The vital importance of high altitude stall recovery training in simulators
 

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y25...ps8f502996.jpg

A picture is worth a thousand words...

And the importance of IR enhanced vision systems!

The manufacturers say the current simulators DO NOT model the characteristics of the actual aircraft in high altitude stall conditions.




Boeing and Airbus have agreed on a simulator flight simulation software that generically models narrow body jetliners in post stall conditions. There's talk of making that a mandatory familiarization event in the future.

Prevention, then recovry?
 

Centur
All for it.
How do You figure it shall work ?

Isn't that a normal part of any typerating? Well, within the confines of current simulator specs of course as none can simulate a real stall yet. Anyway, stall recovery both low and high altitude have been normal parts in any typeratings I've done, just last night i had that once again. And then of course in regular intervals during normal simulatior training.

FAA have in recent years moved away from the demo of stall recovery with minimum height loss, and in my view this is a good decision. So often previously many in the sim would add full thrust, allow the nose to drop a fraction, and upon seeing speed increase would then pull up to reduce the loss of height ....often then hitting the buffet again, or worse stalling. Sometimes they would scrape away to regain the lost height, but in a state that was right on the edge and hardly capable of dealing with the consequences of turbulence that would start the whole scenario again.

I'm brave enough to admit that I did manage to stall a jet aircraft at FL410 once, but thanks to the revised training I was not stupid enough to try and recover with minimum height loss. Instead I used up plenty of the sky that was below me, and at those levels (for those of you who are not stupid enough to make the mistake I made), that is what it does take - especially when stall and over speed are close to each other.

no need for simulators, just everyone read, "STICK AND RUDDER"> STALL? PUSH FORWARD until you are flying again.

windshear recovery should be a sep maneuver.

Denti
 

A simulator can simulate anything ,a stall in particulare.
As it is the yardstik for any flght test and performance.
High alltitude test flights at full stall are not needed for sertificatiion and not always recovered. Thereby not required, and not documented by test data.

Have fully stalled a Jar25 aircraft many times at say 8000 feet, but no medium or large jet.
Computer says NO.

Simply not true. The TDMs state that their FSTDs will meet approved data, no more, no less.

The issue is that the major airframe manufacturers are reluctant to either release or produce the required data for the TDMs to model.

How about an unmanned full scale FBW airliner, flown over the ocean, via satellite, like a drone?
An aircraft at end of life cycle can be reused for this kind of training. Maybe not cheaper, but very accurate.

The 737 FCOM/QRH doesn't say what minimum speed should be attained during stall recovery at high altitude before attempting to return to level flight.

However, a handy guide to what minimum IAS you should attain before levelling out after a stall recovery process lies in the Boeing 737 Classic FCTM under Chapter 4 - Climb, Cruise, Descent, Holding. Sub heading: Holding Airspeeds Not Available from the FMC. It states among other information: Above FL250, use VREF40 +100 knots to provide adequate buffet margin.

Depending on actual weight of course, then for want of a better figure it works out at close to 230 knots IAS before attempting to level out after stall recovery. If nothing else, in the heat of the moment it is a quick figure to work on since it is high unlikely the crew will have the time and inclination to go heads down into the FMC during a stall at high altitude simply to locate a suitable level out airspeed.

By keeping the body angle between zero to minus two below the horizon until reaching at least 230 knots IAS, you can should count on (IMHO) losing at least 3000 ft of altitude before reaching that speed. That assumes high power used in the process. That figure was from observations in a full flight 737-300 simulator

Quote:
The manufacturers say the current simulators DO NOT model the characteristics of the actual aircraft in high altitude stall conditions. Simply not true. The TDMs state that their FSTDs will meet approved data, no more, no less.

The issue is that the major airframe manufacturers are reluctant to either release or produce the required data for the TDMs to model.








"Simply not true"? So if the airframe manufacturers don't release, or produce the data, exactly what data are the simulator manufacturers using to generate their simulation model?


Since you state that my statement is "simply not true" what Airbus or Boeing a/c have actual, and accurate, simulator modeling for post stall flight characteristics and which simulators can provide that training?


AW&ST has had several articles on this subject of high altitude upset in the last two years. That is the source I'm using. Interested readers could review those articles to find out what the simulators can and can't replicate. The articles discuss how Boeing and Airbus test pilots have agree to a generic software model that does a reasonable job replicating the flight characteristics of a generic n/b aircraft in the post stall regime.

