FD in a stall
 

The Air France and Air Asia accidents got me thinking about something. What would the FD show while the aircraft descended in a stall?

Will it still be giving commands to capture the FCU altitude? I'm wondering if the PF in each of those accidents, being confused, simply reverted to what they'd been taught so often- "just follow the FD". Would that explain the prolonged nose up inputs?

I wonder how much time each of those pilots had spent flying without the FD? I've seen multiple cases where a student is having trouble flying the aircraft, the instructor will keep pressuring the student to simply follow the FD.

Could these accidents have been cases of pilots blindly trying to follow the FD, and never trying to look behind the bars?

I believe the MCP control active modes and these are shown on the FD, so they would show previous commands. Like the TCAS as well?

Hi Check Airman,
The BEA report of AF 447 accident http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...p090601.en.pdf on page 190 says:

"2.3.2 Operation of the flight directors
When an unreliable airspeed event occurs, the automatic control features (autopilot and autothrust) disconnected automatically. The crew could only then re-engage them by pressing on a dedicated push-button on the FCU. The flight directors behaved differently, insofar as the cross bars disappeared from the PFD, even though the flight directors were still engaged.
....
The credibility of the cross bars is strengthened by their disappearance followed
by their re-appearance: if they appear, it implies that the indications that they
display are valid;

ˆ Since they attract the crew’s attention (green colour and presentation in the
centre of the PFD), the presence of the cross bars could have influenced the
actions of the PF, notably in respect to his reaction to the stall warning;

ˆ It is only possible to be aware of the changes in active modes (when the cross
bars reappear) by reading the FMA, which is probably difficult to do in a high
workload situation induced by piloting or failure management tasks."

When the FDs reappeared automatically, their modes would be HDG and VS. If the aircraft had a rate of climb when the FDs re-engaged, then they would constantly request a pitch up command whilst the aircraft was descending in a stall.

Only a Wild Guess, but a Fair Question
 

@Check. You may not recognize it sir, but, I think you have answered your own question. Please see your third paragraph, quietly asking about hand-flying experience. In the SIM or the airplane, I suspect that those unfortunate crews had little or possibly no experience hand-flying their airplanes. "Follow the FD" is not horrible advice, but one must fully understand exactly what inputs the FD is capturing, how it computes instructions for you* and what you should and should not follow.

*Regardless of airplane type, your FD is a small, canned set of brains that can operate far faster than can your bio-brain. That does NOT mean that in extreme circumstances it will come up with a better solution than you can. It simply does its thing much faster. Perhaps a fair answer is, "If the FD's guidance looks reasonable to the experienced pilot. it probably is." If the FD's guidance does not look reasonable to your experienced eye, think for yourself and hand-fly, if you know how to do so. (Sorry, no snark intended, but how many of today's transport pilots have ever hand-flown anything larger than a C172, past gear-up or in the terminal flare, in he SIM or in an airplane. (I'm not certain that the FM SIMS can even do it.) As far as I know, the only live, in-airplane flying of this type is done by Boeing and that other company's engineering test pilots,(:D those kids CAN hand-fly and do so, regularly). Heavens no! I am not suggesting that you regularly hand-fly at high altitude cruise! I'm simply asking whether you and your colleagues have ever had the experience or been trained to do so. My best guess is no; if/when it may become necessary, you'd have no clue, with Boeing's partial FBW or the other company's full FBW. What do YOU think?:hmm:

In the AirAsia report, far too little is said on the FD and other active vertical modes, only that FD were displayed when parameters were inside the flight director envelope.
At least they published more on the FD that they did on the THS ...

Looking at FD indications at the gate (airspeed zero) on aircraft like the B744, it does seem that directions are based on mode. E.g. In FLCH with an altitude dialled in which is greater than the current altitude, the FD bar will go down (in an attempt to gain airspeed). In V/S mode, I recall that the FD bar went up.

Unfortunately, not all modes can be selected on the ground (e.g. VNAV)... and, of course, I am talking about an older generation (non-FBW) aircraft.

Thanks guys. As I suspected, the FD was telling them to climb. Hopefully training departments will take note, and actively encourage more raw data flying.

