There they go, blame the pilots and training. The Europeans with those 'Side stick flying the airplane through the autopilot' and those silly 'none moving Auto Throttles', having had billions invested already in this system philosophy, will not retract and admit to the stupidity of this Airbus concept.:mad:

Do you expect a 'logical' outcome to a legal case for damages?

One thing it could do is monetize the risk of for example, training regimes, in a way that will wake up the beancounters not only at Air France but at all airlines. But do not expect there to be any logic in the final outcome.

@Hardbutt - you're displaying as much ignorance as you are prejudice with that post. For one thing the sidesticks do not control the aircraft via the autopilot, and the thrust lever design, while originally unorthodox, has been proven safe and reliable through 25 years of service.

Dozywannabe, whose the ignorant one. The side stick inputs go to the flight control computers (same as autopilot) which will have the final say on the flight control movements. And to add to confusion, pilot on one side have absolute no clue what the other side's stick input is. And as for the non moving Auto Throttles, how many deadly crashes have we seen where the pilot tries to 'figure out' what the f@#& the auto thrust is doing. Like I said Airbus are too far down the road and will not admit they had a silly concept with which they started with. :mad:

coroner -- wtf!?
 

coroner

Obviously. every investigatory board in Europe is WAY, WAY ahead of the NTSB - we still have to rely on forensic investigators to determine whether or not pilot training played a part in a crash.

Kudos to the coroner - his "findings" will certainly help increase the safety of air transit.

LonewolfI sat through virtually the whole duration of the coroner's inquests into the deaths in the RAF Hercules that was shot down in Iraq and the Nimrod that blew up in Afghanistan. I came away with a great admiration for both coroners.

Neither had, as far as I know, any previous aviation expertise, but both had clearly done detailed research into the necessary areas. They demonstrated an impressive ability to understand the detailed technical evidence placed before them. They were able to conduct forensic cross-examination of witnesses, and I was particularly impressed by the way they could sort the wheat from the chaff.

So I suspect that the coroner in this case was probably similarly well prepared and professionally capable.

As well as having the benefit of a 200-page report from one of the longest and most thorough accident investigations in aviation history, from which all of his comments on the circumstances of the accident were drawn.

A fact that his critics on here seem determined to ignore. :ugh:

UK Judges and Coroners are no fools. You only have to sit in a courtroom and watch to realise this.

They are extremely learned and intelligent. They collect evidence and come to neutral unbiased pronouncements.



I think the real question about the recent A330 and A310 crashes is not necessarily that the Airbus is flawed any more than a Boeing is, but why any pilot would think that holding full backstick/yoke at 37,000' or aggressively pumping the rudder pedals in turbulence was an 'acceptable' thing to do to an airliner??? Both these actions would have crashed a Boeing just as it did the Airbuses.

The real investigation needed here is how do some pilots somehow get through the system with these fatal flaws in their thinking. Why weren't they checked?

This is why :

Post #5

I would assume that the real problem preventing a change to the Airbus sidestick system is an implied admission that these controls are unsafe. However AF447 can be an opportunity, as it can now be argued that the decreasing competence of normally-trained pilots mandates simpler twinned controls.

Edmund

Gentlemen(and possibly ladies),

I have been a Pruner for many years and have read with increasing irritation the inevitable descent of any thread into B vs AB rubbish. Both makes of aircraft have superb safety records but, like anything which has a human input, cannot be absolutely perfect. I have flown well over 100 airctaft types from single engined spam cans to the largest military aircraft in existence. I have also extensively operated both B and AB. In the case of AB, the FBW comes quite naturally after about an hour in the sim and the non moving throttle can be regarded as an advantage if its principles are understood. I have found it a delightful machine to fly manually. The B is equally likeable and, although I do have a favourite, there is nothing really to choose between them. The constant carping that takes place on this web site does nothing to enhance its status and merely give journos false ideas with which to titillate the public and drives the majority of readers to the more intelligent discussions in the Military section.

If that were the case, then why would Bombardier have adopted a similar system in their new C-Series airliners? More to the point there have been crashes in very similar circumstances involving a B727 and a B757, both of which have traditional controls - I suggest your argument is somewhat misplaced.

pontifex

Your argumentation does even less to enhance anything, especially safety, even if its status is admirably high it can always be enhanced. Unfortunately not with arguments like yours.

The carping happens because the industry stubbornly refuses to accept flaws in their products. The reason is simply cost and makes such refusal cynical.

Take B with the speedbrake issue, other designs being far less prone to error. Take the AB’s absence of tactile feedback, many accidents and inquiries do not directly blame it on this flaw, but any sharp reader can deduct that if it was present, there would have been a higher chance of not leading to catastrophe.
In both products a simple adaptation of the philososphy would increase resilience to incidents, and basically this refusal by pretending that it would not, brings out all the carping, because it is cynical.

It is to a certain extent understandable because of the cost involved. What I will never understand is that professionals sing the same lame song. They should demand and welcome any measure that enhances safety, or they come out to be either lobbyists or to be not that professional after all.

As an example let me cite you once more:

Any design with room for error can be regarded as advantage from a certain angel if its principles are understood, even if the advantage is only weight reduction ……
But if we want to increase safety, then we must take into account that understanding principles has its limits with the actual state of training and experience of pilots, and this state is certainly not improving! So such an argument resounds cynical, because it takes away blame from designs, from engineers, and puts it squarely onto the end-user, the pilots.
Designs can be overcomplicated or not adapted to human behaviour and such designs should be exposed.
Even small flaws can be changed, but to call professionals who expose flaws ‘carpers’ only disqualifies the caller.

In order to do so, then your "sharp reader" would have to dismiss out of hand the documented evidence showing exactly the same kind of mishaps happening to aircraft with conventional controls roughly as often (for AF447, read Birgenair 301 and NWA 6231 - and for LH in Hamburg read the recent Southwest prang at LGA). To call what is actually a design *difference* a flaw is a misnomer, because the design has not resulted in any more mishaps than the other kind, and the length of reliable service this design has given thus far clearly refutes the doom-and-gloom predictions of the naysayers.

CapetonianIn my experience, this statement can be applied to a considerable number of Western countries. After working in commerce for 35 years, across a very wide range of different types of company and internationally, the move towards 'hand-off' management is nearly complete. In large companies it is the standard.

As to 'B' following 'AB' down the same route of production materials and processes (not to mention flight deck concepts) - it has been obvious for many years that that is exactly what they are doing. Of itself, that is neither bad nor good.

It is the management of the carrier that set the mood, style, practice, tolerances, acceptable practice and the 'never-under-any-circumatances'. There will be failures down the line but the buck USED to stop with the Managing Director and the Board. In the era of the CEO, the buck gets killed long before it reaches his doormat.

Dozy,

I'm not saying the sidestick is the *cause* of anything, rather that it might need modification or adaptation to render it *better*. Must everything be set in stone?

Not at all - but a dispassionate reading of the evidence does not support the assertion that linking the controls would make the design any safer. That much should be beyond dispute.

Pax Boy

You share my views on the priorities and capabilities of much senior management today. Unable to make any judgments without reducing everything to numbers-a process fraught with errors and lack of any specialist knowledge about the operations of a company.
I wonder how many big airline CEOs could actually recognise the different aircraft types they operated let alone the inner workings of the flight deck.
More on track for this thread it is interesting to se the approach of more modern UK coroners-for years it was an open verdict on pretty much anything now we have people like this individual making a bold and serious statement and the people involved in the re analysis of the Hillsborough tragedy taking an equally forthright approach. All that's aid though I was pretty shocked that an experienced AF FO managed to get trapped into the AF447 situation -I would have expected better but I suppose that's easy to say from behind my desk rather than a lonely dark flight deck in mid atlantic turbulence.

Isn't that the rub for any system in an aircraft? ;)

Lonewolf_50, re, "Isn't that the rub for any system in an aircraft? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...lies/wink2.gif"

Yes, it certainly is.

I've been thinking that there isn't an "automation" problem, there is a knowledge problem. It is becoming apparent that a lack of knowledge of systems is the problem - the success of thousands of pilots speaks for itself.

"What's it doing now?", offered lots of times in humour, if serious, is an easily-answered question - get the CRM going, then click, click - disconnect the AP and pull the thrust levers back out of the CLB detent and use them just like ordinary throttles/thrust levers, fly the airplane, sort out what ever it was that was temporarily confusing one, re-engage when comfortable. To me, any pilot who doesn't/can't/won't disconnect the autothrust on an Airbus is admitting that they don't know their airplane. The machine flies beautifully with everything off.

PJ2

Capetonian; yes but it's not just AF is it? Colgan, whoever the finless A310 belonged to, and the carrier that recently crashed the 777 at SFO were not AF. This is a general problem - not enough time is spent training and practicing this. On the ATPL course, we did recovery from unusual attitudes* In my case; in a PA28. I have never done that in an Airbus SIM. (I've never flown Boeing).

pontifex; Yes, I couldn't agree more - A vs B is very tiresome. They both design and produce fantastic machines of the highest quality. (Unfortunately, they are nowadays operated by pilots with very variable ability and training).


*One is told to close one's eyes and take hands and feet off the controls. The instructor then puts the aircraft into an unusual attitude, for example, 30 degree bank, nose high - approaching a stall, and then one is told to "open your eyes: you have control". You have to instantly assimilate the situation and attitude and quickly return the aircraft to straight and level flight with the appropriate power, configuration and attitude using just your instruments. A very good exercise.

I still feel that there's a fundamental flaw in expecting humans to monitor computers.. Computers make an excellent job of monitoring.. they'll happily monitor away for a million years..
Now tell a human to take a look at his watch.. and tell him to carefully monitor it for the next 3 1/2 hours to see that it doesn't falter...:bored:
Pilots need to be designed back into the loop.. with the computer monitoring us.

On the basis of this statement:

That would still be you. The flight control computers are part of the FBW system, which as many have explained over and over on here is a completely separate system from the autopilot.

In the most simple terms, all the FBW system does is replace the old cable and/or electromechanical/hydraulic connections with electronic ones. FBW simply translates control input from the pilot (or the automation) to the flight surfaces and engines, it is not an automated system in and of itself. Furthermore, the envelope protection aspects do not "overrule" the pilot, they just keep the aircraft within the safe limits of the flight envelope of the airframe.

Sometimes a small excursion outside the safe limits may be required Mother Nature doesn't know the limits. Boeing recognise this airbus doesn't

Yes, but we are not monitoring computers per se, we are monitoring the flight path. In other words, the computers should be following what we have programmed them to do, and one of our many functions in the cockpit is to monitor the flight path and the instruments to confirm that the computers are in fact doing so.


A bit off-thread, but: That half-wit who wrote to the Times about pilots falling asleep because of the autopilot missed the point, as so many non-airliner pilots do. We are not sitting bored and going to sleep because of the computers* - there is more than enough for both pilots to do throughout a flight**. The computers may be controlling the flight surfaces during the cruise, but we, the pilots are still doing the flying, navigating and communicating required.

(An analogy is: a cruise control in a car looks after the speed, but you the driver are very much still involved in decisions and considerations, and are checking your mirrors every 10 seconds and keeping tabs on other traffic around you etc.).



*fatigue caused by poor rostering - long hours and minimum sleeping time between duties - is the cause of sleep incidents, despite what Europe may think, and is something that urgently needs to be addressed if we are to avoid any more Colgans etc.

**fuel and fuel system checks (are there any leaks?); navigation checks; keeping an eye on all the aircraft systems; radio work; position accuracy checks; avoiding thunderstorms by 20-30 miles and flying round them, plotting one's position; checking the weather conditions and diversion airfields along the route, (in case of engine failure, pressurisation failure, or medical emergency for example); checking position and that of others when beyond radar coverage; ditto when overflying states with minimal air traffic control facilities, and/or navigation beacons; avoiding turbulence, special checks and considerations during ETOPS phases; checking the pressurisation and air conditioning etc. etc.

Oh yes, there's plenty to do, and using an autopilot increases safety because that way we are doing all those other tasks as well and not using our total concentration to keep an airliner within +/- 200' of it's cleared altitude, at 37,000' doing 500mph, while being just 1000' feet above or below other airliners coming in the opposite direction!

What are the other tasks ?
Piloting the aircraft ? :rolleyes:

jcjeant,

Try VERY carefully reading Uplinker's post prior to yours!

Cheers ;)

Uplinker please know (or indeed remember) a fact about the A330 when discussing the performance of the First Officer that night, the A330 stall warner is suppressed below 60 knots because the computers believe the aircraft to be on the ground below that speed. It is incredibly unfortunate because when the First Officer was pulling back on the stick the audible warnings were going away. Therefore he (wrongly) believed he was doing the right thing at the time. From what I read about the crash the picture in the flight deck was incredibly confused and I don't think they really trusted anything instrument wise. Would anyone conceive that an airborne A330 could be travelling at an airspeed LESS than 60 knots? Incredible but all so sadly true in this case.

Yes the crash was poorly handled as we know. But don't treat the guy like an idiot because the only one who sat in his seat at the time was him alone. It is highly possibly he believed the aircraft to be overspeeding given the lack of airspeed information and an audible warning that went away when he applied back pressure. Which of us could honestly say that we definitely wouldn't have been led into the same trap given the same set of unfortunate circumstances in the middle of the night on a long haul flight crossing time zones? It would be incredibly arrogant to rule it out.

They just needed the real pilot up there at that time who would have handled it but he was taking his rest break. No pilot who had a clue what he was doing would pull the nose up over 20 degrees at that altitude and not know he was going to stall. These guys were not qualified to hand fly obviously and killed everybody. Putting out the stall warning alert at 60 knots should not make a competent pilot feel all is well with that deck angle at that altitude.

Pilots need to be designed back into the loop.. with the computer monitoring us.

Bring on the dog; ah, but it's there to keep us out of the loop. Tacho's in the cockpit? They've already thought of cameras; add a motion sensor and an alarm; job done.

It is highly possibly he believed the aircraft to be overspeeding given the lack of airspeed information and an audible warning that went away when he applied back pressure.

This has been hashed about already. It's a very modern a/c with ground speed read outs. The lack of air-speed is a red herring. What was the ground speed readout? Back to basics. If you are not sure what is going on you put the a/c into a known state and wait & watch; generally level flight. Pitch & power and assess. If you don't know the basics it's impossible. There in lies the root cause. BASICS!
It's like the various crashes with blocked tubes. The instruments might work in the wrong sense. Back to Basics. Level flight at a known power setting. Gently move the stick and watch what the instruments do. If they are obviously daft then assess, but don't start pushing & pulling is gay abandon hoping to finds the exit to the maze of confusion.

I think it is a fact that the crew did not do what they where supposed to do to recover from the stall.
You can only conclude that they were unsufficiently trained to recover from a stall.

Coroner's Inquest - the facts
 

Just so everyone is fully informed of what happened:

The Coroner reviewed the full accident report, the relevant medical and pathological evidence, then called the AAIB as expert witnesses to explain the sequence of events and the findings of the BEA report.

Evidence was also admitted relating to Thales pitot tube problems on A321 aircraft in 2012 (see AAIB Bulletin 9/13), equipped with the same later mod tubes that were specified in the AD for the A330/A340.

