Common misunderstandings B737
 

G'day,
I am not a Training Captain.
I would like to ask all you Checkies and Trainers out there on the B737 series (or other types if it applies to jets in general) what the most common misunderstandings are that you come across either in the sim or on line checks.
I'l give you an example, many of the pilots I fly with don't understand the basics of how the cost index system works.
What are some of the common misunderstandings you see year in year out?
Cheers, Framer

Immediate rush to select start switches to CONT in slight turbulence. Using autobrake when runway length and surface conditions obviously don't require immediate braking on touch down.
Relying on the cabin altitude warning at 10,000 ft (if not pressurising after take off) rather than checking the cabin rate of climb indicator to confirm pressurisation is taking place normally with this check being done as part of the after take off scan.

On hearing the 60 knot call by the PM during landing, lowering the reverse levers full down quickly causing aircraft acceleration as the reverser panels close leaving the N1 passing 60% on the way down to idle. Failure to read the FCTM which discusses the correct method of going to idle reverse.

Relying heavily on using Supplementary Procedures section to remind pilot how to crossfeed and how to do the necessary switching for engine bleeds off take off and switching to normal bleed config after take off. This is elementary systems knowledge and should be known without resorting to a `cheat sheet`.

Using excess control wheel offset for minor crosswinds on take off when no offset is necessary in the first place. Relying blindly on the PM call of "rotate" before commencing rotate instead of rotating at the VR speed on own ASI bugs. "Following" through (pushing) with hand behind thrust levers during other pilots autothrottle take off. Quite unnecessary and annoying to PF and can cause damage to AT clutch system.

Inability to use commonsense in pilot induced oscillation when hand flying on final. Simply relax death grip on controls for less than a second and aircraft takes care of itself.

Being persuaded by twitchy captain that practice manual flying is dangerous even though weather and ATC conditions are ideal.

Questioning every decision by the captain to make a point you are a team and it is your "Right". In other words big noting yourself and scoring points fuels your ego.

Not keeping an eye outside looking for traffic in VFR departures and arrivals but instead keeping heads down and relying 100 percent on TCAS for initial warning. There are many more but other Ppruners will surely add their own.

Thanks A375,
Some good points there, I think I've managed to make most of those mistakes at one point or another and then had them beaten out of me :)
I wonder about the clutch on the A/T system though, is that from the 2,3,4,500's? because I've never heard of it before. Personally I'd never see a reason to push one up unless there was T/L assymetry but often I'l pull some thrust off in the cruise and hold it for a second or two while the A/T is still engaged....poor practice?

Thrust reduction during the flare:

It's apparently a wide spread technique to initiate the thrust reduction at 10 feet or less with the goal of achieving a smooth landing. In my opinion this technique is wrong (and not in line with the FCTM).

In my opinion it's more than often counter productive and the direct result is a firm touchdown. I believe the cause is two fold. First, it's more difficulty to judge the required input to counter the pitch down moment due to the thrust reduction which happens within a relatively short timespan and at the most critical part of the flare, where you want the most precise control. Second, the extra thrust carried causes the speed to be too high (wind correction should be bled off during the flare) and the aircraft to continue flying, which obviously is counter productive as well, when the goal is to land.

Then there is the aspect of flaring distance. The above will certainly result in a landing in the last part of the touchdown zone, and those that regularly uses this technique may do so quite consistently. However, once in a while they have to "drop it", for a very firm touchdown, when it becomes clear that it would otherwise result in a long landing.

With correct technique, it's no problem to close the thrust levers by 30' and obtain a perfectly smooth landing. With the added bonus of being in the beginning of the touchdown zone. Again the reason is two fold and the opposite of above. First, it's easier to adjust the control input required to counter the pitch down. Even if you use either of two techniques: 1) Slowly closing the throttles give more time and better feel to keep nose where it should be. 2) Slamming the throttles shut at 20-30 feet may not give the same accurate feel, but it then gives more time (feet) to get the adjustment right. In any case the adjustment is complete before the final critical few feet of the flare and all control input can be concentrated about path control, instead of thrust compensation, for the most precise control. Second the engines are at idle and the speed is correct and decreasing when touching down - the aircraft is ready to land by itself more of less with very little input.

