WR63:
To put a finer point on it, two rated Captains did not maintain airspeed, apparently from not paying attention to it. It doesn't get more basic than that.

In Birmingham, airspeed appears to have been OK based on info available. Something else went wrong.

As "what" becomes more clear, perhaps valid comparisons can be made between the two events. In SFO, the pilots were alive to share their experiences with NTSB. Not so in this case.

A nice illustration of my earlier post...
 

Speechless I am, Sir !

The difference between a crash caused by a competent crew that made an error and an incompetent crew that made an error finally explained! In remarkably few words! Should there be a vacancy at the head of the Flat Earth Society, you can count on my support :ugh:

Numbers can only approximate intangibles. If you want to know what kind of person Cerea Beal Jr was, read the guest book in his Charlotte Observer obituary. Cerea Beal Jr. Guest Book: sign their guest book, share your condolences, or read their obituary at Charlotte Observer Sure, most people wouldn't think of writing something bad, even if the person was bad, in an obituary guest book, but, that guest book would be pretty much empty. There are plenty of entries from fellow pilots, other colleagues, associates, and friends to paint a very good picture of Cerea Jr. One entry indicates he was a fixed wing pilot (I assume private pilot), while living in Chigago, before he was in the Marine Corps flying Jolly Green Giant CH-53 helicopters, and, at some point, was a fixed wing flight instructor for PPL's.

Agnostique75, Thanks. Brevity is the soul of wit! You can quote me on that, if you like. Although they are both errors, one is all but planned, the other is unexpected. Love the French Riviera, by the way!

Reading those tributes as well as those for his FO Shanda Fanning, it is obvious that not only were they both good people but they both also seemed to be regarded by their peers, as consummate professionals.

I spent the last 20 years of my flying career night-freighting. Despite the unsocial hours, it was bloody good fun when it came to the flying bit of the equation.

There was usually very little traffic at night and ATC were very relaxed. We would get airborne from our hub, check in with Maastricht and be cleared direct to Helsinki or Istanbul.

Going eastbound to somewhere like Hannover or Nurnberg, both of which were advertising the westerly runway on the ATIS, the easterly runway would usually be offered if the winds were light.

This of course was no problem as long as you realised that you were now high on the profile for the new runway and made an IMMEDIATE adjustment so that you could be back on the profile for the new runway by at least 1,500 ft. It has to be said that we knew our airfields well.

So we could just possibly be involved here in a situation where ATC offers a straight-in on to another runway or else the aircraft asked for the same thing.

Suddenly, we are too high (having planned for another runway) but we can hack it. The rate of descent is now higher than it should be for a stabilised approach but the runway is in sight so all is well. Then, the runway lights start to disappear.

Two things can be wrong;

1. The visibility has reduced so that we can't see the lights any more.

2. We are descending at such a rate that the runway lights have gone behind a hill.

I experienced the latter scenario out in the bundu one night in Arabia and luckily survived to tell the tale. I survived.

I suppose what I am trying to say is that only mistakes are made in a hurry.

How do you compare this with AF447? One involved a total lack of professional piloting skill in the face of a known issue while this is somehow much more sinister...

Here we appear to have two competent pilots who either made a very fundamental error or fell victim to an error of some type with either data or AP programming.

Incidentally, I have flown into BHM sitting in the left seat of a DC-10 (but never at night) and I don't recall anything difficult about the airfield.

A friend's observation over six packs...human error? Well if you wish to sugar coat it. Complacency and a case of skygod teflonism perhaps?

The only runway available that night was 18/36.

06/24 was NOTAM'd closed at the time of the accident for maintenance of runway centre line lights. They would have left Louisville 45 mins earlier, expecting to fly south and straight in to RWY18 presumably starting their descent at the appropriate time.

If they had briefed for 06/24 and were offered a straight in to 18, I can see a possible rushed descent but not the other way round.

With the ongoing discussion over the KBHM RWY 18 PAPI approach, I've constructed a profile with exaggerated height. The notes on the graphic probably explain all that is needed.

http://oi44.tinypic.com/2i131v6.jpg
Edit ::-
IMTOY distance to I-BXO LOC/DME is shown as 3.3NM on the AL-50 plate, but in fact is 3.349NM - which is shown correctly here. The PAPI 3.20° G/S equates to a RoD of 800 FPM at 140 KTS GS.

