Dodo Land
 

First of all: Thank You Rat5. Very good post!

I state that I have never flown the B777 and for a raw data approach I mean:
- Of course no A / P.
- No autotrim on any axis
- No A / T
- No F / D
- No FPA
- No Track
Only Stick, Rudder, Throttles, HSI, ADI, and air driven instruments.

Almost 40 years ago we used to train on SE 210 performing ILS Approaches to simulated minima, with R1 instrument, and its omni bearing selected and locked in a position very different from the ILS inbound course. It was very challenging but effective to maintain manual piloting skills.

Highlights:
even before starting the ILS, know the Following:

-Initial rate of descent is Approximately 5 times your groundspeed in knots ... 140 knots groundspeed Apch ... your initial 700 fpm descent rate ... make your calculation in advance. 600 to 700 fpm for most jets to start

-Attitude and engines / engine (OEO) pre-fixing for each configuration / speed, to maintain in the various phases of the approach ...

-Intercept localizer and make a good guess of the heading required to maintain it. Scan your needles and the basic flight instruments (classic T) ... do not chase the needles, try heading for the refinements as you go

-The drift is equal to the wind cross-component divided by the ground speed in NM / min.
So after capturing the LOC apply a first gross correction to the drift: if your GS is 140 kts = 2.3 nm / min and have a 10 knots x-wind component, add 4° to the right of your inbound course. Then you'll only make small corrections of no more than 5 degrees (the angle of bank should not exceed the amount of heading variation).

-As the glideslope needle comes alive, configure the aircraft for Landing, so as by the time you are ON glideslope, you are fully configured for landing and maintaining your 600-700fpm descent in TRIM ... and correct power.

We used to extend the landing gear when a dot and a half below the glide, landing flap when a dot below.
On glide the aircraft must be configured and at the prescribed speed, with attitude and thrust as precalculated.
Determine what is the exact attitude to maintain the glide slope and make small changes around that.
Do not chase LOC and GLIDE but anticipate their trends.
Maintaining a Sterile Cockpit.
Only standard call outs allowed.
”OUTER MARKER TIME ...” “CROSS CHECKED!”
APPROACHING MINIMA
MINIMA ... GO AROUND Or: LAND
Pleonastic?
Or a forgotten art?

Very good post Rat5


The latest generation of young training captains have been trained in the electronic age. They conduct line training the way they've been trained. Utilization of automation to their fullest degree.


There are but a handful of us oldies out there that flew the trusty 731s, 727s, and DC9s. Nothing more than a multi-engine aircraft with dual Nav-Coms with a coupled autopilot with the old reliable RCA CRT weather radar. When we flew NDB approaches... we flew NDB approaches. Today... when an NDB approach is generally an RNAV overlay approach which to me is not an NDB approach.


As a trainer, I enjoy imparting what I've learned over my years of flying. I encourage my students to hand fly as much as they want during the climb and descent below RVSM. I have no problems with them wanting to turn off the FDs. Turn them back on and engage the automatics if things start going pair shape. But hey...that's what the learning process is all about. After all what's going to happen if all the automatics fail?


I can only hope that more line trainers will encourage manual flying. I would like to hope that the Asiana incident would be the turning point on the total reliance of automation... but I do have my doubts.

New pilots' profile
 

Please, Leftlook, do you know if any poster opened a thread on PPRuNe about the Kyrgystan crash ? I found nothing with the PPRuNe/Google search tool.
EDIT : Oh, I found it
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...h-bishkek.html

I am concerned with dutch roll since 1979, and since 1992 I try -without success- to explain the need to train airline pilots to dutch roll, and how.


The 1500 pages report which is not public seems to recognize that lack of formation and training and information. It is a great improvment, if really they modify the training and the procédures.

It seems that master's of psychology did not helped the copilot flying, and the majored Captain in engineering could not overcome better the dutch roll.


