause? In an actual event, the crew reported flickering unlock lights during initial climb. They discussed the possibility of false warnings (loose connections, wiring etc.) but decided it would be prudent to follow the FCOM and pull the affected engine back to idle. The unlock light ceased so they once again advanced the throttle to maintain climb profile. The reverser then deployed and rolled the aircraft over to 180 deg in a matter of seconds. The airforced trained PF then completed the roll through 360 deg and requested clearance to return to the field. On ground examination found nothing wrong. |
In an actual event, the crew reported flickering unlock lights during initial climb. They discussed the possibility of false warnings (loose connections, wiring etc.) but decided it would be prudent to follow the FCOM and pull the affected engine back to idle. The unlock light ceased so they once again advanced the throttle to maintain climb profile. The reverser then deployed and rolled the aircraft over to 180 deg in a matter of seconds. The airforced trained PF then completed the roll through 360 deg and requested clearance to return to the field. |
Originally Posted by underfire
(Post 9883146)
Interesting. I seem to remember a few aircraft that would use deliberately use the thrust reverse in flight, the DC8? The Concorde to get from SS speeds.
It is commonly used on a few military aircraft, I remember the ride on a C17 diving in...without warning, it does feel as if you have been shot down. you could not do that with paying customers, at least ones you like. |
First of all, thank you to all the contributors to this thread, I've not been this gripped since the Concorde thread started.
lessons learned which I will never forget !!! but now the regs call for three levels of safety .... but it's memories of what we all screwed up that I shall never forget I'm still amazed at how languid some pilots/maintenance organisations are about T/R faults. After the Lauda incident, which I remember well, I had occasion to lock out faulty T/Rs on Boeings and Airbus' and the attitude of some was quite disturbing. |
In flight reverse
On the trident we used in without any problems although it wasn't very pleasant down the back.
Think the limit was around 11,000 but we were allowed to use emergency reverse in the flare. The dc8 was reverse on inners. In the mid 70s Concorde had an engine go into reverse in cruise. It returned to lhr, got another crew and after trouble shooting was sent on its way only to have the same fault after rotation. It crossed over my cottage, near to Newbury, so low that I rushed outside thinking there was a crash; about 40 track miles; it only got above three grand crossing the Bristol Channel. Iirc the engineeer got some sort of award for shutting the engine down velly quickly. |
It sure sounds like a good thing the DCV was carelessly reassembled -- if it had be done carefully but with one "small" oversight, it might have really ruined someone's day . . .
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