AW-

Part 25 is the "certification" reg. It says what the *a/c* must be capable of doing.

What the *pilot* does is governed by his company procedures, and that may mean a power change.

Didnt an Emerald Airways Andover (or HS748?) abort above V1 a year or so ago? I must admit if I was taking off full-length in my 737 on a 12000ft dry runway with the runway-limit V1 greater than V2, and I heard a loud bang and fire warning at Vr (or just after), Id bloodey stop too. Rather have the thing burning on the ground than in the air anyday.

Slasher

What if it was a fire warning without the bang?Is it really burning?Has it damaged the tyres,brakes?If you do slide off the runway what's the terrain like?

I can't answer all the above in a split second so I'll stick to the usual plan thanks.It might stop, it will almost certainly fly.If you stop and it all goes wrong but you're lucky enough to live you may well be going to jail.(I know...you'd rather be alive in jail than dead...)

To quote Flight Safety on the official view high speed rejects beyond V1 are 'notoriously and disastrously unsuccessful'.We certainly don't train that way.

Always willing to learn though if you can point me to events supporting your view.Concorde sadly comes to mind.

As I'm sure you know there aren't very many long runways in the UK anyway.

Rgds

411A
Not comet but Nimrod,
yes there is a big problem with a fire on one engine spreading to the other. The firewall in between the engines is called RIB 2 and has its own overheat detection for hot gasses.
If you recall the nimrod that ditched in the morray firth a few years ago had an uncontained fire that spread to both engines and burned through the wing. When the wing started warping the skipper decided to ditch. All crew suvived.
It's a while ago but I'm sure we still waited till positive climb before doing anything.
On a side note you couldn't stop the bell till the fire was out without pulling cbs.
very off putting.

[This message has been edited by FE Hoppy (edited 03 May 2001).]

fly_boy

Our A319/A320 procedures are to raise the gear, cancel the lights, and toga if required.

Look at the fire at 1500 ft, the aircraft will climb out at 2500 fpm going through 1500 quickly with both running, much slower and more chance of hitting something on one engine.

Been shown both methods in the sim, ecam actions at 400 ft, or 1500 ft, I now like the 1500 ft method.

At 1500 ft the whole ecam procedure can be accomplished safely with the autopilot on, so the pilot flying can monitor the aircraft and the pnf carring out the checks, down low too much is happening to monitor the a/c and pnf.

:rolleyes:

Again it is the armchair warriors trying to legislate safety. Boeing says to carry out recall actions only when the airplane is safely under control.. That is all you need to know.
If you take off with an engine on fire (warnings are inhibited but the message is still clear) you must be under control, so if you wish you can do the recalls as soon as you are off the ground and gear is selected up.
A real pilot will make a decision based on the conditions he is experiencing at the time. Obviously if you are having control problems you would leave it alone for a while, and if the weather was bad or a dark night etc...
So many guys now say "at 400 feet I will..." What crap. It might be safe at 100 feet, or unsafe at 800 feet. Give me a break.
An example: a 747 taking off at LAX. The #2 engine starts surging. It gets worse and worse as the airplane starts to climb away, the gear is up. The FO reaches over, since the Capt has done nothing and said nothing, and retards the throttle slightly. The surging stops.
The captain angrily pushes the throttle up again, the surging starts again, even worse than before, and says "Wait til 400 feet!"
The engine was damaged, had to be shut down, fuel dumped and landed back with 400 passengers to deal with. The engine had to be replaced. Boeing procedures might have prevented a lot of that, but let's replace airmanship with regulations.
Come on, guys, the manufacturer has done all the studies, all the certification. Why do we insist we know better?

Boofhead you dont need to rush into things in a modern jet aircraft. Rule # 1 in any emergency is sit on your hands first (except arguably a fire/failure etc near V1).

PS Your 747 LAX example (surge/stall) was NOT an emergency. The FO was correct and the capt deserves his *rse kicked.

[This message has been edited by Slasher (edited 09 May 2001).]

So lets get this straight,when its[b]not[b/] an emergency, its OK to p*ss about with the throttles below 400ft?

I have been following this thread with some interest.

The comments generally are skirting around three principal concerns:

(a) emergency actions planning is a matter of risk assessment and risk management; ie pay more attention to that which is going to kill you soonest, and try not to turn a small problem into a major screw up.

(b) in a (well trained and competent) multicrew environment, one-man-band cowboys and off-the-cuff decision making scenarios generally are bad news. While one can always find examples which might suggest that the procedural rules are not sound (eg the Concorde accident and the DC10 (as I recall) which lost the port wing LEDs) the probability of a satisfactory outcome in the event of mishap is, on the majority of occasions, enhanced by adopting well thought out and standardised procedural approaches to the implementation of emergency procedures.