Rubbish. Those guys did the best they could. Throw a 12 year-old into a Formula 1 at max speed at night in the wet and they will make just as big a hash of it as the AF447 guys did.

Without prejudging the UPS accident, the same could well have happened here. A crew trained and checked to the required standard presented with an unusual situation which they could not resolve/cope with. Come to think of it, Asiana 214 was exactly the same thing.

If you flew, you'd know what I was talking about.

Rubbish. Those guys did the best they could. Throw a 12 year-old into a Formula 1 at max speed at night in the wet and they will make just as big a hash of it as the AF447 guys did.

Without prejudging the UPS accident, the same could well have happened here. A crew trained and checked to the required standard presented with an unusual situation which they could not resolve/cope with. Come to think of it, Asiana 214 was exactly the same thing.

If you flew, you'd know what I was talking about.

I have flown and I know exactly what I'm talking about. AF447 was and always will be simple incompetence. The scenario with the unreliable airspeed was a known event and should have been reviewed and briefed as a normal part of training. Had the PF flown pitch and power all would have been fine. Had the PM taken control of the aircraft all would have been fine.

Under no circumstances would a qualified and competent pilot fly higher where the margin of error would be less without reliable data. Beyond that it is impossible for me to comprehend any pilot holding full deflection for literally minutes....even a GA pilot understands that the 1st thing you do is unload the airframe...

Simple truth is the PF was not qualified to sit in the pointy end of a commercial airliner....period.

Well actually, I was just trying to get a better idea of what you meant by "not needed" before answering.

I frequently fly into runways which have no VGSI (Visual Glide Slope Indicator, Could be a VASI, PAPI, PLASI or other) so I would consider a VGSI "not needed" if on a visual approach in good visual conditions in daylight.

That said, if it's there, I'm going to use it, even on a nice clear day, and in fact in the US, if flying a large or turbine aircraft, you are required by regulation to use it and stay on or above it.

Sure, that could be considered as "not needed". Even in that case if the VGSI is visible I'd be referencing it.

Coagle,

There is a book you need to read...like yesterday.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0754649644/ref=redir_mdp_mobile

Mis-understood. . .
 

It bothers me a little, well, maybe a lot. For those who thought when some said "it could happen to any one of us", I whole heartedly believe they mis-understood. We all know flying is and can be unforgiving. We know the risks involved from the very beginning of our flying careers. We still do it. We all do it for different reasons....I bet we all do it because we just love to fly. Only those who do can explain the feelings. There's plenty of good aviation quotes that I could never match in words. There is always plenty of room for error. Scary, really. Getting buried in the approach plates after this accident for me has be a huge wake up call---"it could happen to any one of us"....we are all susceptible to making mistakes. No one is perfect. That's all. Yes, we are professionals, but not perfect. I'd love to hear from any one here that has had a perfect flight. Two professional pilots died doing what they love...doing what we love. I was in SDF today...as we taxied to rwy 35L, and passed all those UPS jets, several A300s, I got chills. So sorry this happened. I hope this made sense. Just read their memorial pages, may Cerea and Shanda rest in peace.

@PEI

Thanks for the link. At the end of the day, its all to do with the interpretation of "numbers" and how they correlate with your own situational awareness. Stuff up one side of the triangle and either of the other sides will get you.

Exactly what the flight path was that lead them to this situation, can only be guessed at. The "runway in sight" call 4 secs prior to the initial contact, would as you suggest, indicate they were not visual immediately before the call.

Wow! At that price, I'll wait for the paperback to come out:ouch:.

Given mm43's chart. The only theory that reasonably explains the accident is a too early transition to a visual approach. Otherwise, how do you get so far down in the weeds, (assuming that the altimetry was functioning properly).

Even given an early transition to visual, there were some cross checks with the RADALT and altimeter should have been done that would have probably saved the day. Fatigue?

The CVR transcript will be interesting.

This incident impressed me nearly 40 years ago...

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...7%20G-AWNC.pdf

(British Airways B747 hit trees on approach Kuala Lumpur)

Interesting that despite all of the modern aids and devices this kind of thing is still happening.