Pity the poor MPL or P2F in the right hand seat in that weather and the captain becomes incapacitated. Pity the passengers too..

As an instrument tech at BZN I was involved in recalibrating the stall warning systems speeds on the Belfast, in order to increase the margin between the warning and the actual stall. A Belfast had encountered ice over the Alps along with tail de-icing failure and the stall warning system had not operated as required with the aircraft at a high nose-up angle. We did the adjustments by trial and error, with the crew holding the nose until the actual stall occurred for each tweak of the setting until we got the target margin of [30 knots?]. We covered all flap settings and I recall that the aircraft lost some 5.000 feet in the "clean" stall condition - producing some interesting comments during the first try, as we wondered if it ever would recover!

For civil certification the CAA predictably insisted on having a stick pusher installed.

I wouldn't typically associate that picture with stall recovery.

It seems to me that jetsteams are common cause of high altitude low speed events.

I would. Air Algerie MD80 apparently stalled at high altitude in cloud during storm penetration. The accident appears to have developed as a loss of airspeed awareness leading to a fully developed stall and roll off departure to the port side with post stall gyrations. The nose then became planted way nose down, left wing down as the stall broke, but they never recovered from the nose down-wing down attitude

misd-agin

That's exactly the point. The TDMs do not have the data to generate a realistic/accurate model. It isn't that the TDMs DO NOT model, it's that they CAN'T model the stalls correctly.

I don't know of any current Airbus datapacks with adaquate data to produce an FFS with accurate modeling for post stall flight characteristics. Can't comment on Boeings but there are some other manufacturers that have produced accurate data that has allowed for realistic post stall flight characteristics.

That might work at the early stage of a low stall AOA, it would not have worked for AF447. Attitude is not relevant for stall recovery (which is the phase from stall entry until recovery completed), AOA and speed are the key elements. If those are in the ballpark, then attitude is the next step. Sure we reduce AOA by reducing pitch, but not until a given amount of degree nose down, but until AOA is below stall AOA, then we maintain that AOA until enough speed for attitude correction is available. Sure we take care of the bank angle in order to not exceed safe aircraft parameters, but for reducing AOA as fast as possible it has no relevance. Bank angle might even help in reducing AOA, think about it like in a nose high unusual attitude recovery, where the reduction of lift due to bankangle helps to bring the nose down faster than by a pure push over.

Underslung engines can create a pitch up moment, thus hindering the attempts to reduce the AOA, while the speed increase by the power output might be minimal due to the high AOA high drag flight path. To power out of a stall is not the correct thing to do when enough altitude is available. AF447 is again a good example for the lack of positive influence of TOGA at the wrong moment. Sure it is vital to have enough power available after the AOA has been reduced enough for aceleration and following attitude and altitude correction maneuvers.

If i misunderstood your post, then please explain.

Thank you F4 for your reply. Of course you are quite right about recovering from the stall by what ever means necessary and that means no restriction on the nose down angle to get out of the actual stalled state. Without the benefit of an angle of attack indicator the crew have no choice except to lower the nose and thus reduce the angle of attack, to a speed where it is obvious the aircraft is unstalled (no buffet/stick shaker)

From simulator experience it takes very little nose down attitude below the horizon before it is obvious you are out of the stall and the next thing is to decide when to level out. Due to the loss of thrust at high altitude and slow engine acceleration, full throttle does not give the marked pitch up one would experience during a low altitude go-around in the landing configuration and is easily countered by appropriate elevator and stab trim use. In other words no problem for a competent pilot; especially as some stabiliser trim is needed to keep the aircraft in trim during the dive until a specific safe airspeed is reached. .

Although once attaining VREF 40 +100 knots should hopefully get you out of immediate trouble in good weather conditions, perhaps I should have mentioned that in the context of the original post (inadvertent stall in severe storm weather at high altitude) that the descent should be continued without delay until reaching severe turbulence penetration speed. Especially as the aircraft may well still be in severe turbulence in cloud. There may be significant height loss before reaching a typical severe turbulence speed.

And unbelievably it was flown by a TRE with 10,000 hours on type. Presumably he had flown approaches to stalls in the simulator, and taught others the correct (??) recovery technique as well.

All of which leads me to conclude that Centaurus is absolutely correct; either simulators do not accurately replicate high altitude stalls, or there are experienced pilots out there with woefully inadequate knowledge of the correct stall avoidance and recovery techniques.