(c) at the end of the day, one's actions, in the event of an accident, will need to be justified in an appropriate legal forum, presuming that one survives.

If I may offer several comments of my own..

(a) the previous reference to FAR 25 and changes below 400 ft is unfortunate and misses the point. FAR 25 is an airworthiness standard .. operating standards are specified elsewhere. The requirement referred to is intended to stop the manufacturer 'cheating', eg by scheduling a manual thrust reduction to reduce Vmca problems or by scheduling a manual thrust increase to improve WAT performance. The requirement only addresses the engine failure case - considerations of when fire drills ought to be commenced are a separate (operational) consideration altogether.

(b) In regard to risk issues, accident histories and sim studies clearly suggest that rehearsed drills and predictable sequences have, generally, a better outcome than letting Cowboy Bob rule the range, sixshooters in hand.

Given that fire warnings during takeoff occur relatively infrequently, and that many are subsequently found to be false warnings, there is an argument for de-emphasizing the need for immediate panic (sorry, action).

On the other hand, the likelihood of an OEI flightpath's deviating outside the obstacle trapezoid, or the shutdown manoeuvre's ending up in a UA, is an immediate and very real risk. In my experience on endorsement training, the majority of pilots under training (even those with considerable experience in similar jets) perform more reliably if the workload is well managed. Throwing a low level engine shutdown into the soup pot on a takeoff from an obstacle limiting airport is usually not as satisfactory as getting the aircraft up a bit first and then worrying about the system problem ... after all, if you hit the hill, or go in inverted, the (probably false) engine fire is not really all that important. I would take the view that it doesn't matter whether the recommendation is 400 feet or 200 feet or 1000 feet ... the important thing is to keep the priorities sensibly ordered.

(c) in respect of initiating an RTO from above V1, this presupposes that the pilot concerned is competent to assess the distance numbers involved and this is generally not the case - brake energy considerations aside. Boeing has a very useful little video based on the 757 and looking at the RTO manoeuvre in which the message is strongly pushed that the risk is better managed if the takeoff is continued and a planned recovery made with whatever resources might be required being available.

An interesting thread, nonetheless ....

What would have happened if AF Concorde had aborted after V1? (I haven't seen this discussed but may have missed it.)

Is it possible there would be some survivors? I don't have detailed technical knowledge but presume it wouldn't have been able to stop on the runway, although it did eat up a lot of Rwy after V1, nearly leaving the left side, I think.

I suppose there is no way they could have known in that moment how catastrophic the problem was, but if they had, maybe the option to stop would have made sense?

Any opinions?

E S

Re the Concorde, I have yet to read an authoritative detailed report. However, I think we would all agree that the crew was faced with one of those nightmarish horrors which we have all contemplated over a beer.

It is quite obvious that, whatever the crew did, the outcome was going to be unpleasant at best. In the event, the continued takeoff evidently led to a directional departure and subsequent uncontrolled impact with predictable results ...quite possibly this was one of those times when the after V1 RTO option may have been the better course. The remaining option, of course, was to throw the beast back onto the ground, off airport, when the control problems became manifest. I have no knowledge of the local topography so I can only speculate. I always recall the Sioux City DC10 accident ... it is quite amazing just what can be survivable.

It is very important to remember that the certification performance doesn't provide any guarantees at all.. only some reference data ... the pragmatist would likely take the risk averse position that the crew did their best within their training experiences with the information available in a very dynamically developing situation but it was just one of those days when taking a sickie would have been the better option ......

Folks,

I worry about post V1 RTO discussions.

In the vast majority of cases, it means the captain deciding to definitely trash the aeroplane rather than fly it and possibly trash it. A split second decision, counter to all training and advice (ignoring the turkeys at FlightSafety), based on what information?

Did our compatriots in Concorde know what was actually going on - I don't think so. They didn't have the benefits of countless replays of the external view (which in truth many commentators still got wrong) and they had nothing to convince them that the aircraft would not fly away.

There will always be situations where the likelihood of trashing the jet is equal (double engine failure in a 3/4 holer just past one engine V1 without lots of runway remaining, for one!) and thus surviveability of the impact becomes the controlling factor. But I suggest that you need very clear and unambiguous indications to abandon the continued take-off after V1.

As to the example of the clever FO vs the dumb captain: there are a bunch of CRM issues involved and they are not all one way! The greatest priority must be to achieve a safe flight path and then to calmly deal with the problem in a co-ordinated and organised fashion. How quickly you proceed to that second step will be determined by the time available before there is likely to be a collateral control/damage consequence.

