B777 over the atlantic
Guest
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EROPS = Extended-Range Operations
ETOPS = Extended-Range Twin-Engine Operations
But I prefer - opérations de bimoteurs avec distance de vol prolongée.
For some reason it sounds like there's less chance of everyone getting wet if you're flying with "bimoteurs" instead of just two engines.
[This message has been edited by stagger (edited 08 January 2001).]
Guest
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Lu,
Won't start a technical discussion with you, as the outcome would be akin to Burkina Faso going to war against the US. Short and bloody.
However, bringing in the 737 in an ETOPS discussion is pretty far fetched. A more appropriate a/c would be the 767, or which less than 1000 has been built and not all of them ETOPS equipped / certified and with 3 different engine makers and probably several sub-types. So, assuming around 1/2 the 767's are ETOPS and 1/2 of those operate with, say, the PW4000. That'll add up to around 250 of that particular type. Each flying an average of 10 hours pr. day, that's roughly 1 mill. hours/year for the entire fleet. And with an inflight reliability of 1-10 9 a failure will be a most uncommon affair. And losing both engines on the same a/c should be more or less impossible, from a statistical point of view. And finally, the design of any 2 engined ETOPS aircraft has allowed for the aircraft to operate safely on 1 engine for up to 180 minutes.
Please don't kill me over the exact numbers, this should only serve as an example.
In short, I'd feel perfectly safe crossing the pond in any 2-engined ETOPS aeroplane, be it a Boring or A-bus.
Any ETOPS drivers around who's experienced an inflight shutdown and consequently diversion ?
Won't start a technical discussion with you, as the outcome would be akin to Burkina Faso going to war against the US. Short and bloody.
However, bringing in the 737 in an ETOPS discussion is pretty far fetched. A more appropriate a/c would be the 767, or which less than 1000 has been built and not all of them ETOPS equipped / certified and with 3 different engine makers and probably several sub-types. So, assuming around 1/2 the 767's are ETOPS and 1/2 of those operate with, say, the PW4000. That'll add up to around 250 of that particular type. Each flying an average of 10 hours pr. day, that's roughly 1 mill. hours/year for the entire fleet. And with an inflight reliability of 1-10 9 a failure will be a most uncommon affair. And losing both engines on the same a/c should be more or less impossible, from a statistical point of view. And finally, the design of any 2 engined ETOPS aircraft has allowed for the aircraft to operate safely on 1 engine for up to 180 minutes.
Please don't kill me over the exact numbers, this should only serve as an example.
In short, I'd feel perfectly safe crossing the pond in any 2-engined ETOPS aeroplane, be it a Boring or A-bus.
Any ETOPS drivers around who's experienced an inflight shutdown and consequently diversion ?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Here's the fundamental problem with ETOPs as I see it...
Say that you'd expect a single engine to fail (not necessarily catastrophically) around once every 30,000 hours of flight. Lets call the probability of single engine failure within an hour of flight Psef
So Psef = 3.33 x 10^-5
Is the probability of double engine failure (Pdef) simply given by…
Pdef = Psef x Psef = 1.11 x 10^-9 (roughly 1 in a billion).
No!
Why not? Because the events are not independent!
Psef can be calculated from the history of a particular engine operating under normal conditions. Sufficient hours of operation have been accumulated under normal operating conditions to indicate that an estimate of Psef = 3.33 x 10^-5 is not unreasonable.
In contrast, comparatively few hours of single engine flight time have been accumulated under the abnormal operating conditions likely to be associated with an ETOPs diversion. Consequently, we simply do not know just how likely it is that the second engine will fail under these conditions.
Given that the first engine has failed it is likely that the probability of the second engine failing is substantially greater than Psef so the probability of dual failure is substantially greater than Psef x Psef.
Note that ETOPs regulations do acknowledge this problem and try to make these events as independent as possible. For each engine - different overhaul times, different mechanics etc. However, these precautions don't deal with the fact that an engine operating alone during an ETOPs diversion is not operating under the same conditions as one of a fully functional pair during normal flight.
Guest
Posts: n/a
To: Stagger
First of all reliability and safety calculations are based on 10-6 so all failure rates must be converted to that value. Your calculations are correct. The probability of losing both engines using your failure rate of 30,000 hours is 1.1109 10-9. However your statement “No” is incorrect because the failure of one engine is independent from the failure of the other. The failure of both engines at the same time can be attributed to an external source (fuel starvation/contamination or, flying through an ash cloud or heavy rain/hail and there fore cannot be quantified in the calculation. It can be considered but the frequency of occurrence is unknown.
