Jet might survive missile strike

[Mighty_Duck]

There is an interesting article in USA TODAY by Fred Bayles on the possible effects a shoulder-fired missile could have on a commercial airliner. The link is: http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmp...today/11590453
Many years ago, I remember seeing a photograph of a HS-125 VIP executive jet that was hit in Africa by a missile but did not explode (obviously), it only took the right engine off the pylon. Given the incident that happened to the chartered Israeli B-757 some time ago also in Africa and still the uncertain aftermath of TWA-800, this a most interesting subject as it looks like the prefered method the crazy terrorists of this world are looking at to down our beautiful flying machines. Some VIP aircraft are equipped with flares to confuse the incoming heat seeking missiles but it is an expensive and commercialy unviable solution. Care to comment?

[RRAAMJET]

Having flown VIP some time ago with "systems" (TQF), no I don't care to comment....

Careful what you post here, folks, especially those of you who, like me, were involved in trials and research.

I do believe, however, that we should get together an educational "roadshow" for airline crews detailing fact as oppose to fiction and rumour. I've passed the suggestion along to the TSA some months ago, but have as yet had no reply (no surprise - I must not have taken my shoes off...)

I visited the Hawker when it was at Chester....tough jet. Very eye-opening. It was being used by Rwandan President Habyarimana and was shot at over Angola by an Angolan MiG 23 (escort, anybody?). The first missile knocked the rt eng and overwing emerg exit off, and the second missile luckily went for the falling separated engine.

Habyarimana got his in '94 in a Falcon 50, downed by a SAM.

[GuinnessPWS]

The definitive answer is: It depends.

What kind of commercial aircraft are we talking about? A hit on an MD80 or RJ is going to be different than a hit on a 4 engine aircraft or business jet. How alert (or fatigued) is the crew? How bad is the damage? What was the weapon system? What aspect was the missile fired and where was it in relation to the aircraft when it detonated. An IR seeking man portable SAM does not always fly right up the exhaust and detonate inside the tailcone.

As for TWA 800 there are some theorists out there who don't beleive the results of the accident investigation, but I would venture the majority of experts in the field discount the MANPADS hypothesis.

Flares are not the only defence against IR threats, however your comment about defences being expensive is correct. I hope specific details regarding the capabilities of these defensive systems is not forthcoming on this forum.

This fact is certain though - The possibillity of catastrophy is close at hand whenever these weapons are fired at any aircraft.

[Whoaaa]

Amazing that no one has mentioned anything about Korean KL 007 that was downed by the Russian back in 83.

[GuinnessPWS]

I didn't know KL 007 was destroyed by a MANPAD.....

[A and C]

Ther was a very good reason for the Israeli B757 to not have been hit by the SAM,s that were fired at it but if you dont know why I,m not going to tell you !.

[antisthenes]

It’s ridiculous posts like these that put the fare paying public ill at ease. A casual search on google will bring a wealth of info on DIRCM, AMD’s as well as less esoteric IRCM not to mention Manpads capabilities. All this preposterous “I know a secret and I’m not telling you” nonsense achieves nothing. Rest assured the bad guys trying to do the buying know all too well about their limitations.

Airbus has issued a request for information to appropriate defence contractors which was publicised in Flight for heavens sake.

[tonybliar]

antisthenes - just because the information is available it does not mean that the bad guys have seen it - why make it easier than it already is for them?

I think we should all exercise some restraint in what information we make available to people who might not be as friendly as we would like and we should stop selling arms to nations with a proven connection to terrorism.

[TheDrop]

When this kind of technology http://www.blinder.dk is available for a few hundred pounds for automobiles, why should there not be something like it for commercial aircraft, albeit not for speeding tickets but missiles ???

[Obs cop]

The Drop,

Generally speaking, portable short range Anti Air Missiles tend to be heat seeking, meaning the missile itself has a sensitive seeker head which locks onto a heat source and guides the missile towards it.

The primary detection of the aircraft is visually by the operator and the subsequent guidance relies on the infrared signature of the target. Being passive systems which do not actively transmit any signal towards the target, there is no signal to be directly jammed. The three defences (simplified) are to reduce the signature of the aircraft, hide the aircraft or to seduce the missile away.

The above is obviously a massive simplification of the world of countermeasures, but hope this clarifies why blinder could not help!

Obs cop

[Just_Another_PPL]

Well said Antisthenes, as for the Israeli incident i understand that all thier jets have "countermeasures" due to the high risk to them.

That is the reason i belive the 2 missiles missed.

[lomapaseo]

there is certainly little if any data published applicable to the big jets that passengers fly on. Thus neither the press nor the terrorists has anything other than speculation to think about.

The large transport aircraft designed and certified under the FAR/JAR part 25 have lots of margin for single site damage and taken together with the crew will likely get the plane back on the ground for the threats that are currently on the market.

The biggest problem that we currently face is the terror that uninformed speculation causes to our industry. I'm not saying the word "never" but there is a probability that means it is far more likely that it won't suceed with pilots that follow their training to fly with deteriorated systems..

[tonybliar]

lomapaseo - I love your confidence in the aircraft and crew but the truth is that the missile in the hands of the terrorist has no notion of what is fair or just. It requires little skill or training to operate and might just be devastating to any target aircraft. Target size is a factor but collateral damage from a successful guidance to even an outboard engine pod could ruin the lives of many.

I know your industry has suffered unjustly since 9/11 but it will continue to suffer until we can control weapons of terrorist application.

[lomapaseo]

tonybliar

Always good to see a new poster join us.

I also don't deal in fair and just.

Just the facts backed by reason and analysis which has to count for something in a technical discussion.

[Mighty_Duck]

Sorry I left the thread so soon to take care of things, but there are some very interesting posts already. RRAAMJET has the exact infromation on what I had read in Flight International, thanks. Whoaaa must have missed the investigation on the KAL-007 shoot down over the Sea of Okhotsk, I feel for the Russian pilot who has to live with so many lives on his consciense. Antisthenes gets all worked up over there, have a cup of tea, relax and enjoy the thread, we are just commenting here, lighten up. Ops cop seems to have a better understanding on the way those missiles work. A and C, as for the reason the B-757 escaped impact, I can only guess that it was too close for the missile to be armed as it is mentioned in the original article, but then again, I only fly airplanes, I don't know zilch about missiles.
Lomapaseo wrote :"I'm not saying the word "never" but there is a probability that means it is far more likely that it won't suceed with pilots that follow their training to fly with deteriorated systems.." ... I can only comment on that, that you do trust a lot your flight crews to come up with something extraordinary, that will rely basically on a great degree of airmanship. With multiple systems failures and without knowing the extend of the physical(aerodynamic) damage done by a missile will put that crew in a situation that they have never seen in a simulator and have never trained for, thence, the doubtful outcome.

[Ignition Override]

WING COMMANDER DANNY, and STAFF: Will you edit any comments on this or other Pprune threads which appear to reveal any classified and dangerous information about SAMS, especially the (cheaper) highly-portable infrared types?

Let's hope that Pprune Towers has the scanning ability to spot such info!

Thank you all very much for any extra time to look for such data. It must be difficult enough dealing with issues regarding that d****d pervert NR. But this subject is also very serious. Good luck over there.

[rwm]

I read a book on the shoot down of KAL007 not that long ago, and acording to the book, based on many of the findings of the numerous investigations, the aircraft was hit by two missiles, and survived for up to 15 min. The crew were able to transmit comunications, while they were attempting to get the crippled 747 on the ground. There is much speculation as to if the a/c had broken up before it hit the ground.

[RRAAMJET]

Lomapaseo states: "...little data published..."

Exactly -
published being the operative word...nor should it. Not yet, and certainly not until crews can be briefed first.

The work has been done, in great detail. I was one of the pilots when the MOD did extensive studies into this over a decade ago. The data is out there, but in the hands of those who deem when it is appropriate to disseminate it.

Some Israeli airliners are protected, but have a close look at some other visitors to LHR from around the world....look at the upper trailing edge of the pylons. You'd be surprised. And all because they are occassionally used by their respective Head-of-State.

[Dagger Dirk]

Flawed CounterMeasure??

From Air Safety Week (18 Aug)

The lethal needle
The subject of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other government agencies' sting operation was the illegal sale of the SA-18 "Igla" missile (Igla is Russian for "Needle," the symbol of which is emblazoned on the weapon), an advanced successor to the SA-7. As one industry source said, it is quite possible that "everyone who shouldn't have it, now does have it."

The Russians have sold the SA-18 to North Korea, Vietnam and Iran. Last year, the Israelis attempted to block the sale of SA-18s to Syria. Some reports suggest that Palestinian cells have been trained in Iraq to employ the SA-18. Although at least seven fatal attacks against commercial airlines have occurred from 1996 to 2000, killing more than 300, the SA-18 has not yet been used in this deadly role.

With a time of flight of 7-15 seconds (depending upon firing position and relative direction of the target aircraft's flight), the SA-18 has a slant range of about three miles and a maximum altitude of more than 11,000 feet. Its infrared (IR) guidance system is claimed to offer better protection against electro-optical jammers. According to defense industry literature, the SA-18 has a single-shot kill probability against unprotected military fighters of 30-48 percent, and that the use of infrared countermeasures (IRCMs) only degrade the missile's effectiveness some 20 percent, to a single-shot kill probability of 24-30 percent.

