Bonin as PF might be expected to scan his instruments.
Robert as PNF may have had the opportunity to look around. According to one earlier thread, the THS which had been around 3 degrees NU at 2.10.50, moved steadily, reaching 13 degrees NU at 2.11.50, where it stayed. ( This would have been in response to Bonin's input, I think.)

This was not commented on by either pilot, and perhaps it was unseen. Someone said that the THS is not in ones normal scan on an AB 330.

Would the rotation of the THS be more readily noticeable from the corner of a pilot's eye if (for example) a white mark made any movement noticeable ?

I do not know the "gearing" of the wheel but a movement in just ONE direction over a period of a minute might have warranted further investigation, by either pilot.

Does PNF have PM ( Pilot Monitoring) responsibilities ?

AF447
 

There is evidence that all three were tired.

Robert reported upon his return that he did not sleep well but only "dozed a little."

His seat remained fully back and to the left in the parked position the entire time.

Robert should have taken over at the first sign that Bonin wasn't flying as required "you're going up so go down" but that was strictly against the AF culture.

In fact, few (if any) PMs anywhere are trained to take over the airplane.

I've never heard of it being practised in the simulator or as part of actual hands-on training exercise.

In the future, it must be, for the ability of the average pilot to fly manually without any little green bars to follow is diminishing with time.

Soon, the engineers will be able to address the leading cause of accidents today - LOC - in flight due to the pilots not being able to handle the situation.

They will do this by removing the pilots and frankly we will have deserved it if we don't take action.

The alternative is for pilots to become pilots again and learn to control and recover the airplane from extreme situations.

AF447 was hardly in an extreme situation... At least initially.

I was a totally untrained newbie 2nd Officer on a York, ordered by the Captain to hand fly at cruising level, to give the F/O a rest for an hour. ( The A/P was U/S) It was daylight, and I was told "Not to wander about". The next sector was at night, and I did "my hour" again, I assume, adequately.

I understand that a York was perhaps easier to hand fly at cruising level than many more modern aircraft ( if they were allowed - RVSM etc.) Pilots have much better training than was available then. ( Some 62 years ago.)

Hi Mr. O. Firstly, feel free to "upset" me all you like - it's not about that and I'd never presume to have such delusions of grandeur. It's just that most if not all of the questions asked in the R&N thread that was merged into this one - and those that have arisen subsequently - have already been covered in the existing threads. I'm sure I'm not the only one who doesn't want to see the hamster-wheel spun up again!

While your second sentence is informed conjecture (it's a possibility, but only one of many), your first is absolutely correct. Additionally, failure to turn off the FDs - which was, IIRC, part of the UAS procedure - implies to me that the PF was not in fact applying that procedure, as others have suggested.

Did it? I know Bill Palmer made that claim in his excellent book on the subject, and I know the LHS was apparently in the "storage" position upon impact, but the CVR did record a "noise of seat being adjusted" at 2:03:38 (i.e. after Robert took his seat and the Captain vacated the flight deck). This raises several possibilities, including:

• The noise was from Bonin moving the RHS forward
• The noise was from Robert moving the LHS forward, and he may have returned it to the "storage" position to accommodate the Captain on his return

The second possibility can make sense if one takes into account that the cockpit noise had increased significantly at the onset of stall, and rendered the seat motor noise unintelligible to the Cockpit Area Microphone.

As for the position of the RHS, and its importance to Bonin's leverage on the sidestick, the report is crystal clear on that point.

My plea to avoid the return of the hamster wheel remains - not just because of the sheer amount of information and questions answered in the previous threads, but also as the existence of the report - which, combined, should provide all the information that can be proven. I know that as pilots, you'll all feel an especially visceral need to answer the questions that cannot be proven - above all why the PF acted as he did. But all we have there is conjecture, and that conjecture has already been minutely examined in the existing threads.

Conjecture
 

AF447 conjecture will remain unless the DCVR is released in its entirety but the BEA has instead provided inedible hashed morsels.

The juge d'instruction can force the BEA to do it.

Why has she not?

The transcript is over-edited and the flow of converstion is not linear.

Why is that?

Did Bonin use his S/S as a handle to pull himself up whilst adjsuting his seat and by doing so caused the initial pitch-up coinciding with start of this misadventure?

Was there was a PAX seated on the jumpseat which would explain Bonin's unrelinquished grip - figuratively and literally - on the S/S and as PF?
Was that PAX Mme Bonin?
In the final judicial experts' report (not BEA), there is an unidentified 4th voice on the DCVR.

This would explain as to why Dubois was not seated when he came back onto the F/D.

Then there is the licence question and yes it has been discussed.
According to the 1st BEA report, he held a "Frozen ATPL" or "Writtten ATPL" but by the 3rd report, he was mysteriously promoted to ATPL proper the same way De Gaulle promoted himself from Colonel to General whilst in exile.

The BEA must explain why this misreporting occurred.

So you want to know if Bonin really had a proper licence?
The answer is on his payslips.
AF give their crew a 6% premium on every flying hour if they hold a "full" licence.

Which neatly brings us to AF selection.
In 2008, 30 F/As were fast-tracked onto the RHS and were exempted from psychometric testing.
Why on earth did Dubois utter to Bonin: "T'as le PL, toi?"
Simply because he had a doubt himself as an ex-F/A who belatedly and reluctantly became a Captain having failed his linecheck in 2007.

Reading the report of the group of experts appointed by the juge d'instruction one is left with the distinct impression that those experts have had access to the full sound recording, not just the transcript.

Since both the DFDR and the CVR memory modules were put under judicial seal as soon as they arrived on deck of the salvage vessel, and contain important evidence in a criminal proceeding, I guess that the judge has full access to both sets of data.

Winnerhofer throws a small hand grenade into this turgid thread.................

Winnerhofer sounds a lot like jcjeant, to be honest...

Experts
 

A second panel of "experts" has now been ordered at the behest of Airbus who although were happy with the first panel's report even though none of the panel had ever flown an Airbus.
The new panel has a Swiss Professor as well as 2 other non-French members out of a total of 5.
On the judicial front, Zimmermann will retire in 2014 and the trial is expected in 2016.
Experts: COMPAGNIE NATIONALE des EXPERTS de JUSTICE AERONAUTIQUE et ESPACE

They already are white-marked... Photos: Airbus A330-203 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net ;)

And to preserve the integrity of the evidence to be presented at that trial she will no doubt control what BEA are allowed to publish.

Dozy
To be honest I think it's a lot like jcjeant on this particular subject (AF447 case) but fortunately for you (because you would be tired of answering) they are not all member of PPrune or don't post their opinions and griefs :)

BEA
 

And to preserve the integrity of the evidence to be presented at that trial she will no doubt control what BEA are allowed to publish.

Therein lies the much politicised rub.
Don't forget pressure by Unions are extremely powerful but in the end Airbus will get off the hook because commercially AF is a light-weight compared with Airbus.
Might is right.

Remember that the BEA is not independent at all and all their reporting is wishy-washy made up of oui, mais, peut-être obsessed by not ruffling any feathers.
This "No Blame" nonsense is an antithesis to safety.

I rate the TSB the best of all hands-down and their SR111 report has yet to be surpassed.
Going off topic, Zimmermann was A320 instructor before he became an MD-11 one.
A320 procedure in case of smoke/fire is LAND ASAP and till this day I can't understand why he didn't use that as a Pavlovian fallback instead of going though an endless checklist.

Oh look! A zombie thread!
 

Would you be so kind to provide reference where small (or big) excursion outside the safe limits saved the day in airliner while it wasn't preceded by severe brainfart (e.g. hung engine leading to high altitude stall in quad) or bizarre failure pushing aeroplane out of envelope? There is abnormal alternate law on FBW Airbi but then it seems not knowing anything about the subject discussed is not considered to be disqulifier when it comes to posting disparaging comments here.

At least, that what aviation authorities believe we are doing. That's why non-backdriven flight and engine controls were certified without objections - their position is demand, while what pilots need to know is result as seen on instruments.

For 15th time at least: go make AoA vane that will work reliable at 500 and 5 kt. You'll make millions out of it, I guarantee you. Well, at least you'll have a hobby that will last you a lifetime.

Therefore making his opinion legally worthless. Introduction to BEA report refers.

I know what you are referring to but just to make it clear for everyone: there is no indication that anyone in the cockpit ever could make head or tail of anything, even the split second before they were wiped of out existence.

So say you and when asked to elaborate:

There is someone around unable to grasp the concept of difficulties of accurately measuring alpha at wildly different q and why it is acceptable to have the instrument that can't measure it where no sane-minded pilot would ever go. It's not DozyWannabe, if you wonder.

Other crews flying the same aeroplane, for the same company, getting the same failure didn't crash or hurt anyone or damaged anything (source: interim2). Now what?

Absolutely right, even as this video was out after interim3 got out and before final. Now I don't want to detract from this absolutely superb piece of aeronautical journalism (no irony here) just to add a bit: LOC is the greatest killer nowadays because TAWS has virtually eliminated CFIT and we are currently enjoying the historical low of accident rates and pilots of yesteryear occasionally lost control too.

Realistically, matter of command didn't boil down to "Fish or steak for dinner?" but it was rather matter of life and death and neither CM2 or CM1 were able to recognize it because they couldn't recall the most basic aeroplane energy management lessons.

It was done this way millions times before and hundred of thousand times after without any adverse consequence so what is the problem with it?

If I could travel through time and tell every deceased colleague the way they would meet their eventual demise in aeroplane I am absolutely sure everyone would vehemently deny they would be that stupid to perform it.

Basically, your statements boils down to: "I have no idea about human factors but I'll keep myself opinionated around here".

To which I replied that it must be hard for pilot to discern between 400 ft AGL and FL350 over the middle of Atlantic. I don't care about the law or PPRuNers' opinions but I would care a lot if my unfamiliarity with emergency procedures would cost me a life.

Actually, not many crews in A330 UAS used procedure, CRM or brains at all. Most of them blankly stared until problem went away by itself. Some ignored stall warning but kept pitch control neutral. Some pulled until stall warning, then pushed, then pulled giving their customers a hell of roller-coaster ride. AF447 crew were only that both pulled and ignored the stall warning. The others lived happily ever after.

Again, I fully agree just to make it perfectly clear: no emergency requires uncoordinated or undisciplined action, even "instant" in transport aeroplane means 3-5 seconds.

I only wish it were so - there would be general mushing around new indicated FL350 but not a few thousand feet climb.

No they were not. He put roll under control pretty efficiently and way before stall warning went off third and the longest time.

At some points he kept nose well above FD bar, at some points he pulled when there was no FD available.

There were about forty A330 crews that went through similar predicament. Every single one was inexperienced. Just one perished.

True, if we take just what was happening from 2:11:10 and ignore everything that went before. Now, give me a good reason why we would do that.

Duuuude! You are blissfully unaware that everyone in developed world nowadays is trained to take over and was so even way before AF447.

Dude, two posts and you are already acting like some veterans around here... wait a sec... did someone got banned recently?

Can't.

UN, more precisely: ICAO. Now if France would consider leaving ICAO a small price to pay for BEA judicially being forced to release transcript...

AZR

Thank you for the photos of the THS. (I can put my paints away !)

But it STILL leaves the THS moving for a whole minute going fully NU. Surely this should be unusual in (what was nominally) cruising flight.

Some smaller movements could be expected to be due to the routine automatic transfer of fuel or even passengers moving.

Both F/Os ought to have been alert and looking. Some of this is recorded on the CVR.

Clandestino,
You are being a naughty boy;). You are trying to spin this thread up to max RPM by using poorly researched and poorly supported comments.

FYI, the AOA probe on my F-4 would be alive with normal wind over the deck on the ship and was also good for over 750 knots worth of Q. I don't think anyone is going to make serious money re-inventing that item.

AF447 IAS if it could have been accurately read never got below 150 KT after the departure from controlled flight, so I do not understand this fascination with an AOA able to operate at 5 knots. The only way an airborne jet is going to do that is by climbing vertically, and then only briefly, and most guys flying heavy iron know that is a really bad idea. The AOA probes were functioning, but there was no way to present that information to the crew in AF447.

Bloggs is right when he says
Even BEA thought that EASA should review that concept.

Sure, several times, but we also knew how to regain control.:}

Quote:
I think that this was the Captains crucial error. (Well apart from leaving the flight deck at all given the proximity of the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone and the associated radar visible thunderstorms, which were a mere 10 minutes ahead).
Well, it seems that someone finally had a problem with it, didn't they?

Quote:
Originally Posted by Machinbird
The aircraft was in roll direct. He apparently he had no prior experience in flying in Alt2b Law in the simulator at altitude and likely, no experience in flying in Direct law at altitude. As a result, his mental model of the aircraft response was out of calibration and his control inputs were well beyond appropriate for roll.

So 30 seconds worth of beating snakes with a side stick is your definition of efficiently gaining control? Wow!

MB, good for you, you finally beat him at his best repetitive game, nailing all of us like he is the ace of the base. Thanks. We have grown tired of hearing his constant I am smarter than you crap.

I'm joigning you Machinbird, with bubbers44 :)

Just to remind everybody where this came from AF447 crashed in the Atlantic Ocean RIO to PAR flight because two copilots with captain taking required rest was in back sleeping. They encountered precipitation and pitot tubes froze up causing no airspeed indication so autopilot disconnected so PF pulled up 15 degrees at 35,000 ft and of course stalled. The FO assisting did nothing but request the captain to return to cockpit. By then they were in a deep stall and when the captain arrived it was too late so they crashed and everybody died. All that was necessary was one pilot who could hand fly but he was sleeping. I think this our next generation of pilots.

We haven't hired a pilot since 9/11 so our guys are still seasoned and capable but some foreign airlines hire pilots right out of flight school to fly with another almost equally incompetent pilot while the captain takes his required break. Is this the wave of the future??

@Machinebird:

NOT, the stall warning is NEVER turned off, not even by WOW.
It is a general (others brands are NOT immune!) ADIRU issue:

NCD AoA when air data senses low airspeed.

A33Zab,
Of course, you are literally correct. It is the NCD issue that turns off the stall warning. Essentially, it is an engineering problem that was too hard to solve at the time and they waved the magic wand and decided that an aircraft in flight would never get in that situation. AF447 proved that that reasoning was a bit flawed.

It is not an insoluble problem however. I've flown older aircraft that had a stall warning that did not have the NCD problem. Were they properly corrected for Mach Number in the absence of A/S? No they weren't, but they still gave warning before you completely lost control because they were not digital.

The engineers need to scratch their heads a bit more so that the system handles things like A/S failures gracefully. NCD for such a critical system is not acceptable.

The link doesn't work, but at least on the Boeing aircraft I'm familiar with (basically everything save the 737), airspeed doesn't go NCD until 30 knots.

Clandestino,

In your eagerness to respond in a single post to several pages and many contributors, you have a tendency to select snippets of text out of context, and comment rather dismissively on them. In doing so, you misrepresent the contributor's argument. (I'm wondering if you suffer from a short attention-span - not unusual in hot-headed youth...)

Quote from me (replying to PJ2), as quoted by you about 18 hours ago:
As I've said before, I also wonder if the APPARENT sudden loss of about 300 ft of altitude (due to the removal of correction for airspeed when the IAS went AWOL) might have provoked a knee-jerk (of the wrist) response.

Your response:
I only wish it were so - there would be general mushing around new indicated FL350 but not a few thousand feet climb.

You have ignored the rest of my paragraph.

This is what I went on to say:
But the realisation that this was just another of those UAS events should quickly have dawned, followed by a return to the familiar pitch-attitude for cruise flight. As you say, simply maintain the status-quo...
Inappropriate initial reaction is one thing, but what happened after AF447 had completely vacated FL350 climbing was irrational and inexplicable in a competent pilot who had spent many hours monitoring the flight instruments in the cruise and step-climbs on dark nights - much like the one in question.

Hi Clandestino,
Please explain why you dismiss, for the 15th time at least, a vertical descent rate of 10,000 ft per minute (about 100 kts) does not qualify as a valid speed for angle of attack vanes.

The continued stall warning, whilst they were stalled, might just have improved the Captains' SA.
Edit. Is it really that difficult to have stall warning Valid >60kts AND on ground, Or valid when airborne?

When the AoA exceeded about 30 degrees the IAS dropped rapidly. There was about 1 second between 60 and 30 kts IAS, and another second to negative IAS.

It was sad but it was slaughter of the innocent. It is very clear that the pilots in the cockpit simply had no idea of stall phenominon and unreliable speed technique. They did not seem to know the normal pitch in level flight. Instead of TOGA had they just switched off ATHR, AP went off anyway and done nothing else they may have been safe till the captain got back. Alternate law except protections is like normal law. But they do not seem to have been trained properly for the situation. Even continuos stall warning although desirable would have made no difference in this case.

Inside AF
 

When you have AoA vanes that are only certified to operate at >=60kts IAS, and the unavoidable fact that Stall Warning is a function of AoA - absolutely!

Regarding your point about the airflow from the VS in the stall - I don't know. You'd need a proper aero engineer to be certain, but I'd say there would be too many variables involved to allow for considering readings in that scenario as accurate. Certainly the DFDR output from the AoA vanes once the stall is established seems to degenerate very quickly into flipping between extremes - and to my mind would only cause more confusion.

@tdracer - we're not talking about IAS going NCD, we're talking about AoA vanes that are only certified to operate reliably above 60kts IAS.

Machinbird's F4 would have had the wind over the deck plus the airspeed generated by the motion of the ship - a very different (and somewhat simpler) design problem to solve. An F4 is a fighter, and the AoA systems specification would by the very nature of difference in application be a very different kettle of fish. Machinbird - your AoA vanes may have been "live", but with all due respect I doubt you paid a significant amount of attention to how reliable the readings were in that scenario - and I think you'd have been far too sensible to try and test the theory by stalling your F4 to the extent that your pitot tubes were being fouled and registering IAS below 60kts!

@vilas:

I have a very tough time believing that a highly-qualified sailplane/glider pilot* (such as PF FO Bonin) would have been completely clueless about stall - which is why I've long maintained that he had some kind of psychological shock response which threw him sufficiently to get muddled. PNF FO Robert tries to correct him verbally several times regarding his pitch attitude ("you're going up, so go down") during the initial zoom climb, but as the aircraft moves into the stall regime and more of the instrument readings stop "making sense" he seems to lose his earlier confidence - which was undoubtedly a tragic shame.

We've been through this countless times before and no consensus was reached - in part because many posters are wedded to their own notions of what the real problems were here, but one thing that needs to be remembered above all was that the Stall Warning functioned correctly for at least around a minute before the aircraft went too far out of the flight envelope, and it was apparently completely disregarded**. For those that want to compare brand A with brand B, one only has to look at the Birgenair 301 B757 crash, where the Captain disregarded the stick shaker in favour of the first (erroneous) warning he got, which was overspeed.

* - EDIT - I'm not saying 'no pilot would...' here, I'm saying that in order to fly a sailplane/glider to a high degree of competency one has to have a very thorough appreciation of the mechanics of flight, because in a glider there is no TOGA detent or switch - approaching stall one has no option but to trade altitude for airspeed!

** - EDIT 2 - The point I'm trying to reinforce here is that while the Stall Warning was silenced at approximately the same time the Captain returned, it sounded correctly and continuously for long enough that the two FOs should have at least acknowledged it. And there were enough secondary indications (unstable pitch, dubious airspeed, rapidly unwinding altimeter) that a Captain should have been able to use to diagnose a stall.

Chris Scott - in your response to Clandestino, I concur with your remarks. I think quoting and responding has its merits and offers succinct thinking and keeps posts to reasonable lengths!, but it is very important to retain the context of the original remarks being critiqued. Sometimes there is a historical dialogue going on and brief quotes which appear out of context to others are really in context in "the long line" but I thought yours and perhaps one other's were a taken a bit out of context. I think reference-links to actual Post # being quoted so others could refer back would resolve the matter, and others can make up their own minds regarding the critique offered.

As regards the matter at hand and as I know you know, whether an actual pitch-change and altitude loss or purely an indication issue, (which this was), one never responds swiftly in a transport aircraft, particularly at cruise altitudes where aerodynamic damping is much lower. The argument that the roll was PIO and that the pitch up was a response to the indicated loss of 300ft are both defeated by subsequent occurrences - the first because the more-sensitive roll was brought under relatively quick control, and second because, once the 300' "altitude loss" had been "regained", the PF kept pulling.

The majority of stick positions is, by the data, "stick back". As said many times, I think there is probably something to the stall warning NCD matter but, as you have observed, it isn't a C-150 where the little piece of metal is permitted to flip forward due to reduced airflow at it's point of installation setting off the approach-to-the-stall buzzer! The designers had to resolve the matter within purely digital systems to avoid the greater problem of false warnings at critical times, and, rightly in my view as an experienced A330 captain, concluded that no crew was going to stall the airplane and keep it there such that the AoA was so great, (45° +), as to actually render the pitot's unserviceable, (entry angle too great - no speed indication, ergo speed < 60 = NCD).

More again about Dubois :
The first words he pronounce when entering the flight deck are (Ref CVR)
What are you doing ?
So .. as the rest space is only equipped with a buzzer ( employed by Robert) and no phone communication ... before entering in the flight deck Dubois know that's something is wrong .. and he don't ask "what happend ?" but instead the famous
What are you doing ?
Is this question is related with the feeling of not full confidence he can have in his crew ?

Dubois
 

Exactly.
Dubois wasn't in the Crew Rest Area but seated and relaxing next to his ladyfriend.
This is why the buzzer was useless because he wasn't lying on his bunk.
Remember that F-GZCP wasn't equipped with an intercom in the CRA as it is an option but standard chez DL so the buzzer was the only means of communicating.
Why did he come charging back onto the F/D?
Because he felt the plane was rocking and rolling.
What was his first reaction?
Not what's up, what's wrong or what's happening but an emphatic "WTF are you guys doing!?"

And your evidence for that "theory"* is?

* - In lieu of a suitable sobriquet for "unsubstantiated rubbish that you just made up".

Just a question I've always wanted to ask: Is there a handset in the cockpit to contact the cabin crew?

What intrigued me is the sound as from a microphone striking a wall, and sometime later a female voice asking repeatedly "hello?", as if answering a call but not getting a response.

HazelNuts39;

Re, "Is there a handset in the cockpit to contact the cabin crew?"

Yes, the control panel for the handset is on the overhead panel and the handset is mounted on the aft pedestal, captain's side. The "Cabin Rest" is a call to the Cabin Crew Rest Area/Module. In some aircraft it is a permanent installation, usually in the aft end of the aircraft below the passenger deck whereas the portable crew module, as on AF447, is located just aft of door L3 below the passenger deck.

As shown on the panel, there are also communications to the Flight Crew Rest area wherever that may be - the asterisk inside the triangle means, "as installed". On the B777 it is upstairs; I don't know what the arrangement is on AF's A330's. The one with which I'm familiar was seat in Business that would fully recline and was curtained off. In this arrangement, there are no communications at the seat, so any urgent need for the crew member, (normally the captain) would have to be first communicated to one of the F/As who would then go to the seat and alert the crew member.

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-jjbN...-jjbND4L-L.jpg

4th Voice
 

In the Judicial Experts' Report (not BEA) ordered by the Investigating Judge there's a 4th unidentified voice on the DCVR.
There'll be now a 2nd Judicial Experts' Report as demanded by Airbus with a new panel who happen to fly Airbus rather than the theoretical 1st panel.
Airbus were 90% happy with the 1st panel's report but this time they really want to come out fireproof pre-trial to get a "non-lieu" i.e. insufficient grounds to proceed.
Airbus' attorneys are invisibly off radar but beware of those who don't bark for their bite is most brutal.
Airbus doesn't depend on AF to survive.

Yes - the cabin crew member.

After the PNF asks "(!) where is he er?" at 2:10:49.8 there is a "high-low" chime consistent with a CC call at 2:10:53.5. The "feminine voice" saying "hello?" is recorded at 2:10:55.9. This would likely be consistent with the PNF buzzing the CC to find out where the Captain is as a failsafe measure.

No - the first panel was convened by the SNPL using the families' group as a cover (and the report contains several glaring errors). Airbus probably don't have an opinion either way. Even if the legal process finds Airbus liable for some aspects of the accident it will have very little or no tangible effect on the company.

Victims
 

There's been a split in French Victims' Association.
Some 10 members including ex-Head left to go solo.
A new Head took over as of 01 June 2013.
NB: The Dubois and Robert families have never been part of any Victims' Association only the Bonin family.
What's odd is that not a trace of Robert's corpse was ever found.

It's also in BEA's report: female voice on track 1 "allo?" ... "oui" ... "allo?"
then: "bruits similaires à un combiné de l’interphone cabine qu’on essaye de raccrocher" (the english translation omits the "trying to").

Keep in mind that the airplane is in "deterrent buffet".

Well .. sorry but I must ask you what you are smoking ....
The panel of experts (the judicial experts) was ordered by the "juge d'instruction" and was required to answer a lot of precises questions
Those experts are from a group of experts who are stand by for such judicial requests
Families and unions have nothing to do with their investigations and reports