In the performance of a Safety Analysis (Fault Tree Analysis) the probability of failure of the two individual engines are joined at an And Gate. That means that to have a total loss of power both engines must fail. The way they arrive at the total figure is to multiply the individual failure rates against each other. Based on your failure rate of 30,000 hours the rate of failure on one engine would be 33.33 10-6 or, 33.33 times in a million hours of operation for that type of engine being used on what ever type of aircraft. By multiplying one failure rate against the other you get 1.1109 10-9.
That is the number that is in the final safety document that is turned over to the certification authorities. However the FAA/CAA may have indicated that the failure of both engines due to independent failure modes might be higher that 1 10-9. If that’s the case the reliability analyst may have to plug in some different numbers when they perform their reliability analysis. The whole thing is based on numbers that may not even have related to the parts being analyzed. Every thing is based on statistical analysis and the numbers in most cases do not reflect the true reliability and safety of the aircraft or its components and appliances. That is why aircraft crash at a frequency higher than that required to gain certification.
------------------
The Cat
First of all reliability and safety calculations are based on 10-6 so all failure rates must be converted to that value. Your calculations are correct. The probability of losing both engines using your failure rate of 30,000 hours is 1.1109 10-9. However your statement “No” is incorrect because the failure of one engine is independent from the failure of the other. The failure of both engines at the same time can be attributed to an external source (fuel starvation/contamination or, flying through an ash cloud or heavy rain/hail and there fore cannot be quantified in the calculation. It can be considered but the frequency of occurrence is unknown.
In the performance of a Safety Analysis (Fault Tree Analysis) the probability of failure of the two individual engines are joined at an And Gate. That means that to have a total loss of power both engines must fail. The way they arrive at the total figure is to multiply the individual failure rates against each other. Based on your failure rate of 30,000 hours the rate of failure on one engine would be 33.33 10-6 or, 33.33 times in a million hours of operation for that type of engine being used on what ever type of aircraft. By multiplying one failure rate against the other you get 1.1109 10-9.
That is the number that is in the final safety document that is turned over to the certification authorities. However the FAA/CAA may have indicated that the failure of both engines due to independent failure modes might be higher that 1 10-9. If that’s the case the reliability analyst may have to plug in some different numbers when they perform their reliability analysis. The whole thing is based on numbers that may not even have related to the parts being analyzed. Every thing is based on statistical analysis and the numbers in most cases do not reflect the true reliability and safety of the aircraft or its components and appliances. That is why aircraft crash at a frequency higher than that required to gain certification.
------------------
The Cat
Guest
Posts: n/a
Dr Red,
Yes it is possible for an uncotained failure of a wing engine to disable the engine on the opposite wing. Happened on a DC10-10 wher the No 2 fan let go and debris hit the fuselage and also went under the fuselage to hit No1. The No 2 fan completely distroyed the front of the engine leaving th High Speed gearbox attached by only the electrical cables and Hydro lines.
Secondly throughout the thread, all failure analysis seem to be concerning engine. There are also system failures that could be equally uncomfortable.
Durring B777 test program one air sytem was shut down whereon the main Non Return Valve failed so the aircraft depressurised through the dead system. This happened on 2 separate occasions - first low level - second 40,000 ft. The crew did emergency descent and were taken to hospital.
Imagine complete depressurisation at PON and what the fuel burn would be at 10,000ft !
Yes it is possible for an uncotained failure of a wing engine to disable the engine on the opposite wing. Happened on a DC10-10 wher the No 2 fan let go and debris hit the fuselage and also went under the fuselage to hit No1. The No 2 fan completely distroyed the front of the engine leaving th High Speed gearbox attached by only the electrical cables and Hydro lines.
Secondly throughout the thread, all failure analysis seem to be concerning engine. There are also system failures that could be equally uncomfortable.
Durring B777 test program one air sytem was shut down whereon the main Non Return Valve failed so the aircraft depressurised through the dead system. This happened on 2 separate occasions - first low level - second 40,000 ft. The crew did emergency descent and were taken to hospital.
Imagine complete depressurisation at PON and what the fuel burn would be at 10,000ft !