Thank you for your well placed answer. Let me add to the quoted point one more comment: The amount how much the pitch has to change depends on the AOA when beginning pitch down. If recovery is initiated just after sounding of the stall warning, then your statement is correct. But actually you might not be in a stall already, as the system sounds the horn prior to stall, it warns in advance of an imminent stall. At that point the reduction of AOA by few degrees is obviously sufficient. In a fully developped stall the difference between pitch attitude and flightpath, which is called AOA, will be much greater, AF447 had AOA in excess of 60°. After reducing the pitch by 5, 10, or even 20° would still leave a high enough AOA to keep the jet stalled. As AOA is not readily displayed in most aircraft to stick to some kind of degrees of pitch nose down is dangerous and will prolong recovery or even prevent recovery like AF447 showed.

Edit: Another point to note would be that different aircraft behave different, and upsets might happen in some degraded modes of aircraft systems or cause those degradation during the upset (degradation of flight LAW's, degradation of autoflight systems like autothrust, autotrim). The effects of thrust changes remain screened by such fully functional systems, the effect therefore unknown until those systems like autotrim or dampening system fails.

Stall recovery training and stall recovery procedures have to take acount of those possible degradations and should therefore be oriented on the basic aircraft handling.

Having studied the posts by the OP, he made the point several times that it was necessary to get the nose below the horizon which means a descent in order to increase speed which is the same as lowering the angle of attack in my book. You seemed to have mis-understood his point judging by the highlighted text. It was never implied that lowering the nose only a few degrees from an extremely high angle of attack (as you appear to state) to a still stalled angle of attack was sufficient to recover from a stall.

You would be dismayed at the number of airline pilots who have not carried out or being trained for high altitude (30,000 to 41,000ft) stall recovery techniques in the simulator. This may be because 15,000ft is considered by some simulator instructors as sufficient for high altitude.

Thank you for taking part in the discussion.

The problem of the misunderstanding is imho that the title of the thread is

"The vital importance of high altitude stall recovery training in simulators"

and the discussion centers around the topic of an "approach to stall recovery"

In the situation the thread title suggests the AOA might be anything from AOA being slightly greater than stall AOA to 60° degrees above stall AOA, whereas the statements i'm commenting on cover only the area just prior and just above stall AOA.

Now if the title of the thread is misplaced and the discussion likes to concentrate on the approach to stall situation and thus the avoidance of a stall situation, then the title should be changed or posters should make their point clear when discussing only the latter.

I might have a language barrier there, but here is the original wording, bolding by me.

That is true as a stall avoidance maneuver or a stall with very little higher AOA (just after stall warning sounded), but not to recover from a developped stall.

Most students were good at approach to stall recoveries, because they choose to initiate recovery the earliest moment possible (which they are supposed to do, military jet) with an automated response stick forward, firewall the engines, stick back), but when they had to wait a bit longer they lowered the nose not long enough, pulled back on the stick too early and went into a secondary stall. All at safe altitude, so no danger.

There is only one way to do it when sufficient altitude is available, lower the nose not a little bit, lower it not to a specified amount of degrees below the horizon, but lower it until stall warning ceases = AOA below stall warning AOA (hopefully not like AF447) and speed has been built up enough for recovery maneuver. That is the point im trying to make.

Latest report on unusual attitude scary recovery. It really makes you wonder about the paucity of training today's inexperienced first officers are given in simulators. Accent on automation is wrong. Accent on pure flying skills are needed well before automation is brain-washed into their heads forever:


An All Nippon Airways Co. co-pilot who accidentally put his plane into a violent dive and roll in 2011 came closer to losing control of the Boeing Co. 737 than previously believed, according to data released by investigators.

The Japan Transport Safety Board's final report about the serious incident over the Pacific Ocean reveals there were multiple warnings of an impending aerodynamic stall, while the plane carrying 117 people exceeded its maximum operating speed a number of times. The report said the jet also exceeded its structural-load limit, or the most stress the aircraft is expected to experience in service.

After the co-pilot mistakenly operated a rudder-control switch at 41,000 feet, instead of a different switch that unlatched the cockpit door, the jetliner plummeted 1.2 miles in slightly more than 30 seconds and briefly flew nearly upside down. The recently released report provides some new details about the extent of the danger.

