Babblespeak, the endless checklist
 

A few years back I was tasked to select and hire pilots to fly high wing Cessnas for a major forestry project, their task was to fly above the spray aircraft with a qualified observer in the right seat and take note of spray patterns/drift and all that good stuff, as they would not go below 1000AGL it was a great chance for some newbies to make some very good coin as well as gain about 600hrs PIC. The selection flights were simple, show me a short/rough field TO, complete a power of landing onto a local grass strip, and navigate to a point in the bush using only the photo used by the spray pilots, nothing trickey at all. I could just not belive the endless babling these kids had been taught at some of our Government run schools, from start up to shut down it sounded like there were a flock of bloody parrots on board, it took some time to de program these kids but in the end all was well, and piece and quiet returned to the cockpits, where is this leading? I recently sat next to another pilot just hired into a turbo prop outfit, during our chat he produced the "Normall Checklist" his new employer is using, dear God, the space Shuttle check list is only one quarter the lenght of this incredible thing, when asked how the hell did he manage to fly the aircraft and listen to ATC, his reply was, "We try, but do seem to miss a lot of calls". Question, am I the only one who finds that there are those out there who seem to be trying to make a fairly simple job sound bloody complicated? I think the final word on this should go to Col Chuck Anderson, for those not in the know he was the lead test pilot for the whole B52 series, and I quote."Im indebted to SAC for one thing, they gave me the incentive to retire,when I first started on the B52 the pilots checklist was on one side of a five by seven card, the co pilots on the other, in SAC the normall checklist was fourty two pages!" Its worth noting, that TC has the longest King Air checklists but manage to land gear up with great regularity, after I got home I dug out my collection of checklists, not one of them came close to the size of the one shown to me by this F/O, and these aircraft were untill recently about as big as you could buy,any comments/observations on my rant?

And when they use these great cumbersome and obstructing documents, they delay the takeoff to the point that you run out of fuel, they still cannot find their way and miss items (like the landing gear!) because the lists are just too long to manage, and when they turn downwind they know there will not be enough time to run the whole thing so they either don't do a checklist or use a memory checklist like GUMPS anyway.

I seem to recall that the inquiry into the crash of a B58 shortly after takeoff attributed the accident to the pilot's failure to monitor aircraft attitude due to the complexity of the post takeoff checklist. The board recommended that a requirement to monitor attitude be added to the list.

After an excellent landing etc...

Yes,

Before bitching about others communication skills, learn what a paragraph is!!

c driver. I totally agree with you. Several years ago I was part of the management of a large international airline.
Whenever there was ANY sort of "irregularity" from an MOR to a full-scale incident the eventual outcome was nearly always to "add it to the checklist".

This serves several essential purposes;
1. Not only can the management be SEEN to be doing something, there is documentary evidence to prove it.
2. Crews can never again wriggle out of the responsibility by saying "No-one told us"
3. Management "feel good" factor of We've Done Something
4. The popular belief that if it is important it MUST be written down.

(After an aircraft nearly landed with the wrong altimeter setting, every checklist - Normal, Abnormal and Emergency included as a final item;
"ENSURE EVERY CHECKLIST ITEM HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED")

Sadly, the tendency to "cover your own arse" in case the lawyers try to take your livelihood and pension off you, controls most areas of aviation as it does other disciplines.

Wizof, you have spent way too much time in the sandbox, "Endless checklists, no paragraphs, get it? {its a joke, OK?}

It seems the hardest thing in life is to simplify anything and the easiest is to complicate everything.

There is a difference between doing "things right" and doing the "right thing".

The former is management, the latter leadership.

Recall not long after I joined BOAC in 1970 the accident report for GARWE (B707) had been published. The a/c suffered a major engine failure on departure RW28R and landed back on RW 05 having been airborne only a few minutes. I think about 5 lost their lives in the evacuation due to fire.