FFS
 

FFS guys, what ever ever happened to the basic idea (I learnt it in 1974 FFS) POWER/THRUST PLUS SENSIBLE ATTITUDE EQUALS PERFORMANCE.Why has this basic law of physics been unlearned? I dont get it.Use it and AIR FRANCE/AIR ASIA would not have murdered hundreds of innocent souls FFS.Jesus.

Check Airman an Goldenrivett
No training department teaches to follow FD when stall warning is blaring. What the training department needs to instil in AB pilots is that in the air unless you were dealing with EGPWS activation or wind shear(which doesn't happen at cruise levels) it is irrational, bizarre and suicidal to pull full back stick and any pitch correction with the stick needs to be cross checked on the PFD.

villas,
see around page 91 http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en.pdf
The BEA report says repeatedly that the FD initial automatic engagement modes were HDG + VS climb.

"2h 10 min 47
The FD 1 and 2 become available
again (modes HDG/ VS).
The selected heading is 34°.
The vertical speed is 1,500 ft/min.
..."

Golden
You are right about speed protection in descent. I stand corrected. Correcting the original.

An interesting question from the OP.

As an aside: @ piratepete, I agree with your "FFS" sentiment, but it wasn't murder - that requires malice aforethought or intent to kill.

However, it could perhaps be argued that it was corporate manslaughter, or whatever the term is, because (some of) the pilots involved had obviously not been trained and/or checked thoroughly enough.

And this raises the question: are there really 'pilots' on the line out there who cannot fly without a FD or look through the FD and fly sensibly when/if required? They must wonder what all those funny gauges and scales around the PFD (such as the VS scale and compass) are for..........

Don't buy that explanation.

With enough experience, the flight directors should follow *you*.

vilas,
Are you sure they actually heard the stall warning?
See AF 447 CVR Transcript and note that between the following times that the ALT ALERT "C Chord" was sounding continuously.
2:10:20 - 2:10:51 = 31 secs
2:12:57 - 2:13:55 = 58 secs
2:14:02 - 2:14:20 = 18 secs

It appears that for nearly 2 mins of continuous "C Chord", no one bothered to cancel it.
If you look closely at the "ATC, other voices, warnings, remarks and various noises" column, the crew were saturated with continuous audio warnings.
The continuous "C Chord" was only interrupted by "SV Stall Stall", "Dual Input", "cricket", "sink rate", "pull up" etc.

The BEA have asked if the present stall warning noise alone is adequate warning due auditory overload.

See Final AF447 Report Suggests Pilot Slavishly Followed Flight Director Pitch-Up Commands | News: Aviation International News
"Another reason for having ignored the stall alarm could have been a matter of sheer perception, Troadec said. “Audio alarms are no longer heard in some situations,” he admitted. This has prompted the BEA to recommend the addition of a visual stall warning."

I don't think the crew actually "heard" the stall warning. I think they automatically filtered all those "distractions" out. They needed a specific stall warning attention grabber like a vibrator or buzzer felt through the side stick, not a flight deck saturated with noises like an orchestra warming up.

You betcha life there are and probably in their thousands. Had a newbie in the 737 simulator with 300 hours total time of which 100 hours in the real 737. He was employed as a first officer in foreign airline

When asked to conduct a take off, circuit and land with FD and AT switched off he became quite agitated and said he had never flown with FD and AT off.

Yet his licence showed he had completed a full command type rating.

Needless to say he was unable to cope with hand flying in even visual conditions without the aid of the FD and AT. Height keeping was +/- 800 ft and airspeed +/- 50 knots. Bank angle at one point was 60 degrees. This was no exaggeration, believe me. These people are out there on line and are the future captains of large jet transports

So......did you pass him ?

“… are there really 'pilots' on the line out there who cannot fly without a FD …’ many posts imply that there are, but equally all pilots could encounter mental blocks which limit ‘the hands on’ abilities due to the surprise of a situation.