Of course there are circumstances that may warrant to keep the thrust in or even adding thrust in the flare, likewise sometimes thrust reduction should be initiated higher than 30 feet as well. But either should be done as a deliberate action when required. Reducing by 10 feet as the norm should not.

...and reduce speed to .76 during cruise. Even when there are no recommendations in the manuals to set this speed for cruise phase of flight at any turbulence intensity.

If one knows his C pattern and read the after take off checklist afterwards he is covered.

Are you saying on a normal landing the thrust levers should be closed at 30ft? I reckon I have only seen that done two or three times ever. Would it not increase the chance of either a tail strike or hard landing if you misjudged it?
My thoughts on the Bleeds off take-off; We use a checklist to confirm proceedures that we do every single time we fly, so why would we then decide that after introducing a proceedure used rarely that the checklist is a bad idea?

Yes, that's what I am saying.

Here is what the auto throttle is doing during an autoland for reference:
"the A/T begins retarding thrust at approximately 27 feet RA so as to reach
idle at touchdown. A/T FMA annunciates RETARD."

No, I actually believe that reducing the thrust at 10 feet carries a bigger potential for a tail strike. Typically the tail strike occurs when the pilot gets surprised for whatever reason and pulls back on the controls to and gets a rising radio altitude, speed decaying quickly and pitch rising. Having a nose down moment due to thrust reduction may add to the surprise, especially for the less experienced pilot (add to the situation a dark night, a runway with no centerline lights etc.). Floating is another factor that increases the risk of a tail strike. I believe the scenario is often seen with the 10 feet reduction: RA goes 10, 8, 6, 4, 4, 4, 4... and pitch keeps rising, usually ending with the aircraft falling those last feet for an uncomfortable arrival. I believe this floating is because of the thrust carried into the final part of the flare as written above and/or that a too large input was give to compensate the the falling nose. When a too big input is given, it's difficult to reverse it.

Here is another pitfall mentioned in the FCTM, though I will agree that you have to be really unlucky for this to occur:
On the other hand with reduction at 30 feet, the risk is reduced because the aircraft is not going to float and you are not getting any pitch surprises a few feet off the runway. The only risk of a tail strike, that comes to mind, is when reducing thrust early is combined with what typically is a beginner error in the flare itself. Namely to start raising the nose at 50 feet. With such a misjudgment, as you say, I guess a tail strike is possible with any technique. This often happen because the inexperienced pilot is fixated on the following the FD instead of looking out the window. Upon hearing the 50 call and looking out the window becoming surprised at the rising runway and pulling back the controls. This can be avoided by looking out the window early, preferably the last 2-300 feet, keeping the aim point fixed in the cockpit window and only looking in to check the speed. If the approach was stabile when reaching 300 feet there really shouldn't be much reason to look at the FD or ILS anymore.

After the thrust reduction stop the nose from dropping and not more, which is usually a movement on the control which can be accomplished with the wrist. At 20 feet pull very slightly on the controls to bring the nose up (FCTM says 2-3 degs, I never looked so I can't verify this). After that there is actually not much movement required. At 10 or 5 feet maybe a little after adjustment. But I will claim that from the initial adjustment at 20 feet, without further input a quite acceptable landing can be made, because all parameters (idle thrust, speed, descent rate) are correct. The last adjustment is to get it smooth.

The opposers to reducing the thrust at 30 feet, have a fear that aircraft will drop out of the sky like a stone if thrust is at idle. It will not. My guess is that this idea comes from the feeling of the pitch down when thrust is reduced.

A typical bad flare begins with the a slight break at 50 feet, followed by another one at 30, thrust reduction at 10 feet, a touch down zone drifting hasty by below and a drop from 4 feet to avoid entering the FOQA statistics for long landings.

A good flare is thrust to idle at 30-20 feet, keeping the nose from dropping, almost simultaneously lift the nose the notch that the FCTM describes as 2-3 degs at 20 feet and another notch at 10 to 5 feet. Result a nice smooth touchdown in the beginning of the touchdown zone. :)

Assuming a -700 landing at flaps 30 the normal pitch is 2.5 degs on the 3 deg ILS. If we take the high value 3 deg pitch up at 20 feet from the FCTM and add another highly set 2 degs for the extra notch at 5 feet, we get 2.5 + 3 + 2 = 7.5 degs pitch. Tail strike occurs at more than 12 degs with compressed struts.

