Framer,

As I posted earlier, the Flight Planning and Performance Manual. See above.

Regarding the TCAS thing - in UK airspace you are specifically required NOT to announce that you have an aircraft on TCAS. Its a waste of time and adds nothing. Not only that I am extremely wary of saying anything that might indicate that I have any responsibility for separation.

The whole thing about reconfiguring bleeds after takeoff is quite surprising. I know exactly how the aircon and press system works, but this is so critical to safe flight that making sure you have done it correctly is crucial. Enough people have screwed this up to make the bleed reconfig checklist an essentially mandatory step in my opinion. I think sometimes we have to remember that proving that we are ace pilots is not often compatible with passenger transport operations. Bleeds off takeoffs are just not common enough on modern types to be a safely executed memory procedure.

I am not familiar with this descent profile (certainly not in the Boeing manuals), but it may be a procedure your company has adopted and had approved by the regulator. If so, then it seems reasonable, and it certainly get the aircraft down to a safe(r) altitude quickly.

Happy to fly with you now.

Ahh yeah I didn't see that. Ta. I wonder if it is the same as our "Performance and Limitations Manual" as we don't have a 'flight planning and performance manual'.
I have no recollection of it being in ours or of hearing it mentioned so it may be specific to your company or companies that elect to have it included as per local regulator rules. Interesting info and good to have in the back of my mind, thanks.

I believe it is standard Boeing, but I don't know why you don't have in your manuals.

Slide 63 of here are graphs in question.

Captains who unexpectedly shut down both engines in the taxi to roll onto stand unpowered thinking it's cool to do so.

captjns - agree about the roll-out etiquette, too many skippers are either starting the APU of adjusting the cabin temperatures whilst my little-MS brain is trying the wrestle a 65T jet down from 140knots to 60.

In a jet? Sounds like something someone might do in a Baron when they have 500hrs but in a jet?

In a shiny, nearly new, 737-8.......

Aye, seen this myself. Very amusing especially because the APU wasn't even ready at that point.

I remember, still with a chuckle,the 'one-man-band' I flew with years ago who, taxying on stand at Newcastle at 0200 in a 734, shut down both off stand and immediately reached up and threw off the taxy light - except it wasn't the taxy light. I wet myself laughing............

More haste, less speed!

Almost like the ones that want to shut down an engine taxying in when it's obvious the next turn on a small apron is going to be in the opposite direction!

I noticed that a rising number of captains take over control at high speeds after touchdown and more and more FOs expect this too, either actively transferring control or looking lost when nothing has been said by 80 knots. Fantastic in crosswind rollouts on slippery runways... :ugh:

More haste, more dark, perhaps?

"Stuff that annoys your friendly checkie"

1/Start witches to Cont in light turbulence
2/ Using Auto Brake when it's not needed
3/ Not checking the cabin ROC indicator with the ATO cx's
4/ Quickly stowing the reversers at 60kts
5/ Using Sups for crossfeeding and No Bleed takeoff
6/Using too much aileron during roll during crosswinds departures
7/Relying blindly on the rotate call
8/Following through on thrust levers after TOGA pushed
9/Inability to resolve PIO's
10/ Thinking that hand flying is dangerous
11/Questioning every decision the Captain makes
12/ Relying 100% on TCAS instead of looking out
12/Reducing to M0.76 in the cruise due turbulence
13/Maintaining thrust until 10ft during flare
14/Not confirming the FMA(s)
15/Using checklists etc to cover the windows (sunlight)
16/Over controlling on the approach (PIO)
17/Slow rotation, not pulling correctly through the dead zone
18/ Changing frequencies then immediatley transmitting
19/- Putting the automatic temperature selector to full low (or even to manual) on a hot summer day
20/Doing the flight control check (rudder part) without holding the tiller
21/Disregarding a gentle suggestion by the FO not to climb to the max level when it is turbulent
22/Going overboard with superfluous confirming switch selections.
23/Pilots who have no idea of immediate actions in event of tail-pipe fire
24/Fuel cross feeding/balancing well before the IMBL caution is alive.
25/Pumping the elevators on rotation and flare
26/Failing to call rotate if the speeds drop out of the FMC.
27/not calling the FMA correctly. LVL CHG is the button you press on the MCP. MCP SPD is the pitch mode that is engaged.
28/flying in V/S when inappropriate
29/people thinking they only have 12 minutes to reach 10 000 feet in an emergency descent
30/people pushing TO/GA before engine are spooled up & around the same value.
31/people thinking "we have him on TCAS" is relevant.
32/.................................

What about shoving the control wheel full forward when landing on a wet runway still at high speed.

Better than trying aerodynamic braking like on a Cessna and holding the nose gear off the runway until 100 knots!

Surely many of the points listed above (most of which I would concur with) should have been taught correctly in the first place by the training pilots employed by the company?

If these "misunderstandings" are widespread then that would, imho, point to a lack of standardisation in the training departments of these companies?

And please, I am not having a knock against training pilots (I speak as one who did the job for circa 15 years including TRE/IRE and a spell as pilot training manager) rather than the system (or lack of it) which has allowed these "misunderstandings" to propagate.

Surely it's about singing from the same hymn sheet rather than trying to "please teacher"?

I agree with you Bob, I imagine most pilots reading this will read 30 of the 31 things and think "I would never do that" but one of them will make them think " shivers.....do I do that?"
Thats what I'm hoping for anyway. So I think that this has turned into a list a crap behaviours rather than misunderstandings but thats cool. I've learnt something (to do with O2 and descents) and I imagine lots of other people have too.
I still think there is heaps more to come.
What about thinking that the optimum level displayed while you're on the ground will get higher as you burn fuel off in a vnav climb ? Ever see that?

Not seen that one yet. But the only effect I can think of with holding the control wheel forward would be to increase the landing run.

Oh yes, often it gets lower as the ISA deviation increases!

Entering the ground-level ISA deviation in the Descent Forecast page