Slide 2 > in Managing Startle identifies the mental condition of normalcy, where the 'conditioned response' to a surprising event is to revert to normal operations, i.e. it is difficult to remember not to use the FD in a stall.
The complexity of modern operation could sway pilots to seek the ‘comfort blanket’ of the FD for a range of normal situations, not the hazardous surprising events, but the ‘surprises’ of normal flight because these events had not been considered or anticipated. Thus the issue of ‘cannot fly without the FD’ could be rooted much deeper in our industry – normal operations, training, policy, philosophy (pilot as a hazard vs pilot as an asset).

Also see the presentation on AoA research.
Slide 16 shows that pilots seek ‘what to do’ information in critical situations (Rule based thinking, not SOPs).
The FD supplies 'what to do' information and thus reduces workload vice flying raw data, which requires Knowledge-based thinking to generate an understanding of the situation and then the required actions.

Memory fades, but my aircraft did not remove the FD when approaching or at the stall; the autopilot was disengaged at stick shake. But even with an 'erroneous' FD display, stall recovery was not a problem because the stick-push provided the overriding ‘what to do’ action, this is similar to a protected FBW aircraft.
However, in FBW aircraft without protection (no automatic recovery action) then pilots even more so seek ‘what to do’ and if the FD apparently provides that, then it is used, probably without consideration of validity or applicability due to expectation.
The governing activity in the choice of what to do is in the mind – what to do, not how to do it physically.

What would an FD show in a stall, almost certainly a pitch up command; returning to the set altitude, vertical flt path, or vertical speed. This assumes that there are few attitude hold systems or if there are that mode is infrequently used.
An airspeed mode (other than with AT control – generally in the cruise), could indicate a reduction in pitch.

what ever ever happened to the basic idea (I learnt it in 1974 FFS) POWER/THRUST PLUS SENSIBLE ATTITUDE EQUALS PERFORMANCE.Why has this basic law of physics been unlearned?

the flight directors should follow *you*.

Amen to both. I spent years beating into my students the basic FD philosophy: "if it's correct and helping then follow it, if it's not then reprogram it or turn it off."

No.1. How do you know it's correct? In the days before FD's the same computer was between your ears. You interrogated the 'T' and decided if the a/c was doing what you wanted it to. If it was, you left well alone; if not you adjusted whichever parameter needed adjusting and kept scanning the T. Now, in theory, the FD does this for you. But back to the basics; you need to scan the T (less intensely than before)to confirm the FD is correct & sensible. You must not be an FD slave. The best computer is still between your ears.

No.2. B737NG the FD needs to detect an error between CMD input and actual performance. It will then give guidance, in a direction, to correct the error. It will not give a fixed amount of correction. If you let the error progress the FD deviation will increase. Just look at the guys who rotate too slowly or at too high speed. The FD goes very high >18, way above 15, and see what happens to the speed as they follow it. It then pitches down to 15, or even less. If you are smooth and go 'towards' the FD e.g. 16 it will then descend to meet you. Job done smoothly. Same in LNAV SID's. If the turns are severe & you lead the FD for turns by a gnat's cock it will be smooth and not overshoot at all. Ah, but then you need to scan the MAP; heavens above, there's a MAP?

No3. Same on ILS. Scan the raw data LOC/G.S. and you can smooth out the FD PIO and anticipate what it's going to command you. You can correct the error BEFORE it has occurred.

I did stalls with FD's ON & OFF in ALT HLD. At the stall I froze the sim and asked the students what the FD was showing in guidance? Nothing, because it was centred. Ah, but you are about to stall, so is it useful? What is the ATT? Now repeat with F.D's OFF. Ah Ha!

I've always advocated, but never been given the time, that students should learn to fly the basic a/c. Then add the FD, then add the automatics, then add the non-normals. Nowadays the only non FD flying they get is the tick in the box level turns and the tick in the box raw data ILS. That's it. No wonder they don't know what it should be doing with AFDS in use, and thus they can not monitor it. With A/P engaged the FD's will inevitably be centred, but are they correct? Cadets monitor the A/P via the FD's and if they are centred then everything's alright.....as they stall in ALT HLD. Ah Ha! If you want to monitor A/P performance it would be easier with FD's OFF; then you would have to monitor exactly what the a/c was doing.

