Airbus technology defects
 

This story takes place in France, concerning Airbus technology.

A former Air France 747 pilot has been reduced to silence because he knows too much about Airbuses defects, about the reasons of the crashes and about the lies around all this, to hide the truth.

Read here (in english) : http://jacno.com/za-an-inmo.htm

If it takes too long, just read this short letter : http://jacno.com/za-an-an39.htm

It seems unbelievable, but is true. This guy is a real victim of the “Reason of State”.

In France, everything relating to Airbus is locked : justice, media… everything which has something to see with state interest. When orders come from the very top! Is it necessary to recall the Mitterrand’s hidden daughter, where silence was the rule for all media, also hiding means to reduce to silence those who would not accept to say nothing about this young lady?

Could we talk about this incredible story on local forums, to pilot associations and trade-unions, and, if necessary, to civil aviation administrations and journalists?

They did call the A320 the "John Wayne Airplane" after that Paris Air Show disaster in '88 I think.
Why?

It climbs mountains, knocks down trees & kills Indians!

Anybody who does not think the French are experts at covering up for their own, needs to have a close look at the Alfred Dreyfus incident.It is staggering that this could be allowed to happenand even more so that the European courts won't help.

If you fail to understand the complexities of the systems declaring them unsafe is a great cop out!!!

Do you people think you might need good lawyers soon?

Quote from Hansard,

"and that is why you employ lawyers: because lawyers are all about the law and not the truth"

if something is not understood its use can be unsafe

While I am no psychiatrist, he certainly seems to have a serious case of obsession. What facts about the case were hidden? He fails to inform the reader what they are. Could it be because there aren't any? In fact, a French court recently threw out a case against several officials which made similar accusations.

The investigation clearly states that an error was made by the crew in selecting a vertical speed of 3300 f.p.m. instead of a flight path angle of 3.3 degrees. This, combined with a lack of an installed GPWS, led to the collision with the high terrain on the approach. If any officials needed to answer for their actions, it was the Air Inter management who elected to buy A320s without a GPWS system because "GPWS systems give false warnings". If I were an airline manager, I'd much rather have a crew respond to a false warning than to scatter an aircraft on a mountain top.

By definition, being called Lawyers rather than Truthyers!

As for the Airbus cover up story, it would hardly be the first time that a western government has covered up something of import. It's interesting that this has not been reported on (to my knowledge) in the British press. Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong on that, but I've never seen any of the information regarding these accidents over here.

This does not suggest that there were no problems with the Boeing 737-2/3 rudder actuators.
So how about with older widebody Airbus types?

We are at a JFK hotel tonight. Not very far from here soon after 9/11, an A-300 crashed. It was very easy to blame the flying pilot, especially buried six feet under the cold ground, due to some comments made by just one pilot he had flown with.
No pilot goes "ape", or "bananas" and pushes wildly on the rudder pedals-maybe the rudder, at that moment, already suffered from erratic oscillations? During my career, I never heard about any pilot, none whatsoever, using rudders in that manner. It is unheard of-but that comment certainly let the NTSB "off the hook".

Imagine the resulting legal 'Katrina' storm (much of it from the FAA....), if the NTSB had used documents from foreign "translated" regulatory agencies to create doubt in the reliability of a large aircraft-after years of operating with US carriers, i.e. American and Fedex! That same plane might have suffered, before the accident flight, structural damage during either turbulence or a hard landing.

Were there not strange anomolies (uncommanded control inputs to other A-300s), in aircraft operated by Interflug, Air France and AirTransat? How often is a rudder designed whereby a pilot pushes on the pedal, but after a certain distance of pedal travel, a disproportiate angle is commanded by the rudder actuator? This has been alleged for the A-300/310.
The"airline" Interflug is gone, and would that company and Air France keep records of maintenance inspections after the 'alleged' incidents?
Did Fedex aircraft suffer unexplained rudder problems on any A-310/300s?

