Pressure Piling on BEA
 

@ Squawk_ident

Hi Squawk_ident.

With regard to your posting above concerning the pressure that is being piled up from " ...political and economic power...", let's please not forget that everybody in this forum who is participating in the discussion about AF447's accident cause, including me, is contributing to this pressure as well, which is in many perspectives a very positive development, compared to e.g. 15 years ago.

Of course there are limits and BEA's work must not be compromised by false accusations or by loading them with supplementary PR work in order to keep the conspiracy theorists at bay and away from naive press colleagues. But we can be sure that they as well follow this thread in order to think out of the box and at the same time this community also represents a sort of legislative power, as the media would be picking up any major cries of foul from this community - we make a contribution as well.

This represents a very positive development in my eyes and improves accountability and transparency to most stakeholders. They are being paid to do their jobs and this includes dealing with public and societal and whatever else pressure.

Being the technician in charge or not, it is part of his job and I bet that most pilots would frankly claim their daily responsibility and respectively pressure to be feeling much bigger indeed.

So don't become too touched by their efforts. They will for sure earn our respect and credit in this investigation, as well as in others (e.g. Air Caraibes), but they have to deliver first.

Thanks, Mods
 

This is to recognize and thank John Tullamarine and other Tech Mods for their patience in monitoring, and apparently culling so few posts. It was very frustrating to me in the first thread in R&N that my posts regarding Wx radar were summarily deleted without explanation.

Hi,

Your answer has nothing to do with my critics about the BEA.
My critics about the BEA are about his right to be a moral judge of what the press released.
It's not his role to decide if a press release can be harm for families victims etc ...
If they want reply to press articles they must be factual and not emotional.
They have to publish a strong denial or a strong approval.

To be specific, we are trying to push the envelope. :cool:

Garage Years

I think the concern is for when the computer becomes an obstacle to the pilots recovering from a situation. The worry that The Shadow raised is the case of the computer masking a situation that is trending toward dangerous, leaving the pilots to play "catch-up" when they have to take control.

Aside: If you have ever, as an instructor, let the student pilot "go a bit further afield" as he makes an error, you are aware that the further he strays from desired performance without correction, the more work it is to get things back in order.

I think that on these boards, it is axiomatic that getting behind the aircraft rarely turns out well ...

snowfalcon, thanks! :ok: I'd guess that a checklist or something like an ECAMS resource in the cockpit would walk the pilots through the step by step if such a realighment/recaging were necessary inflight.

Perhaps not, perhaps fixed only on the ground.

The BEA have the authority, in fact, are compelled to make findings. It is bad luck they incur criticisms. They are professionals, and must remain isolate from politics, and public opinion. Not to do so is a condemnation of their very role. That they responded to the Press at all is incompetent. To make moral judgments re: people's feelings, freedom of opinion, and what is proper in the culture is inexcusable. Their credibility is damaged greatly, jcjeant is on the money here.

As In: Pushed to respond to a mere gnat, (The Press), imagine how anxious they will be whilst composing their Final. Politics and Economics make the Figaro as a small barking chien.

Flight control laws
 

Salute!

Thank you Garage, thank you, thank you, thank you!!!

The "Direct Law" in the 'bus is not much different than the basic Viper control laws. Closest relation is on the ground and with WOW switch depressed.

- There was no direct relationship between control stick input and control surface deflection or rate of deflection.

Here's the roll command function:

http://i120.photobucket.com/albums/o...s/roll_cmd.jpg

But wait!!!! There's more!!! That was only the "command". Between the "command" and actual control surface movement the computers blended AoA, body rates, etc. The end result was still the same - the jet tried to achieve your command.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++

So we roll back the clock to late 40's and early 50's. Hydraulic augmentation or even direct control of the ailerons, elevator, rudder. No direct feedback from cables or pushrods. Wow! The dinosaurs bitched. We new kids on the block didn't know any better. I, personally, learned in Champs, Luscombes and Taylorcraft taildraggers. But when I went to USAF pilot training our first plane had mechanical controls!! I could "feel" the burble and lack of response at the edge of the envelope. And then on to the fighters.