I boarded the crew bus to travel from the car park to operations. Two senior captains were discussing the report and one said "I really don't understand how they managed to do the after take off checks, the descent check, the approach checks and the landing checks in such a short period of time". Someone on the back of bus then shouted "Gear and Flaps! What else do you need?". All on the bus fell about laughing but the conversation taught me quite a lot!

There also seems to be a mistaken belief that if you require pilots to drone on about what they would do in the event of a take off emergency that this means they will do the right thing. Sorry but I think this is rubbish - the only way to ensure (as far as you can) that they will react correctly is to actually practice it in the simulator on a regular basis. Am I against take off briefs - no not at all but they should, in my opinion, be as brief and concise as possible otherwise it's done by rote and people stop listening.

The problem starts in flight schools, and has many elements

1) The vast majority of instructors have no real world operational experience and thus have no idea of operational efficency. There is no penalty in flight training for wasting a bunch of time doing long elaborate checklists, in fact the longer the student takes the more the school makes.

2) Flight schools tend to use the checklist as a training tool loading it up with operating procedures and non essential bumpf instead of only including items directly affecting flight safety.

3) Flight schools in general do not understand the difference between check lists and do lists and the concept of building the checklist around a system of simple consistant flows. Instead every check seems to require a long labourous head down reading and doing exercise.

It is not malice it is just ignorance on the part of flight intructors....and will never change unless there is a critical mass of instructors with some real world line flying experience. Unfortunately the economics of flight instruction in North America will never allow this.

I remember reading an article by John Deakin about checklists that made a lot of sense to me. The basis of it was that they should only include the "killer" items, those things that will kill you if you get them wrong.

The whole issue came back to me last week as I was renewing my instrument rating and adding a RNAV Approach endorsement to it at the same time. The company where I did this was very strong on using the checklist for the aircraft, a Baron BE-55. The checklist was straight from the handbook and involved several A5 pages of small type to get from pre-start to shut-down.

The detail contained in that checklist amused me when compared to the one contained in the Boeing 737 NG FCOM which in essence follows Mr Deakin's dictum of only having the killer items. It is set out below, with apologies for the formatting, and I think a perfect example of less is more:


PREFLIGHT

Oxygen Tested, 100%

NAVIGATION transfer
and DISPLAY switches NORMAL, AUTO

Window heat On

Pressurisation mode selector AUTO

Flight instruments Heading____, Altimeter____

Parking brake Set

Engine start levers CUTOFF

____________________________________________________________ __
BEFORE START

Flight deck door Closed and locked

Fuel _____KGS, PUMPS ON

Passenger signs On

Windows Locked

MCP V2____, HDG___, ALT___

Takeoff speeds V1____, VR____, V2____

CDU preflight Completed

Trim ___ UNITS, 0, 0

Taxi and takeoff briefing Completed

ANTI COLLISION light ON


BEFORE TAXI

Generators On

Probe Heat On

Anti-ice ___

Isolation valve AUTO

ENGINE START switches CONT

Recall Checked

Autobrake RTO

Engine start levers IDLE detent

Flight controls Checked

Ground equipment Clear

____________________________________________________________ __

BEFORE TAKEOFF

Flaps ___, Green light

____________________________________________________________ __

AFTER TAKEOFF

Engine Bleeds On

Packs AUTO

Landing gear UP and OFF

Flaps UP, no lights

DESCENT

Pressurisation LAND ALT___

Recall Checked

Autobrake ___

Landing data VREF___, Minimums___

Approach brief Completed

____________________________________________________________ __

APPROACH

Altimeters ___

____________________________________________________________ __

LANDING

ENGINE START switches CONT

Speedbrake Armed

Landing gear Down

Flaps ___, green light


SHUTDOWN

Fuel pumps Off

Probe heat Off

Hydraulic panel Set

Flaps Up

Parking brake ___

Engine start levers CUTOFF

Weather radar Off

____________________________________________________________ __

SECURE

IRSs Off

Emergency exit lights Off

Window heat Off

Packs Off

Absolutely agree that the Boeing checklist is an example of how ALL complex aircraft checklists could or should be. The good thing is that it is Boeing themselves who created this, so it's hard to argue against it. Most aircraft will get airbone and return to earth quite safely if they have fuel, are configured correctly, have no warning lights on at takeoff and are kept in trim. I flew F27s in command for over 5000 hours with NO checklist for the pre-start (had to be memorised in a scan sequence or you did not get to fly it) and the only printed one (which I made up and had approved) said:

PRE- TAKEOFF
Fuel (pumps on, enough of the stuff? and crossfeed off)
Air (pneumatics needed for brakes and gear)
Water (methanol, needed or not needed?)
Flaps (two usual settings - make sure it's correct)
Trim (being the usual flight control trims plus fuel trimmer)
PRE-LANDING
Gear
Air
Water
Flaps
Trim
The setting of V speeds, checking instruments and briefings etc came under 'airmanship' and so were not formalised in a checklist. Yet I have seen checklists for this same aeroplane that ran to 5 pages.
Of course there were other things to look at and do, but none were likely to kill you and most had lights associated (prop locks etc).
The problem starts with those manufacturers who write detailed blow-by-blow accounts of how to operate every switch, button and lever in their wonderful flying machines. This appears in the Flight Manual or Pilots' Operating Handbook.
In Australia, all operator checklists must be approved by CASA. If an operator has the right argument, can show 'equivalent safety' etc and is working with a practical Inspector, a lot of what's in the AFM or POH can be detailed in a SOP somewhere and then an abbreviated checklist MAY get the official nod. The problem arises if the regulator is in ass-cover mode and insists on the AFM detail being included in the checklist. And is compounded when management pilots add their own stuff in because they feel a need to pitch it at the lowest common denominator (often themselves).

Why do so many operators of fixed-gear single-engine aircraft use such detailed checklists? It seems to be the 'in-thing' now. I don't recall learning to fly with a checklist. Even on light twins we got away with memonics and scans and I bet there were no more gear-up landings then than now.
For a simple type, other than perhaps before starting engines when it could be good for the lowest common denominator to be reminded to remove the pitot cover, turn on the fuel and apply parking brake, a person of average intellect should be able to do the rest without referring to an instruction manual, which is what these long checklists are.

Could not agree more with these comments.
What has happened is the "check list" has changed into a "do list" because pilots are being tought that this is the only safe way to operate.
IMHO the safest way is with SOP's, airmanship and a very small check list

Mach E, Im so glad you mentioned simple single engine aircraft, I recently saw a checklist for an unpresurised, fixd gear S/E aircraft, it was fourteen pages in total! The author of this document then proceeded to start up and taxi with the engine cover still on, didnt do the engine, {160H/P Lyc} or the cover any good.As for the turbo prop checklist which prompted my rant Im now told by the same young man that its a rip- of the one used by production test pilots at the plant where the aircraft are built and contains many items of interest only to the QA folks, which are totally pointless during normall revenue flights, just what you need during a ten sector day! Glad to read Im not the only one who finds this stuff to be total horse feathers!

While on a flying instructors course we flew the first Winjeels delivered to RAAF Central Flying School at East Sale circa 1955. The RAAF taught a standard before take off check at CFS that basically covered all RAAF aircraft from Wirraways to Mustangs. Bits were added or subtracted here and there depending on the type. The standard RAAF before take off check started with Harness, Hatches, Hydraulics.

Apart from these generic before take off items which were learned by heart, all other items were in a left to right general sequence. Of course there were no written checklists in the aircraft in those days - it was all up there in your head.

40 plus years on I happened to see a privately owned civil registered Winjeel at Point Cook and looked into the cockpit for old times sake. I was astonished to see the owner had one of these pilot shop roller-blind checklists attached the coaming.

Glancing over my shoulder to ensure the owner wasn't around to snarl "Piss Orf", I scrolled through this beautiful carefully typed work of art guaranteed to warm the cockles of the most cold blooded CASA FOI. The first item and underlined in red as a "Killer" item was "GOODAY!