Well well, some more French bashing...
Some of you even need to use the nearly 100 year old story of Dreyfuss to their aid. Are you guys serious? In the last 6 years alone, Bush and his buddies have covered up enough for a century. Where has the Antrax case gone, btw???

While I agree that French government is not one of the most willing to act transparent, some other "Grand Nations" are certainly not much better. But please be more rational and stick to the point.

Fact is, that where ever you invent new technology, there is a possibility of mistakes. Airbus is a very safe and secure aircraft. There are Boeings and there are Airbus. Both are excellent aircraft.

dani

Dani-Our own agency, our friendly FAA, has "allegedly" ;) kept quiet in the past about certain aircraft anomolies. Their dream was to hope it that the aircraft was operated by a foreign airline or military squadron-how would the American public, who flew on these by the thousands, be aware of it?
The aircraft which suffered from aileron 'snatch' in some icing conditions was just one. Look up the political expression "plausible denial". When the reports are locked away in a 'Schublade' and nobody else is aware....dead bodies and fragmented aircraft parts in the frozen ground near Roselawn, Indiana.
Any agency or government can have the motivation to cover something up, not just the French.

Is it possible that it happened with the 'Spatzl', the 'Chips', the 'SPQR', even the Amis? Especially when it is legal and many billions (whether aircraft sales, or staggering Arbeitslosigkeitskosten...) are at stake.

No matter where-it should be exposed, just as plundering of airline pension funds and other...eh...corporate cash "upstreaming", "up" to holding companies, must be exposed :E .
How about kickbacks from bankruptcy law firms which charge an airline extortionate rates? Look under enough stones in the forest, and some slime will be discovered, especially when a government's executive branch dictates the mentality for government department ministers (Secretaries), and therefore appoints them, whether DOT, FAA....the Tombstone agency. When dead bodies are brought in, the FAA reacts as if they were always unaware of a problem or certification flaw (i.e. icing).

And when the pseudo-government agency which helps support, to a very limited extent, private (even airline!) pensions, and strangely:oh: , has the SAME people on the Board which decides whether or not to loan an airline money.
Imagine the possible conflicts of interest.:E . ! Das kann man sich leicht vor-------.

Aircraft belongs to the German Air Force fleet now carrying members of the government. Incident check and any subsequent maintenance was done by LHT, all documentation available.

There is not an innocent member of this club.....
 

The unusual rudder actuation of the A300 series is not alleged, IO. It is a demonstrated fact. And to be fair, the 737 Classic series rudder incidents indicated something was clearly wrong with the PCH units. There is more to both stories than is generally known.

Probably hasn't been a lawsuit involving a product defect in recent times where some form of legal subterfuge is not being skillfully applied to free the manufacturer from liability. Sad Status Quo.


Now, allow us move on to the newest generation of aircraft:

The good news:
A physical defect in a valve or other device can 99% of the time be expertly reproduced or reasonably proven forensically to exist - no contest here.

The not so good news:
A software bug can remain well-hidden due to the numerous lines of often complex code that is best understood only by the original programmers. Then there is the programmer's intended interaction with the not-so-finite real world which becomes practically an ethereal matter. The resulting trail from said defect may only be visible to a select few, if there is any trail left at all.

The more we digitise, the more need there is to audit the process and results - especially considering the current state of corporate honesty.

This business of not owning up to one's mistakes (both personal and corporate) is becoming very tiresome.

Honesty and integrity should always trump liability, but that is now but an idealist's dream.

The trust-factor, however, remains huge.

Is it possible to obtain a copy in English of the book identified in the first posting above?

True, indeed. Software generally does not fail-soft. The heavy dependence on software that is 'undocumented' and inaccessible to all but a select-few company insiders means no accountability, no transparency, and no independent verification of the critical control processes and underlying assumptions that operate most functions in modern aircraft.

With engines, airframe, and avionics coming from several sources, the potential for hidden flaws in integral control software compounds with each design change and each 'model' variation thereon.

