Biz Jet Jock-

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I think I'm missing something. If that's the "go-around from hell" i'd hate to show you some difficult ones. Climb straight ahead to 3dme then turn right to the vor climbing to 4000'. By then you've had around 4 mins to clean up, talk to atc and read the next (not difficult) bit of the procedure. Not exactly beyond a professional crew i'd have thought.

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Oh really? Are you sure we are both looking at the same chart?! HKG-(Hong Kong) Runway 25R? Maybe not...,( which kind of highlights the reasoning behind this thread). Mephisto 88's comments are pertinent here (extract below).

Perhaps you fly to some of the more exotic destinations with special technique/knowledge/practice required, in which case fair enough, but I am sure you will agree it's not quite the same for the average long haul heavy jet operator who might visit such spots infrequently.

Doves-

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Yoy make a serious disservice to the professionalism, discipline and competence of the Saudia pilots (albeit they were coming from, in my time, some 56 different nations). From a review of my notes I find on thier SOP:

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My apologies; no disservice intended. However, the SOP's (as written in Vol A,B, etc) are exactly that and, as has been pointed out ad nauseam, do not have to be verbalised at length each and every time.
However,-
Absolutely! (but within limits; and therein lies the rub).

Mephisto 88-
Say no more! 'Nuff said. Seems to be the only sensible approach. Maybe the aces can fly that missed approach , as published, manually in raw data, perfectly (and it better be perfect with all those rocks around),on a nice sunny day, but how about when the chips are down, with possible mapshift and unfriendly weather; when I did a g/a on that runway a few weeks back due to a passing typhoon, I asked for, and got very nice radar vectors,thank you very much to HKG radar. I still maintain the published procedure was written by lawyers, not pilots.

9.G
Thank you for the performance clarifications. Specialist knowledge always much appreciated.

411A: Negative. If not for the terrain - not understanding the automatics and actually flying the airplane, would have been a little embarrassing but ultimately of little consequence. The crew are always responsible for terrain clearance, not ATC and had they been more situationaly aware of the surrounding terrain the crew would never have allowed that descending left turn while within the valley and below the level of the surrounding peaks. This counts double in a non radar environment such as the arrival into Cali. A comprehensive briefing of the descent and arrival would have highlighted the presence of the high terrain and the fact that all roads to CALI from the North pass 1st through TULUA VOR not ROZO.

Here's a little clue I can share. If you are ever unsure for whatever reason, where the magenta line is going to take you when plugging in a new waypoint. Put the nav in HDG mode on the original course before making the new waypoint active. That way you get to see a preview of where the nav want's to go and you can decide whether that looks right before committing yourself. Failing that, allways have the heading bug shadow your current course when in NAV mode and if the NAV takes you off in an unexpected direction when plugging in a new waypoint, simply enter HDG mode to resume the original course until you can sort it out.

Regards, no charge.

bfisk: FO reply: So if we don't see high intensity approach lights with multiple crossbars and papi on left on this beautiful CAVOK day, then we will go around right?

Regards.

Very good point indeed. I see how my actual wording puts me in a corner there. I guess old habits die hard... Thanks for poiting that out to me. That's CRM right there :ok:

MU3001A

10 out of 10, gold star, tick VG.

Happened just the other day: radar vector and cleared descend in to a cumulo granite.

Of course the crew is responsible, as it should be.
Approach briefing (or lack thereof) my foot....the respective crew simply did not follow the mandated procedure...no more, nor less.
That the crew accepted a last minute change, is no excuse.

Why didn't they follow the mandated procedure? Was it because they hadn't studied it or briefed it and were therefore unfamiliar with the procedure or the correct track to fly while descending into the valley and easily distracted by the offer of a straight-in landing? Which they had every right and responsibility to refuse by the way, if they felt they couldn't make the adjustment in the time remaining? Allowing the aircraft to complete that left turn was an unconscionable error for anyone sufficiently familiar with the procedure and aware of the nearby terrain.

One also wonders why the specified NDB was not tuned/identified on the ADF?
Instead of looking at the magenta line going in the wrong direction.
Briefing had nothing to do with this accident...incorrect programming of the FMS, and a hurried rapid descent most certainly did.

The question of responsibility isn't always as easy as it might seem:
That's the reason we have minimum radar vectoring charts nowadays which ironically can't be used for position determination but it gives us some idea of what ATC is up to.

However some states in their respective national regulations still hold PIC responsible for it. Be sure to have read national R&R before accepting it.

Beware as well bout the fact of resuming responsibility for terrain clearance once DIR to was accepted. Many times ATC offers one short cuts in mountainous areas like LIME on ORI 6 Q departure which basically can be accepted under the presumption of following: PIC is solely responsible for terrain clearance once accepted and a/c is either above MSA or contingency procedure for climb out has been established.

Cheerio:ok:

There seem to be a few discussions going on on here, but I am referring to the original IBZ briefing question and replies.