Two flight attendants were pinned to the cabin floor and were slightly injured. One attendant told investigators that after she felt "earthquake-like vertical shaking," she slumped to the floor on her knees from downward forces so strong she couldn't raise her arm.

The report is likely to refocus industrywide interest in high-altitude upsets, or incidents in which jetliners slow dramatically or end up with the nose or wings at unusually steep upward or downward angles.

The 100-page document also highlights the 38-year-old co-pilot's delayed and confused response, which investigators attributed to gaps in training, undue reliance on automation and seeming anxiety about quickly letting the captain back into the cockpit. According to the report, "excessive dependence on autopilot" exacerbated "lack of full awareness about the need to monitor" flight controls. The co-pilot couldn't recall the stick shaker's activation, it said.

The report said the co-pilot failed to recognize there was a problem for 17 seconds, and then alternately pushed forward and pulled back on the controls. The captain, returning from a bathroom break, was locked out of the cockpit while the plane nose-dived and executed back-to-back rolls in opposite directions. The maneuvers lasted about 90 seconds, though passengers may not have fully realized what was happening because it was dark outside.

An earlier report disclosed many of the co-pilot's errors and the plane's excessive speed. But it suggested there was only a single activation of the "stick shaker," a last-ditch safety alert that a plane is about to lose lift and may be on the verge of a crash.

Investigators found that the plane's excessive-speed warning was also activated more than once during the episode.

All Nippon said it "took action following the incident to prevent any recurrence, and we are continuing to take additional measures in line with the report's recommendations."

The co-pilot, who hasn't been identified, remains an All Nippon employee but isn't currently assigned to flight duties, according to the carrier.

Japan's safety board urged the carrier to ensure compliance with single-pilot operation protocols and enhance training to cope with high-altitude stall warnings.

The report should get a lot of attention in the industry since it details "a real poster-child event about complacency" and an inappropriate response, said Rory Kay, an ex-737 captain and former senior pilot-union safety official who now works as a training captain on Boeing jets. Pilots should "treat high-altitude stalls totally differently than those at low altitude," he said. Thinner air up high means jet engines take longer to rev up power, and a sudden upward nose command is more likely to create control problems.

Once the plane was back on the correct course and altitude, neither pilot disclosed the extent of the problem to air-traffic controllers, who in turn never pushed for answers. The jet, en route to Tokyo's Haneda airport from Okinawa, made a normal landing.

The crew's failure to promptly alert mechanics about the specifics of the event, according to the report, meant the plane continued to carry passengers for four more flights before all required inspections for possible structural damage were conducted. The checks didn't detect any problems.

The nose of the ANA jetliner was pointed 35 degrees down from level flight, a much steeper angle than passengers typically experience. The plane was subjected to forces nearly 2.7 times the force of gravity.

The report determined that the co-pilot's training didn't include dealing with high-altitude flight upsets or any "upset recovery training accompanied with a stall warning."

Before the upset, the ANA co-pilot failed to follow company procedures requiring him to put on his oxygen mask when he was left alone at the controls.

Investigators found that the co-pilot's initial preoccupation with opening the cockpit door prevented using "calm judgment" to continue monitoring controls and then to fly the plane manually. Upon returning to the cockpit, according to the report, the captain took over the controls because he found the co-pilot's condition "fairly unsettled."

The ANA event occurred two years after the crash of Air France AF.FR -1.35% Flight 447, a widebody Airbus A330 that stalled at high altitude. That crew's failure to understand and counteract a rapid descent ended in the death of all 228 people aboard. The crash was a seminal event that sparked world-wide emphasis on stall-recovery training, particularly at cruise altitudes.

Many airlines quickly revised simulator training to include lessons learned from the Air France accident.

There have been more recent instances of high-altitude upsets. An American Airlines Boeing 757, cruising at 35,000 feet over Venezuela on August 30, lost some 7,500 feet in about one minute. There were no injuries and the flight continued on to Brazil. An American spokeswoman couldn't immediately be reached for comment.

Japanese investigators said the ANA co-pilot, who was relatively inexperienced, had less than 2,800 flight hours in another 737 version and only 197 hours in the Boeing 737-700 involved in the incident. As previously reported, the cockpit-door unlock switch on his earlier aircraft was similar to the location, size and shape of the rudder switch on the 737-700 model.