Imagine further how the design integrity of these aircraft may degrade over decades of 'minor' control and subsystem repairs intended to deal with specific operational problems encountered along the way, many of them done on the cheap without the top-to-bottom integrated-systems evaluations that look at the bigger picture of overall vehicle reliablility in light of each and every modification.

The various civil authorities need to develop enough backbone to compel full disclosure ( confidential, where necessary ) for ongoing technical evaluation of algorithms, principles, and all other operational data about the software controlling ALL airbourne controls, systems, and subsystems used in civil aviation. Only when this is done will the true facts be available for inquiry and independent evaluation when incidents arise.

Rudder actions
 

Indeed, rudders, and their sometimes strange actions, notwithstanding pilot inputs.

Now, with American Airlines, their poorly thought out advanced maneuvering program, and the possibility of a rogue First Officer using the rudder in an inappropriate manner...this is bad enough.

But, perhaps not nearly as bad as Boeing, as those with very long memories will recall, again with American Airlines, and one of their B707's suffering a rudder hardover just after takeoff in the very early 1960's, from IDL (now (JFK).
A swan dive straight into Flushing Bay.
Did Boeing cover this up, with the help of the FAA?

You be the judge, but the 707 was a known quantity with regard to rudder hardovers...for quite a long time.
And, the result was, shall we say, not good.

That large rudder power guarded switch, painted red with white stripes was there for a reason, and was certainly used more than one time, you can be sure.

vaPilot2004: It is always my intention to avoid any hint of libel, and also for our generous supervisors at Pprune Towers.
To be quite frank, my aviation reading on days off mostly includes Pprune, a little "Aviation Week & ST", "Flying" and the other Internet, i.e. 'MD-11' anomolies.

By the way, not too many years ago, "Aviation Week" stated that original records from TWA maintenance revealed that BEFORE the 727 flown by Hoot Gibson rolled into a dive over Michigan, there had been uncommanded LE slat problems...again, from dates before that famous incident.
Who had hidden those documents so many years?:E
I've flown nothing larger that the 757 and have no desire to. The smaller planes are more fun, serving large and many smaller airports.

I said nothing about MD-11 certification issues and
'possible' landing gear fatigue (PSP?). Nothing.

This comment betrays a lack of understanding of safety critical software systems design. I wouldn't expect you to have an understanding of same unless, like myself, you had spent several years studying the topic. If you have not done so then perhaps you could avoid making ill informed sweeping statements about my profession.
Software systems can be and are designed to fail in a deterministic state and furthermore the hardware systems on which they run are designed likewise. The degree of redundancy in a FBW flight control system is typically an order of magnitude greater than for a hydromechanical system.
Safety critical systems are never written in an "undocumented and inaccessible" way. Large projects often have dozens or hundreds of contributors all working within a far more controlled process than that used for business applications. Many systems are subject to external scrutiny and certification. Where redundancy is required it is not unusual to use two different teams (sometimes different companies) to develop the exact same application - a development approach originally pioneered by NASA.
I would be more concerned by many of the mechanical and electrical systems than I am about the software. Pilots tend to blame every glitch "on the computers" when in reality the vast majority of issues are caused by transducer failures or even a simple misunderstanding of how to use the system. Such problems can equally affect hydromechanical aircraft. As far as I'm aware there has never been a FBW failure in a commercial aircraft that has resulted in loss of critical control systems. The number of tech problems due to software are totally eclipsed by mechanical and electrical problems.
FBW software systems are known to have saved aircraft, but are yet to be proven causal in any production hull loss. That makes our record infinitely better than almost every other aircraft system.
Just imho.

Well said!
Wow, some-one who actually knows what they are talking about.
Fifteen happy Airbus years behind me and I'm not dead yet. Isn't that amazing?

Didn't Airbus employ 5 different companies to write the FBW software for the A320 family? I believe on the B777 all the flight control software is written by the same company. I know which I think is the more sensible approach.