The future is not what it was and is getting harder to predict. But will standards improve to what they were? It will be for others to find out and attempt to stop the rot.

Completely agreed. The cockpit is quite ergonomic, but I've long had the opinion that Airbus went a step too far when they removed tactile feedback from the control system. They managed to interconnect the rudders? Would it have been prohibitively difficult to connect the sidesticks?

Interesting note about the altitude alerter. I'd have thought that the stall warning would have taken priority over all other audio alerts. At least they knew they were off their altitude...

RAT5,

I see what you're getting at there. People eventually stop monitoring the aircraft, and instead start monitoring the FD, which is invariably centred.

I guess the question becomes, for those of you whose training departments encourage raw data flying (no FD, AP or AT), what can the rest of us do to get other training departments on board with that philosophy?

Golden
I have no problem with the idea of better or improved stall warning. I am more concerned about pilots stalling a/cs with vicious pitch input which starts it all. You will agree that in any aircraft at cruise altitudes there is no requirement to apply any control input without checking your pitch and bank especially so in AB FBW since the flight path maintained and also the result of your input must be checked. If this is instilled agressively such accidents can be avoided which is all I am saying. I am not suggesting pilots to have extra ordinary skills. If you don't light a fire you don't have to extinguish.

Hi Check Airman,
The Stall warning does have priority over the other audio alerts. Unfortunately it has been designed to go mute if IAS<60 kts. (Despite still being airborne).
I sincerely hope that design feature is being addressed. (e.g. include Weight on Wheel logic)

vilas,
I think that is AB logic too. Provided the aircraft remained in Normal Law, then even if the AP dropped out, the crew would have a familiar aircraft - no problem.

However ALT LAW feels completely different at high FLs with ailerons in roll direct. It took AF447 & QZ8501 PFs completely by surprise. (See bank excursions in report). The end result has been well discussed previously.
I suggest that crews need more sim practice in ALT LAW at high FLs.

Hi Check Airman. I do not know if it still the case, but in 80's on B767 in UK the CAA certified the a/c such that on autoland the FD's were removed. I think the theory was that the FCC's were driving both A/P & F.D and thus there was no cross check of correct operation of A/P. My memory is fuzzy of so long ago.
In training, when I was teaching V/S & HDG SEL NPA's, with A/P & A/T, I made the students turn the FD's OFF. They were nervous until I explained that the FD's told them nothing. They would always be centred. You had to scan the basic T as YOU were in charge of vertical & lateral navigation. It didn't matter what rubbish you selected in MCP the FD would always be in the middle. Cold Comfort and dangerous as it stopped the basic scan.
So it encouraged a scan, AND it trained WHERE to look for the important information on a 'side by side' EFIS. Now, when they were doing LNAV/VNAV NPA"s they knew how and where to monitor the A/P. They even did VNAV/LNAV NPA's with FD's ON/OFF. More Ah Ha moments.

Rat 5, your views at #18 represent old school flying. I am old school, but increasingly believe that this approach will not solve modern day safety problems; the world of aviation has changed.

Aircraft have changed beyond recognition, they are easier to fly, but require much more ‘operating’.

The technology changes are immense, affecting all aspects of aviation. With hindsight there were mistakes in the introduction of automation; yet the safety benefits far outweigh the negatives. Automation was seen as a saviour – ‘if an aircraft system fails engage the autopilot’ – it provides the pilot with more time, opportunity to fly different routes, new ATC structures, which then mandate automation, etc, etc. But who considered ‘what if’ the automation failed in the self-generated mental environment that considered humans as the weak link and automation the saviour.

Regulators must review their past activities in the above; how to train automation, approach to a stall, engine failure, … The regulatory process is more biased towards law, something which constrains opposed to enabling safer operation; who can read (understand) and apply all of the regulations. All operations are in regulatory ‘error’, it’s only with the continual adjustment by the front-line human that operators’ deviations are not discovered.