It seems that the stability augmentation system had a failure and started the dutch roll. So we typically have a new problem with FBW, which must be masterized not only with basics, but with specific Learning.

roulishollandais
Dutch roll demonstration and control was shown to us in B707 and A310. It was quite pronounced in 707 but in A310 it damps out and was not problematic may be same in A320. Perhaps that is why not taught.

vilas
so long no oscillation - or sudden change (turbulence, rate limitation, modification of shape, thrust, configuration, weight, wake turbulence, etc) - and piloting resonance ... But
USAF changed their philosophy after that investigation and his 1500 pages report !!!
I hope it will be published soon !
Air Force Releases KC-135 Crash Report « CBS Seattle

There was a TV programme about airline pilots I recall, it must have been 20-25 years ago and the conclusion even then was that pilots would eventually be condemned to sit on the flightdeck doing nothing just watching the automation. Automation is to my mind, in the main, a good thing and certainly prevented many more prangs than its caused but it needs to be used properly & "appropriately" The apathy lies with what can be deemed as proper & "appropriate".
I also remember that old gag about replacing the co-pilot with a dog which was trained to bite the Captain if he/she touched anything.....

The Flight International headline is ‘back to basics’, but the commentary and thread focusses on manual flight skills; what about all of the other professional skills of fight. There are only a few accidents specifically identifying handing issues, which is disproportionate to the overwhelming number of successful operations, presumably involving manual flight. This data would suggest that the industry does not have a serious problem.
However, this does not dismiss that there is a problem, but it is an issue apparently relating to specific circumstances and contributing factors which need to be better understood.

I doubt if a true ‘back to basics’ training programme could be established – time or money; nor that an extensive change is necessary as current operational scenarios differ from those pre-automation and require new skills.
The problems appear to be associated with the advent of automation, but not necessarily directly due to automation. The beliefs that automation would reduce workload and training underestimated the risk of unforeseen changes or knock-on effects – even greater capability or unintended application. Automation has reduced physical workload at the expense of mental workload, but training and operations have not adjusted to this. We cannot expect crews to understand all of the implications of automation malfunctions and thus there is a need to assist with problem solving; and occasionally where crews need to revert to manual flight in surprising circumstances, they may be ill prepared.
Yet the industry still expects crews to manage with less knowledge, less experience, and reduced opportunity to refresh skills – a belief that “…the strategies of CRM, SOPs, and professional culture will mitigate these threats… professional culture is the weakest…” (ICON report 2001).

The problems involve assumptions that previous skills are adequately trained and can still be called on, less training is required for automation, crews will be able to manage complex operations, and poor standards of emergent automation interfaces are not a significant threat. The industry expects too much of the human and thus must heed the advice of James Reason – it is difficult to change the human condition (training), but we can change the conditions of work; thus the industry should look at the tasks in rare situations which the crews are expected to manage, and then consider reducing, improving, or avoiding them.

ICON Report “The Human Factors Implications for Flight Safety of Recent Developments in the Airline Industry” 2001

You know there are hundreds of pilots out there who are very good at hand flying, practice regularly and can fly difficult approaches with no AT or AP with no issue.


The problem is they fly Turboprops and jet carriers don't seem to want them as they must smell weird or something....must be because they keep using their feet.....


If only the PTF cadet system was shut down and a proper career path re-established, some proper experience might get a look in again.

True.
I was much better at manual instrument flying when I had three thousand hours than when I had six thousand hours. The above statement by Turkish is the reason.

In many cases, LOFT in the simulator is a time waster of dubious value, especially as the session is primarily a flight deck management exercise with full use of the automatic pilot. Time and therefore costs, are the main over-riding factor against increasing the amount of manual flying in simulator training. Airlines need to re-evaluate the purported value of LOFT exercises and instead replace them with manual raw data instrument flying practice.

For every enlightened operator that encourages manual flying under appropriate conditions during line flying, the will be a dozen or more who shy away from it to the extent that it is expressly forbidden. However, the latter must be forced by their regulator to schedule simulator hand flying raw data training on visual approaches, ILS in strong crosswinds, high and low altitude stall recovery for example. If practice makes perfect, then what more cost-efficient way to prevent the skill atrophy that has become such a serious issue, judging from the plethora of reports from research and international flight safety conferences.

