Hi,

I agree .. that make sens

I believe you are referring to untrained non-professionals, no?


Abandoning your training and following your instinct is usually the quickest path to the scene of an accident.


Be assured -- they are.


Uh, no.

Securite
 

In the dim and distant past when I was a very junior AATC in the RAF and "Preston Airways" was alive and well at Northern Radar I remember the demise of the third level of emergency call below that of of "Mayday" & "Pan" this third level call was "Securite"

Securite
 

Sorry, I should have addressed this to lonewolf 50 and others in relation to the word Securite

In my view, the whole case for what the computers can do with regard to stability is overstated. Even computers can't make rocks fly. The aerodynamic form of the a/c no matter how inefficient demands that it keep flying. As long as the integrity of the structure is preserved, it takes some effort (either on the part of the computers or the pilots or both) to keep the a/c from flying. This is the context in which we should look at direct law. It simply takes the computers out and lets the aerodynamics do its thing. The question is will the pilots be prepared to start flying stick and rudder at the drop of a hat?

There are two entirely different animals at play in commercial aviation boomsets and we need to careful that the features are not mixed up...

Active Noise Reducing (ANR) headsets (i..e. Bose Aviation X, Telex 850, etc) that include an electronic circuit to reduce noise heard when wearing the headset - what this system does is exactly as you describe - elimination of steady "noise" by comparing the noise signature outside of the earcups and generating an anti-phase version of the same noise within the earcup, resulting on cancellation of the external steady noise. This is an output system...

Noise cancelling microphones (or more accurately 'directional microphones') affect only the input signal (so heard in your transmissions, primarily to reduce noise in what 'you' send to others).

As for "hot mic" recording, I think there is a specific CVR configuration that allows hot mic continuous recording, but it does not seem to be standard.

No Mechaca, I am not referring to non-trained professionals - I've seen 20 year IT people with A+ skills go completely blank and stare hopelessly at the same text for minutes on end, when confronted by strange issues. I've seen physicists try to make physical sense of manifest nonsense, because "the computer must be right - it's my fault". It's the nature of all humans to assume they are wrong, that they are doing something that's not in the manual, and to start pushing buttons hoping to regain control, not just of the computer system, but of themselves. If computers are going to fly airplanes, then they must do so under complete command of the crew, and in a sudden control emergency, it is senseless to lack an instant "GIMME" switch, that turns the airplane into a very big stick-and-rudder platform. I have no doubt that in the end, we'll find out that the crew lost precious time trying to figure out what to do with the FMC, or even as someone suggested earlier, put the AP back in charge when that was sure to lead to disaster.

I have no idea why some professional aviators are so adamant, to the point of irrationality, in their defense of flight computers. Perhaps it is the human need to feel "on top of the curve" and "up to snuff" with modernity. No one is arguing that FMCs are not a great idea for normal flight - but when it becomes an end in itself, something has gone off the rails.

CogSim - that's exactly right, and it's the point I'm trying to make. It's not enough to just be able to turn off the FMC - there has to be a designed-in envelope of stability that is familiar to crew and instantly available, and that will stimulate their natural instincts, not present them with puzzlers that eat into their situational awareness.

The A332 schedules fuel into the tail during refuelling for a load above 34.5t and it schedules up to about 2500kg until the selected quantity is above 71.788t. This is also the figure when the centretank starts to fill. The trim is full with a fuel aboard at 105.2t
The standard practice for my company A332 is to put all the bags in holds 3 and 4 to achieve a rearward cg for fuel economy but ours are in a two class fit and are generally full throughout.
Fuel is loaded into the trim for fuel economy and on the A300-600 for flight envelope purposes at mtow. During my time on the A332 I do not remember ever loading more than 80t with 10 hour sectors and high zfw and for most of our flights the centre tank was empty. I also only can think of one crew who ever filled one up with fuel and this is only possible when the aircraft is empty.
Does anybody have a copy of the flight plan with the flight time and an idea of the zfw? I could then give a rough guess as to the likely fuel aboard at push back.i could also do a rough calculation of where the cg was but I am guessing at around 37%
As to hot mics all of our UK registered aircraft have this and they are all anr equipped.

