Stuck thrust lever B733 sim scenario
Joined: Mar 2000
Posts: 2,809
Likes: 0
From: Bothell WA
NTSB Inspector Wannabe 411A Said:
I think they would still be dead and a lot of people on the ground too.
Experimentation can be carried just a bit too far.
Recall Alaska Airlines and their ill-fated MD-80 just offshore in California with tailplane trim problems.
Had these folks diverted when this problem was first noticed, they might well be alive today, together with all their passengers.
Recall Alaska Airlines and their ill-fated MD-80 just offshore in California with tailplane trim problems.
Had these folks diverted when this problem was first noticed, they might well be alive today, together with all their passengers.
Fleet Manager
Joined: Apr 2001
Aviation Qualifications: ATPL
Posts: 7,447
Likes: 310
From: various places .....
Is it possible that we have missed the point that the AFM and SOPs address many of the problems which fall out of the FMECA processes but certainly not all eventualities ? I contend that it is neither possible, nor commercially feasible, to train for all events.
There have been more than a few situations arise where the crew was stuck with a problem with no easy solution and certainly no guidance in the flight bag.
Clearly, if the wing or tail comes unstuck, then the end is nigh ... and even then there was the instance of an highly skilled aerobatic pilot with a (presumably) lower cap or pin spar failure who rolled inverted and recovered to a half roll crash landing and survived .....
But, as has been shown by crew recoveries of very difficult situations with no-one there to hold their individual hands, a lot of situations, while extremely hazardous and having a high probability of an unsuccessful outcome, need not necessarily be a fatal in waiting.
I, for one, see considerable value in using spare simulator time for crews to get some exposure to out of the ordinary situations in a non-checking, non-training, "have a look at this" type environment.
Clearly, it has to be understood that a simulator is a bunch of computers arguing with each other and the fidelity of the simulation in a particular situation which has not been optimised by the simulator's operator may be imprecise or significantly at variance with the aircraft. As such, the value of simulator time in non-optimised situations may not have as much transfer value as some would presume - but should that negate the flight discipline and management benefits which might be gained by such exposure ?
The opportunity to test the crew's planning and management skills provides crewmembers with feedback into the strengths and weaknesses of the individual crewmembers. This, in an ideal world, might then provide the crewmembers with some food for thought over a wine that evening.
The realistic aim is not to train for some improbable situation where such training cannot reasonably be justified in a commercial environment. Rather, the value is in the underlying development of the crewmember as a manager of hazardous situations.
Is this such a bad thing ?
As to the Monday morning quarterbacking arguments after the accident, one can hypothesize all day long and this, too, will have some value in a disciplined environment. Having a look at the problem in a simulated environment, while not a perfect answer, possibly is coincidentally useful to crewmembers.
There have been more than a few situations arise where the crew was stuck with a problem with no easy solution and certainly no guidance in the flight bag.
Clearly, if the wing or tail comes unstuck, then the end is nigh ... and even then there was the instance of an highly skilled aerobatic pilot with a (presumably) lower cap or pin spar failure who rolled inverted and recovered to a half roll crash landing and survived .....
But, as has been shown by crew recoveries of very difficult situations with no-one there to hold their individual hands, a lot of situations, while extremely hazardous and having a high probability of an unsuccessful outcome, need not necessarily be a fatal in waiting.
I, for one, see considerable value in using spare simulator time for crews to get some exposure to out of the ordinary situations in a non-checking, non-training, "have a look at this" type environment.
Clearly, it has to be understood that a simulator is a bunch of computers arguing with each other and the fidelity of the simulation in a particular situation which has not been optimised by the simulator's operator may be imprecise or significantly at variance with the aircraft. As such, the value of simulator time in non-optimised situations may not have as much transfer value as some would presume - but should that negate the flight discipline and management benefits which might be gained by such exposure ?
The opportunity to test the crew's planning and management skills provides crewmembers with feedback into the strengths and weaknesses of the individual crewmembers. This, in an ideal world, might then provide the crewmembers with some food for thought over a wine that evening.
The realistic aim is not to train for some improbable situation where such training cannot reasonably be justified in a commercial environment. Rather, the value is in the underlying development of the crewmember as a manager of hazardous situations.
Is this such a bad thing ?
As to the Monday morning quarterbacking arguments after the accident, one can hypothesize all day long and this, too, will have some value in a disciplined environment. Having a look at the problem in a simulated environment, while not a perfect answer, possibly is coincidentally useful to crewmembers.
Last edited by john_tullamarine; 1st May 2004 at 00:50.
