That may be a bit of an assumption. The Board didn't say that was the first time someone called the runway in sight, nor did they say anything about what was said at minimums. I suspect further analysis of the CVR COULD indicate that the "runway in sight" call was intended to verbalize the reasoning behind not reacting to the EGPWS "Sink Rate" call. It may have been an attempt to clarify that they were now visual and not required (by policy or OPSPEC) to react to the EGPWS as they would in IMC. I'm clearly just speculating, however, it seems the whole group was ASSUMING that the call indicates they had just gone visual, even though this was significantly past the MAP. Just trying to find a way to make sense of the call at that time.

@ capnbloggs

What? Something a student pilot is expected to handle from their first solo - a visual descent to landing in CAVOK and daylight - is an "unusual situation"?

I hold no brief for the ethnic/cultural argument, and know full well that "western" pilots can prang aircraft like anyone else. But let's not get silly in presenting the counter-arguments.

Asiana: visual - daylight - clear weather - over flat terrain (water) - slowed to stick-shaker speed
UPS: instrument - night - clouds - over hills - maintained flying speed

No useful comparison.

----------------------
@ mm64, et al. Thanks for the diagram. I wanted to post something similar, to point out that - among other things - the RA would be bouncing around as they crossed all those hills and hollers on final, and thus an imperfect cross-check.

It's possible (not necessarily probable) that they lost the real PAPI in the hills or scud, and then picked up "false" lights - street lights, house lights, or car lights, on Bethel Ave. or the surrounding hills - and followed those right to their "landing."

@ pipeliner

The reason I didn't plot a position for the "runway in sight" call, was to avoid muddying the waters as to where the aircraft actually was. We know the NTSB released 9 sec time from initial contact until CVR EOR, and that data fitted neatly as plotted.

You are right, it could just have been a procedural call, and nothing should be read into it.

NASA report
 

1999 NASA report on 18 approach.

The approach to runway 18 at bhm is marginally safe at best and is a setup for an accident at worst. Runway 5/23 was closed from XA00Z to XK00Z. As a result, we briefed the localizer runway 18 approach. It was my first officer's leg and neither of us had flown to this runway before. We were both acutely aware of the high terrain to the north of the field and paid particular attention to that fact in our approach briefing. The only depiction of the high terrain is on the airport page. The WX was clear with excellent visibility. Bhm approach cleared us for the visual but we indicated we wanted to intercept the final outside of baskin and fly the final part of the localizer 18 approach. Although not listed on the approach page, there is a PAPI on the left side of runway 18 which has been in use for about 1 yr. We calculated the appropriate vdp based on timing as well as on the ibxo DME. From the vdp it was clear to us that if the field was not in sight at the 1300 ft altitude at the ibxo 3.3 DME, it would not be possible to complete the approach safely. The PAPI was visible from the 3.3 DME and we began a 700 FPM descent when on GS. The first officer and I were both bothered by the close visual proximity of the ground while on the final stages of the approach. At about 1 mi from touchdown, a car passed under us on an east/west road. It was between 100 ft and 80 ftAGL. I again verified visually that we were on the PAPI glide path and that the glide path was visually correct with the runway visual presentation. It was clear that we were correct and the radio altimeter then began to show the ground dropping away a bit. We passed over the threshold at 50 ft AGL having been centered on the glide path the entire time. By use of the ft scale and the graphic presentation on the airport page, I believe the radio altimeter was accurate and that we were on or even slightly above the glide path when we had the 80-100 ft reading. How high are the trees on that hill? Although the approach and landing were uneventful, the following problems are presented: 1) there is no note about the extremely close proximity to high terrain when on this approach. The mandatory airport review page does not address runway 18 or runway 36. 2) there is no PAPI depicted in commercial chart despite having been in service for about 1 yr according to the bhm tower. 3) using a 3 degree GS and an aim point 1000 ft down runway 18, the 884 ft terrain 4000 ft north of the field calculates to a ht above ground of less than 100 ft. Trees are of course not included in this calculation. 4) runway 18 slopes down to the south and complicates the landing. A 7100 ft runway means a 6100 ft area to stop in and the downslope tends to have the effect of falling away from an aircraft in the flare. Unless you fly it on to the runway fairly aggressively, the distance could be even less. 5) NOTAM 11/023 reports runway 18 is ungrooved from 1550 to 2490. NOTAM 11/024 reports runway 36 is ungrooved from 4610-5550 ft. This obviously would have an affect on stopping under most instrument conditions, ie, a wet runway. I respectfully submit the following recommendation: discontinue use of runway 18 for company operations due to the high terrain present under the normal glide path. This is a dangerous approach so prohibit it. If the use of runway 18 is not prohibited, then I make the following recommendations: 1) include a picture of the runway 18 and runway 36 approachs on the mandatory airport review pages. 2) include specific notes on the operations pages about the high terrain to the north giving radio altimeter readings of 80-100 ft, 1 mi north of the field. 3) restrict use of runway 18 to day VFR conditions only and require the localizer runway 18 approach be flown. 4) update the bhm page forthwith to show the PAPI for runway 18. To be blunt, I will not fly to this runway in the WX or to a wet runway. If it is the only runway open in those conditions I will divert. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter states that he has followed up with company, and they have issued a prohibition against using runways 18/36 except during day VFR conditions. He also stated that he did not see the rotating beacon on the hill approximately 1 mi from the runway. The GPWS indication did not show any red during the approach, but varied from green to amber. The first officer was flying the approach and the captain monitored the descent. He said that they did not exceed about 700 FPM rate throughout the final approach, and that after landing, both pilots debriefed their impressions to each other. They felt that they had taken prudent precautions, but that this approach was hazardous.

Pattern is full, you can bang on all you like about what student pilots can/could do. The fact of the matter is that all of these pilots were rated as competent by their authorities and companies. All were at the controls when aircraft crashed. To a large extent, IMO AF447 and Asiana were "set up" by their employers. Do you really think they crashed due to a devil-may-care, deliberate breaking-of-the-rules attitude? Do you really think that if they had had more exposure (looks to me like Asiana had virtually none) to their respective problems in the SIM or on the line they'd still have crashed? Probably not. It remains to be seen whether the UPS pilots were in the same boat.

At some point in complex operations, you simply can't just "blame the crew".

The OLD Dive&Drive is safer than continuous descent.

I realize you are probably just trolling but if not please enlighten us as to how dive and drive is safer.


And while you're at it, explain why no major Airline still uses that technique.


We used to do d & v back in my 727 days and it was dodgy then,
In my modern Boeing we do a constant rate descent LNAV / VNAV
to a DDA on a non precision approach and there's no comparison.


It is 100% safer.

roulishollandais thinks...

Perhaps in a 1 ton PA28 or C182. We only had dual Navs and NDBs. when flying the old B737-100/200 and 727. We didn't have the advantage of GPS with 20 meter accuracy. We had to acquire ground contact with immediate effect, however with safety in mind being first. Today, with modern technology, I'll take a CDA to the DDA as my first option. Safety comes first.

Not sure why you think it's safer to do the CD approach, maybe you are a wide body driver, I always liked the dive and drive because you're at the MDA for a while, easy to do in light twins, deck angle not to severe.

That Nasa report
 

The NASA Report is absolutely clear about runway 18. It says:" I respectfully submit the following recommendation: discontinue use of runway 18 for company operations due to the high terrain present under the normal glide path. This is a dangerous approach so prohibit it."

mm landing profile
 

Very interesting profile. I made one (not nearly as clear) for myself and came to the same conclusions.

I used the latest USGS map (2003 elevation database) with the following altitude curves:
Mrs Benson house: 780 ft
Top of the hill: 800-820 ft
Threshold: 645 ft
Papi: 640 ft

Assuming a 75 to 100 ft. tall pine tree (850 to 880 ft alt) at Mrs Benson house (on Google street view, there is a tall one there, much taller than the utility pole), pilots could not possibly see REILs (hidden by the 820ft hill), they may barely have spotted a red PAPI, definitively not a pink one.

If you have seen what I have seen in simulator sessions then believe me you would treat what you have said in the highlighted paragraph above, with a fair amount of skepticism. Certified competent means nothing apart from an administrative entry into a pilots log book.

Dream Land asks...

As close to a stabilized approach one can be as if conducting a Precision Approach.

Dreamland, dive n drive works ok in light aircraft, but it usually requires a change in aircraft trajectory and energy which is undesirable at low altitudes in heavy aircraft

Yep, fully understand. :ok:

Continuous Descent Table
 

The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents
 

Machinbird [commenting on the price of $118.70 at www.amazon.com]
Wow! At that price, I'll wait for the paperback to come out

The paperback is out, and amazon quote $35.35
Amazon.com: The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents (9780754649656): R. Key Dismukes, Benjamin A. Berman, Loukia D. Loukopoulos: Books

As usual, you may find a better price at BookFinder.com: New & Used Books, Textbooks, Rare Books & Out-of-Print Books

Regards, Peter

Continuous Descent/Constant Angle vs Dive & Drive
 

Hey RoulisHollandais, you've been doing too many Dutch rolls! :hmm:

There's been lots of research that's pretty well proved that Constant Angle/Constant Descent Final Approaches (NPAs) are far safer than Dive & Drive for a whole bunch of reasons. In addition to the performance issues raised previously by others, note that following Distance/Altitude guidance checklists on charts - whether flying AP+(advisory)VNAV or especially if flying manually (with or without FD) - helps assure situational awareness - particularly for GPS procedures.

For those who don't have access to the FSF ALAR toolkits, check out the same material for free on SKYbrary - Flight Safety Foundation ALAR Toolkit, and ref ALAR Briefing Note 7.2 CANPA (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/811.pdf)

The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents
 

Kindle version only $28

MM43 http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post8003816 a very useful diagram.

From an NTSB briefing on the CVR: "Thirteen seconds to the end, one crew member reported the runway was in sight."

If you were to extend the flight path back where the 'runway in sight' call would have been made from - that's adding under half as much of that dotted flight path, how would the runway have been 'in sight'? Certainly not the touchdown end, PAPIs and approach lights they would be hidden by the crest of the hill.

Would you agree it is looking more like the crew suffered a visual illusion pf some sort?