Boofhead

The thing is that we are expected to conform to our ops manual requirements, so yes most of the standard drills are exactly that-standard. If I started changing things on my own(without good reason), the trainers would be very unimpressed and rightly so IMHO.I like operating this way.By the way my company is now very close to standard Boeing.

I have flown for six jet transport operators and they all train similarly in this area.OK five of these were UK companies and the sixth run largely by Brits.Is this where the differences arise? (411A leave it!!)

I have seen pure manufacturer checklists on the Lear 60 and I thought they were awful,not at all practical,unless you're a barrister!

I agree strongly that Airmanship is vital,but equally so is a disciplined environment.But if you think you might die before getting to 400 feet I wouldn't recommend waiting!

Rgds

Flanker. You must be skimming what I wrote (proof that those who do not want to learn will refuse to try), I did not advocate ignoring company procedures. I rant against it in fact. I am saying that those who write these procedures should stick to the maufacturer's recommendations. Many companies think they have not only the right but the duty to put their own stamp on the Ops Manual, and the result is often inefficient and dangerous.
It should be possible for any B767/747 etc pilot to fly for any airline and use the same checklists, procedures and callouts, with only minor variations.
I think there is no reason to put an altitude restriction on the decision to carry out recall drills after takeoff. Such drills should be carried out as per the manufacturer's procedure, using training and airmanship to ensure that this is done safely. The trainers should discuss altitude as one of the criteria in making the decision, sure, but every case is going to be different in the real world and fixating on one instrument can be counter productive. It is not safe at 390 feet but OK at 400? If 400 is safe, then 800 must be twice as safe. And if that is true, then 1600 is even better! Why not 3200? Surely you can see the futility in this, and that is why those who developed the procedures did not mandate altitude in the decision process.
And a line trainer should know his company's manuals very well. He should ensure that all the pilots he flies with use the manuals and do not make up their own procedures.
And no, my first "real" airplane was not the Trimotor, it was the DC3. We used the original Douglas manuals and they were great. I wish I had kept one, just for the photos alone.

Boofhead--
Very good ideas, too bad many companies do not follow. Noted that SQ years ago used the Boeing supplied procedures and checklists on the B707, to everyones delight. Then the company got bigger and started to "adjust" the checklists on other fleets, to try to match one another. Better to stick with the original plot.

Was just reading the previous page with regard to stopping a takeoff after V1. Now I'm a novice at this game and certainly don't have any experience in jets BUT I was under the impression that to abort a takeoff at or just before V1 needed the use of everthing. Brakes, spoilers, reverse thrust etc...

I'm jsut wondering that if you go to abort the takeoff after V1 because of an engine fire, do you really want to be using reverse thrust - possibly making the problem worse?

Anyway - like I said, I'm no expert on this topic and have infact only got a couple of hundred hours and mostly fly singles, so please excuse me if this seems a silly comment to the rest of you.

TwinNDB

I guess the questions was 'if you know that, even after V1, continuing take-off will result in a crash, do you try and stop anyway?'

I asked this question before reading a post about Concorde in the Rumours forum which implies that the aircraft 'in the opinion of some' should not have commenced its take off roll anyway. If any of this is true, it sounds like a much more complex and loaded situation than I had supposed.

Martin.

Iz your way off the mark. Try actualy reading the posts.

Boofhead

Just because I dont agree with you doesn't mean I am happy with 'adequate'or don't want to learn.If that was the case I wouldn't be discussing this with you,would I?

Boeings way works but so do many others and I like using others too!

The standard recall drill height is a simple compromise between 'Flying the Aeroplane' and dealing with the problem.There will always be possible exceptions.Too radical?
:rolleyes:

If 411A agrees with you,you must be on a loser!

Don't mean to offend, Flanker. I work with a good bunch of guys and we discuss our job and what we see going wrong a lot. I find there are some who have done it the same way with one company for many years and firmly believe that their way is the best. They resist even considering different ideas. No two airlines are the same, but if you look at the differences from Boeing procedures, hardly any of the changes stands up to scrutiny.
Some airlines like to have what they call "Standardization" whereby when they buy a 744 they try to maintain the 747 classic procedures, to assist crews in upgrading. They try to marry the checklists and operating procedures for the hydraulics and flight controls, and so on. In the process they dumb down the 744. When all the classics are gone, they still have the dumbed down procedures. But if you are brought up in that environment, you will not even be aware that it has shortcomings.
Some airlines even dumb down the new generation airplanes such as the 733 so that they can operate it with the 732 using the same crews. In this instance they remove the ability of the crews to use LNAV/VNAV and even Alt Capture. Again, what happens when the 732s are retired? Meanwhile the crews in this company get used to this and are not aware that it is a pretty silly way to do it.
But an even more insidious problem is not with guys like you, who obviously care about the profession and take some time to think. The bigger worry is the newbies, who have never had the chance to see it done right, and have never been taught how to think. They fly the airplane in a rote manner, with the management writing rules and regulations every day to cover the eventualities they can imagine their crews might have to face. If the pilots follow the procedures, they think, they will know what to do.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to cover all the possibilities and for the crews to remember all of the procedures. Sometimes the problem is not easy to diagnose and the wrong procedure will be followed.
Far better to train the crews to think and to use judgement and experience. What we used to call airmanship.
Like the starving villager, if you give him a fish you feed him for a day, but if you teach him to fish he will be able to feed himself.
This is what the Boeing procedures do. They emphasise the basics and if followed, will cover all normal and non-normal situations, resulting in safe and efficient flight. A pilot who knows how to think does not need to be told what altitude he must have to carry out a fire drill after takeoff. A pilot who is trained to operate by rote will need to be told. This type of pilot will never be better than adequate.

Boofhead--
Very well written, spot on!

Flanker--
Whats your problem? Are you one of these "new" guys?

411A
Yep but my Vanguard time must count for something. ;)

Flanker---
Vanguard...yes indeed, in the past.
I flew the Lockheed Electra for awhile, cruised at 335 knots. Wonderful machine. Was the Vanguard about the same?

Yes similar speeds, around 66000kgs Max T/Off weight.Rolls Royce Tyne engines.

We flew them two crew with long checklists and a Smiths Flight System to contend with!

Hardly flew it really but I look back fondly on the time I managed to get!

Gentlemen (and ladies, as the various cases may be),

Has the discussion somewhat wandered off the original topic ? Perhaps a new topic relating to operational philosophy ought to be considered ?