Thus, the operating environment is increasingly complex; it cannot be fully understood, even described in detail. Within this the human has also changed.
We do not live in the same social climate; our expectations have changed, seeking instant knowledge without considering its value (Goo and Wik), immediate self-satisfaction for minimum input, bombarded by endless distractions – TV adverts, 'must see' text messages, etc. There is no need to ‘learn’, remember facts, or even apply logical thought.

These aspects have changed behaviour towards and in flying/operating – pilots may expect the FD to provide the correct flight path without looking at attitude or heading, use FD to cross check AP, expect the AT to maintain speed at all times.
We are creatures of habit; we – the industry, have embraced the automation habit.
In this scenario it would be extremely difficult (time and cost) to apply ‘back to basics’ or ‘old school training’, which could still be inappropriate for the current aircraft design, operational environment, and social climate.

We require modern day solution for modern day problems. Following the FD might be a solution for pilots; I don’t know, but if it is then the solution must have the robustness required for operations to deal with unforeseen and surprising situations, and the even greater surprises of what the human is capable of in these situations. I suspect the current FDs do not meet these requirements, particularly in a stall.
Thus future systems, including training, will have to ‘protect us from ourselves’; this requires a new view of safety which must also consider the changes in the overall operational environment as above.

Maybe it would be beneficial for the FD bars to automatically be removed during a stall or upset, thus forcing the pilot to properly interpret the instruments. It's not as if the FD is providing any useful information.

It also saddens me that Airbus doesn't install an AoA indication on the PFD as standard. In 2015, with all new airplanes rolling out with glass displays, the six pack should be expanded to 7.

Good point on monitoring the ils with the FD off. It's probably easier to catch a problem without the FD there as a distraction.

Goldenrivett
High level handling is already addressed in type rating. At FL350 handling is given in normal law and the margin available and the decrease in it with bank is shown, followed by alternate law handling and with increasing bank stall recovery. This can be reinforced during recurrent training. However both accidents are the result of intentional totally uncalled for pitching. Therefore there is enough evidence to suggest that the sensitivity of roll and dangers of full stick inadvertent application in alternate law are not well understood. In QZ5801 case there was no speed problem and yet the application of recovery procedure indicates inadequate knowledge of the procedure. As for FDs are concerned it is not raw data flying but the habit of looking through FDs and noticing the pitch is what needs to be developed.

Check Airman, see the presentation on AoA research which concludes “that we probably do not need a display”, “little of no use when approaching the stall”. There are strong arguments re rule and knowledge interpretations of AoA displays.
Note that the display formats were research orientated, but they do identify the difficulty in creating an intuitive display, e.g. compare the gauge with the indexer (S7 and S8), which way to push?

Villas, the presentation also shows some of the difficulties of trying to ‘looking through’ the FD with EFIS.
Modern display formats tend to ‘box in’ visual attention toward attitude and thus towards the FD; – Gestalt where the visual interpretation will perceive a boundary even if not actually present.
Many old style displays had a true 3D construction; EFIS is a 2D depiction of a 3D system – no depth in the perception; thus more knowledge based effort is required to ‘look through’ an EFIS FD than with a mechanical instrument.
There are similar problems with instrument scanning.

No bloody way:eek:

Amen to that. Engine failure at V1 and go is always a tricky manoeuvre for the first time during type ratings. I have seen students spooked by the FD dancing needles. The instructor, if he has the courage, and the skill should be able to hop into the seat and do a flawless demonstration without the flight director to help him. That gives the student an ideal to aim for and increase his confidence. A picture is a worth a thousand words, comes to mind.

No Fly Zone
 

Must have something to do with your handle...

I (and most of my colleagues) regularly hand fly on departure up to around 10,000' and below say 5-6000' on arrival, even higher depending. Company encouraged.

In the 744 and 748.

Our younger guys do it too.

Keeps up proficiency and is actually 'fun'.

Cheers,
Soda

Vilas,

That's just the problem. It's harder to look through the FD, than to just turn it off. While in sim during my 320 rating, I noticed that I had no clue what my VS or heading was. I was just focused on keeping the FD perfectly centred. When I turned of the FD, I was much more in tune with what was going on.

