The MPL is not replacing the CPL. However it is an alternative which is only aimed at airline operation, not at the business jet market or any other non-airline environment.

Interestengly enough MPL students cope very well in the charter segment though, flying a nice visual circuit in a 737 or A320 is apparently not a big issue with the right kind of training, even in challenging conditions. LIFUS is usually longer than with CPL candidates, they need more landings during base training (i believe it is 12 or 14 with ours instead of 6 for CPLs) and the learning curve is indeed quite steep, which requires certain personality traits to begin with.

The MPL is in theory not an hour based training, it is purely competency driven, however many current implementations leave quite a bit to be desired. Still, there needs to be a thorough selection of applicants in those programs, the whole training is monitored very closely and conducted in close coordination with the sponsoring airline, and yes, a sponsoring airline is a required part of an MPL. Since the whole MPL thing is still kinda new there is monitoring in place during normal line flying as well, mainly during training and checking of course.

I would qualify my thoughts with: a cross channel ferry captain does not necessarily need to be able to sail a dinghy, but, it does teach them respect of the sea, wind & current. All good stuff, but you don't need to be Ben Ainsly to be a captain of a Frigate.
Food for thought washed down with a good slosh of sea water & fresh air.
It is a discussion for many moons. However, I do feel we have gone down the new/wrong path very quickly without due diligence. It has been a very slippery slope and one that will be extremely difficult to climb back up. Indeed it is proving difficult to brake the slide.

It's not the crew's fault. Chances are the SOPs require them to sit there and push buttons. It's the automatics that got it wrong...:E

already answered :

It's not the crew's fault. Chances are the SOPs require them to sit there and push buttons. It's the automatics that got it wrong...

Ouch: Oh dear! I refer you to "Children of the Magenta Line" for reference. I always thought any SOP starts with A.N.C.

RAT5, I read your posts regarding this topic, and could not agree more..
Seems notwithstanding the slippery slope downhill in this matter, I am pleased to find common ground.

Rat5,
Oh Please, what does A.N.C. mean ?

Aviate
Navigate
Communicate

Simples?

I'm red of shame, I should have found that by myself.
thank you BOAC !
Did you mean "Simple!" (en français dans le texte) ?

A.N.C. & MECANIC
 

Return to topics.

Let us compare that SOP's context :
"Aviate-Navigate-Communicate"
to the old cockpit work repartition in four tasks ( I write it in French, as I learned it) :
"Pilotage, Navigation, Communication, Mecanique".

The latter disapeired with the flight engineer in the airliners' cockpit.
Pilot Unions were unable to explain during the 80's why a new threat came in the cockpit.

That threat was not "electric" or electronic but "mecanic", but that happened totaly only with FBW, when systems were supposed to replace the flight engineer.

PIO (Pilot Induced Oscillation) are showing us how the mecanic function may be connected to piloting.
The April 2014, 1500 pages, USAF investigation report, after the KC-135 crash in Kyrgyz Republic (May 3. 2013) emphasises how the Duch Roll - the lowest level PIO- induced by pilots, autopilot, SOPs and training, destroyed the plane.

Modern black boxes let us show all the significative parameters of that KC-135 Dutch Roll as it could never be done earlier, and USAF did a large study showing how the pilots signed their death, after everybody forgot the "Mecanique" Crew function in the cockpit, during the flight.

FBW, systems, let us forget that the fourth term : "Mecanique", belongs to human cockpit BASICS, knowing if limits of flight domain are respected, if phase planes don't show instability, and avoiding to put the aircraft in a wrong state, and correct it when it is still possible.

With algorithms hiden to pilots for supposed commercial reason, FBW expedites the possible beginning unstability of the flight.

@ vilas
 

Quote: " I am saying even on autopilot you need to scan same way as if you are flying manual and be in control never take things for granted" Unquote.

Excellent!:ok:

I did not say that FBW was "intended" to "delete" (!) the Flight Engineer from the flight deck, but a wrong analysis has been done by some megalomaniac political activists, puting Airbus (B the son) against Airbus (H the father), seeing - without enough correct analysis of the fourth function - in increasing possibility of digitalised systems, the unhoped occasion to destroy the supremacy of flying crews organised in Unions - supposed to be dangerous "CGT communists" or "WWII terrorists" -. The other son (M) suffered the longest SNPL strike of pilots on planes without FE ! That is just history of our professions. For grounded system engineers it was an unhoped promotion : they were ignorant of the four cockpit functions.