Wow! No direct mechanical connection to the elevons in the F-102. Then same for the F-101B. We had springs and dampening gizmos to keep us from commanding full deflection at any speed. Elevator in the VooDoo and Phantom had a pneumatic bellows that "stiffened" the stick the faster we went. VooDoo even had AoA protection that included rate limits - this was back in mid-60's.

Biggest change in flight controls was in 1973. You guessed it. Lightweight Fighter program. GD introduced us to the "electric jet".

The initial impression to all of us was that we didn't move a hydraulic valve with the stick or rudder. Hell, we just sent a signal to the actuators on the wing or tail and voila!!! NOPE!!!! And nope big time.

The designers tried to make the jet "feel" like the ones from the old days. They also figured we didn't need to pull hard at slow speed to 60 degrees AoA, then recover from the stall or whatever. Hornet violates this design consideration, BTW. Then they added gee protection, blended AoA and gee command and pitch rate when landing gear was down. And the beat went on......

The electronics did not simply convert stick deflection to surface movement. Along the way, the computers applied all kindsa functions and limits. To be honest, the jet felt like all the others except the relics that had mechanical connections ( pre-60's except for the big jets most here have flown or heard about). The engineers did a great job on the Viper, but that same team did not work on the Airbus. We also did not have much of an autopilot connection to the flight control system. It was not quad-redundant and had limited functions. More like a pilot's stick input.

more later, as I wanted to "set the stage".

Anectodotal input for you here, gums. 25-30 years ago.

Picked up an A-7 pilot from one ship, taking him to the Carrier. He'd been doing some staff function with the Anti Air boss on the Cruiser. We had a chance to talk about that magic new jet, the F-18. He'd had a chance to fly it, I think at Pax River. He told us that flying straight and level, he could look out at his wings and (I think this was at slower speeds) watch the very small corrections being made without any movement of the stick. Also said the plane flew as smooth as silk.

I think when the Hornet is departed, the pilot is required to let go. Feel the force, Luke. Likewise on the cat, launch is "Don't touch". Pilot grabs the right handhold, so the guy with the thing can go poosh.

jcjeant,

The BEA's response to the le Figaro article was not only correct and fully justified; it would have been seen to be neglectful not to have issued it in the circumstances.

Your constant, carping, biased criticisms of the BEA are becoming... ennuyeuse. Condemning their press release is surreal. Give it a rest - unless you wish totally to discredit your arguments?

Well, to be fair it's a completely different design consideration :

Going from memory here, so please correct me if so, but as I understood it the F/A-18 was more of a hybrid of the advanced setup in the F-16 and more traditional control methodolgies - in a not dissimilar way to how FBW is implemented in the B777 vs the A32/3/4/80 series.

Hornet aero
 

Salute1

Well, Dozy, the Hornet and her prototype - the YF-17, were "conventional" in terms of static stability. Still are.

The YF-16 could be flown with a "conventional" forward c.g., but allowing it to move aft provided a dramatic increase in several parameters. The Airbus utilizes it's FBW system to reduce trim drag, but that's about it. In the Viper, we saw a dramatic change in pitch rate when we had to balance fuel forward to reduce the chances of a deep stall. And BTW, none of we operational pukes had a deep stall the first year or so. The phenomena was discovered by the golden arms at Edwards after the flyoff and the YF-16 was selected.

The guys in our initial cadre had several pilots from the flyoff. They all liked the way the YF-17 "felt". OTOH, it could not maintain the same turn rate as the YF-16, failed the transonic acceleration requirement, and it was a gas guzzler.

Before I post "part two" of the changes in flight controls, here's a tidbit.

We have had pitch and yaw dampening augmentation since the 50's. By the end of the 60's, we began to have "augmentation". Clever devices "helped" us to fly smoother and have better control response without losing control. Good example was the A-7D and Navy model. We had "control aug". When following lead on the taxiway you could see the control surfaces jumping all over the place. The inertial inputs were moving the control surfaces to achieve the pilot's commands. Hmmmmm.