It seems many airlines have different briefing regimes, that or the pilots do. Personally, having been subjected to watching numerous accident report video replays and also reading numerous accident reports over the years, it seems that a good briefing can offset the chances of cocking up when you get there. Some people on here think its too thorough? Personally, I don't want to be briefing the go-around, missed approach and whether we're gonna be diverting at the point I call "go-around flap". Its kind of busy then, so why not mention the essentials at the outset? Much of the rest of the briefing is company standard for me I am afraid, we have to brief things like runway incursion points/ runway exits to be used, whether we're gonna be flying auto or manual (gives the other guy a heads up), and what we're gonna expect (RV or procedural). MSA needs flagging up as does whether I am planning on landing full flap or flap 3. As I brief I cross check that I've set it up properly in the box, by pointing to the relevant bit in the computer/ on the screen as I brief. This is useful for a cross check and means that generally (unless having a really bad day) I know I've got the thing set up as I expect it!! I brief the nav aids I'll use, and check them in the box at the same time.

Surely spending 5 minutes briefing well at a quiet time is better than coming down the approach, discovering that its procedural not vectored at the last minute, having a blocked runway causing a go-around, not knowing the missed approach, not having the nav aids set properly etc. just increases the chain of events that can easily lead to an incident or accident.

At work I find its better to be boring and safe than to have a flight that gets too exciting (and possibly unsafe).

No surprises.

411A: If they had briefed the arrival/approach they would have realized that they already had the IAF for the VOR approach to RWY 19 - TULUA VOR programmed into the FMS and were flying direct to it at the time they accepted the offer of a straight in approach. Because they hadn't briefed any arrival/approach they were not situationally aware enough to realize this and confused the approach clearance they were given, leading the captain to select direct CALI VOR in the FMS, which action erased the TULUA waypoint. He then compounded the error by activating the wrong waypoint in the FMS thinking he was inserting ROZO, the FAF for the cleared approach. The aircraft responded by turning off the approach track toward the mountain peaks and the rest is history.

How long does it take to switch to HDG mode or disconnect the autopilot and take over manually and stop an inappropriate turn?

Just a few seconds, certainly.
However, it would appear that (more than) a few pilots are so wrapped up with operating the FMS, common sense does not enter the picture.

Hey out there. Is there any member of the Saudi cockpit crew able to confirm or oppose what Phantom Driver claims:

After
Doves-Quote:
Yoy make a serious disservice to the professionalism, discipline and competence of the Saudia pilots (albeit they were coming from, in my time, some 56 different nations). From a review of my notes I find on thier SOP:
He wrote:

”….My apologies; no disservice intended. However, the SOP's (as written in Vol A,B, etc) are exactly that and, as has been pointed out ad nauseam, do not have to be verbalised at length each and every time….”
Regards
DOVES

411A,
You're right on the money, the OBSESSION with programming and using the FMS seems these days to lead some pilots to feel that they don't need to fly the actual aircraft and use their own judgement, as a 737 TRE I've seen this in the sim SO many times. Its been said before but maybe I need to say it again - whatever the 'kit' you've got in the flightdeck you're still a pilot and must fly the aeroplane and use your awareness and airmanship to ensure safety, you need to know where the terrain is, where the airfield is and where you are at all times. Theres nothing new here, its good old fashioned FLYING.............:ugh::ugh::ugh:

Yes I completely agree with that, although it is diverging from the subject of approach briefings to some extent. But so what! The FMC is an abacus. It is a tool for the pilot to employ, not be employed by. Where perhaps there is a similarity, it is that the programming of the FMC should largely be completed before either of the primary briefings take place. The rest of the time there should only be regular inputs as and when time and priorities permit.

Far too many people typing away furiously (or not as the case may be) when their priority should be a timely course/ speed/ or altitude change. Or heads down doing something unnecessary when their priority should be in flying the aircraft, or monitoring the pilot who actually is.

Back to the original question
 

It depends on how familiar I was with the airport, who was sitting next to me, etc but Airbus Girls's briefing is similar to what I would use.

I certainly have discovered many interesting points, thank you. :D

I'm surprised that some people emphasize the KISS motto when they themselves havent applied it while answering my question ... :suspect:

Briefing for what everyone is already expecting, is a waste of vocal cords. Useful briefings will focus on what is not expected; in other words, the "What if's". Also important, don't confuse briefing, with Cross-checking!

I've almost fallen asleep during some briefings which included enough detail that I could have walked in my sleep to the layover hotel, but if a go-around in good weather due to traffic, etc, occurred, everyone would have been a$sholes and elbows figuring out where they were going and how they were getting there.

Keep the briefings Short, CONCISE and interactive. For example, if you really want to be sure that your PNF is going to select flaps 3/2 when you call "go around", don't simply "tell" him/her. Ask! ie, "... in the event of G/A, what will YOU do?" If you don't regularly do this, I promise you, you will get a dazed and confused look the first time you do. But, better confused now, then when you stuff the thrust on!

"How long does it take to switch to HDG mode or disconnect the autopilot and take over manually and stop an inappropriate turn?"

From my memory, they don't even noticed the aircraft was deviating from the course...The were in the rush (3 hours delay for takeoff at miami), and when they noticed the GPWS call, they called TOGA, but forgot the spoilers out....No altitude gained, hit the hill only 20 meters from the top....

Good advice
 

Very good point PappyJ, thanks for making it. I like this INTERACTIVE technique because it gives you the chance to rehearse what you will do. I have never made a real go-around in the 744, and our skills degrade until the next simulator check when all hell breaks loose.

I really like to have my crew verify page number/date on the plate. This has avoided errors on several occasions particularly while flying in the military.