I scrolled and scrolled and scrolled until I came to the end of 147 items of challenge and response by the single pilot. And all that nonsense for a simple ab-initio trainer designed to replace the Tiger Moth....:ugh:

PS. I forgot to add I saw the owner fly his Winjeel some time later. He was all dressed for combat with bone-dome, dark vizor, green flying suit, fur lined flying boots (looked like sophisticated UGH boots), white chamois flying gloves and a survival knife tucked into a flying boot. He was off to do a few touch and go's..

Ah yes Centaurus, "The Warbird/Walter Mitty Bunch", If only we had known how difficult it is to fly these things we all would have joined the Army! Its really just an extension of my rant, folks babling on about sweet FA and thinking they are making flying more safe, in fact the reverse is the case, we had a clasic example of one of these types that I had to restrict from flying my vintage stuff, this after he just about melted the mags with his endless ground idle whilst he babled on giving endless briefings to his students, but in spite of this he managed to total one of our Oldies, started with full throttle and no brakes, better write a longer checklist to include "check for stupidity".

Yes Centaurus brings back memories of nearly 50 years ago with the RCAF. I expect all the commonwealth air forces inherited it from the RAF.

Without listing all the items the acronym/mnemonic went like this:

HTMPCFFGVGMH

And then there was the U.S. "GUMP" check.

Interesting.

We've just been subjected to a revision of the airbus pre-take off cx list. What a diatribe it is now.

I used to fly a jet that required very little in cx listing. However, on taxiing on to the tin strip:

FUEL (er, enough?)
FLAPS (anywhere but up)
ARM MASTERS (ON)
STO STOP (set)
TRIM (set)

WATER (armed)

..life savers. I still do it now, in the back of my mind, lining up on 27R etc, LHR.

nurj :}

I absolutely agree to the use of checklists, nevertheless only usefull and sensible written ones make your life easier or even extend it. Who would read a 15 items approach checklist in a traffic circuit with 5 aircraft?
LH went so far their final checklist on the airbus is simply: "all green, flaps xx"

This thread is like a breath of fresh air. In my younger days flying light twins I always used mnemonics including the likes of "PUF" on final........pitch.. undercarriage.. and flaps etc. Joining the Airlines along came checklists, which I think is fine and the way things are done in a mult-crew cockpit. Recently with retirement looming I renewed my Aussie I/F rating to have a current licence on my return home next year. The checklist on the little Beech Duchess was longer than any Space Shuttle. This is obviously something that has crept in over the years. The 747 pre-take off checklist has only five items, the Duchess at least 50. Glad to see they are all lunatics and I'm not. You have all made my day.

By George, the most complex turbine aircraft I ever flew had the check lists which were in the form of small "click over" lists on the glare shield, when all checks were done they folded down out of sight thus no" heads down "during taxi.The most items on any one of these was nine!
It would seem that those with experience are all on side here, so how do we fix it? For myself Im taking instructors along on revenue flights to try to show them the real world, however its an uphill task, one of them turned up with his "own" checklist which included pressing to test the gear lights after the three greens were on , and I quote "make sure its not just a short putting them on", I gues the bloody great thump under the floor when the uplatches let go could in his mind have been a bird strike! There has to be a middle ground between "Kick the tires, light the fires, first one of the ground is leader and brief on guard", and the present babblespeak , we can but try.

like others have said, this thread is a breath of fresh air. If you are so intent on checklists a mile long how do you concentrate on actually flying the aircraft? In a similar vein I am amazed at what some people wear when flying. For myself I am mostly going somewhere on business and therefore wear business type clothing but an awful lot of pilots tell me I should have all sorts of thing to wear not just ordinary suits.

I think one of the problems is the schools have introduced basic technique to check-lists such as 'seat track' and 'harness'. If you need a checklist to tell you to put on your seat-belt you should not be allowed within five miles of an airfield let alone an aircraft. I see alot of robotic flying in the airlines where pilots are not really thinking about what they are doing. There seems no real connection to the aeroplane, if you know what I mean. To read about large transport aircraft taking off without flaps, for example, is mind boggling.

By George, I think the above problem is due to pilots treating checklists as a "to do" list and not a checklist that the function has been done. Most of the crashes due to failure to set flaps seem to have been due to the checklist being interrupted by an external event, such as ATC or something similar which can only occur where it is being used as a "to do" list.

If the checklist is run as a confirmation that the action has been performed there is less chance of the action being overlooked, although to be fair, there is still the risk that the action has not been properly checked. That was the case with a CRJ crash in the US where the flaps were set to the incorrect setting.

It occurred to me one day that if you screw up the checklist, the chances are that you screwed up something before the checklist, but less likely the other way around.

Anyway, I see a few posts referring to a new fangled single pilot ops using checklists in flight. I've never heard nor seen of such a thing. Read and do checks on the ground and 100% memory from line up to turn off. I haven't heard of anybody doing it differently :confused:

Air checks.
 

Up to twin commuters, I've never seen an obvious checklist, except one A/c had a row of tabs mounted in line of sight on top of the panel. Flick 'em one way for T.O. and back again before landing.

Slightly off-thread I know, but one thing that amuses me is the habit of pilots "backing up" the throttles on take off. I was a pax in a Metro taking off from Sydney and as it turned to line up I saw two hands shoving the throttles forward and all the way on the take off run were these two large mitts completely covering the throttles until after lift off both hands vanished to later appear on respective knees.

Same in 737 cockpits. Some one presses TOGA and next second a second hand appears and follows through until rotate then magically both hands disappear. I often wonder about the trauma blood and bits of skin that would be the result of the follow up hand being squashed between the start levers and the sharp edge of both throttles if the captain (who presumably is in charge of the throttles) suddenly decides to whip the throttles closed as he calls "rejecting"

After all, politeness has it's place in society but I can't imagine him saying to the backer up of throttles "Excuse me old chap would you mind removing your hand from my throttles as I wish to reject the take off"

Heres a classic, just had a phone call from an instructor, one of his solo students recieved a bolicking from TC for entering a live runway at an uncontrolled strip when a Citation was on final, the reason given by the student for this lapse was"I was reading the last items on the BTO checklist and didnt notice I had crossed the hold line". Whats the last item on this list? "Check for traffic on final!" Another example of stuff on checklists which should be simple airmanship, not on a written list.

Great thread.

Some 5 c worth from the editor side of checklists and procedures. I've been writing manuals of all sorts for 20 years. Since 8 years also in aviation.

While waiting for this first employment on a JAR 23/25 aircraft I flew a Piper Aztec E PA23-250 to keep my CPL/IR MEP rating. As I always found it fun to write up manuals and as for the Aztec there were none except of the very rudimentary 40 years old Piper documentation I built my own checklist... :bored:

It was great fun to get mislead and find back to a "good" way of flying the Aztec. Reading this thread I had to go and fetch my first example of this checklist. Huh 15 pages but only A5 (half a letter format) printed only on one side. Including Pax briefing speed tables and power settings. :ugh:

The fun was to write up something and then try it in real life. Hahaha - after the first try I was back in the office shortening it. And then I shortened it again and again. It was exactly all these "Airmanship" items (such as "seatbelts") which load a checklist.

Then I changed to have an expanded checklist for training purposes and eventual preparation as I started flying also C340 and C402's just to have a reference and the checklist itself was down to 4 pages.

The last version was 4 pages including the approach speed table and all items from line-up to landing were memory items. the most useful was the approach speed table - no more long landings with that one.

Later in my career I had the great opportunity to write up the procedures and checklist for the ATR Turboprop. The checklist fit on a 20 x 30 cm (4 x 6") single sided laminated sheet. Still the instructors insisted in a couple additional items not in the "killer-item" class I would have omitted as they were covered by cautions or very obvious such as "document door closed" which had a caption and you would bet you can hear it being open when starting engine #1.

With my actual operator in a very complex transport jet aircraft we also have a very simple and straightforward checklist philosophy. Great working.

Today I'd always opt for the KISS (keep it short and simple) approach to any checklist. As for any aircraft I have seen up to date:

Power - V1 - rotate - V2 - gear up - flaps up

always worked just fine. And the reverse order for landing as well ;)

Happy Landings

PLovett,
Gee, that shows you what an old style Boeing the B737NG really is!
The whole B757/767/744 checklist, once brakes are off to brakes on again, is in the middle of the control wheel, no need even for hand held list ---- they are strictly "vital actions", the rest is procedural --- SOPs if you want.
Tootle pip!!

Actually, you can do that with the 737 as well, all our "in motion" checklists are in the middle of the yoke and that is more than sufficient, however, in motion starts with the before take off checklist, the taxy checklist has to be read before beginning to move. However, that might not be completely standard boeing as we have boeing company tailored procedures.

I read that one of the proposed responses by the FAA/NTSB in the 'wake' of the US1549 ditching in the Hudson is that they might in future require a 'Dual engine failure after Takeoff' checklist. As if Sully needed it! In fact, it would in all probability have distracted him, IMHO.

Whatever happened to 'Situational Awareness'? Vital action checklists are useful, but will never replace a pilot who is constantly questioning him/herself, is aware of his/her surroundings and is alert to changes in it.

Interesting thing here is that the traditional ditching checklists are based on the days of Constellations and StratoCruisers flying across the pond where maybe you'd had to shutdown 2 engines and then had at least 30 mins to drift down before you had to ditch. Ditching were "premeditated". So you had time to do all sorts of preparation (get the pax/cabin crew briefed, put the lifejackets on, get the dinghies out, burn off fuel to minimum etc).

Vast majority of ditchings now are unpremeditated. A/c goes off end of runway at airport near sea or multiple bird strike after take off, eg.

The current ditching checklist on a/c such as the B737 (and I guess A320) is so long that Sully would have been mad to even consider it! Yes there is a case for an abbreviated memory "checklist" containing "vital actions" which is really what we are saying on this thread now.

It really grates me when I see a checklist which tells me to face into wind and/or look behind before running up - these are basic airmanship items!

I read in the initial reports on the Hudson ditching that the crew did not do the checklist (for good reasons) and thus did not activate the Ditching Switch. I guess that switch closes the various valves in the fuselage and stops water from entering, extending the float time. It also appeared that with the valves still open, the water entered so rapidly that it tore the bottom out of the lower rear fuselage area, hastening the sinking and preventing the rear doors from being used. If the Ditching Switch had been operated, maybe the airplane would have floated better?
Probably not, but who knows?

Boofhead, you are correct, the ditching switch was not selected to "ditch", however its my understanding that as the ditching checklist was written on the assumption that one would have lots of time gliding from high alt to get the whole thing done and as the ditching switch is way down the list F/O Styles didnt have the time to select it, again, keep it short! Mind you keeping it short and Airbus are not normally on the same page, but thats another thread altogether.

Couldn't agree more.
Take the lawyer out of the cockpit and put common sense back in is my mantra.
Flows backed up by a sensible checklist not "Do" lists followed by nothing.
I remember a very able airline Captain who was accused of having one foot in the tar pit after critiquing a flight as "so much correct and so little right"!

Just to clarify the checklists in question on US Air 1549, the crew were actioning the dual eng fail checklist: 3-5 pages of relight and approach preparations The ditching sequence/preparation in this procedure is towards the very end of the procedure and the landing occurred before the ditching portion could be actioned.

The stand alone DITCHING checklist is a separate checklist and was not used by the crew as it assumes both Engines operating.

Have a look at the current 737 after take off check list. It mentions four items.
Bleeds on, Packs auto, gear and flaps. now look at the amplified procedure in the Vol One. It says "After flap retraction is complete: Set or verify that the engine bleeds and air conditioning packs are operating, Set the autobrake selector to off, set the landing gear lever to off after landing gear retraction is complete - then do the after take off checklist.