Had an F/O do this to me once after climbing out of fog after take-off. It certainly got my attention!

I have to agree with all of what A37575 has to say, particularly not checking the cabin is pressurizing during the climb before reaching 10,000', stowing the reversers fully at 60 kts & getting a burst of forward thrust & waiting for the "rotate" call instead of rotating on your own ASI & using the call as a back up as per the FCTM.

As for landing, cosmo kramer is correct. Start reducing power to idle at 20 -30 feet & then flare the thing, instead of flying it on with a nose low attitude. Works nicely with flap 40 as well!

Absolutely agree with that!

Works well for me to use the FCTM method :D

Here is the list so far of

"Stuff that annoys your friendly checkie"

1/Start witches to Cont in light turbulence
2/ Using Auto Brake when it's not needed
3/ Not checking the cabin ROC indicator with the ATO cx's
4/ Quickly stowing the reversers at 60kts
5/ Using Sups for crossfeeding and No Bleed takeoff
6/Using too much aileron during roll during crosswinds departures
7/Relying blindly on the rotate call
8/Following through on thrust levers after TOGA pushed
9/Inability to resolve PIO's
10/ Thinking that hand flying is dangerous
11/Questioning every decision the Captain makes
12/ Relying 100% on TCAS instead of looking out
12/Reducing to M0.76 in the cruise due turbulence
13/Maintaining thrust until 10ft during flare

Lets see if we can get it to the
"100 things that annoy your friendly checkie".

One thing from this I am interested in finding out, if we are in the cruise and the speed is sitting a few knots high and the A/T is doing nothing about it, and I take 1% off the N1's by pulling the thrust levers back for a few seconds, can that cause damage to the motors and clutch ? I have never heard it mentioned before and thought the machine was designed to do that.
Framer

On the -300 the configuration of the bleed panel was the V or C however on the -800 it was always a checklist which I must say I prefered.

Not confirming the FMA(s) always got me adgitated, especially when someone would comment "whats it doing" or would be in HDG instead of LNAV etc.

Not checking Cabin ROC - unacceptable.

Using checklists/handy dandies to cover the windows because of the sunlight. You obviously couldn't see out the windows and it totally ruined the checklists.

Over controlling on the approach (PIO) and you ended up doing this little "jig". The pilot would probably be thinking it is the atmospheric conditions.

Slow rotation, not pulling correctly through the dead zone thus increasing likelihood of a tail strike, not pulling to correct pitch attitude or following FD's to above 20 degrees.

Basically not reading the books and poor airmanship irritated me, and the blank look when you are politely trying to point this out.

"Stuff that annoys your friendly checkie"

1/Start witches to Cont in light turbulence
2/ Using Auto Brake when it's not needed
3/ Not checking the cabin ROC indicator with the ATO cx's
4/ Quickly stowing the reversers at 60kts
5/ Using Sups for crossfeeding and No Bleed takeoff
6/Using too much aileron during roll during crosswinds departures
7/Relying blindly on the rotate call
8/Following through on thrust levers after TOGA pushed
9/Inability to resolve PIO's
10/ Thinking that hand flying is dangerous
11/Questioning every decision the Captain makes
12/ Relying 100% on TCAS instead of looking out
12/Reducing to M0.76 in the cruise due turbulence
13/Maintaining thrust until 10ft during flare
14/Not confirming the FMA(s)
15/Using checklists etc to cover the windows (sunlight)
16/Over controlling on the approach (PIO)
17/Slow rotation, not pulling correctly through the dead zone

Good stuff Eagerbeaver, question....what about blocking out the sun during the cruise, for me, with TCAS etc, I figure it's safer not to be uncomfortabe and maybe even get a headache...acceptable?

I know, it is picky and it is extremely bright during the day. The sun visors are inadequate. I used to put up with it.

http://www.pprune.org/data:image/png...BJRU5ErkJggg==
Boeing AFM:

Where do you think they came up with those FMC numbers?

If you're climbing or descending, you pitch for speed. In "level" flight where the jet is being shaken, you need a target N1 to get the target speed. The speed is the goal, not the N1. And that goal doesn't change whether you're going up, down, or level.

How about, when switching frequencies, they immediately start transmitting, without pausing to see if there is already a conversation in progress?