A4

FWIW, I have been doing design, development, and analysis of fault-tolerant, fail-soft, and never-fail electronics, software, computing architectures and real-time systems since the days when transistors were large enough to trip over and software came in the form of wires and holes. One of my patented designs for testing, diagnosing, and analyzing complex systems has generated more than a trillion US$ of product manufactures in applications ranging from complex LSI circuits to global distributed computing networks, with the total growing by more than a hundred billion $$ this year. Along the way, I have developed a very large number and wide variety of mission-critical electronic products, real-time control computing systems and applications and have planned, supervised or officially reviewed development of many hundreds more. I am also, for several decades, a pilot and aircraft owner-operator, and moderately familiar with the design-life-support cycle of commercial aircraft.



The arrogance, shallowness, and evident miscomprehension of the problem embodied in this (foregoing) comment brilliantly underscores a systematic failure to grasp the concept of Systems design for the real world.... where mistakes have irreversible consequences and everyone involved must assume TOTAL responsibility for all possible outcomes. How reassuring... to know one's life hangs on a thread devised, designed, delivered by a shop full of clever snitty self-obsessed primadonnas.


On the surface of it, one would say you appear to be an exemplar of the exact problem to which I have referred. The problem is under-scrutinised and under-tested design experimentation by sanctimoniously self-assured technicians who feel that all problems have been solved, the world is perfect; the current technology of choice will always save the day. Probably you believe this because you have been recognized as competent in your job and your designs have always worked - or appeared to work - properly up til now.

Too much confidence, fueled by the appearances of success, is bad for the judgement and bad for the soul, however. Let us all cross fingers and hope you will never confidently send a load of customers to sleep with the fish.

The reason being so that the same error was not repeated over five computers, and so that the others would cancel the input of an incorrect line of code.

Even if one firm was used for the 777, different computers using different programming languages and software platforms were still used.

Since none of my patented designs are likely to have generated a trillion of anything (which of course proves the value of your opinions) and since I did not intend this to degenerate into a personal attack, I'll bow out now and get back to some other shallow arrogance I have to take care of before dinner.

Arrogance was your choice for flavour - per your earlier post. Bon appetit!

IO - I agree that the French authorities do not have a very good track record of facing up to the facts when these might just turn out to be embarassing - call it misplaced national pride if you will.

However, you have it seriously wrong when you mention the Roselawn ATR 72 accident in the same breath. In that case, (and while the French DGAC certainly didn't shine by its cooperation with the NTSB investigation), there were a number of factors which conspired to cause that accident;

1/ The aircraft was flown in freezing drizzle (a heavy icing condition for which it had not been certificated) at the wrong IAS, with the wrong flap setting

2/ It was flown in the hold in these conditions (when the crew should have elected to leave heavy icing asap)

3/ They apparently had not Level 3 anti-icing ON throughout

As part of the accident investigation, ATR sent one of their own aircraft (before its delivery to Alitalia Express) to Edwards AFB, where it was flown by a test crew behind a KC-135 spreading water over the ATR 72's airframe in icing conditions to reproduce those experienced by the ill-fated Roselawn aircraft. While ice did accumulate on some parts, it was mostly shed by the anti-icing when used properly, and the test aircraft did not experience any serious control difficulties or depart from controlled flight. These tests, may I add, were requested, conducted, validated and published by the FAA.

The source of the Roselawn crash was traced to a ridge of ice forming in frizzing drizzle (a known freak icing phenomenon) behind the de-icing boots, therefore disrupting the airflow over the ailerons. While not specifically requested by the FAA, ATR decided to extend the de-icing boots over a larger part of the wing chord to prevent re-occurence.

All current operators of ATRs have very strict and specific anti-icing procedures which when correctly adhered to, make the ATR no less safe in icing conditions than any other turboprop aircraft (Dash 8, Fokker 50, Saab 2000, Casa 235/295, Do-328, etc).

If it really was unsafe in icing conditions, would ATRs be routinely used by airlines in, say, Alaska, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Italy or New Zealand to name but a few?