I find it hard to imagine that a flasing red box on the pfd would be totally ignored. If you're looking directly at AoA data, it must be easier to recognise that you're in a stall, and then take action.

The presentation didn't detail the experimental methods used to come to the conclusion that the direct AoA readout is ineffective. I'd like to see that data.

RAT 5, your views at #18 represent old school flying. I am old school, but increasingly believe that this approach will not solve modern day safety problems; the world of aviation has changed.

Aircraft have changed beyond recognition, they are easier to fly, but require much more ‘operating’.

Indeed, but I still advocate that one must have a good sound understanding of the basics of handling the a/c and how it wants to fly so that you can become a sharper operator. It is a building block process. Todays MPL courses are being completed by 148hr cadets with very basic handling experience: even very basic aviation/airborne experience. They have rigid SOP's telling them what to do when and which buttons to push when. It is a play station, not an aircraft. Guys get commands 3000-3500hrs after 4 years of those same rigid SOP's and they have no idea about the a/c, and not too much about the environment. It is still a play station. Put them outside the SOP ideal environment and they are lost. Is that healthy or professional?

I'm not sure modern a/c are easier to fly; the basics still apply. They are easier to fly very accurately in 3D due to the displayed information. What is missing in TQ's is a good grounding of what is being displayed and how to use it. I still see guys in the sim, and on line, who obviously are not looking at the MAP. VNAV/LNAV is in CMD and the FD's are centred. All must be OK with the world. Duh!

The reason I advocate the 'old school' approach is because I went from B732 to B767. I didn't dump all the good basics and start with a clean sheet. I kept the old drawings, the picture changed, added a few new lines and I coloured them in. It worked and stood me in safe stead for the next 25 years. The EFIS displays were just a different way of giving me the same basic information, in a much more useful manner, and adding some really good extra titbits. The automatics were awesome after the B732. Wow, it allowed me to be much more precise and efficient is a really relaxed manner. I could see exactly what the a/c was doing, what I wanted it to do and what it was going to do. My training was in-depth. It was company culture. Standards were set high.

The instructor, if he has the courage, and the skill should be able to hop into the seat and do a flawless demonstration without the flight director to help him.

Skill should be a given, then courage is not a problem. Indeed it should be a delight to do so. Trouble is the time required. Self-funded TR's are short of such time. It would be great to teach V1 cuts with no FD. You always ask what the rotate ATT should be. The cadet always gets it correct, but then the FD is a magnet and they over rotate and end up <V2. AT MFRA they do not attack the FD to accelerate but sit just above it with too high a V/S and thus slow acceleration. With no FD they have to fly V/S 0-200fpm i.e. look at it.

I realise I am a Boeing man and this is an Airbus thread, with more laws than my wife & mother-in-law put together. One of them was Direct, the other Alternate and I was whatever was left. However, whatever a/c you are being trained on to operate I still believe you should be able to fly a broken bird with whatever it can throw at you and which the manufacturer says should be survivable. My older MD's expected it and I'm damned sure the pax expect it.
Bring on Space Cowboys

I suspect base training is the only time guys get to handle a basic a/c. It is a hoop to jump through and show competence. Why then is it so discouraged afterwards by so many airlines? The argument is safety. I wonder if that has proved to be the case, or is it the opposite?

I suspect this will become another circular never ending discussion resurrecting the same old same old..........

Check Airman and safetypee
Looking through the FD is not literally but means just notice attitude also. Since all we do with FDs is just centre them once they are centred the attention can be shifted to other parameters before moving back. It is just a matter of forming a habit. Pure raw data requires good scan which requires practice but once a pilot develops it shouldn't require much practice to maintain it. The problem is with everything normal you don't need all this so unless you force yourself good habits can get rusty. But many things will only be practiced in the SIM like EFATO, alternate/direct law or high level manual flight.

It is just a matter of forming a habit. Pure raw data requires good scan which requires practice but once a pilot develops it, it shouldn't require much practice to maintain it. The problem is with everything normal you don't need all this so unless you force yourself good habits can get rusty.