After all of that, and some questions from the families, the Coroner handed down a considered narrative verdict. He did a thorough and even handed job, and the families were satisfied with the result.

(Coroners in the UK are judicial officers charged with conducting Judicial Inquests into unnatural deaths, not to be confused with US Coroners.)

Bubs - they were all real pilots. For one thing the much-maligned PF was a highly-qualified sailplane pilot and would probably have had more handflying experience than his peers (albeit at relatively low levels). The PNF was clearly concerned at the start of the sequence, but seemed to be overcome with indecision as time progressed. When the Captain arrived, even he couldn't make head or tail of what was going on until it was too late.

As I've said many times, the old "no pilot would X" claim is something of a convenient excuse, because if the circumstances conspire in certain ways, then even the best and most experienced pilots can make horrific mistakes (e.g. taking off without clearance, retracting high-lift devices too soon, attempting a landing in a thunderstorm that exceeds minima etc.). As we covered in the original threads in Tech Log, the circumstance here seems to have been a startle response that got out of hand - combined with a lack of high-altitude manual handling training and a lack of recurrent stall recovery practice.

"They just needed the real pilot up there at that time who would have handled it but he was taking his rest break. No pilot who had a clue what he was doing would pull the nose up over 20 degrees at that altitude and not know he was going to stall. These guys were not qualified to hand fly obviously and killed everybody. Putting out the stall warning alert at 60 knots should not make a competent pilot feel all is well with that deck angle at that altitude."

Not having flown anything this big yet - would just one sensor can make the aircraft go into ground mode? Wouldn't it be airspeed+squat switch+(stuff)?

@Yancey Slide:

I know it's a bit of a big ask, but I recommend going through the Tech Log discussions on AF447 before risking starting the old hamster wheel up again. The <60kts IAS limitation on the validity of AoA data has nothing to do with ground mode, but if you want more detail, then the threads are there for your perusal.

The long and the short of it is that the aircraft did not go into any unusual modes, and the only technical problem was the icing of the pitot tubes. Even that had cleared prior to the aircraft stalling. It should be pointed out that the stall was allowed to develop to a point where the aircraft was so far outside of the flight envelope that any instrumentation would likely have given readings that didn't make much sense.

I'll go dredge the tech log, thanks. The question wasn't so much re 447 as it was a generic inquiry about redundancy in ground/air mode logic. I wouldn't have thought one sensor was sufficient.

Yancey - to save you having 'hours of fun', accept that the designers expected (not unreasonably!) the a/c to be 'on the ground' at 60kts or less and therefore designed the software to close the warning. They now realise, thanks to AF, the error of their ways.

@Yancey - You're right, it isn't and there are several conditions that need to be satisfied for the systems to switch to ground mode. It's important to understand that the <60kts rule was added to the spec regardless of air/ground mode though - it's purely because the AoA vanes' certification states that they cannot provide useful data below that IAS.

There was a lot of discussion over the relationship between that limit and the stall warning in the Tech Log threads, and the only thing that could be considered a consensus opinion was that it is a very tricky problem to solve. This is because a behaviour that may be valid in some scenarios would not be valid in others, and could be downright dangerous in many of them.

The take I came away with is that no matter whether your instrumentation is of the old "steam gauge" variety or of a more modern vintage, it can only provide useful information when inside the flight envelope, or to an extent when slightly outside. The further outside the flight envelope you go, the less useful some of the instruments and warning systems become.

EDIT : @BOAC - see my first paragraph. The <60kts limitation is not related to ground mode, and the designers made no such assumption. What they couldn't take into account was a scenario in which the aircraft was as far outside the flight envelope as AF447 became.

- and I didn't say it was?

@BOAC:

I may have misinterpreted then:

As you seem to be equating the AoA <60kts inhibition with being on the ground as a design feature, when it is not. It is an implicit side-effect of the design, but it was not intended to apply only on the ground.