The hours do not indicate a "relatively inexperienced" pilot although it is highly probable that he was hired initially with the usual 200 cadet flying hours straight from flying school then fed a diet of automation from the time he first entered a 737 simulator.

Years ago a well presented AA training video on unusual attitude recovery pointed out that AOA was a standard parameter in FDRs, but not on the Flight Deck ... so why NOT available as standard instrumentation? ... it still isn't , so why NOT?

Sounds more like failing to fly an attitude rather than an altitude. Not really what I mean. Any phase of flight runs the risk of stall of the crew are ignorant of the correct technique or where monitoring is lacking.

Where the crew are exercising good judgement, technique and awareness and still get horribly close to the wrong end of the amber bar. If that is the case, just imagine the lacklustre crew in the same situation.

I think this is part of the problem.

Regulators and airlines need to mandate more theory and more practical training with regard to upset/stall experiences. There needs to be more aerodynamics training and more actual flying (airplane or simulator) experience.

It doesn't help that there are airlines in Canada who still teach their pilot to power out of the approach to stall exercise, disregarding an AC that has been out since 2005, and has since been replace with a more detailed AC, that says to treat any approach to stall as an actual stall and use elevator to reduce the AOA. It states that multiple times and it also states multiple times that altitude loss is secondary to stall recovery. It couldn't be clearer - powering out of stalls with zero altitude loss is NOT the way it should be taught but that's the way you get a 4 (highest mark) on the flight test for that exercise. :ugh:

For those interested, here is the current AC: https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviati...-700-1793.html

I've found throughout my relatively short aviation career that hours mean virtually nothing. You could take a group of 2000 hour pilots and they'd all perform wildly different from each other. You could take a group of 5000 hour pilots and do the same with the same results. And so on. The only thing you'll see is that with experience, you'll notice an improvement in skill and decision making but when looking at a specific pilot, it's impossible to judge a pilot's skill and decision making solely based on their flight hours.

This is an issue with the way they train now. They'll set the airplane up at about 10,000' to 14,000' (most of the time in VMC with smooth flying conditions), in level flight, then slow down at a constant rate while trimming to about 20 knots above the stall speed, then with hands already on the control column and power levers, they will slam the power levers forward as soon as the stall horn sounds and then push a bit on the control column so that they don't climb immediately (because it will if you don't push enough after adding full power). The airplane on these training flights is at the lowest weight that you'll ever encounter while flying operationally and at it's forward CG limit.

That is the absolute easiest possible recovery you could have for a stall event! And that's all that's required... and they're still teaching it wrong. It's frustrating when discussing this with pilots at the airline because they dismiss the AC... what experience and training do they have to say that what is in that AC is not correct?

Before you add power.

Teaching to power out of a stall event (stall horn, stick shaker/pusher, or actual aerodynamic stall) is the opposite of what you should do, especially at high altitude. Rapid power advances may cause asymmetric thrust which, if you are stalled, can put you into a spin.

I think it should be taught to lower the nose until the horn goes off, then smoothly add power while keeping the nose at the same attitude. By the time you've added full power (~2-3 seconds) you should be at a speed to start smoothly coming out of the dive. Adding power while there is still an indication of a stall shouldn't be done, especially at high altitude where longitudinal stability is reduced. This is a generic recovery procedure and each airplane will handle a bit differently but the basics are all the same.

Power is only used to reduce the altitude loss after a stall. How do you think a glider recovers from a stall?

Thoughts on that, RetiredF4?

Thank you for your excellent post, i completely agree and have nothing to add.

Amen to that, bro’.

Having done some sim high-altitude exercises fairly recently, I think the absolute fidelity of the simulator was secondary to the emphasis on the above.

Hopefully, none of us will ever be in a situation where we have to recover from a low-speed LoC event but exposure to even generic training shows that a) you need to reduce the AoA in a positive and determined way and b) you’re going to lose a *lot* of altitude in the process but this is absolutely required to survive. Whether this is 4,000' or 14,000’ is less relevant - it takes what it takes...

As a someone who came into power flying from gliding, I always found the “old” method of stall recovery rather weird and difficult to get to grips with: now it’s just back to what I always did!

AOA Gauge
 

Please be aware that although most civvie (big) jets do not have a real AOA gauge on the flight deck, they do have an indication of stall AOA in the form of the red bar(ber pole) on the low end side of the speed scale.