Yes if the FMC is inoperative you should use the target N1 for unreliable airspeed for .76 cruise. But I disagree that the target is to obtain that particular speed, the goal is to provide provide high high/low speed margin. If the result is .79 that's fine too:
Hence, if the result is .79 you should only reduce thrust if having a large increasing trend vector.

Anyway, that was not the point.

The point was that some people blindly sets this speed without knowing what they are trying to accomplish. It's not some magical speed that will provide a smoother ride, which people seems to believe when selecting it during light turbulence.

Find it quite amusing that this thread is entitled "Common Misunderstandings" and yet you cannot agree amongst yourselves!

Maybe it would be better to title it "Training system fails to get the correct message across?"

Pot calling the kettle black?

- err - those two don't quite join up! Is M.65 acceptable? M.82? As long as you have the right N1's of course......................

NB For youngsters - N1's do NOT provide buffet boundaries.

- Late descent clearence for some reason - pushing LVL CHG and pulling the thrust levers back manually without waiting for the AT to do it - of course speed will decrease below the target - leads to nice oscillations during the first couple thousand feet - after this, complaining how unreliable the AP is as it fails to maintain speed.

- Starting the descend 20NM before the TOD because "the -200 had a bad press. system, and it needs time to sort out the descend rate."

- Putting the automatic temperature selector to full low (or even to manual) on a hot summer day (same on the Airbus). It sets temperature, not the rate of cooling!

-Doing the flight control check (rudder part) without holding the tiller, or with a speed you have hard time following the yoke.

-Disregarding a gentle suggestion by the FO not to climb to the max level when it is turbulent and it was turbulent on the other way 2 hours ago - almost stalling -then explaining why it was a dangerous. (as the 700 was really unstable on the speed during turbulence)

-When "Drag Required", pulling the speed brakes, even as PM, although we still have 70 NM, no wind and we are at FL200 at 270kts with no descend restriction, then explaining, during the 15 NM level flight, what drag required means (descend planning is quite easy on the classic, the second part is mainly CRM, I admit)

-Taxiing with 15 its on a long strait taxiway and when the whole airplane starts vibrating at 16 kts, slowing down to 14, which does not solve anything, and after this, writing it down to the tech log as a failure (I might not be correct about the exact speeds, but there is a note in the FCTM about this)

- 737-300, 16 NM on the LOC/GS, Flaps 5, 10 kts headwind, speed around 15-20 kts higher than the bug, very slow but steady deceleration, no speed restriction. AT warning light starts to flash, PM (usually the CDR), either puts the gear down or extends the speed brakes. (not because of the circumstances, but because he/she does not understand what the three lights next to the PFD mean (which I also forgot by now))

Going overboard with superfluous confirming switch selections. The FCTM states the essential confirmation items and this now appears in QRH.
Imperious "support" calls such as SPEED in a loud voice even though speed is within company tolerance. Usually done by nervous nellies as point scoring .

PNF "hovering" with hand creeping toward gear lever in eager beaver anticipation of the PF calling "gear up". Ditto flap selection with hands and fingers quivering on flap even though no call yet for flap extension/retraction. Ditto mitts holding heading bug in anticipation of turn.
Re autothrottle clutch motors. Boeing issued a Bulletin years ago (seen on Pprune in Tech Log occasionally) saying more than a slight pressure on the thrust levers against autothrottle operation may cause damage to clutches and cause incorrect AT operation.
Pilots that are lazy and rarely select the flap at correct recommended airspeed mainly on extension. Usually 20 knots or more in excess of manoeuvre speed recommendations although inside max flap speed figure. Sometimes called "using flaps as speed brakes" which is not on.
Lazy calling of 80 knots airspeed check on take off roll with the call often occuring well past 80 knots. Some pilots have never thought of also checking ground speed reading during 80 knot call even though recommended in FCTM as a fall back if erroneous airspeed problem is suspected.
Pilots calling 1000 to go when chime goes off rather than reading the altimeter for 1000 ft to go. In other words reacting to a chime rather than altimeter reading.
Pilots who have no idea of immediate actions in event of tail-pipe fire after engine shut down after taxiing. They then cannot locate this in QRH and faff around while the ground melts below the burning tail pipe. Although this is not a Memory Item, commonsense dictates you should not need a checklist to tell you what to do if it happens as passengers disembarking and ground crew yell there is a tail pipe fire.
Ditto suspected tail strike during lift off.
In simulator crew who "share" items during manual reversion approach and land. "You work the throttles for me and I will work the controls" Some regard this as good CRM. In fact it can lead to uncoordinated thrust/pitch coupling. This writer has seen Boeing advice that sharing the controls was never envisaged in manual reversion because one pilot can easily operate power and fly as normal. Boeing said if two pilots were required to be on the controls for manual reversion it would be stated in the FCTM and a third crew member would always have to be carried in case of incapacitation of one pilot.
Fast taxiing and heeling around turns to make up time.