For all the active pilots here ( and recent pilots), tell me if you see the control surfaces jumping on that Airbus in front of you when it rolls over cracks in the concrete and such.

So much for "direct control". A true direct control would leave the control surfaces "frozen" unless the pilot moved the control stick.

I don't think I've seen this particular link posted before, but those interested in the recent discussions about Sullenberger should read the flight crew interview material from the investigation report

"Le circonstances" and the Friendly Flying Systems / "Wiring fault"
 

GY,

Defending vigorously his position you have a big and powerful conglomerate, with "State of the Art design capability" delivering "friendly" highly optimized Flying Systems in their a/c.

In another position you have the pilots being helped by "friendly flying systems" (that are "under continuous evolution"), and facing some "extremely complex scenarios" related to the richness of real world and mother nature and "enriched" by the sometimes highly complex behavior of their "friends".

In another position you have a govt. entity, BEA under intense pressures to "understand" factual information "recorded" in a/c debris, recorders and a/c occupants. And needing to work "together" the "designers" to be able to analyze the "complex mechanisms" of "highly complex systems", etc". And now clearly in a hurry that further complicates the task of their professionals. There are also other "players", as we know, in this "complex stage" contributing to the pressure.

The "circonstances report" to be issue soon can be aligned to the huge interests involved? To "construct" this question i just considered the facts that the a/c didn´t deviate earlier to a "important WX condition", the fact that the "friendly flying system" was eventually affected by UAS and considered that the System degraded creating additional factors for the a/c ability to exit the "important WX condition" the a/c entered (for any reason) and never left.

The report may fit well with the huge interests of the conglomerate and the French State. The timing of the Paris show (just one month from today) is a very important "time constraint". And we may ask: Which player(s) should be "strategically preserved"? The conglomerate, the carrier or the pilots?
Who has the bigger responsibility for the navigation since monday? IMO, no longer BEA. It seems came from the "player" that fed Le Figaro and is carefully "assembling" the near future environment along the BEA´s analysis.

The turbulences we are observing, i commented in an earlier post, impossible to avoid, are dangerous to all players. As a technician i yet felt how difficult they are. And it´s threat to properly emphasize in the "highest profile phase" (during next days) what is really most important. *

Svarin,

What kind of cause can create such wiring fault.

The importance to me is not related to what this "wiring fault" could make to a redundant architecture.

I would like to understand what can create a "wiring fault". Other than a Kapton issue. :E


(*) I must mention that i consider most of conspiracy theories too simplistic and never taken into account the global picture. Eg. TWA800 shot by a missile and other similar ones.

question ...
 

I did my 320 type rating some years ago .. (the real one with 6 real circuits !!.. haven't used it since though, so in the real world call it sim time) .. coming from another more basic type I was advised in clear language "IT" will maintain 1g and zero roll rate IF you leave "IT" alone.

Simplistic perhaps, with an upset more so, subtract the layers of protections quietly withdrawing from the game; my question to those who actually fly the thing day to day is ... does this hold true ?

Whatever happens will "IT" try to maintain 1g zero roll rate and fly away ?

Barking chien or "instrument"?
 

Or a "useful instrument" In the right timing?

Who "is in control" now?

Cheap memories
 

JD-EE

My point is:

Sound recording in cockpit can be HIFI at a LOW PRICE.

I posted microphones. I didn´t mention headset microphones.

The A330 has a ground mode of Normal Law, which I believe requires a SS input to deflect the control surfaces during the taxi (proportionally to the SS command). Control surface deflection can be monitored on the SD Flt Control page. You don’t need to be in another aircraft to tell if they’re moving. You are not "technically" in Direct Law as such on the ground anyway unless you landed that way. I’ve never noticed if the control surfaces are moving independently during taxi; the priority naturally is that the SS inputs result in the expected movement. You are of course able to command full deflection of each surface in the Normal Law ground mode. No g or roll rate logic involved.