Yes, it may seem that that barberpole is only an indication of minimum speed, but that is not true: its position on the speed scale is driven by AOA - pull g and the red bar comes up (showes a higher minimum speed), unload and the red barberpole moves down to indicate a lower minimum speed. In other words, unload untill your actual speed is outside of the barberpole region and during pillout, do not let the barberpole grow up into your actual speed.

And about simulator fidelity - perhaps the motions are not exactly how they would be in the real aircraft, but manipulating the controls to make the SIM do what you want it to do is still a better learning experience than to have no maneuvering experience at all - real stall or stick shaker situations often show that pilots (without maneuvering experience) are too hesitant to make necessary control movements if those required movements are unusualy large or require unusuallly large forces, i.e. are outside the scope of daily routine tiny well trimmed out stick and or rudder applications. And before someone brings it up - the control movements that brought down the AA A-300 out of JFK were not "required control applications", they were excessive and totally not needed during the wake encounter.

Appreciate if anyone could provide the direct link to the Japan Transport Safety Board Final Report (English version) on the All Nippon Airlines B737-700 incident on 7 September 2011 described in this thread. Have tried Google but no Final Report. Thanks in advance

Nothing wrong with this generation if pilots a thousand hours solo in a "steam gauge" single seat fighter wouldn't fix. You learn about AOA, trim, low and high speed aerodynamics there, all the while scaring the hell out of you.

ZFT - ultimately we agree - pilots as end users don't have accurate post stall simulator modeling. It doesn't matter that it could be done as an end user all I need to know is that the simulator doesn't accurately modeling how the airplane will respond.

DL and AA 737's and 777's have AOA gauges.


Checklists have had verbiage using the AOA gauges removed because they were poorly written AND Boeing said the procedures hadn't been flight tested AND in certain circumstances the AOA gauges could be inoperative or give misleading information.


The generic low altitude loss of airspeed training had lead to bad habit patterns that did not transfer to high altitude/low energy flight regime.


So having generic "put the nose this low" that havn't been vetted by flight test is meaningless.


Example - doing loss of airspeed at altitude in the simulator. CKA, new to fleet, didn't know I'd been involved in the issue for over two years. So we do the high altitude upset and run the airplane totally out of airspeed. Very similar to AF 447 in that we were several thousand feet above MAX ALT in a nose high attitude. Ugly. CKA loved the FPV and had come up with a generic 'rule of thumb' that had worked for him up until then - "set the FPV 5(?) degrees nose low and you'll fly out". So we're at twice his target FPV attitude and the plane's barely flying - AOA barely below stick shaker. CKA - "no, no. Keep the FPV at X". Tiniest reduction in back pressure results in instantaneous stick shaker (anyone doing a high AOA knife fight know's what I'm talking about). Unload, go back to twice his target FPV attitude(double wasn't a goal, just what was required to make the plane fly), and we eventually recover.


CKA "huh, that's always worked before." Ugh.


During the event N1's were limited to 75% due to the nature of the failure(s). Didn't bother deselecting EEC's/ELC's because AOA, and not engine thrust, was the primary focus needed to fly the aircraft safely.


Debrief sent to stop teaching unofficial techniques that didn't cover all areas of the flight envelope.


Low altitude techniques, like the AB stall recovery training in Normal Law, can be dangerous in other flight regimes or non normal flight law.


Basic flying skills still are the #1 priority.

It did not penetrate active storm cell at any time before the stall.

It is not and was never taught this way as it is impossible to power out of stall for any aeroplane except for aerobatic ones of extreme performance (e.g. Su-31 and -35).


Major issues being lack of a) need to provide such data at all b) funds c) adequately suicidal test pilots.

There is no aeroplane in this picture. Could you please provide us with some incidents/accidents where plane was stalled at high level following penetration of CB?

How and why does one teach stall recovery for pilots of stick-pusher equipped aeroplanes?

clandestino, actually it has been taught for some time in FAA land. Now, I don't like it, don't think its right, but it has been taught that way for some time now.

Low altitude stall recovery is firewall power and accelerate. In underwing mounted engine aircraft one must be careful not to allow the nose to come up with engine power application.

I WAS NEVER A FAN OF THIS and think you should get out of the stall (push forward) while adding power.

That's "Approach to stall recovery", not "stall recovery".

clandestino

fine

then we have never practiced stall recovery in any us simulator session in any plane I have flown.