Man-Machine Interface
 

"To err is human, to really foul things up requires a computer"
(Murphy's law?)

tubby linton
 

Location: Lost under the sea

If it wasn't so poignant, it would be funny :)

Correct, you have no idea. I respectfully suggest you haven't the slightest clue about the design, engineering, testing, and production of modern transport category aircraft and their systems. Your keyhole view makes it appear irrational to you.

Those professionals who in fact do, ARE on top of the curve and up to snuff. And to staggeringly profound levels.

Respect what you don't comprehend, and debate it when you have an informed argument to bring.

tubby, from the first interim report

The aircraft left the gate with a calculated weight of 233,257 kg. The estimated takeoff weight was 232,757 kg, for a maximum authorised takeoff weight of 233 t. This takeoff weight broke down as follows:

• empty weight in operating condition: 126,010 kg,
• passenger weight: 17,615 kg (126 men, 82 women, 7 children and one baby),
• weight in cargo compartment (freight and luggage): 18,732 kg,
• fuel weight: 70,400 kg.

The on-board fuel weight corresponded to forecast trip fuel of 63,900 kg, route factor fuel of 1,460 kg, final reserve of 2,200 kg, fuel to alternate airport reserve of 1,900 kg and 940 kg additional fuel. An LMC corrected the definitive load sheet to take into account one passenger fewer without baggage.

The balance corresponding to the aircraft’s takeoff weight and given on the definitive load sheet (after LMC) was 23.3% of the MAC, for a forward limit of 22.7% and an aft limit of 36.2% at takeoff.

On the basis of the operational flight plan, it is possible to estimate the trip fuel at 27.8 t after a flying time of 3 h 41 min, the aircraft would then have had an estimated weight of 205 t and balance comprised between 37.3% and 37.8 %, which is within the limits of the operating envelope.

Routing and wapoints
ATLANTICO (SBAO) 1 h 33 INTOL BRAZIL
OCEANIC DAKAR (GOOO) 2 h 20 TASIL SENEGAL
OCEANIC SAL (GVSC) 3 h 43 POMAT CAPE VERDE
CANARIAS (GCCC) 4 h 37 IPERA SPAIN
CASABLANCA (GMMM) 6 h 2 SAMAR MOROCCO
LISBOA (LPCC) 6 h 47 BAROK PORTUGAL
MADRID (LECM) 7 h 22 BABOV SPAIN
BREST (LFRR) 8 h 1 DELOG FRANCE
PARIS (LFFF) 8 h 35 NORMI FRANCE

CogSim
Location: Lost under the sea
If it wasn't so poignant, it would be funny

I do not agree with what you say. I think that tubby linton should change his location to something less distasteful, as his present one has no connecton to his actual location. A bit out of order IMO for this thread.:(

But his "location" applies to him no matter which thread he posts in. I seriously doubt he's making light of AF447.

By flying on instincts, do some of you mean "flying based on trained and learned habit patterns and experiences?"

I am not sure how you mean "instinct" in this sense, which is why I am asking.

For Machaca:

"They are" based on what assumptions?

This may be a dated reference (mid 1990's) but there was an aircrew in Japan whose Captain had the plane not respond to his control inputs. That crash would not reassure me, but I've flown on commercial air transport since, so my risk assessment is that such bugs are not frequent enough to stop me from traveling. (The industry itself, on the other hand ... )

Granted, there has been ample opportunity since then to mitigate some of the bugs in the system, with the sytsem being the human/machine interface.

The various incidents where oddball AP inputs, and uncommanded control inputs, force the pilots to overcome the robot are reassuring only in that it demonstrates how important the Human element is in the human/machine interface. As with non-FBW aircraft, "how well do you know your aircraft" is a question pilots confront daily.

location
 

I know I've been lost under the sea trying to get answers about how such a tragedy could have happened. At least that's the way I took it. YMMV.

When I read instinct, I'm reminded of what Wolfgang Langewiesche calls "seat of the pants" flying. I think it is largely accepted to be irrelevant in modern day piloting.

Is that why some pilots are losing perfectly flyable airplanes? I'd suggest, that if you are right, that could answer many questions.
Until computers are perfect, there most certainly will always be situations where the pilot had better know how to fly an airplane, as opposed to a computer.

I agree. However, the reliance on training and instrumentation comes from the realization that your "instincts" can fool you, and do so surreptitiously.

If you are interested,

"Appendix D. Human Factors" of the final report on PK-KKW makes for a sobering read.

http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_av...KW_Release.pdf

Thanks for the link CogSim. I'm downloading it now... I'm not familiar with the reg, but I hope it's not one of those times when the pilots "instinct" was to pull up, as his stalled aircraft plummeted earthward. ....you see, I'd call that a layman's instinct, not a pilot's. Any "pilot" worthy of carrying hapless folks in his machine had better instinctively KNOW how to get out of a stall. (in truth, he should know how to avoid getting there in the first place, but that's certainly not "instinctive".)

Just to add some fuel to the discussion; some interesting quotes from NASA's initiative on Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) -“Stability, Maneuverability, and Safe Landing in the Presence of Adverse Conditions”

2009 Paper: http://www.aeronautics.nasa.gov/nra_...ch_plan_c1.pdf

Slide: http://www.eng.morgan.edu/~cibac/eve...%20(Totah).pdf

cmt: On that basis, simple extrapolations in FFS may have to remain the norm for a while longer

Tubby,

Geez, I can see what you mean with all the fuel tanks completely full on an empty aircraft. The total weight would be equal to the maximum TOW, actually, slightly more.

From the Airbus CG chart, I calculate the max operating aft CG limit of 39% @ 205 tons and your 37% estimate pretty much coincides with the BEA projection at the time of the incident.

Thanks for your input on the fuel transfer to and from the trim tanks, I was trying to understand how this might work.

Hi,

The BEA is actually under enormous pressures coming from any directions.
Methink it will be a official BEA communication (and information) before the former date announced by the BEA

Google Vertaling

Original press article
Vol AF447 : Il n'y aurait pas eu d'erreur de pilotage | France Soir

The press has a bone to chew on and she is not ready to let go prior to arrival at the spinal

Air France-KLM delays a major(1) aircraft purchase till after the Paris Air Show.

Air France repousse l'annonce d'une commande de 100 long-courriers - Le Point

(1) 100 A350 or 787 @ $250M a piece.

May be Airbus will have some eye-to-eye talk with some newspapers... :)

Is it LE FIGARO belongs to Airbus and France Soir to Air France ...

I think the answer is in the FCOM 3.02.34 (also mentioned in the Air Caraibes Note) :
As you say, the stall warnings ACA got were not false, they were only inappropriate in the way that the crew did very well to ignore them by maintaining a pitch and a thrust setting and not destabilizing that precarious situation.

I must say this ACA note is terrific. Congratulation to Mister HOUANG. Not much to see with the usual bla bla of a BEA report ...

If I may be permitted to add one more thing about flight simulation...

As good as they are for achieving the objectives they're intended for, the term Full Flight Simulator (FFS) will probably remain a misnomer, regardless of any eventual envelope expansion with regards to the flight data package.

There is one real world factor that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to generate in an FFS...

FEAR

deSitter,
 

My piloting background is limited to Piper and Cessna, but I have 40+ years in all levels of computer software, hardware, testing, etc. on systems of various sizes. I agree with your take on giving the human the option to shut the computer out of the loop. Our ability to implement complex computer systems surpasses our ability to sufficiently test them or to fully comprehend subtle changes made to software. It is not that people are incompetent, or that excellent tools are not available; it is that we are not perfect, and neither is the software we develop. Minor miscommunications and software glitches brought down an Ariane V, destroyed a Mars lander, forced F-122 fighters to return to base, caused an Airbus to make an unexpected descent, and updated our smart phone clocks incorrectly. I, for one, think there should be a big red "Give Me The Helm" button because there will be more incidents - we just don't know what they will be. I agree, too, with your description of people frozen by unexpected or irrational results - the "deer in the headlights" - especially in times of high stress.

Thanks to you all for the exceptional information on this site from obviously very capable professionals. It is a tremendously enlightening and rewarding read for this VFR pilot.

Laser gyros and survival of a CSMU
 

Sorry to reply late to a couple of topics, but I've been either off the net or very busy the past few days.

--

Ring laser gyros measure changes in angular orientation, and, as previously mentioned by JD-EE, are commonly installed in a "strap-down" configuration (always aligned with the axes of the aircraft or other platform), rather than, as in the older precision inertial nav systems, with the mechanical gyro mounted on a plate having 3- or 4-axis motor drive to keep the gyro erect in an inertial frame, while the aircraft (missile, whatever) rotated around it. That difference is mainly an interesting point, a laser gyro could be installed either way.