Where have all the "pilots" gone? Long time passing....
 

Sorry to use a paraphrase of an old song, but MSB has a good point.

I have refrained from comment until I got a feel from the "heavy" pilots here.

Make no mistake, as a single-seater for most of my flying time, I grew used to using all the automation and "help" as the technology advanced . Except for a very short tactical flight, the AP was great and allowed me to use the entire "system" to reduce workload and get the job done. No navigator, no flight engineer, no co-pilot.

The biggest difference I have seen from my experience versus the posts from heavy pilots here is I never had an AP that would climb, level, descend, hold a set speed, level off altitude, and such. Never had a "coupled AP" for the ILS except for one jet and 400 hours in it ( manual throttle). Crude, but it worked.

I realize that training is $$$$ for the airlines. Gotta fly the money-making missions. But seems to me that a a few more sim flights and maybe even a flight in the plane in the real world would help.

As a systems engineer in second career, I like MSB's philosophy. The human interface and the human skills/experience/judgement is very important for the overall system design. The human in the loop is akin to another computer that is integrated into the overall system.

Am I way off base here?

Hi gums, msbbarratt,
I cannot agree better, as retired airline pilot and scientific and technological IT analyst.

Human belong to the "effective system" before aside effect of every other human factor.

Degenerating dutch roll, or more positive the HUD, are good examples.

Airlines should save $$$ for training better and more on sim and planes by saving the leasing rates and expensive research and investigations and increasing insurances.

Civilian aviation needs better instructors too, with experience of high performance systems: Military instructors could bring their expertise again as they did it during one or two decades after WWII,
...and how you do it on PPRuNe:)

safetypee . . .
 

I have flown with too many new-schooled copilots who have an acute aversion for manual flying even in day VMC. I believe this to be a dangerous trend, especially in situations when the automatics go on vacation. :{

From talking to many airline pilots in my profession as a flight simulator instructor, and at the risk of generalisation, I would guess that the majority of todays co pilots as well as captains on current jet transports have that aversion to manual flying. It starts with their initial introduction to airline flying in simulators where the accent is more about SOP call-outs and heads down entries into the FMCS than basic instrument flying skills. When you see and hear of pilots leaving the FD in view and calling it raw data simply because they have their hands on the controls, then you know automation has them totally in its grip. More's the pity.:confused:

One has to wonder what the reaction is of the newbies who dream of 'being pilot and then is one'. Perhaps those on tailored courses with only 148hrs are better honed to the new world, but the flying school QFI self-improvers who fly around insight of road, rail & river and enjoy the thrill of being in the air might have a big shock of what is really means to be an airline pilot. I wonder if the dream is fulfilled. This brings me to think about the selection process of new entrants. Reading the blurb that is spewed out by the big airline HR departments about the characteristics their 'ideal candidate' will have I wonder if they are in sync with reality. Is the 'right stuff' sitting up front in todays bells & whistles wizz-bang do almost nothing aircraft?

No idea if the uniqueness of this criterion described in a book on SWA first published almost twenty years ago still applies and/or can be a potential explanation (apart from the arguably quite unique management style of SWA with collaborative rather than adversarial employee relations):
"Southwest Airlines is the only company in the airline industry that requires a pilot to have a 737-Type Rating before he or she is considered for hire. This rating, given by the Federal Aviation Administration, essentially says a pilot is qualified to be the captain of a Boeing 737. This means that all first officers are qualified to fly as captains."
(Freiberg, K. & Freiberg, J. (1996): NUTS! Southwest Airlines' Crazy Recipe for Business and Personal Success. Austin, Texas: Bard Press, p. 98f.)

Ask Asiana! There might be more to fix then just lack of piloting skills and system management.