However, so-called directed IRCM countermeasures (DIRCM) may be more effective. "We are all about directed IRCM's," declared Jack Pledger, director of IRCM business development at Northrop Grumman [NYSE: NOC]. He and other Northrop Grumman officials have proposed retrofitting onto commercial aircraft a variant of the company's Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM). This defensive system is used to protect many large military jets, such as the C-17, the KC-10 and B737, the latter two of which are very similar to their commercial cousins.

Foiling the attack
In contrast to flares or strobe lights, Pledger said, "Our LAIRCM allows us to direct much higher energy on the missile seeker."

The defensive system would be mounted in an upside-down "canoe" shaped pod on the belly of the airplane. Four fixed sensors, each with a 120º field of view, are arrayed in the pod to cover forward, aft, left and right. The overlapping coverage of these "staring sensors" would provide full 360 coverage.

Operating in the ultraviolet range (UV), the sensors are designed to detect the distinct spectral "signature" of a missile launch. Working in the UV bandwidth allows for better discrimination of a missile launch from background clutter.

Alerted by the staring sensors, a rotating scanner working in the IR bandwidth (to further discriminate a missile threat from clutter) tracks the inbound missile. It quickly transmits a narrow laser beam of IR energy in a modulated, classified waveform. This energy disrupts the missile's tracking system, causing it to break IR lock and veer off course and away from the airplane.

If the airplane is attacked at close range (e.g., Mombasa scenario), as little as three seconds will elapse from missile detection to its divert. At longer ranges, total LAIRCM engagement time would be on the order of 6-7 seconds.

The combination of UV and IR detection and tracking has much to do with the system's effectiveness, Pledger proclaimed.

How well does it work? Pledger said LAIRCM is designed to defeat all missiles on the U.S. military's threat list. He stressed the word "all."

The system has undergone successful operational tests. "The military requirement was to defeat multiple threats in the air, which we have demonstrated in live firing tests," Pledger added.

Deploying defenses
Pledger said the concept envisioned by Northrop Grumman would involve installing LAIRCM on four airliners, representing a mix of narrowbody and widebody airplanes, for purposes of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight tests. "We can be ready for FAA-authorized flight tests in nine months from the decision date," Pledger said. He estimated that FAA certification could be obtained within three months.

This timeline suggests that a defensive system for airliners could be tested and certified for deployment in 12 months. Northrop Grumman officials envision partial deployment, initially to 300 airplanes in the U.S. fleet. This population includes those large jets flying to destinations "outside U.S. borders," Pledger said. Most of these aircraft also are in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF aircraft often fly to the same locations as military aircraft already protected by LAIRCM systems. Thus, the first-stage retrofit to these 300 airliners would provide near-term protection for international flights and for mobilization aircraft.

From contract award to completion of the 300th aircraft, the work could be done in 28 months, Pledger estimated. That schedule implies an average retrofit rate of slightly more than 10 airplanes per month. The work would be done during C or D checks. Cost would average $2 million per plane, not including design and FAA-certification costs. The commercial version of LAIRCM would be common among all aircraft. It can operate on 28 volt DC or 115 volt AC aircraft power, further simplifying fleetwide installation. "It's the leisure suit approach, one size fits all," Pledger quipped. A specific adapter plate is all that would be required for each model of airplane, he explained.

In March 20 testimony before the House Aviation Subcommittee about the missile threat, Dr. Robert DelBoca, Northrop Grumman's vice president for infrared countermeasures systems, said the military's LAIRCM system is "proven, effective, affordable means of providing [missile] protection to America's airline industry and our flying public."

More to the point, he added, "It is available now."

Even so, the retrofit program envisioned by Northrop Grumman may not be aggressive enough. Retrofitting 300 airplanes over a period in excess of two years (28 months to test, certify and retrofit) covers less than 10 percent of the U.S. fleet. This schedule implies that it could take nearly a decade to retrofit

the entire U.S. fleet. Expanding the retrofit program to cover a larger fraction of the more than 4,000 jetliners estimated to be in U.S. service would drop the installation cost to $1 million. Northrop Grumman officials estimate the entire fleet could be equipped in a six-year period at a total cost of around $3 billion (which places the average cost below $1 million per airplane).

In the meantime, the loss of a single jetliner - from a regional jet to a widebody - on any flight in the U.S., not just overseas, from a portable missile would be intolerable. >> Pledger, e-mail [email protected]; Onorato, tel. [phone] <<

Hmm. If you look closely at the statement in green and then at this url (and

this one and this one)you might see the fatal flaw in the Northrop Grumman LAIRCM device.

[TyroPicard]

Sorry Dirk I just can't spot that fatal flaw; you'll have to spell it out for me.

Cheers, TP