The dutch roll is a significative exemple : it was taught in the former time, "romantic [attachment to the ] days of yore "- ie. "Hands off" on DC8 - and the bad analysis of the cockpit oganisation with that FBW forgot it. But facts have the last word. Dutch roll still existed ; automatic SOPs were introduced (A/P off, Y/D off, and then ?????) bad trained, bad known, bad teams, etc. : Read the KC-135 report... until in flight destruction of the plane.
Nobody did see that the "M" was missing after "A.N.C."
AA587 is another exemple of that lost M inside the cockpit and lost Basics.

All due consideration - what the heck does that statement even mean?

I'm sorry, but that's just utter rubbish. Aviation technology has been evolving at a fairly consistent pace since the days of the Wright Brothers. Digital technology made its way into aircraft control systems via the space programme - usually first with military technology, then filtering down into civil applications.

Just as the move from sextants to radio beacons and INS technology obviated the need for a dedicated navigator on the crew, so did the advance in terms of automated systems monitoring make the FE position a thing of the past. This was not a political move - it was simply that the third generation of jetliners (i.e. widebodies) had a set of ancillary systems so complex that they were pretty much at the limit of what a single human being could effectively monitor and operate. With future jetliners only getting more complex, the only viable option was to look into automating operation of, and rationalising feedback from those systems.

It was the French SNPL who tried to make it political when they attempted to take on Airbus over the lack of an FE station on the A300 - apparently they came off worse and have never forgiven the company.

NB. The A300 was *not* a FBW aircraft.

Modern aero science and aerofoil design have tended to reduce the likelihood of aircraft developing dutch roll characteristics. Early jetliners suffered more from it because the phenomenon took some time to understand.

The KC-135 is a 707 airframe, and therefore an early design with pronounced Dutch Roll characteristics - which should have been taught on that type.

I have not yet heard of a FBW generation airliner that developed a Dutch Roll, but if you have please let me know.

I thought it was due to improper application of a wake turbulence recovery procedure which was not appropriate for that airframe.

Why do you think FBW precludes Dutch Roll which is an aerodynamic characteristic?

The Embraer 195 was prone to Dutch Roll.

Hey LSM,

I wasn't suggesting FBW itself *precludes* Dutch Roll, for the reason you give (being an aero phenomenon).

What I said was that I hadn't heard of an FBW-generation (i.e. A320/B777 or later) type getting into trouble with Dutch Roll. I believe the Embraer E-Jets are partial FBW (excluding ailerons).

Dozy
As I mentioned before we were given the demo of Dutch roll in B707which was notorious for it and how to control it also in A310 which had tendency to dampen on its own. It is no longer taught. So it is true that modern aerofoils do not have vicious Dutch roll tendencies.

af447?
 

Rio-Paris : le crash est dû à "une réaction inappropriée de l'équipage", selon une contre-expertise[alerteinfo]-20140513-[bouton]-[site-web]
Not the good thread, but AF447-11 is closed.
Judicial counter-experts report published

Roul, an ideal post for this thread as it provides an alternative view of what ‘basics’ are required.

From a rough translation, the key issues being debated / contested are:-
“Inappropriate response of the crew”,
“Lack of structured failure analysis",
“Not understanding the situation"
“The division of labor in the cockpit."
“Inadequate pilot training in the application of the unreliable IAS procedure."

Inappropriate response depends on awareness and understanding, which can be influenced by training; thus these are some of the important basics. These aspects don’t exclude the underlying technical failure and the operational / regulatory approvals to continue flying reliant on additional training.

Indeed - Learmount's "crusade" on this point was in part pre-empted by the findings on AF447. Specifically the fact that the PF ignored a minute of stall warning and continued to pull nose-up (precisely the opposite of the required response) and that the PNF seemed unable to overrule him - instead waiting for the Captain to return and wasting precious seconds.

I attended a training conference for US University Aviation Departments were this discussion was active Some University's have moved to the Garmin model where the displays are actually more sophisticated than those in some transport aircraft.

However if their first job is with a turboprop carrier flying older equipment, and this particular carrier had older Dash 8's the training situation was less than ideal. These new candidates were called "Children of the magenta line".

They sometimes had difficulty in getting from "A" to "B" because there wasn't any line to display where "A" and "B" actually were. They had to tune radios, and read dials and interpret where they and "B" were. All the while they had to look at other round dials and figure out which way was up and how fast they were going and which way they were pointed.

The airline actually had the audacity to require them to be able to do this all at once one one engine and then even respond to checklist challenges. Oh the agony of it all. How can anyone be expected to look a round dials and actually move across the country and find and airport and land like that?

"Gimmie back my Nintendo game."