Guest
Posts: n/a
http://fly.to/avia3710
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaver...28/litrev.html
http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/006484.html Similar Singapore Airlines 777 oil loss (Feb 2000) (thread now not retrievable - but reproduced below from archive)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
below is from http://www.egroups.com/group/triple7/745.html?
Quote
I'm still catching up with news after the holidays...
AIR TRANSPORT - MAS Admits maintenance lapse after 777 suffers double engine
trouble
Flight International Online News (24Dec99)
Malaysia Airlines (MAS) has admitted that a maintenance lapse was
responsible for the emergency landing of a Boeing 777-200 suffering low oil
pressure on both its Rolls-Royce Trent 800s.
Flight MH137, operating from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Auckland, New
Zealand, on 4 December, was forced to return to Kuala Lumpur International
Airport after the captain noticed a gradual oil-pressure drop in both
powerplants.
MAS says: "A technical inquiry has established that the engines were losing
oil pressure from a breather vent tube on each engine, which were
disconnected for maintenance. A lapse in hand-over between the shifts had
led to the vent tubes remaining unconnected. An engine test run was
conducted after maintenance. No oil leak was detected until the flight was
despatched."
Full story at http://www.flightinternational.com/fiwelcfra.html.
This is about as close to a sin-bin offence for a failure to meet ETOPS
standards that an airline can approach without heavy fines and a loss of
certification. If either engine had failed due to this problem I daresay
we'd be talking about how Malaysia lost the right to fly 180 minutes
ETOPS....
Russ.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> A recent B777 in flight shutdown was filed by SIA management as "pre-cautionary" Investigations revealed that there was little oil left in the engine, as most had been ejected over the Bay of Bengal. Non compliance by the crew to shut the offending engine down, would have resulted in a severe case of the shakes!
If it had been correctly filed as an required in flight shutdown,then SQ may have had problems with its 207 mins ETOPS over the pacific.Urm, would you fly here?? Do pax care? Does anybody?
IP: Logged
venom
Experienced PPRuner
Posts: 20
Registered: Oct 98
posted 17 February 2000 18:06
---------------------------------------------
Oil does seem to be rather a worrisome problem with SIA. After all the expat engineers left a few years ago, management decided to employ main-land Chinese engineers to make up the numbers. During routine maintance of one of their A310 one of these new boys did an oil change and filled the engine up with hydraulic fluid. The aircraft subsequently had an engine failure after take off.
Lucky the same guy didn't do the other engine. ETOPS policy I hope?
Amazing stuff, but it happened.
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaver...28/litrev.html
http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/006484.html Similar Singapore Airlines 777 oil loss (Feb 2000) (thread now not retrievable - but reproduced below from archive)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
below is from http://www.egroups.com/group/triple7/745.html?
Quote
I'm still catching up with news after the holidays...
AIR TRANSPORT - MAS Admits maintenance lapse after 777 suffers double engine
trouble
Flight International Online News (24Dec99)
Malaysia Airlines (MAS) has admitted that a maintenance lapse was
responsible for the emergency landing of a Boeing 777-200 suffering low oil
pressure on both its Rolls-Royce Trent 800s.
Flight MH137, operating from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Auckland, New
Zealand, on 4 December, was forced to return to Kuala Lumpur International
Airport after the captain noticed a gradual oil-pressure drop in both
powerplants.
MAS says: "A technical inquiry has established that the engines were losing
oil pressure from a breather vent tube on each engine, which were
disconnected for maintenance. A lapse in hand-over between the shifts had
led to the vent tubes remaining unconnected. An engine test run was
conducted after maintenance. No oil leak was detected until the flight was
despatched."
Full story at http://www.flightinternational.com/fiwelcfra.html.
This is about as close to a sin-bin offence for a failure to meet ETOPS
standards that an airline can approach without heavy fines and a loss of
certification. If either engine had failed due to this problem I daresay
we'd be talking about how Malaysia lost the right to fly 180 minutes
ETOPS....
Russ.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> A recent B777 in flight shutdown was filed by SIA management as "pre-cautionary" Investigations revealed that there was little oil left in the engine, as most had been ejected over the Bay of Bengal. Non compliance by the crew to shut the offending engine down, would have resulted in a severe case of the shakes!
If it had been correctly filed as an required in flight shutdown,then SQ may have had problems with its 207 mins ETOPS over the pacific.Urm, would you fly here?? Do pax care? Does anybody?