Hasten slowly...

------------------
Stay Alive,

[email protected]

Yes Flanks, especialy when my 737 has its PMCs inop and I have to fiddle with the throttles at Vr to stop the little eager CFMs from busting their 930 deg TO EGT limit.

[This message has been edited by Slasher (edited 10 May 2001).]

We don't do anything until 400ft agl or flap retract unless the prop does not autofeather(dash8-300).
I think there are good reasons for doing that because even if an engine is on fire after t/o it still produces power which you need and also because at a busy time like that where you really need the power and are so close to the ground ,you don't really want to be making a rashed decision wich could lead you into shutting down the wrong engine.


------------------
Fly high be safe !!

I prob went too far with the example, but my point is that we should use the manufacturer's procedures and not make them up ourselves. Altitude is not the only thing we need to think of before doing anything that might upset the applecart. By writing and briefing "Nothing until 400 feet" primes the non-thinking pilot (more and more of those all the time) to react to the altimeter. Losing the airplane at 400 feet or at 1500 feet in a big airplane will have the same result. Boeing says "when safely under conrol" and that is all that is necessary.
And for the 400/800 feet boyos, what do you do if an engine goes into reverse on lift off, or two engine out of 4/3 fail at the same time? You will never even get to 400 feet if you don't do something straight away.
I fly with too many FOs (who will be captains soon) who cannot think or prioritise. They are the products of the "rules and numbers" managers and have never learned. But they know the rules, and with AIMS and such, fly in fear of being caught breaking a rule, no matter how minor or stupid. I have them overbanking and descending through the altitude and not even noticing because they must get the seat belt sign or landing light switch on, since that is the "procedure".
Personally I would probably wait until 1000 feet or so before shutting down an engine for a fire warning. I object to requiring an altitude for the action, since that is not a correct nor sensible way to decide.
I have said it before and I say it again: You cannot legislate safety.

Slasher, if you're in that once-in-a-lifetime situation where you need to continue after a V1 engine failure, would you care about busting the EGT limit for a short while?

Boofhead

I fly a Boeing ,but I don't fly forBoeing.

I follow company rules because they have generally been refined over long years of experience.

Sometimes 'thinking' pilots think their way right into trouble.

Flanker. If your company had a better way to do it then Boeing would copy it. (And Airbus etc). If your company had the better way then other companies would copy it. That this does not happen proves the fallacy of companies changing procedures based on their own experience.
For example, a new airplane type is introduced and the pilots who flew the older version or similar are sent to do the type rating with Boeing/Airbus/Fokker and they do the quickie version (free). They do not understand the reasons for the procedures, and are taught very superficially (I know, because I've been there).
When they come back, they proceed to rewrite the manuals so that they agree with what they are used to, such that Airbus guys put Airbus procedures in Boeing manuals and vice versa, and old techniques such as flight control checks during taxi instead of before start are retained. The procedures take no account of the new technology, and because the management types who are doing it don't know enough about the new airplane a lot of it's potential for safer and more efficient use is lost.
All this before the airplane is even used in service for the first time! And heaven forbid we might try the manufacturer's recommendations first! (Boeing might make great airplanes (sorry, aeroplanes), but they don't know sod all about operating them!) The cry of the ignorant.
Then you newbies, second or third generation types, who have never seen it done the right way, are trained how it is done Here, and by goodness, we are the world's most popular/best/successful/profitable airline, so we must be doing it right!
Well this might come as a surprise, but you are far from doing it right, as your posts show. You are just doing it the best you can since you cannot/will not learn the right way. The result is and will continue to be a failure to reach the full potential of your airplanes and pilots. Sure it is adequate, but is that what you aspire to? Adequate?

Wow Boofhead

Certainly lit your rocket!

One thing aviation is full of is variety,I have seen lots of different ways of doing things(even on the same type).To me the important thing is that we all have some idea what to do and what the other guy is going to do in an emergency.You sound like a one man band.

You make too many assumptions, mainly that everything you think and everything you do is correct.You're right,I'm not that clever.

With all that Ford Trimotor and B17 time who am I to argue?

We were talking about engine fire not reverser deployment.RTFQ!

Flanker. yeah, you can see how I got my name! I don't mean to come across as a knowitall, for I am most definitely not one of them. I am trying to make the argument for the opposite position, so I guess I am not making my point very well. The discussion started as a Fire drill, sure, but if you apply an altitude requirement to that, why not to all recall drills? Do you think the average guy would know the difference?