Ring laser gyros that have been incorporated into an inertial navigation system (with suitable mathematics), are used, along with accelerometers, to provide the short-term attitude (actually a very long, short-term :), since the laser gyros have such low drift), while the accelerometers provide long-term attitude (gravity reference) and accelerations along the axes to integrate into position. (The latter - double integration of accelerations - is where a lot of drift in INS systems comes from, and thus the requirement for some sort of aiding; in a modern aircraft, that aiding would come primarily from GPS and the altimeter).

That is all background for a discussion of tumbling. Tumbling of a mechanical 3-axis gyro (which trys to stay aligned in an inertial frame), occurs when two of the gimbals supporting the gyroscope happen to align, a state known as gimbal-lock, which can physically yank the gyro's spin axis off its original alignment to some other direction. This is bad because it takes a long time, using other aiding, to re-erect the gyro. More sophisticated systems may use 4-axis gimbals, which are steered so that no two ever align.

A strap-down system can suffer a related effect if the mathematical attitude solution involves only the three axes: roll, pitch and yaw. The problem occurs when pitch becomes near vertical and yaw becomes indeterminate. The vehicles that I have worked with are incapable of approaching pitch of +/-90 degrees, and so I cheat and use only roll, pitch and yaw. I'm not sure if, in an INS, this might cause loss of short-term attitude accuracy, or if it will recover a correct indication as soon as the platform leaves the vertical. However, this should never happen, because there is a mathematical construct known as "quaternions" that avoids this problem (don't ask me, I don't know :)); I suspect that it is a mathematical equivalent to the 4-axis mechanical solution. Hopefully, any aircraft INS is thus designed to avoid mathematical "gimbal-lock".

One more point about laser gyros in INS systems: they allow the system to perform the function of a gyro-compass. After a short alignment period, using the accelerometers and the rotation of the earth, an INS not only knows which way is up (down) but also the direction of true north. The laser gyro INS systems that I am (a little) familiar with acquire true north to an accuracy of a few tenths of a degree within 10 minutes of a cold start, as compared with 6 hours for a mechanical gyro-compass typically used on a ship. This alignment does not drift, even when the platform is in motion.

--

CSMU:

I will begin by confirming that I know nothing about the design of any CSMU in flight recorders, except what I have read on the web. However, I do know a lot about designing electronics for the deep ocean.

Some of the prior discussion, about whether or not to open the recorder, and how water might be detected inside, seems to be "misplaced". It was made clear by BEA at the press conference held the day the recorders arrived in Paris, that the following steps would be performed: open the case, wash the memory board in deionized water, dry the board in a oven, microscopically inspect the board (and, if I recall correctly, repair any obvious damage), and only then try to read the memory.

I do not think that CSMUs are designed the way many posters think, nor the way I would design a typical deep-sea system. Without quoting the dozen or so pages I found (sorry, hurrying), I'm not convinced that a CSMU is actually intended to be water-tight in the sense that a typical pressure housing is sealed and has pressure-proof penetrations for wires. CSMU designs appear to vary considerably between vendors, and are kept as trade secrets or may alternatively be patented.

In the descriptions I have seen, the outer shell, stainless or titanium, is not thick enough (at 1/4 inch) to act, alone, as a pressure housing at 6000 meters depth (20,000 psi, sorry for the mixed metric/English units, I use the MKSA system, but still have not internalized Pascals :)). It would collapse but for one or both of two mechanisms: either it is designed to leak (not sealed at all) and/or it is internally supported by incompressible materials.

The next layer inward is typically thermal insulation. One reference identifies this as "silica" which is a mineral and is possibly packed densely enough to support the shell, but I wonder how good its insulation properties would be if it were packed that hard.

The next layer is the thermal mass (works in conjunction with the insulation to limit the temperature inside. In some designs, this is identified as paraffin, with the phase change providing the primary heat absorption. This opens the possibility that the paraffin is also used as a water block.

The description of the Honeywell data recorder, which has been previously linked in this forum, mentions that their CSMU "uses modular "dry-block" materials for both the insulating liner and thermal mass, there is no need to deal with the sticky thermal gels or special insulating fluids." This implies to me that it is common to protect the memory boards from water with gel or fluid, rather than using an enormous increase in weight to make the CSMU a traditional pressure vessel. It is also possible that I am wrong about that, and the gels/fluids are secondary protection; in which case, the outer shell must be water tight and adequately supported internally.