IP: Logged
venom
Experienced PPRuner
Posts: 20
Registered: Oct 98
posted 17 February 2000 18:06
---------------------------------------------
Oil does seem to be rather a worrisome problem with SIA. After all the expat engineers left a few years ago, management decided to employ main-land Chinese engineers to make up the numbers. During routine maintance of one of their A310 one of these new boys did an oil change and filled the engine up with hydraulic fluid. The aircraft subsequently had an engine failure after take off.
Lucky the same guy didn't do the other engine. ETOPS policy I hope?
Amazing stuff, but it happened.
Guest
Posts: n/a
In answer to the shadow. You don´t have to go to the far east to experience grave maintenance errors, we can do just as well here in europe. A few years ago a British Midland B737 takeing off from East Midlands
had to shut down 1 engine due to dropping oil qty, the crew elected to divert to Luton, and during approach the other engine started loosing oil aswell, the landing was uneventful, but during the subsequent investigation it was found that both engines hand crancking pad covers had not been installed after a boroscope inspection.
had to shut down 1 engine due to dropping oil qty, the crew elected to divert to Luton, and during approach the other engine started loosing oil aswell, the landing was uneventful, but during the subsequent investigation it was found that both engines hand crancking pad covers had not been installed after a boroscope inspection.
Guest
Posts: n/a
http://www.open.gov.uk/aaib/gobmm.htm
(is the Boeing twin engine semi-fail case).
------------------
Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men?
(is the Boeing twin engine semi-fail case).
------------------
Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men?
Guest
Posts: n/a
SunSea etc.
I'm aware of that. There's also a few A320's operating under ETOPS. However, my point was that the 737 doesn't operate very often under ETOPS, whereas the 767 (or A330 for that matter) does so far more regularly. And I chose the 767 simply because it's by far the most widely used a/c type fra transatlantic flights. Indeed, the 747 is seeing decreasing usage over the atlantic, in favour of more direct point'to'point routes flown by smaller twins such as the 767, 777 and 330. To my knowledge only a few airlines operate the 747 from Europe to the US east coast, AF and BA being some of them. But they are serving huge hubs FROM huge hubs, and are heavily dependent on lower deck freight to make the crossings profitable (or so I've been told anyway)
I'm aware of that. There's also a few A320's operating under ETOPS. However, my point was that the 737 doesn't operate very often under ETOPS, whereas the 767 (or A330 for that matter) does so far more regularly. And I chose the 767 simply because it's by far the most widely used a/c type fra transatlantic flights. Indeed, the 747 is seeing decreasing usage over the atlantic, in favour of more direct point'to'point routes flown by smaller twins such as the 767, 777 and 330. To my knowledge only a few airlines operate the 747 from Europe to the US east coast, AF and BA being some of them. But they are serving huge hubs FROM huge hubs, and are heavily dependent on lower deck freight to make the crossings profitable (or so I've been told anyway)
Guest
Posts: n/a
GotTheTshirt -
The incident you refer to (unless I'm mistaken) was United Airlines 232 in 1989. The DC10's number 2 engine did fail explosively after the six-foot fan blew apart.
The hydraulic lines were severed, rendering flight controls basically useless, but the other engines were not directly damaged, and the pilots managed to ditch at an airport, saving many lives.
Following the incident, hydraulic systems were overhauled with fuses, etc, so the chance of this happening again is greatly reduced.
I would like to point out that the engine that failed was NOT on the "other wing" but centrally mounted, and that this failure was UNIQUE to such a configuration.
I concur there are other factors that can affect the airworthiness situation after engine failure, but still assert that in today's aircraft, the chance of one' engine's failure affecting the other engines directly is infinitely remote (excepting fuel exhaustion, and other no-brainer occurrances).
I would actually be far more concerned about engine schrapnel puncturing the fuel tanks, control surfaces, cabin space, stewardesses, and so on.
------------------
There's nothing like an airport for bringing you down to earth.
The incident you refer to (unless I'm mistaken) was United Airlines 232 in 1989. The DC10's number 2 engine did fail explosively after the six-foot fan blew apart.
The hydraulic lines were severed, rendering flight controls basically useless, but the other engines were not directly damaged, and the pilots managed to ditch at an airport, saving many lives.
Following the incident, hydraulic systems were overhauled with fuses, etc, so the chance of this happening again is greatly reduced.
I would like to point out that the engine that failed was NOT on the "other wing" but centrally mounted, and that this failure was UNIQUE to such a configuration.