As to DozyWannabe's earlier mention of “manual reversion”, the term itself can apply to a number of different solutions to degraded flight control systems. The earlier Boeing non-FBW aircraft that I’m familiar with do not have direct linkages to the primary control surfaces. In the event of multiple hydraulic system failures, linkage to both the aileron and elevator trim tabs is unlocked and the pilot inputs are to the trim tabs which eventually result in movement of the primary control surface after some excruciating delay. This is probably why a system like this is aircraft size (inertia) limited. A backup electric pump and separate dedicated hydraulic system provides rudder control however. Either electric or at a minimum manual stabilizer trim is always available, barring a jam.

If I recall correctly, the DC-9/MD-80 elevators were unpowered anyway. The MD-90 elevator was unpowered unless the aircraft was stalled and then it was automatically powered to assist recovery. I think the hydraulic pump came on when the shaker did.

All other conditions equal, I would much rather be in ALT 2 or Direct Law in an A330 than in manual reversion in a B727/737. Time marches on. Unique systems with unique problems require unique solutions and there’s always room for refinement.

More knowledgeable Airbus types may correct any of my errors at their leisure.

(I've filed it away to check control surface movement on the ground and FPV functionality the next time I get a chance.)

Hi,

I reiterate my firm position on the unnecessary comments and void in their response to the press

To read:
Google Vertaling

The BEA does become more cautious in his responses to the press?

Original link:
FENVAC

OK465
 

When I first began flying,one thing I recall most was:

"There are Rules and there are Laws. The Rules are made by men who think that they know better how to fly your airplane than you.
Laws (of Physics) were ordained by nature. You can, and sometimes should, suspend the Rules but you can never suspend the Laws."

I am now retired, after a host of years in the pointed end of my office. Perhaps I recalled well.

Give me a break!

They will be far less anxious composing their final report than you and jcjeant will be in awaiting its content...

I'd venture to guess that whatever they say, our anti-Airbus cabal on here will consider it a stitch-up in any case. Still quixotically tilting at 23-year-old windmills...

Pilots must be proactive; The System is reactive
 

John,

After learning on 38 UAS cases since 2003 we may ask: Are the the present airworthiness system working pro actively (in important issues like this one) like pilots naturally do?

IMHO on this subject there is a "slow moving bureaucracy" affected also by lack of will to invest (and be proactive).

Since the Comet investigation the System still moves only after the losses.

And the UAS cases of a parameter so important indeed strongly recommends to pilots to act pro actively "staying away" like you mentioned.

My point is: Considering the System lags behind (bureaucratically) pilots increasingly operating complex a/c systems must realize the (natural?) limitations of the System.

I worked in a (private) positions report network in the seventies (using TTY, HF rig, etc. ) and after reading the comm. logs of AF447 and analyzing reactions of brazilian, senegalese centers i ask: What was done (or is being made) to fix the errors that occurred at that night? This relates directly to safety and that´s the reason of my question.

Mac

02:11:55 EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,,FCPC2 (2CE2) / WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2, HARD
This is definitely a wiring fault, where FCPC2 and ADR1 lose their connection

I thought that it had just been reported that the BEA had said that they had found no faults with the aircraft after examining the FDR. Or would this 'wiring fault' not be apparent at this time?

As I've said before, the thing is that comparing FBW as it is applied to a fighter jet like the F-16 (constant correction due to inherent instability in the airframe) with how it is applied in an airliner like the FBW Airbus series or the B777 (to assist pilots in managing the flight on a stable airframe) is to ignore a fundamental difference in the design specification - i.e. a completely different set of problems.

The F-16 had to handle modes of operation that would be completely outside the frame of reference required by an airliner, and on top of that it was a pioneer in it's field - so it's hardly surprising that it was possible to "throw" the computer. While the A320 was the first fully-FBW airliner (aside from the H/S mechanical reversion you mention), it drew upon experience from the development of the A300 series - and before that - Concorde (which was effectively analog FBW - if you haven't checked out the Tech Log Concorde thread, I urge you to do so - it makes for fascinating reading).

The A320 series FBW control law reversion looks complicated on paper, but I can assure you that it was designed to behave in a completely logical manner in flight, and the design pattern it followed had input from line pilots as well as engineers - something that rarely gets mentioned. The FMC (autopilot) and FBW technologies are not that closely intertwined and can effectively be thought of as completely separate systems. The design of the automation as a whole was completely optimised for airliner operation, which is why looking at it from the perspective of FBW as implemented in fighters it's not likely to make much sense.

The analogy I like to think of is that you wouldn't try to plough snow with a combine harvester, despite the fact that the underpinnings of a snowplough and combine harvester are very similar.

how much is the range of moving aft the CG for the YF-16 ? 40%?? 45%? or more ?

my raw calculation for an A330 with 205t is that the change of CG is abaut 0.7m if you transfere 4,8t from trimtank ca. 31m(?) foreward to centertank (31*4,8/205=0,7)
100% of the profile may be around 6,6m ,and if the trimtank was full (?)
the max cange in CG is 10,6% (0,7*100/6,6=10,6)
given CG 37% the max forward CG in that case might reach 26,4%


p.s. if 10 Pax move 40m the change of CG is not nothing, it is ca. 2,2%,

SEA SEARCH OPERATIONS - Summary
 

As previously mentioned by noske, the BEA has recently published (in French) a summary of the Sea Search Operations. The conclusions reached have been translated into English below:-
They have also confirmed their confidence in the Remus Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) operated by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution for this kind of operation.

jcjeant, speaking in USA terms BEA has an absolute right to criticize Le Figaro for its sloppy reporting and request that they shut the (whatever) up. And Le Figaro has an absolute right to go on being rectal orifices.

In French terms I am not sure what rights, if any, a person has. But if BEA does not have a right to lay into Le Figaro for irresponsible reporting something is, IMAO, terribly terribly broken.

Had BEA not lit into Le Figaro that way then Le Figaro's sensationalism would stand and gradually become perceived as "truth" when it may not have been.

edit: Let me add that nothing BEA did constitutes censorship, the action of preventing someone from publishing as they choose. Nor is anything BEA did in the least bit immoral in an honest world. They did NOT extend a hand to prevent Le Figaro publishing. They simply declared Le Figaro and its reporter were reprehensible people.

jcjeant, I suppose it is morally correct to slam the victims families back and forth trying to deflect their suit with a purely preliminary observation on the data. Suppose that given what Le Figaro has published that appears to have you absolutely convinced of the Pilot's and Air France's fault we still find it was an AirBus error. What did this do to the families? They thought there was a conclusion and they can get on with suing somebody into bankruptcy or whatever else they want to do. Then their plans are upended and their emotions are strung out again.

You're starting to reach too far, make presumptions of guilt with which I am VERY uncomfortable. Is this the German way? In the US you'd be utterly unfit for jury duty if you jump to conclusions with this level of facility.

RR_NDB, what would "hi-fi" bring to the table other than a lot of noise that would have to be filtered away to hear the voice clearly? Surely as a ham radio operator you have played with filters to make understanding what is being said easier. Have you ever found that a 15 kHz wide filter could make a voice in noise sound clearer? Have telephones ever seen a need to go to 15 kHz audio response for general use?

Memory is cheap, today. But, the plane was designed when large amounts of memory were quite expensive and quite large. So having the electronics filter the sound the way it was is likely necessary.

With today's model recorders will likely store more - days worth? - rather than more bandwidth unless the bandwidth really buys "something" if applied to all the microphones. (However, I might store more channels to get information about wind flow around the cockpit and record them with 96ksps at 16 bits in the hope that might provide information that could diagnose cockpit noises as ice on the windshield, flying through rain, flying into a sudden up or down draft, etc.)

JD-EE
IMHO, the BEA didn't exactly told Le Figaro to "shut the (whatever) up" ; their phrasing was very carefully chosen : "The BEA [...] alone has the right to communicate on the progress of the investigation. [...] any information [...] from another source is null [...]" (check the BEA site for the full sentence) : translation : "neither Airbus nor Air France nor anybody else in the industry is supposed to communicate on this subject". Thus they don't order Le Figaro to stop publishing, they just question the reliability of Le Figaro's source, according to the fact there has been no official info from BEA.

At the end of the day, the net effect is the same : BEA 1 - Le Figaro 0. :ouch:

A few observations:
1. I accept that this FBY technology overall is a good thing, and understand that some of you are saying it is pretty much essential (to a greater or lesser extent) for aircraft of this size.
2. I have been surprised at how often you to disagree about the detail - much more than I would have expected. There have been vigorous debates about the principles of various flight laws, or the implications of a particular error message. Maybe this is because you do not all operate the A330, and that some of this detail is particular to that aircraft type. Or would there still be disagreement among a group of A330 pilots?
3. A lot of this stuff seems based on IT rather than "airmanship", and I wonder if this is a problem. When things go wrong in an aircraft, there will sometimes not be sufficient time to work through what is going on and what it means. The situation will often deteriorate while you are thinking. This is true in many areas of life - there is not a pause button where you can freeze the situation and work out what is happening and what to do. Sometimes you have to act - because not acting will lead to a disaster.
4. IT is often a bit different - stop, understand, then act. But many areas of life require prompt action. I am 100% sure the IT people that produce this technology understand this. But I do wonder if there is not some remnant of this thinking in the way this technology is developed. Is there a small residual bias that assumes there will be time for the pilot to work through the problem and take the correct action. Rather than overloading the pilot with information, should this technology simply allow him/her to get on and fly the plane, and encourage him/her to do so? I remember seeing the interview with the Qantas A380 pilot after that engine failure out of Singapore - page after page of error messages to work through. How would this have turned out if the consequences of the explosion presented a more immediate threat to the aircraft?
5. I was interested in the view expressed by someone here a day ago that this technology can disconnect a pilot from the aircraft to the point that s/he is unaware of a deteriorating situation - of how close the system can be to failure, and how the pilot could be totally unprepared to have control thrown back to them. This issue makes sense to me.
6. I wonder if this is a wider problem in society. Overall we are making things more reliable and more user friendly and more accessible. We are doing this by dumbing down technology, and taking the view that end-users "don't need to understand it". This means that a smaller % of users understand how it works. Overall I guess this is a good thing. Except when it goes wrong of course.

My 2c on philosophy today.

Lonewolf 50, Continuing on the "gyro re-alignment" subtopic:

As far as I understand, such manual operations should not be necessary.

I did some googling and found out about this Northrop Grumman LTN-101/101E GNADIRU (Global Navigation Air Data Inertial Reference Unit) which is certified for Airbus [correction: but was not installed on AF447 which had Honeywell units, see next post below].

As the description says, it integrates air data, inertial (solid state gyro based) and GPS data and continuously "realigns" or calibrates itself to maintain data integrity using something the manufacturer calls AIME (Autonomous Integrity Monitored Extrapolation) technology. "AIME continuously analyzes available satellite and inertial signals. If the data’s integrity is compromised, AIME automatically uses the aircraft's position history to maintain accuracy and integrity. Onboard predictive Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) programs are not required".

This is probably a similar (but enhanced) concept to that used in many car navigation systems, which use GPS for primary positioning but revert to inertial sensors (solid state MEMS) when GPS signal is lost in a tunnel.

An interesting "side feature" of such an integrated system is that you could use it "in reverse" to calculate e.g. the strength and direction of the wind gusts that hit the airplane, by comparing the differences between air data, inertial and GPS data. It will be interesting to see if this kind of results will appear in BEA's report, given the turbulent weather conditions that we know were in the vicinity of AF447.

snowfalcon2,
The accident aircraft was equipped with Honeywell ADIRUs, though it is certainly possible that they are also equipped with a similar function.

Figaro si, Figaro là
 

DenisG said


I understand what you are saying but I disagree on some aspects. Even if the Internet medium is today a major tool in communication and propagation of opinions and ideas, I do not think that a State Agency such as AAIB,BEA,NTSB etc...in charge of an aviation disaster would have time to watch various forum, including the best of them and to act according to what they read. No, imho pressure are really coming from political an economical powers. In my country like in many others, political and economical worlds are so tightly linked that you can barely make a difference and determine who exactly gives orders to the other.
Two days ago, as I relayed here (I'm not a journalist btw, just working in the Aviation industry and consider myself as a SLF) Mr Mariani (junior minister of Transport) said publicly that a report would be doubtless published "late June". Very well, let's wait. Normally a statement from a minister should not be contradict two days after. Yesterday we learned that the BEA will made a major update in one week. The BEA being a State agency they are obviously under pressure of their management that is to say the ministry. And they certainly won't do that unless authorized by their management. Even a representative of a victims association wonders if the things are not going too fast now . We are walking on the head, with a situation where (almost) the same peoples, who, some months ago were asking for more transparency, efficiency and speediness, are now begging for less precipitation to guarantee a reliable result for the manifestation of truth. But PHG spoke very opportunely and at the same time we learn that AFR-KLM, who needs to renew its long haul fleet will postpone its choice until this Summer.

JPI33600 said

Exactly, but like in other democratic societies with a free press, journalists publish informations that they consider reliable. In France, the sources of the journalists are kept secret. Periodically this debate about the sources secrecy is coming on the public scene because of sensible informations published in such domains as politic or Justice. The political power, sometimes, is really annoyed with that.

mm43,
Was not the BEA just meaning it is not yet determined whether the ULBs did transmit or both failed ?

Hi,

The opinion of HMC

Source:
AF 447. Les « circonstances » de l

Hi,

JD-EE

The families organizations work with assistance of barristers and solicitors and aviation experts .. so be sure they will sue who is to be sued .. and in due time !
The newspapers don't play any role regard the decisions taken by families organizations.
Reminder:
Air France and Airbus are already sued (Justice court of Paris)

You are making some valid points here but it should be nuanced: all people around don't know what the real situation faced by AF 447 was. Those interpretations are not based on DFDR or CVR data but on those ACARS reported which are following their own logic (Central Maintenance Computer), a logic quite different from any live report. Those ACARS have a different content, timming, meaning and purpose than real time cockpit warnings; moreover, they do not provide any clue about this crew action/reaction and they are far from complete in this form (a short header lacking the full data to be downloaded from CMC); also, everything happening in the cockpit is not covered by ACARS and some of these ACARS do not show on cockpit screens.

IT stuff vs. Pilot stuff: you can't train the crew to fully master every bits of avionics or the whole troubleshooting process. Hence, assisted procedures are to be developped in order to help them for recovering what system they first need in priority for the next phase of the flight (procedures being flight phase related). Faults are hierarchised by order of priority, but it is quite challenging when many warnings of the same priority level are triggered almost simultaneously (AF 447).

This is where ergonomy/interface (and training with it) plays its critical part as too many warnings may also induce too much stress/work for the pilots to understand quickly what is going on. Especially if, beforehand, their situation awareness was very low while the process was designed for the pilots being entirely dedicated to their task. Same isssue if the event is particularly improbable and/or complexe (like A380 case). Consequently, the workload resulting may be critically affected by external factors than those taken into account during each procedure implementation. On the other hand, it doesn't mean that the procedure is always soundly elaborated as it may also appear that it is flawed in combination with other ones triggered at the same time. In this case, time and feedback from experience is the only way to correct such issues, because neither the Pilots nor IT could ever agree to make it perfect from the drawing board stage.

Quote from this post
That's why the public should have access to the data as well.
Of course the BEA would still keep the lead in the investigation.