Cheers :cool:

Greetings FougaMagister: My criticisms were for the US FAA, not any foreign government department or aircraft industry etc. A serious problem can happen with any aircraft.

I read a bit in "Aviation Week & ST" about ATR icing test flights behind the KC-135 after Roselawn. I was mistaken and certainly did not understand the ATR's procedures. My impression was that our "friends" at the FAA covered up, or kept very silent on some critical information.

Your well-informed, objective response was interesting and appreciated.

Merci beau coup. Now it is time to review systems on a "steam-gauge " jet which has a basic rudder etc and no automation.

Arrogance
 

Arcniz

Pot this is Kettle?:D

electricjetjock

Hello Kettle. Go ahead...

IO - thanks. The NTSB's report on the Roselawn accident is an interesting read, which chastises the DGAC and the FAA for their lack of oversight in the certification process more than the aircraft itself. It can be found on http://www.aviation-safety.net/index.php

I didn't mean to be abrupt, I just get tired of hearing the words "ATR" and "icing" always associated in the same sentence... When I found the aircraft to be a sound design (if a bit heavy in roll, and with a user-unfriendly AFCS).

Whether or not turboprops really are more prone to airframe icing is debatable; they usually don't have the luxury of being able to fly above the icing level...

Cheers :cool:


P.S: sorry for thread creep!

FougaM:

Roger that.

Bonne nuit.

To paraphrase an old saying: "It is better to keep your fingers off your computer keyboard and let people think you are a fool, than to use them to confirm their suspicions."

In the wrong hands anything can be lethal. Just watch pink panther movies.

I'm sad the egsc_h17/arcniz bunfight descended into personal abuse and then huffy withdrawal from the fray. Their obviously expert but contradictory arguments were getting to an interesting stage. In particular, egsc said
As far as I can tell, arcniz did not offer any contradictory evidence. I wonder, do you have any, arcniz? If you do, I for one would very much like to see it. If you don't, doesn't that rather weaken your argument that
airsound
not stirring, honest......

Small point, but there was this one:

http://ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id...11X11781&key=1

It was an experimental system, though.....

There are LOTS of stories around and apparently sufficient past practice to question whether the slats extension was *uncommanded* or the result of some 'work-arounds' developed by crews to get more wing in cruise.

Do you? It is referred to as 'dissimilar redundancy' so one error will not manifest itself in other programs. Also different chips.

IF you were to study the FBW control system, you would see that different chips and different software is controlling different surfaces so a lot can go wrong before you lose (or 'loose' as is often the word used on the net :) ) control. Not a bad idea.

Small point, but is automation generally good or bad for the pilot industry?
BM:hmm:
PS The aviation industry(military or commercial) is not the subject of this question.

WileyDog3:
It is certainly possible, although a TWA pilot told me that the specific procedure was unknown to TWA 727 pilots, and it was research at Boeing Aircraft which produced that procedure. A large corporation has, compared to a pilot, unrestricted resources with which to defend its reputation and even more money at stake: all of this creates a huge incentive to produce or fabricate a possible theory. Hoot and his crew also counter-sued the NTSB (!), from what I remember.

If the NTSB was ever totally objective about all investigations, that is news to me. Of course they are "provided" data from the aircraft builder, among the many other sources. But they seem to always do a far better job than the USAF investigation of the "King 56" case: C-130 4-engine rollback, due to syncrophaser glitches. An article on some website about the unnecessary crash stated that Air Force investigators must attend a 3-day school, then they are accident experts, and their conclusions can be final.

The article in Aviation Week stated that the same exact B-727 ship (aircraft) number had suffered from uncommanded slat (a Douglas term :) )/leading edge flap problems before the major incident happened.

Airbus Defects
 

All aircaft have defects in relation to the ones you are not flying..(in general)
A boeing pilot for one can see the defects in airbus, where the airbus pilot would see the same in boeing????
The decussion sould not be abouts there defects? but rather there differences in design and performances...(cockpit flows etc)

I hope that you don't believe that garbage.