Vilas: well said, but there is one problem, and that is with the starting point. I agree with the process, but today's training doesn't require the students to 'develop a good scan'. Neither does every day operations in many airlines. Therefore there never were good habits and therefore the rust is deep seated from the beginning and the metal corrodes fast until there is no strength when it is tested under stress.

RAT 5
Airbus type rating for CPL starts with Entry Level Training in which the trainee undergoes 8 sessions in FBS of Flight and Navigation Procedure Training. First four sessions are without AP/FDs and ATHR in which they practice raw data flying including SIDs, arrivals, approaches and landing. Progressively FDs and AP is introduced but the entire course is without ATHR. But many airlines have managed to hoodwink the authorities and have replaced it with their own inadequate version of only one session of handling in FBS and 4 to 5 sessions in procedure trainer. So unless the trainees are very talented they are found wanting in this aspect. Even then it needs to be consolidated in line flying. So ultimately it is a business after all and the best airline is not the one with best pilots but with maximum profits.

While above the FCU selected altitude (FL320), surely the FD would be commanding nose down. The bottom picture on p57 of the final report certainly indicates this. Of course as soon as they descended below FL320 it would be commanding nose up, but they were well down the road by that time.

However I agree that FD has no business showing such a disastrously incorrect command. And I also think the airbus FDs do reduce our awareness of the aircraft state. Which brings me to ask the question why do we leave them on at all? The plane works fine without them. I gave it a go today, FDs off, but left the AP on. Flew the whole descent and approach with normal inputs to the AP, but I watched carefully what the plane was doing, rather than watching 2 nicely centred FD bars.

So why do we fly routinly with FDs on? Why not keep them on as an aid to hand flying as and when required?

So ultimately it is a business after all and the best airline is not the one with best pilots but with maximum profits.

Vilas: thank you for that insight into AB's standard TR syllabus. I had heard that with their new generation a/c they were going even more back to basics. I wonder if other manufacturers, Boeing in particular, have the same ideas. Considering the recent, too many, crashes of reasonably serviceable a/c perhaps the authorities who are responsible for over-seeing training/crew certification standards should open their eyes and become active in defining what the training MUST involve and not just the old style regurgitated TR syllabus which hasn't changed since 1980, to my knowledge. The required items on an LST form have been there for eons. In my experience some airlines have substituted rigid SOP's for in-depth training. Stick rigidly to the rigid SOP's and you'll be OK. Trained monkey comes to mind.
Ref' your closing statement it reminds me of "if you thought safety investment was expensive wait until you have an accident." Somehow that seems not to be quite so prevalent as it used to be. Cost/risk management seems the game today.

Duper: So why do we fly routinly with FDs on? Why not keep them on as an aid to hand flying as and when required?

Great question and one which I think needs a real serious considered debate. With A/P in use they are nigh on useless, and indeed hinder the monitoring process. Hand flying they can be useful, but need monitoring via raw data.
If you ask the many XAA"s your question I would not be surprised by either of these answers. "we've always done it that way since they were invented." ..."I don't understand the question." I suspect the debate will encounter huge inertia, but don't give up. What about the technical committee of ECA?

From memory the other planes I have flown with APs, needed the FDs on for the AP to be engaged. Either that or I thought they did!

Maybe it's a hangup from the mistaken belief that the FD must be on for the AP to follow it? I'll admit I didnt know until today when I tried it out!

It is surprising and alarming that many new pilots are apparently happy to just centre their FDs and assume that everything is OK.

Now that we don't have to record our autolands, I think that we should have to record raw data, manually flown ILS approaches. We should be required to make a certain number of such approaches in every six month period (weather and conditions permitting) and record them on a form, like we used to for autolands.

By making it official and mandatory, it might start to get us all into thinking about raw data as being a normal procedure, and it would help us hone our flying and prevent ourselves becoming lazy by not allowing our skills to atrophy.



@Dupre, just be bloody careful with Airbus. The systems are interlinked and you can get yourself into serious trouble (as others have done). For example, turning both FDs off forces the A/THR into speed mode - which is usually a safe thing, but just be careful about unintended consequences caused by interactions between systems :ok: