:eek:
Close call!

The utility pole on the left side of your picture is likely 820. That mail box is very close to the yellow line. The tree on the right (with the red tape around the base) may be 854.

So they made contact with what appears to be the last trees before the cleared area.

The altitude constraint at IMTOY is actually 1380 feet and if you can identify IMTOY you can go down the path past IMTOY to an MDA of 1200 feet. Add 50 feet to get a D-DA of 1250 feet which I believe is what most 'authorized' U.S. carriers would use on this approach.

The FMS database I have access to does not have IMTOY depicted, you would have to identify it with 3.3 DME off IBXO to go down to the 1250 feet D-DA.

With IMTOY missing from the FMS procedure you would never manually insert it inside the FAF at any place I've ever worked, as IB57 has said. However, if for some unknown reason you did, with say, a D-DA of 1250 instead of the published crossing altitude of 1380, I do believe you would get a new path that leads to touchdown well short of the runway. And the path would not just be lower, but steeper as well with the altitude constraints at BASKN and IMTOY. I would hope you would get some sort of error message since the path angle has changed with the erroneous entry, but perhaps not.

As pointed out previously, the IBXO DME reads 1.3 at the runway threshold, not zero so this might confuse the cross check when things don't look exactly right.

It is an absolute alphabet soup but I read the 'Only authorized operators may use VNAV DA (H) in lieu of MDA (H)' to mean that you can use the D-DA on the 3.28 degree path, if like presumably UPS, you are authorized.

The additional question of whether an incorrect entry of minimums on the approach page of the FMS would cause the autopilot to stay on lower than it should is a good one. Data entry on these legacy FMS boxes is arcane and archaic, sometimes you need a leading zero, a decimal point or a slant, sometimes you don't. And, subtle differences exist between similar looking FMS's on Boeings, Airbuses and MD's from what I've seen.

This fits with what I saw when I drove through on the day of the accident. There was also a medium sized hardwood that got topped on the other side of the house from the picture Huck pasted. Judging from the probable path maybe the left wing or engine took that out. Unfortunately, I've been working too much to go back site seeing, but I'll put a camera on pole one day for all of us would be investigators.

Yes, I have. The utility pole with the transformer in all the pictures is point 820. All the trees in Huck’s photo with red tape around the trunk were hit. Using Huck's photo for reference:
The first match point is the leafless top of the skinny pointed tree to the right of the mailbox, with a single bare branch pointing left and a shorter one to the right. Zoom in and you can see the red tape on the trunk. This matches the tree to the left of pole 820 in the top photo in post #470 , but viewed from the opposite direction.

This same tree is visible in the lower photo of post #470 almost directly behind the mailbox. About 2/3 of the way up from the mailbox is a horizontal, yellowish leafy area that almost looks like a ring around the trunk. In Huck’s photo it is reddish, about halfway up the tree.

The other damaged trees in the upper photo are between tree 854 and the driveway. It is hard to get a reference for them due to perspective compression from the photo being taken with a telephoto lens. Tree 854 is off Huck’s photo to the right.

Damage to the trees is easier to see when compared with Google Street View which is here: http://goo.gl/maps/NWjw5 It may take a moment to load. Point 822 is the light pole on the south side of the road, with the light hanging out over the road.

That suggests that trees were hit, which were not on the FAA survey list (and the FAA did not consider them tall enough to be a potential hazard). Has there been any announcement from NTSB about which part of the aircraft made tree contact ? The wide swath of trees makes me wonder if the leading edge of the wings were involved. The trees were sufficiently fragile as to give way against the forward momentum of the aircraft.

Anyone care to guess if the first impact noise on the CVR was the trees ?

There are quite a few points in the UDDF file which are certainly not obstacles (note the catch basin in the road)

The ridge leading up to threshold would mask most of these points as well.

Here is the line on Google Earth
http://i44.tinypic.com/j8ehie.jpg

Here is the house with topped trees (note ridges beyond, also note eye level altitude of 808 feet, about 20 feet off ground surface alt.) This seems pretty close to where the aircraft was, and perhaps what they saw.
http://i39.tinypic.com/2lxa3xv.jpg
Ridge before threshold (note runway beyond)
http://i43.tinypic.com/4hz7gj.jpg

Those are some interesting graphics. Mrs. Benson said she found pieces of aluminum on her back porch, and i have to wonder if tree contact was made earlier to do some initial damage, and then again at her trees to knock the parts loose.

Would you be able to extend the red line back about 3000 ft to where they may have been when the sink rate warning was issued to determine pilot's view and possible obstructions in the path toward the Benson house.

This is the house roughly 550 feet north of the Benson residence along the extended centerline. There is tree debris on the roof and if you zoom in you can see damage to the top of the tree on the right side of the photo. (from Before UPS Flight 1354 crash, tension between Birmingham airport and neighborhoods | al.com)
http://imgick.al.com/home/bama-media...bf15579c6b.JPG
You can see the tree clearly (leafless) on my photomap http://www.m2ei.com/kbhm/northern_points.jpg

Here is another photo extending about 0.4 nm north from Benson's. The full size image is: http://www.m2ei.com/kbhm/benson_north_to_834.jpg
http://www.m2ei.com/kbhm/benson_north_to_834_small.jpg

The track below is part of a series I have been making to emulate the path taken by UPS 1354. The full detail will be posted some time in the next 24 hours, but how they came to be there is, to my mind, a mystery.

http://oi43.tinypic.com/30kbvb5.jpg

Ridge before runway
http://i44.tinypic.com/etxfzc.jpg

House with clipped trees/powerlines
http://i41.tinypic.com/2ajnwvs.jpg


House shown in sardaks image

http://i43.tinypic.com/123r78l.jpg

profile high point near house in sardaks image
http://i41.tinypic.com/2s9yk94.jpg


I suggest looking at this hilltop as well.

http://i43.tinypic.com/312fg5v.jpg

EDIT for reference, the threshold is at 1.3mi on the profile
http://i39.tinypic.com/aka16x.jpg

Profile beginning at threshold...

http://i44.tinypic.com/2u478d2.jpg

It may be a mystery how UPS 1354 got that low - but obviously they are not the first. So whatever the reason UPS 1354 was low, it may be common to other (unreported?) close calls

I bet it is not a mystery why they got that low to anyone who has seen the CVR transcripts... unfortunately the NTSB won't let the rest of us learn anything for months or years.

Ian W.;

Re, "So whatever the reason UPS 1354 was low, it may be common to other (unreported?) close calls "

A good FOQA Program will already have a form of "Early descent" or "Too Low 2 minutes before touchdown" or some variation of the event.

While such close calls may go unreported, (not very good safety culture behaviour), any FOQA Analyst who's doing his/her job will have ensured that the program has such events and that the results are routinely passed on to operations, flight safety, training/standards for corrective action. It is almost a certainty that this kind of event occurs in flight data.

Analysis takes a look at all factors including weather, ATC distractions, circadian time frame, precision or non-precision approach, etc and makes sure that that knowledge is passed on to the appropriate managers and that crew calls are made by the pilot group's FOQA representative (not the company) to understand more about such an event and to pass on the learning.

@ underfire

Fine work on the profiles.

We actually know the track they took, due to photographic imagery of treetop damage. You have made your plots further to the west, and it would be interesting to see the generated terrain profile if you did the same again but on the meridian of 86° 44' 49.18"W.

Rewind - Was any 18 approach legal...for aircraft in 'Height Cat 4'
 

Forget the flight path analysis for one minute and back up.

So a thread on another website quoted a FAA Joint Order that pertains to Visual Guidance Lighting Systems. I am asking if anyone else reads this the same way I do and therefore questions the legality of an A-300 size aircraft being filed/dispatched to a runway under IFR flight plan when the PAPI system was REQUIRED to be operational for either instrument approach to the operating runway BUT the PAPI system settings were NOT COMPLIANT with that size aircraft? However you interpret this, please respond.

----------------------
This gets really into the weeds and does not involve normal TERPS regs - I am NOT questioning the legality or obstacle clearance of either FAA instrument approach to runway 18. I am questioning why/how the approaches aren't restricted at night to aircraft that comply with the existing and mandatory PAPIs.

LOC and RNAV 18 have TCH of 48feet - Look at the last sentence of the second paragraph along with the required TCH for 'Height group 4' (A-300 specifically listed)

[IMG]http://i1333.photobucket.com/albums/...psafd41fe9.png[/IMG]

Full FAA JO here:
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...%206850.2B.pdf

GGNP,

You have a point regarding the suitability for the A300 to use this runway at night, but it wasn't the cause of the low altitude and CFIT. My understanding is that the automation was controlling the airplane. If the autopilot was set to follow the VDA on the chart, they would have been much higher. It suggests that the autopilot was in a VS mode or the there was some other issue that permitted the autopilot to follow the lower profile. If the VGSI path was followed, the aircraft would not have impacted the trees where it did.

Excellent find on an interesting piece of information.

Using 3.2 deg angle and considering the difference of 27 ft (75ft -48 ft), the difference in touchdown point would shorten touchdown distance, perhaps, as much as 482 ft.

I'm not sure the VGSI TCH, in this case based on a standard for Airports PAPI siting, is necessarily intended to assure obstacle clearance (the topic of many interesting graphic submissions so far). Perhaps, I’m wrong on that. In any case we can surmise from the design of the LOC 18 procedure there are known obstacles in the visual segment, (e.g., no VDP).

I suggest that, as I think others have noted before, the "Sink Rate" alert, which does not trigger for less than 1000 FPM VVI (baro), and is heard on CVR approx 7 sec prior to sounds of impact, one could surmise the VVI was greater than 1000 FPM, perhaps 1100+ FPM. So, VVI must be a prime suspect until more data is forthcoming.

One could imagine the crew reacting quickly to the Sink Rate alert at least reducing the VVI in the last moments before impact. Again we must wait for the actual data. At approx. 140 kts, the airplane would travel 1,656 ft in 7 seconds. So does 1100+ FPM VVI make sense at that location in the approach? What could account for it?
:confused:

Autopilot versus Autothrottle
 

Would it be possible to get dominating or conflicting guidance, navigation or flight control commands due to the mode selection when using these automation/software functions at the same time?

i'm sure the software is under configuration management and control, and should be thoroughly tested and wrung out before updates are pushed out to the fleet, but software can be difficult.

For example in this incident the aircraft is flying at 140 knots in a stabilized approach and crosses IMTOY at the correct 1380 MSL altitude and on the 3.28 constant descent angle. Eleven seconds later it reaches the 1200 MDA (or 1250 D-DA), and the software takes action based upon the dominant mode to throttle back the engines and begin a very steep descent. Five seconds after that the sink rate warning is issued due to the high vertical speed. Everything seems to be working okay according to the software because that is what it is programmed to do. But the dominant mode may have issued a command that conflicts with the best interest of the aircraft's stability or safe operating during final approach.