Recently we had a few minutes on the ground at a field in NE Ontario, now used as a destination for one of our Ontario Government owned "puppy Farm" flight schools, if our meeting with an instructor and pupil from this school are anything to go by the lack of skills and common sense is programed from the very beginning of training in this place. We heard their endless transmission as we were joining IFR for the GPS approach for the North South runway, they informed the world {and the other four fields on the same freq} that they would be doing a "full stop", well that's nice to know but "landing" would do the job according to our standard RT booklet, {I am by the way a radio examiner} but to their credit we didn't get the "currently, at this time" babble which seems to be the latest in "Yuckspeak" on the radio these days. On meeting the two crew in the FBO we were astounded to see them dressed in white shirts, slip on shoes, and a very light jacket, now for those who don't live in this part of the world they have just flown for about three hours over pretty rough bush which still has a few feet of snow on the ground, on top of their lack of suitable dress we found they are not carrying any survival gear, the chances of them surviving two nights in the bush are about zero, even less as they were both "city boys". In conversation with the student we were informed, in the most authoritative manner, that on graduation from this school they would have little need for hand flying skills as the "modern aircraft fly themselves" end quote. The other crew member of our corporate aircraft waited until I was out of ear shot and let them know in no uncertain terms that I had some time ago retired from Boeing/Airbus products and would most likely give them a new orifice if the said this again, so there it is, the blind leading the blind, a bit of topic but its typical I fear of our government sponsored schools in Canada, the nation which once taught the world to fly.

Is it just me or have we read on here, over the past 18 months, an increase in serviceable a/c accidents. Start with such things as going off the end of the RWY in TSL Greece and then add in all the others we've discussed in many 'civilised' aviation countries. There seemed to be more crew induced prangs than broken a/c calling it a day and capitulating to Mother Nature & Gravity. Am I wrong?

Further; I heard from the head of a flight college that the idea was the future cadets for MPA CPL could be trained >75% in a sim. They would earn the basic PPL in a prop and then spend the rest of their 150hrs in a MPA sim learning MMC/CRM/AFDS/QRH etc. etc. All that good twin prop IFR, VFR Nav, aeros, circuits etc. etc. was not necessary to be an airline pilot. But, I asked, what about the MPA Turbo-prop/Biz-jet pilot who flew into tiny little airfields in all regions in all weathers? No answer. What about the charter airlines who fly big jets into some inhospitable places? No answer. What dos the guy do who wants a CPL but not an MPA? No answer. It seems the authorities have decided there is only o e sort of pilot. My 250 schools hours is already reduced to 150hrs, but at least they are airborne. What's next, a Play Station or Wii-Wii? Perhaps the ground based pilot is closer than we dread.

Some good points, Rat.

I flew two single-seaters that had decent sims to help before first flight. Great for procedures and such, but little else. One of them had no "training" models, so first hop was truly "solo". Good deal, and I would not diminish the value of the sims as long as they accurately reflect the aero properties of the jet and the training shows the "bad things" that can happen and how to handle them. The KC-135 sim apparently could not model dutch roll, and the crew could not cope with it. Ditto for the 'bus in a reversion mode where the stall protection did not prevent the jet from entering a deeply stalled condition ( recoverable, but had to know what to do and not to do).

I am not a dinosaur WRT new avionics and "aids" to make the flight safer and reduce workload. But sooner or later it will come down to basics, and that is what I fear we are losing. I preached use of the AP from the time I was a nugget until I retired, as we could use it while we pulled out the approach plate for a divert base. We could use it while we took a sip from our coffee thermos or a can of juice. Of course, there were biological needs that had to be satisfied and we couldn't go back to the latrine at row 3A. Heh heh. Secondly, our official manuals emphasized the use of the old steam gauges even tho we had cosmic HUD systems that showed all you needed to fly very precisely ( the flight path vector was the best thing). It's called "cross check", huh?

I realize that training in the real jet is expensive compared to the sim. But somewhere in my mind is the thot that a certified pilot must experience exactly what the plane does under various conditions. But what do I know...