I concur there are other factors that can affect the airworthiness situation after engine failure, but still assert that in today's aircraft, the chance of one' engine's failure affecting the other engines directly is infinitely remote (excepting fuel exhaustion, and other no-brainer occurrances).
I would actually be far more concerned about engine schrapnel puncturing the fuel tanks, control surfaces, cabin space, stewardesses, and so on.
------------------
There's nothing like an airport for bringing you down to earth.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Dr Red
Got the TShirt was possibly referring to:
NTSB Identification: NYC00FA122 Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
Accident occurred APR-25-00 at NEWARK, NJ Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC10-30, registration: N39081 Injuries: 234 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors.
Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On April 25, 2000, at 1942 Eastern Daylight Time, a McDonnell-Douglas DC10-30, N39081, operating as Continental Airlines flight 60, was substantially damaged when an uncontained engine event occurred during takeoff from Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. The 3-man cockpit crew,
11-person cabin crew, and 220 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the flight, between Newark and Brussels Airport (BRU), Brussels, Belgium. The scheduled passenger flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 121. The captain stated that he conducted a crew briefing prior to boarding the airplane. Startup and taxi were normal, and during the taxi, the captain again briefed the cockpit crew, and included engine failures and non-reject situations. The airplane lined up on Runway 04L, and the captain applied takeoff power slowly and smoothly. At takeoff decision speed (V1), there was a loud explosion. A white "engine fail" light illuminated in front of the captain, and the number 1 engine N1 decreased by 30 percent. Number 2 and number 3 engines appeared normal. The captain continued the takeoff, and the landing gear was raised. A red, left main landing gear warning light illuminated on the front panel. The airplane turned to a heading of 010, and slowly climbed to 3,000 feet. During the climb, an airframe vibration developed. After level-off, the crew began to troubleshoot the emergency, and found that when the number 3 engine N1 was reduced to about 25 percent, the vibration disappeared. Both the number 1 and the number 3 engines remained at approximately 25 percent N1 for the rest of the flight. Air traffic control provided vectors for a return to Newark. During the return, the crew dumped about 90,000 pounds of fuel. The crew also ran both 1-engine, and 2-engine inoperative checklists, and prepared data cards for both scenarios. The captain flew the ILS glideslope down to a full-stop landing, on Runway 04R. The ACARS recorded the landing at 2016. After the initial stop, the brakes would not release, so the crew shut down the engines on the runway, and the passengers and crew disembarked through the normal deplaning doors. The airplane was later towed to a ramp. According to the captain, the use of crew resource management (CRM)
by both the cockpit and cabin crews was a major factor in the successful handling of the emergency. Examination of the airplane revealed that all three General Electric CF6-50C2 engines were damaged. The number 1 (left) engine "low pressure turbine" case was breached in the vicinity of the second stage nozzles, from approximately the 3 o'clock, to the 9 o'clock position. The breach was about the width of the second stage nozzle segments, and all of the segments were missing from the engine. Each segment consisted of six nozzle blades. Nine of the 16 nozzle segments were recovered intact, and additional portions of segments were found, for a total recovery of about 85 percent of the nozzle blades. The majority of nozzle material was found on the departure runway; however, one nozzle segment was found in the left main landing gear wheel well. One of the eight anti-rotation nozzle locks was recovered. The threaded stud from that lock had been sheared from the plate, and the engagement tangs exhibited wear and damage. The first stage low pressure turbine blades had minor trailing edge airfoil damage, and the second stage low pressure turbine blades exhibited circumferential rub marks on the inner platform leading edge, and on the airfoils near the blade root. The number 2 (center) engine exhibited leading edge damage to two fan blades. The number 3 (right) engine had leading edge damage to all fan blades, consisting of tears, rips and material loss. Pieces of fan blade, and material similar to that of the second stage nozzles from the number 1 engine, were found embedded in the engine inlet acoustic panels. The left main landing gear, front inboard tire, was ruptured, and the front outboard tire exhibited tread separation, but remained inflated.