[/LIST]Sorry to nit pick, but the thread was for B737 gripes/misunderstandings. Many answers are relevant to any type. So, to prove I'm like minded and fickle I'll add mine. [/LIST]Asking ATC if there is any speed restriction below FL100, keeping the speed at >280 then pulling speed brakes at 3000'. You might save 15secs if you're lucky.[/LIST]Flying visual circuit arrivals in level flight, or even worse in VNAV/LNAV and autopilot. This has been touched on many times in other threads, so I apologise. [/LIST]Fuel cross feeding/balancing well before the IMBL caution is alive. First 1 way then the other. No time to monitor if there is a leak.[/LIST]Pumping the elevators on rotation and flare.checking loadsheets with Japanese brains. No idea of gross error checks nor mental arithmetic; even the university wallers.

gorter wrote:

Boeing wants you to set a target thrust to get a target speed for cruise.

That target speed for all phases is 280 and .76 (or .73 for the classic). The AFM makes that clear. So does the PH. The FCOM takes away the emphasis on the target cruise speed and just gives you the technique.

Can you think of a reason why climbing or descending through FL340 in turbulence you should be at M.76/280 but while cruising at FL340 you should be at another speed?

I can't believe that anyone thinks that it is a good idea to reconfigure the bleeds by memory after a bleeds off departure..

Surely this life preserving measure should be done from a checklist everytime.:confused:

Depends!

On the 737-200 and early 737-300 charter operation almost every take off was bleeds off so we knew the procedure so well we could do it in our sleep (we often did!). Can't ever recall one occasion where anybody got it wrong - we were very aware of what we were doing and when to do it.

With the better performance of modern a/c it's more of a rarity so you might feel better being propped up by a checklist if you feel it's a big deal.

And then there is the question of R/T - I cringe when I hear "Standing by for Descent" instead of "Request descent" or "Bloggsville Leary XXX Request" ..."Leary XXX Pass your message"....."Leary XXX we were just wondering if FL 380 was available" - why not just say "Bloggsville Leary XXX Request FL380" ?

FFB, I accept that on the 200 it may have been a routine procedure but surely now that's not the case isn't it is good practice to be 'propped up' by the checklist?

FlyingRat, I think it probably depends on what you have been trained to do - the modern way is to do things procedurally rather than teaching understanding as to why you are configuring bleeds and how to do it.

Even if you use a checklist you can still get it wrong and/or forget to reconfigure.

Glad someone beat me to the "speed" call thing. Heard it too often, calling 1 knot below Vref + 5 as a speed excursion.
F/O's calling "You have control" at 59.9 Kts. Sometimes letting go of the controls. Sometimes with reverse above idle still selected.
Not knowing how to avoid the "Alt acquire trap" before G/S capture. Sometimes going around because the aircraft "Got them too high".
Failing to call rotate if the speeds drop out of the FMC.
"Why did we just fill out the bug card?"
"I thought it was a legal thing."
This latter sadly reflects too many companies arse covering ethos as is making a standard call long after it would have been relevant.

Maybe. Thing is though, when you start a thread you never know who is going to contribute and whether they will be constructive or contankerous :) The main thing is that some interesting discussion points come up, people read them, people think, less experienced pilots learn.

Interesting choice of words. It leaves no doubt about how you view the abilities of someone who chooses to use the sups in that situation.

Personally I use the sups, I know the system and when I was flying out of an 1800m strip daily I used to do it by memory but now that I do it about once a year I use the sups. It might take three seconds longer, thats all, and it is not an indicator of how well you know the system at all.

