semmern, not to discard the value of the stall training #59, but did you, the trainer, or operator consider training for the situations leading up to the stall.
Of course no training after the event can truly represent the workload and mental process which may have contributed to the state of awareness in the accidents, but these aspects should be considered particularly if they aid avoiding such situations.

Approach to the stall training has been conducted for many years. Yet it seems that no matter how much training is provided, it doesn't stop some from ending up in a 'bad' place. Once they get there, no amount of approach to the stall training is going to get them out.

Solid, realistic stall & U/A recovery training is essential in order to provide some of the skills that may make all the difference when it unexpectedly 'hits the fan'.

Yes, of course we did. We did lots of stalls, approach to stalls, a couple of unreliable airspeed scenarios, both during high-altitude cruise and approach, as well as the exact scenario from Amsterdam with a failed captain's RA in IMC.

The airline in which I have now got a job has AoA indicators at the top right of the PFD, which IMO should be mandatory in all airliners.

semmern, I think that you miss my point. In many recent LoC accidents the crews did not appreciate that they were approaching the stall or in a stall. What training is given to improve these aspects? Stall recovery training is fine - it should be basic knowledge/skill, but if you don't know that you have stalled a real aircraft (not simulator) then what?

Fitting AoA is soft (meaningless) solution; if crews are not aware of airspeed then what value is a new parameter, is this any more likely to be seen than another 'speed' instrument if the instrument scan is deficient?
The failure of RA in simulation after the event probably cannot induce the same surprise as the accident crew apparently suffered. Is there any genertic 'surprise' training which enables crews to see and understand a situation in sufficient time, and then able to select an appropriate course of action?

Surely every pilot has, at some time , seen a war-film in which the Spitfire, being pursued by "the Hun", banks over to one wingtip and rapidly dives away.......Yes, I know the engine got fuel-starved in a bunt, but the issue here, is,A steep roll will drop the nose and accelerate the aircraft, reducing Aof A and increasing airspeed.
Any kid who ever played with a chuck-glider (are there any who didn't? observed that rapid climb to a stall, a nose-drop and with sufficient altitude, a pull-out from the dive....then,of course,one trimmed by adjusting CG with bits of lead or solder,to get a controlled level flight.....

Have highly-trained Professional Pilots really forgotten these basic childhood demonstrations and the explanation and reminder they got in their PPL and beyond, hacking around in spamcans for ~200 hours?
There really is a fundamental flaw in the training regime,if this is the case.
The laws of Physics are immutable. they don't give a fig about SOPS or Company Practice....Aviate!then , navigate, communicate and push paper around.......Nero and Fiddles?

Even when flying an empty aircraft with a Training Captain, one tended to expect the unexpected, which would sometimes occur !
"What was that ?"
And then look around, hoping to spot... Something...
To some extent one " Sat on the edge of ones seat", slightly expecting something to happen..
.In a Sim things might happen rather sooner than after some hours of rather boreing cruising night flight.
Then having to hand fly, something not often practiced.
I had a newish F/O who, following a A/P failure, allowed the Britannia to start to drift down into the opposing traffic flow. I think he may never have hand flown as high ( He had been a crop duster before, I think !)

He hand flew all the way home... Earlier in my life I had had to hand fly a York at cruising level for alternate hours, from UK to KIN before FTL had been appied, as the A/P seldom worked. (I had 1000 hours total time at this stage and was the only other pilot apart from the Capt.)

The aircraft I fly (Metro 3) has no autopilot. That means hand flying it all the way up to FL250 with passengers on board (or FL310 without pax). I've been up to FL310 once before - it feels more and more like balancing the airplane on a pin the higher you climb above FL250. It's a cool experience.

An autopilot would be nice for legs that are over 1 hour but we survive. What's a copilot for anyways?! :p And as far as the copilots, they all have around 200-250 hours when they start flying this airplane.

Msdagain post no 37 o0ct8
 

Please p.m. me about your explanation of 'fighter knife fights' and 'getting stick shaker if you relaxed pullback on the stick'
I dont quite understand

So we're at twice his target FPV attitude and the plane's barely flying - AOA barely below stick shaker. CKA - "no, no. Keep the FPV at X". Tiniest reduction in back pressure results in instantaneous stick shaker (anyone doing a high AOA knife fight know's what I'm talking about). Unload, go back to twice his target FPV attitude(double wasn't a goal, just what was required to make the plane fly), and we eventually recover.






wilyflier - That's a text mistake.


I meant "tiniest INCREASE in back pressure results(resulted) in instantaneous stick shaker". That was in the 777 simulator.






Fighters don't have stick shakers but it was common to be at the edge of the stall/buffet with in high AOA maneuvering. So it was common to be at the ragged edge of the airflow separation(non FBW a/c) during high AOA maneuvering. Some a/c had an aural tone or you'd have to feel the change in airflow and the resulting change in a/c buffeting "seat of the pants" flying.

- yes, I thought he was talking Airbus too.......:)