Impact marks were noted on the outboard side of the left engine pylon, the left wing outboard flap, the underside of the fuselage, the left main landing gear access door, the left side of the fuselage aft of the left wing, and a right wing panel outboard of the flap actuator housing. The installation of upgraded nozzle locks, per Service Bulletin 721082, was accomplished in 1997.
or maybe
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?e...12X22049&key=1
Related to: a long history of slag inclusions in milled titanium billets used in GE CF-6 (ask the FAA's Jay Pardee about that)
NTSB Identification: NYC00IA250
Scheduled 14 CFRPart 121 operation of Air Carrier CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
Incident occurred Tuesday, September 05, 2000 at NEWARK, NJ
Aircraft:McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, registration: N14090
Injuries: 244 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On September 5, 2000, at 1919 Eastern Daylight Time, a McDonnell-Douglas, DC-10-30, N14090, operated by Continental Airlines as flight 60 received minor damage when the number two engine experienced an uncontained engine failure during the takeoff roll at Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. There were no injuries to the 3-man cockpit crew, 11 flight attendants, or 230 passengers. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the international flight destined for Brussels, Belgium. Flight 60 was on an instrument flight rules flight plan conducted under 14 CFR Part 121.
According to Continental Airlines, the captain initiated a takeoff on runway 4L. When the airplane's speed was about 80 knots, the N1 fan speed on the number 2 (center) engine declined from 104 percent to 78 percent, and the engine fail light illuminated. The captain then initiated a rejected takeoff. After clearing the runway, the airplane was stopped on the taxiway. Emergency personnel reported damage on the number 2 engine. The remaining engines were shut down, and the airplane was towed to the gate where the passengers deplanned through the jetway.
The engine was a General Electric CF6-50C2. Examination of the engine revealed the low pressure turbine case was separated around its circumference, at the back side of the second stage vanes. In addition, from the 9 o'clock position to the 2 o'clock position, a 2 1/4 inch wide strip of the metal case was missing from over the top of 2nd stage vanes. A visual examination through the opened engine case revealed no 2nd stage vanes present in the engine.
The 2nd stage low pressure vanes consisted of 15 segments held in place by locks. Twelve segments were recovered, either on the runway or adjacent areas. One additional piece was jammed into the aerodynamic boat-tail located above the engine. Several pieces of engine cowling and assorted hardware were also recovered. Rubbing damage was visible on the trailing edge of the 1st stage turbine blades and the leading edge 2nd stage turbine blades.
Damage was confined to the engine, engine cowling, and aerodynamic boat-tail above the engine.
The engine was retained for further investigation.
or maybe this one two days later: http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?e...12X22067&key=1
and there's lots of other DC-10 similar
Got the TShirt was possibly referring to:
NTSB Identification: NYC00FA122 Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
Accident occurred APR-25-00 at NEWARK, NJ Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC10-30, registration: N39081 Injuries: 234 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors.
Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On April 25, 2000, at 1942 Eastern Daylight Time, a McDonnell-Douglas DC10-30, N39081, operating as Continental Airlines flight 60, was substantially damaged when an uncontained engine event occurred during takeoff from Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. The 3-man cockpit crew,
11-person cabin crew, and 220 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the flight, between Newark and Brussels Airport (BRU), Brussels, Belgium. The scheduled passenger flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 121. The captain stated that he conducted a crew briefing prior to boarding the airplane. Startup and taxi were normal, and during the taxi, the captain again briefed the cockpit crew, and included engine failures and non-reject situations. The airplane lined up on Runway 04L, and the captain applied takeoff power slowly and smoothly. At takeoff decision speed (V1), there was a loud explosion. A white "engine fail" light illuminated in front of the captain, and the number 1 engine N1 decreased by 30 percent. Number 2 and number 3 engines appeared normal. The captain continued the takeoff, and the landing gear was raised. A red, left main landing gear warning light illuminated on the front panel. The airplane turned to a heading of 010, and slowly climbed to 3,000 feet. During the climb, an airframe vibration developed. After level-off, the crew began to troubleshoot the emergency, and found that when the number 3 engine N1 was reduced to about 25 percent, the vibration disappeared. Both the number 1 and the number 3 engines remained at approximately 25 percent N1 for the rest of the flight. Air traffic control provided vectors for a return to Newark. During the return, the crew dumped about 90,000 pounds of fuel. The crew also ran both 1-engine, and 2-engine inoperative checklists, and prepared data cards for both scenarios. The captain flew the ILS glideslope down to a full-stop landing, on Runway 04R. The ACARS recorded the landing at 2016. After the initial stop, the brakes would not release, so the crew shut down the engines on the runway, and the passengers and crew disembarked through the normal deplaning doors. The airplane was later towed to a ramp. According to the captain, the use of crew resource management (CRM)