No. It is not good airmanship to use a checklist as a crutch to tell you what to do because you are too damn slack to know what to do. There are supposed to be two professionally qualified pilots in the cockpit. It takes a split second for one pilot to glance over to quietly check the switching is correct. You would be staggered or dismayed to see as we have in the simulator the number of pilots during recurrent training that have forgotten how to cross feed or confgure bleeds. When questioned the answers are all the same. We use a checklist so why bother knowing what to do? :mad:

Hmmm… how about when a newbie Microsoft type F/Os who refuse to look out the window on a beautiful VFR day at altitude, makes a request with ATC to circumnavigate non-existent weather being painted on the radar which is clearly below the jet… and without consulting with the guy in the left seat.

Or another favourite… “Master caution associated”. I ask associated with what… then come the deer in the head lights gaze.

Any of you ever experience the tap on the rudder peddles whilst taxiing? I cut to the chase and pull out the FCTM and FCOM to enquire where in the manual does it state that the F/O shall ride the rudder peddles. Again… deer in the head lights gaze.

Ahhhh Microsft pilots... where would we be without them??? No one to make fun of.

With reference to the cabin rate of climb. If you are unpressurised, the cabin is still going to climb. My technique is to also look at the differential pressure indication, it's also easier because it is a big dial. When clean at about 3000' the diff will be about 2 psi. At 10000' the diff is about 4 psi. To me it's like a big analogue clock. When clean I want to see ten past twelve. At 10000' I'm looking for twenty past twelve. At 20000' it's about 7 psi or twenty to two.

My other pet hate is not calling the FMA correctly. LVL CHG is the button you press on the MCP. MCP SPD is the pitch mode that is engaged. Same for VNAV. VNAV what? VNAV SPD or VNAV PTH. Announce the FMA.

framer, I think you are misinterpreting what I am saying there!

Of course it's a good thing to use all the resources that are available and I would be the first to encourage reading of a supplementary procedure if necessary.

What I am saying (and I think this has been also mentioned by Tee Emm) is that there seems to be less and less in depth understanding about what you are doing and why you are doing it. If you understand same then the procedure makes a lot more sense rather than blindly following a "checklist".

I am all for this thread which has raised some interesting topics but perhaps a more productive question to ask is how we can get these messages across effectively to line pilots. Does the operator in question have an SOP manual for guidance? My last operator did and it was a very useful document.

I think what has manifest itself to a degree in this thread is that we all tend to have our own personal prejudices. A good operator will have clearly defined procedures but there is, as they say, more than one way of skinning a cat and, as some recent accidents have proved, there are dangers in discouraging pilots from having "original thought" and therefore necessary to provide a balance between structured procedures and common sense airmanship (ahem I mean "Threat and Error" management).

If you have experienced crews who know what they are doing you could maybe issue an Ops Manual which says "Don't crash the aeroplane", on the other hand if you have very inexperienced crews you have to issue an Ops Manual which spells out in minute detail exactly what is required. In reality all Ops Manuals are between these two extremes.

. Nothing to do with ego as you would well know. "Riding" the controls no matter how lightly is not only unnecessary but intensely distracting for whoever is the pilot handling at the time. If the reason is a perceived flight safety precaution in case the other pilots karks without telling you first, then you would know from experience it takes less than a split second to move feet from the floor where they are near the pedals to the pedals themselves. The distraction occurs when the handling pilot from the corner of his eye sees the other bloke's knees or legs moving in unison with his own leg movements. Same with Nervous Nellies who hover with hands creeping towards the control wheel near the flare just in case you know, you fall dead at the flare.

Of course different captains will give you their personal views on such matters as will different first officers. But let's be sensible for Christ's sake and act normally with the controls as one would being a passenger in the front seat of a car. Most abhor back-seat drivers in a car and for good reason. And that is distraction when the driver is concentrating. Same principle in the aeroplane. Distraction. I have observed some pilots on take off with their hairy hands grasping the thrust levers in a claw-like fashion up to V1 with their hands poised in a grotesque shape as if afflicted with polio to demonstrate their readiness to abort at the slightest indication of a problem.

You can almost hear their exhalation of breath once V1 is called and in sheer relief they can take their claw from the thrust levers. It looks so bloody contrived. And is. Some pilots will always be a bit nervous when the other chap is handling pilot. And riding the controls is a manifestation of this. So be a good lad and keep your fingers and feet clear of the controls when the other chap is flying.
Doing so won't kill you you know and makes for harmony on the flight deck:ok:.