It is possible that the boards are conformal coated with something that will resist water for a long time. I am speculating about that; I did not find that mentioned in any reference.

Note well that it is not necessary to protect the memory chips from pressure, only (possibly) from water. Epoxy encapsulated integrated circuits (the most common and inexpensive packaging) do not have voids, and so there is no space to implode, which would subsequently damage the die (circuit) inside. [There are some special devices, such as solid-state accelerometers and pressure sensors, that require a void space to operate, and thus they are not pressure tolerant, beyond the strength of the case.]

While we normally deploy complex electronics in pressure cases, we have also designed and tested numerous "pressure-tolerant" circuits that operate in an oil filled space that is equalized to ambient pressure. Appropriately packaged semiconductors; ceramic, mica, and some solid tantalum capacitors; most resistors; carefully characterized inductors (core materials can change properties with pressure); ordinary wire and connectors; and many other components; all work fine at pressures of 20,000 psi and even greater.

AF/KLM paints themselves even further into "coffin corner" IF this is to be believed.:uhoh:

Hi,

Le Figaro belong to Dassault
Dassault Group - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Dassault is a big shares older of Airbus (Airbus is part of EADS)
EADS Global Website - En

glad rag,

How so? A customer with a potential $25B order paints himself into a corner?:confused::confused::confused:

Gratuitous Swipe not appreciated
 

Whilst desitter has previously outed himself as a sceptic of the FBW model of modern aviation, I believe he poses a reasonable question that is undeserving of the gratuitous swipe levelled at him by machaca.:=

It appears that desitter’s question is framed as a statement (with the possibly offensive “on top of the curve” and “up to snuff with modernity” assertions). Nonetheless, it is a question in my reading, which is: why are so many of the pilots on this forum so vehement in their defense of the FBW computer-controlled flight model?

I, too, would like a reasoned answer to this question. What do the pilots know that the non-pilots do not know/understand.

I am not a sceptic of FBW as desitter appears to be, but, as a designer of computer systems and with three decades experience in the computer/electronics industry designing/testing non-life-dependant systems and a WAIS score of 135, I believe I could understand your explanations should you care to share them.

As SLF, I’d like to know that if/when the computer throws up its metaphorical hands, the pilot in command has the training/experience/skills to take control of the aircraft and fly it in what has often been referred to in this forum as “stick-and-rudder” mode.

I’m interested to know what are the preconditions for such an eventuality (that is, the need for stick-and-rudder flight)? What are the minimum systems/displays required for the pilot to achieve control of the aircraft once the computer has relinquished it to the pilot?

Footnote:
It is a frightening proposition to me – and I suspect many others - that a computer (programmed by a team of experts in the fields of aviation, software, electronics and control systems) with multiple redundancies inherent in its design can get to a point where its received data from all its sources “does not compute” and at that point it relinquishes control to two people trained only* as pilots; at which point they are expected to do something with the beast that the computer(s) could not – that is, bring it back under control.

*NB: I have the utmost respect for pilots and their training and I am confident to fly again in the future.:ok: My point is, there are just two of them and they are in a pressure-cooker situation. The team of designers and programmers have between them a breadth of knowledge and expertise that the pilots could never hope to emulate in the midst of a crisis.

There may be some magic in those words which becomes more apparent as the next few weeks unfold...

Basic flight controls, a functioning attitude indicator, some running engines and their associated power displays, and an altimeter or equivalent are enough to get you out of trouble in cruise.

I realize I'm on probation, so this may not float, but this akin to asking:

"When did you stop beating your wife?"

a) computers do not fly airplanes until the captain decide it, on his own will, by setting up autopilot and autothrust.
b) even so, the captain do select his course, speed, flight level, etc., the computers do not. He is in full charge of the flight.
c) both autopilot and autothrust can maintain a safe flight, only if certain flight parameters are not exceeded.
d) at any time, the captain may decide to take over and revert to manual flight.
e) in manual flight, flight envelope protections do not "fly" the aircraft, neither do drive your car an ABS instead of you; if you still have some flight envelope protection working, then, there is no more reason to turn them off than to disconnect your ABS if you were on the edge of losing control of your car; once control is lost, you may kill yourself, but an ABS can also save you if you need to use your brakes more efficiently.

More likely, they will expect the aircraft to save itself and will forget to fly it, which is a very different issue.

a) this "someone" suggestion is very unlikely: autopilot can't re-engage until the flight parameters are restored to normal, neither ALTERNATE LAW (PROT LOST) would be changed back to NORMAL LAW (until after landing);
b) nonetheless, this end result would not be due to computers choice but to captain action; if captain think that airspeed is reliable when it is not, who is to blame?
c) can't you see the paradoxe: if one had to "fight" (like you said) with such computer, why would he give the computer its full control back in a hurry without even trying to fly his aircraft?

Or, why some professional aviators, relying on automatisms from day 1 in aviation history (mechanical, electrical, electronical,...) are so irrational when it comes to flight computers, to the point that they don't even try to understand how they work?

Human machine interface, ergonomy and training are the main issues with current airliners. If one, for too long, is staying out of the loop (for irrational reasons against the systems or intellectual lazyness), he'll never be able to catch up with the machine of today.

Hi,

And of course a speed indicator.
Seem's the AF447 had one .. but unfortunately the speed show was not the real one ......
That's complicated somewhat the "get you of the trouble in cruise"

Hi,

You don't need a speed indicator to keep out of trouble in cruise. Pitch, power, altitude, and attitude.

Defense of FBW
 

Salute!

First thing I want to make clear - if anyone here has flown a fully fly-by-wire plane with zero mechanical backup before 1979, then speak up. Even the Airbus has a mechanical linkage with the stabilizer ( slow, but still mechanical). The jet I flew, as with the Space Shuttle had ZERO mechanical connections or hydraulic connections between the pilot and the control surfaces. It was all electric, with computers in the way.

That being said, if anyone questions my trust in FBW, then look at the pic I posted of a wounded jet that I landed after a few harrowing minutes. The FBW system saved me from punching out, and I doubt any normal jet would have given me the opportunity to continue flying and then land the damned thing.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

All must realize that the FBW system I flew and the ones other vehicles have flown with since then do not simply convert pressure or control movement to direct movement of all the control surfaces. None!

Most have limits as to control surface movement rates and those rates are adjusted for dynamic pressure, mach, etc. So a ten pound pull might move the elevator a few degrees at 0.78 M, but move the same elevator 10 or 15 degrees when approaching the field with gear down.

Some systems place a premium upon AoA, and this too is varied according to the plane's configuration for landing or cruising or fighting.

The gee limits are the easiest to program and fly with.

With all of the above in mind, I have tried to show that flying about with a cosmic computer-assisted flight control system is not fool proof. With virtually no limits compared to the Airbus, we quickly found a way to beat the computers and wind up in a deep stall. It was a combo of aero and aft center of gravity. We couldn't get out unless we could turn off the computer control of our elevator. Only the elevator. This is prolly not a great idea for the Airbus, but who knows?

PLZ revisit the F-16 'Semper Viper" articles I have posted.

My problem with the Airbus fly-by-wire implementation is two-fold: 1) Too damned many reversion sequences and autopilot connections with the flight control computers with their laws and sub-laws and sub-sub-laws....., then 2) Flying with aft c.g. that most planes would not be certified for.

In the Viper we had to live with a possibility of getting into a deep stall and then using the manual pitch override to "rock" outta the thing. Heh heh, I am sure the PAX would like that ride in the 'bus. Until we got a bigger horizontal tail we balanced fuel forward until coming back home. This did not completely preclude a deep stall, but it significantly reduced the probability, as well as helping to get outta one quickly.

I do not recommend a "direct" control of the elevator in the Airbus for several reasons, so we have to live with what we can control tomorrow, and then maybe re-visit the reversion sequences and control rates, limits, etc.

No reason to fly with an extreme aft c.g. when there is the possibility of prolonged turbulence. I am talking about a CB and not clear air turbulence that exists for 20 or 30 seconds.

much more to discuss, but just back from TDY and have to think more.

At cruise, you don't even need altitude for a while; basically, all you need is "pitch, power and attitude"... beside pilot's experience and training.

This is not correct: all Airbus aircraft are, at first, fully certified (in their final commercial configuration) without FBW (in pure direct law). Hence, the reversion system which is much less affected by FBW degradation than you may think. Basically, AF447 had only its Gee force prot left and everything else was direct.
Beside, there is few differences between combat aircraft flight envelope and airliners ones, as far as pure "flying abilities" are concerned.