by both the cockpit and cabin crews was a major factor in the successful handling of the emergency. Examination of the airplane revealed that all three General Electric CF6-50C2 engines were damaged. The number 1 (left) engine "low pressure turbine" case was breached in the vicinity of the second stage nozzles, from approximately the 3 o'clock, to the 9 o'clock position. The breach was about the width of the second stage nozzle segments, and all of the segments were missing from the engine. Each segment consisted of six nozzle blades. Nine of the 16 nozzle segments were recovered intact, and additional portions of segments were found, for a total recovery of about 85 percent of the nozzle blades. The majority of nozzle material was found on the departure runway; however, one nozzle segment was found in the left main landing gear wheel well. One of the eight anti-rotation nozzle locks was recovered. The threaded stud from that lock had been sheared from the plate, and the engagement tangs exhibited wear and damage. The first stage low pressure turbine blades had minor trailing edge airfoil damage, and the second stage low pressure turbine blades exhibited circumferential rub marks on the inner platform leading edge, and on the airfoils near the blade root. The number 2 (center) engine exhibited leading edge damage to two fan blades. The number 3 (right) engine had leading edge damage to all fan blades, consisting of tears, rips and material loss. Pieces of fan blade, and material similar to that of the second stage nozzles from the number 1 engine, were found embedded in the engine inlet acoustic panels. The left main landing gear, front inboard tire, was ruptured, and the front outboard tire exhibited tread separation, but remained inflated.
Impact marks were noted on the outboard side of the left engine pylon, the left wing outboard flap, the underside of the fuselage, the left main landing gear access door, the left side of the fuselage aft of the left wing, and a right wing panel outboard of the flap actuator housing. The installation of upgraded nozzle locks, per Service Bulletin 721082, was accomplished in 1997.
or maybe
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?e...12X22049&key=1
Related to: a long history of slag inclusions in milled titanium billets used in GE CF-6 (ask the FAA's Jay Pardee about that)
NTSB Identification: NYC00IA250
Scheduled 14 CFRPart 121 operation of Air Carrier CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
Incident occurred Tuesday, September 05, 2000 at NEWARK, NJ
Aircraft:McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, registration: N14090
Injuries: 244 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On September 5, 2000, at 1919 Eastern Daylight Time, a McDonnell-Douglas, DC-10-30, N14090, operated by Continental Airlines as flight 60 received minor damage when the number two engine experienced an uncontained engine failure during the takeoff roll at Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. There were no injuries to the 3-man cockpit crew, 11 flight attendants, or 230 passengers. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the international flight destined for Brussels, Belgium. Flight 60 was on an instrument flight rules flight plan conducted under 14 CFR Part 121.
According to Continental Airlines, the captain initiated a takeoff on runway 4L. When the airplane's speed was about 80 knots, the N1 fan speed on the number 2 (center) engine declined from 104 percent to 78 percent, and the engine fail light illuminated. The captain then initiated a rejected takeoff. After clearing the runway, the airplane was stopped on the taxiway. Emergency personnel reported damage on the number 2 engine. The remaining engines were shut down, and the airplane was towed to the gate where the passengers deplanned through the jetway.
The engine was a General Electric CF6-50C2. Examination of the engine revealed the low pressure turbine case was separated around its circumference, at the back side of the second stage vanes. In addition, from the 9 o'clock position to the 2 o'clock position, a 2 1/4 inch wide strip of the metal case was missing from over the top of 2nd stage vanes. A visual examination through the opened engine case revealed no 2nd stage vanes present in the engine.
The 2nd stage low pressure vanes consisted of 15 segments held in place by locks. Twelve segments were recovered, either on the runway or adjacent areas. One additional piece was jammed into the aerodynamic boat-tail located above the engine. Several pieces of engine cowling and assorted hardware were also recovered. Rubbing damage was visible on the trailing edge of the 1st stage turbine blades and the leading edge 2nd stage turbine blades.
Damage was confined to the engine, engine cowling, and aerodynamic boat-tail above the engine.
The engine was retained for further investigation.
or maybe this one two days later: http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?e...12X22067&key=1
and there's lots of other DC-10 similar
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Dr Red, The Shadow,
Showing my age ! but no the incident was in 1970-72. The aircraft was a DC10-10. I have some photos in the archives but the No 3 fan let go and debris went under the fuse to hit No 1. Debris also hit the fuse and tail and just missed ingesting into No 3 ( Hows that for a bad hair day !) One passenger was killed being sucked out of a RHS seat through the demolished window ! ( apparently no truth to the rumour he hadnt paid for his drink)
This was around the same time that TWA lost a fan on an L1011 going into NY.