I'm with you now.

Well you're getting the message to me and I'm a line pilot. There are about twenty really good points so far and a couple that I'm going to debate when I knock off work tonight. I think the tricky bit for line pilots is that they get told different things from each trainer. You can see from this thread that there are some very passionate people, they have their own ideas about how things should be done and they don't all agree with each other. There is not much more frustrating than having it suggested you do something on one check, and then on the next check doing it, only to have it suggested to you that you don't do that. That actually happens quite a bit in my experience. Maybe each airline should have a private forum where only check and/or training Captains can log in and formulate a united front on individual issues as they come up. The feet on the rudder pedals is a good example of what needs sorting out. As an F/O I always had my feet resting lightly on them.If it turns out that the other checkies don't have an issue with it, then the united front should be that it's fine to have your feet resting on the pedals (as is written into the books in two airlines I've worked for). Rather than have fifty F/o's adjust their habits with one Captain it would be better for one Captain to adjust the way he deals with the distraction.
Just my opinion, the main point is a united front would be good from the line pilots perspective.

Reivilo asks...

Nothing to do with EGO Reivilo... it's all about proper cockpit etiquette

Also… Reivilo

1. It's not SOP;
2. It's not in the Boeing FCTM;
3. It resting of feet on the peddles can be construed as falsely required inputs, if the P1 is unaware of the P2s dogs on the peddles.
4. Notwithstanding above, it's about as annoying when the Microsoft Pilot commences the taxi in procedure with hands waiving aimlessly about the cockpit whilst barreling down the runway at 60 knots.

Can definitely not agree with generally retarding the throttles at 20-30 feet.
Sure, it gives you consistent "ok"-landings, but from my experience (around 1500 landings) the best landings resulted from keeping some power (maybe 45-50% for F40 on a 733) until 10-15 feet with a late break at around ten feet.
Consistently produced very gentle touchdowns right at the 1000ft-marker.

However, one should be absolutely aware of the plane's energy-status when doing such a late break, or :mad:

What is written in the books in the two airlines you have worked for are nothing more than the personal gimmicks of whoever in management wrote the books. The law of Primacy ensures you remember what ever technique was taught to you in your early training. And if that includes riding the rudder pedals while the other pilot is handling, then fill your boots as they say.

One of the greatest potential dangers of that particular habit (riding the pedals in case you decide personally to apply brakes on for some reason) is the take off roll. Let's assume the captain is conducting the take off. The F/O is riding all primary flight controls except the thrust levers. After all, if you think that riding the brakes is a good flight safety precaution, then to be consistent you should also ride the control wheel as well.

Nearing V1, you see a flock birds rising from the runway ahead. You tense up. But the captain says nothing and instinctively or maybe inadvertently, you apply partial brake pressure in anticipation of the coming abort. But the captain has already decided to continue because he isn't worried about the birds. Your nervous tick in applying slight brake pressure then automatically dis-engages RTO. Now if a real abort takes place there is no RTO just when you need it most. The law of unintended consequences?

Where I come from, we operate the controls one pilot at a time, I don't require any assistance from an FO, some people call them the MS crews, I call them the SOP squad, who love to quote the SOP when convenient, and disregard it when not convenient.

Other items mentioned by fireflybob: :ok::D

That's why packs & bleeds are in the after T/O checklist :).

some things I noticed:
- flying in V/S when inappropriate (MCP speed much lower than actual speed / when ATC asks for a minimum rate of climb and VNAV is unable)

- people thinking they only have 12 minutes to reach 10 000 feet in an emergency descent

- CL: people pushing TO/GA before engine are spooled up & around the same value.

- general: people thinking "we have him on TCAS" is relevant.
- it does not help you, TCAS is not reliable in the lateral sense
- it does not help ATC.

- People not completely understanding FMC non-precision approach. depending on database. Some databases only show points on the approach related to safety altitudes. When the safety altitude change is for example 2 miles before the actual descent point with a 3 degree glide there is no waypoint where the descent starts. Pilots then think the FMC is wrong.

- pilots not crosschecking VNAV path with distance to go.

There are some more but I can't think any at the moment.