This procedure and subsequent checklist is challenged and responded to by the same pilot - the PNF. The concept of challenge by one pilot and cross-checked and then responded to by the other pilot is negated. Not much point in having the same pilot answering to himself, is there?

The glaring omission in the 737 after take off checklist is there is no FCOM specific check of the cabin pressurising by observing the cabin diff or cabin rate of climb. The original 737 checklist from years ago - until it was fiddled with by Boeing - included the specific checklist item "Air conditioning and Pressurisation System....Check" That meant ensuring the bleeds and packs were in the required setting AND the two pressurisation instruments indicating pressurisation is taking place.

What we often see as trainers, is the PNF only observing the items stated in the after take off checklist - the four items mentioned earlier. Rarely does the PF look across at the switching while the PNF does his own thing of challenging and responding to himself. The essential aim of the challenge and response is shot to pieces when the other pilot is too pre-occupied in monitoring the automatics to concern himself with what is occurring across the other side of the flight deck -and in any case he is not required to respond anyway so it takes him further out of the loop.

If for some reason the aircraft is unpressurised right from the start of the flight, then with the pressurisation in the auto mode, excessive cabin rate of climb will trigger a master caution as the pressurisation system automatically mode switches to standby. You can't miss that happening. But if the take off is planned that the Standby mode is used for the flight, this alert is negated.

To test (train) if the crew are awake to the fact the aircraft has failed to pressurise after take off, it is possible for the simulator instructor to insert a fault that prevents the aircraft from pressurising. The alarming thing is from our experience, even with trained crews, that the majority of crews fail to notice the pressurisation instruments are indicating the aircraft is not pressurising. And why is this? - because the checklist does not specifically state to look at those vital instruments and the failure of crews to use commonsense airmanship instead of relying blindly on a written checklist.

Boeing may argue that if the packs and bleeds are in the correct position the aircraft must be pressurising. Not necessarily so, as witness the ill-fated Helios airlines 737 flight where the outflow valve was open for the entire flight. The solution is to re-instate in the after take off checklist the first item as "Air Conditioning and Pressurisation....Check - and then change the checklist policy to have the PNF challenge and the PF to respond rather than a one man band job by the PNF.

Well think about it...if your going to put a 200 hr Ab initio pilot in the right seat do you want him reading and verifying every checklist item, or let him do a flow, fire things up on the taxi, asking for the IFR clearance, and getting take off clearance 3 minutes later right at the end of the taxiway?

You guys hire marsh mellows: insecure, on probation, scared little robots and now you want them to think..

Sorry but if I have to sit there in row 15, peeking up at some kid in the right seat, you can sit there for 30 minutes while he runs through the checklist...

The Helios Case however is covered in the preflight checklist: Air Cond & Press.... BLEEDS ON, AUTO, SET. If you reconfigure the pressurisation system after that you have to follow the respective supplementary procedure, those are in my outfit on the back of the (single sheet) checklist. Of course any supplementary procedure has to be thoroughly briefed, the procedures themselve is usually pretty short and easy to do. If you still forget to reconfigure the pressurisation after take off that should be cought during the FL100 check which requires the check of cabin pressurisation.

About the ab-initio pilots, that is a completely different thing and discussed ad nauseum elsewhere. Anyway it is not new since ab initio pilots are the norm for the last 50 years or so with many major airlines as well as the military.

Never having flown a 737 I cant comment on the specifics of the checklist, but for a pilot to not check cabin diff/rate of climb when passing through every five/ten thousand on the way up without having to read it from a checklist shows how far that common airmanship is being replaced by "Babblespeak" , as one previous poster said its a bit like having to read a checklist to tell you to check behind before running up to high power, such things should be ingrained from day one in a pilots training.Judging by my e mails and the number of responses to my rant,it would seem that many experienced crew members share my frustration with this stuff, thank you all for your input. Regards, Clunck.