The big Fan engines were big problems i the early 70's!
I seem to think Continental and Denver but not certain - will check the attic !
Showing my age ! but no the incident was in 1970-72. The aircraft was a DC10-10. I have some photos in the archives but the No 3 fan let go and debris went under the fuse to hit No 1. Debris also hit the fuse and tail and just missed ingesting into No 3 ( Hows that for a bad hair day !) One passenger was killed being sucked out of a RHS seat through the demolished window ! ( apparently no truth to the rumour he hadnt paid for his drink)
This was around the same time that TWA lost a fan on an L1011 going into NY.
The big Fan engines were big problems i the early 70's!
I seem to think Continental and Denver but not certain - will check the attic !
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Dr Red, & The Shadow
Senility has not quite set in !!!
The following from DC 10 Fatal Accidents on the net.
I do have the pictures somwhere ( got them at the same time as the T Shirt) And the other wing engine was damaged !!
3 November 1973; National Airlines DC10; over New Mexico, USA: The aircraft had an uncontained failure of one of the wing mounted engines. A piece of the engine struck the fuselage and broke a passenger window. One of the 116 passengers was sucked out of the aircraft during a rapid decompression. The remains of the passenger were not found.
Senility has not quite set in !!!
The following from DC 10 Fatal Accidents on the net.
I do have the pictures somwhere ( got them at the same time as the T Shirt) And the other wing engine was damaged !!
3 November 1973; National Airlines DC10; over New Mexico, USA: The aircraft had an uncontained failure of one of the wing mounted engines. A piece of the engine struck the fuselage and broke a passenger window. One of the 116 passengers was sucked out of the aircraft during a rapid decompression. The remains of the passenger were not found.
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PRAGMATIST NEEDED -
Just as a single truck took out a barracks of 200 marines and a rubber dinghy nearly sunk the destroyer Cole, Murphy's Laws are waiting for an ETOPS opportunity. The arrogance required for simple oversight or mistake will do the most damage.
The Newark DC-10 accident is sufficient evidence to send the math boys back to 'thinking' school. Beyond what nearly happened (hydraulic leak, as well)is the fact that the event was plagued with a pre-existing and highly ignored history. While the uncontained failures date to the 1970's, the FAA (I believe) only cited a history since 1989.
Pay attention to the fact that the same company suffered two more uncontained engine failures in short order. The aircraft were all based out of the same city; where is the maintenance oversight by the FAA? Add to that the obvious maintenance standard which is alleged to have been the bizarre initiation of the Concorde crash.
I respectfully submit that engineering arrogance has already condemned a planeload of passengers.
Just as a single truck took out a barracks of 200 marines and a rubber dinghy nearly sunk the destroyer Cole, Murphy's Laws are waiting for an ETOPS opportunity. The arrogance required for simple oversight or mistake will do the most damage.
The Newark DC-10 accident is sufficient evidence to send the math boys back to 'thinking' school. Beyond what nearly happened (hydraulic leak, as well)is the fact that the event was plagued with a pre-existing and highly ignored history. While the uncontained failures date to the 1970's, the FAA (I believe) only cited a history since 1989.
Pay attention to the fact that the same company suffered two more uncontained engine failures in short order. The aircraft were all based out of the same city; where is the maintenance oversight by the FAA? Add to that the obvious maintenance standard which is alleged to have been the bizarre initiation of the Concorde crash.
I respectfully submit that engineering arrogance has already condemned a planeload of passengers.
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It is very interesting to see all these numbers, describing the statistical probability of single and dual engine failures. But I can assure you all, that when you are sitting 180 min from an airfield and one engine suddently becomes very silent, numbers don't mean **** . You are sitting there with one engine left, build by the same manufacturer, at the same plant and maintained by the same people as the one that just stopped working.
Perhaps engines on etops a/c should comply with the same requirements as flight control computers, build at different locations and maintained or at least overhauled by different organizations.
But I guess as always the only numbers that really matters are those followed by a $
Perhaps engines on etops a/c should comply with the same requirements as flight control computers, build at different locations and maintained or at least overhauled by different organizations.
But I guess as always the only numbers that really matters are those followed by a $