Engine Fire
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Montreal
Posts: 116
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I heard about Anticosti, but the one I saw the pics of was up at Churchill. Larry Hearn used to show them at groundschool recurrents. I talked to some mtce guys who saw the engines. They said it was a wonder the whole ship didn't go BOOM!
It seems to me they had two fire warnings in there though--right about the time both fans went zzzziiiiiippppp-----BANG! What do you do in that case? (except turn final and land on the frozen river!)
As for the DC-4M (that was the "North Star", I believe ) "a few teething problems" might just be an understatement there! I heard a few wild stories about those multiple engine fires happening a long way from shore. The way I heard it, at least two of the engines were there based on the assumption that it wasn't unlikely that the first two would quit enroute. Great idea, but those WWII surplus fighter engines just weren't made for the long haul stuff.
It seems to me they had two fire warnings in there though--right about the time both fans went zzzziiiiiippppp-----BANG! What do you do in that case? (except turn final and land on the frozen river!)
As for the DC-4M (that was the "North Star", I believe ) "a few teething problems" might just be an understatement there! I heard a few wild stories about those multiple engine fires happening a long way from shore. The way I heard it, at least two of the engines were there based on the assumption that it wasn't unlikely that the first two would quit enroute. Great idea, but those WWII surplus fighter engines just weren't made for the long haul stuff.
Yeah, they were lucky the river was where it was. The Anticosti guy had uploaded the stuff outta UL, a combination of varsol, MEK, acetone etc. They did a dry takeoff in UL, and on the wet takeoff from the island, the right engine blew just before V1. Golden horseshoe time.
The US Navy had a G1 where the F/O armed the w/m on takeoff right after the gear retraction. They'd been doing wet departures all summer, and their procedure had the PNF reaching up and turning the w/m off first thing after retracting the gear. The first cool day, they did a dry takeoff, and the PNF reached up without thinking and flipped the w/m switches, from off to on. They overtemped both engines but got it around and landed. I saw the pics at Flight Safety. The engine mounts were visibly twisted out of true.
The US Navy had a G1 where the F/O armed the w/m on takeoff right after the gear retraction. They'd been doing wet departures all summer, and their procedure had the PNF reaching up and turning the w/m off first thing after retracting the gear. The first cool day, they did a dry takeoff, and the PNF reached up without thinking and flipped the w/m switches, from off to on. They overtemped both engines but got it around and landed. I saw the pics at Flight Safety. The engine mounts were visibly twisted out of true.
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Arizona USA
Posts: 8,571
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pigboat
Similar ops with F.27's in Libya many years ago with an oil company.
All wet takeoffs, all the time.
Standard procedure was to switch W/M off before climb power (14,200rpm) set.
Suggested to the chief pilot that according to Fokker, this was not a good idea, performance wise.
He looked at me long and hard (probably thinking what does this young wiseguy know)...and said, yep you're right, type out a new checklist.
Couldn't get out of the office for two weeks
as he found more for me to do as well.
Learned a lot from these older guys.
Then, when flying with him a month later, he starts looking for ground fine at 50 feet on landing.
On taxi back he says...did I really do that?
On his desk a week later was a big note to himself...thou shalt NOT select G/F before landing.
All wet takeoffs, all the time.
Standard procedure was to switch W/M off before climb power (14,200rpm) set.
Suggested to the chief pilot that according to Fokker, this was not a good idea, performance wise.
He looked at me long and hard (probably thinking what does this young wiseguy know)...and said, yep you're right, type out a new checklist.
Couldn't get out of the office for two weeks
as he found more for me to do as well.Learned a lot from these older guys.
Then, when flying with him a month later, he starts looking for ground fine at 50 feet on landing.
On taxi back he says...did I really do that?
On his desk a week later was a big note to himself...thou shalt NOT select G/F before landing.
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Montreal
Posts: 116
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yahooo, water on at 50'!! What a wake-up that must have been! I guess that's why we always pulled back to 14500 as soon as we cleared the trees instead of flipping the switches--you always can get it back if you get scared, and you won't ever turn it on by mistake.
I always wondered what would happed if you turned them on after 15000 was set, now I know!
I wouldn't have been surprised if exploding cans might have rung the bell after somebody did something like that.
I always wondered what would happed if you turned them on after 15000 was set, now I know!
I wouldn't have been surprised if exploding cans might have rung the bell after somebody did something like that.
411, yeah not a good idea at all to select it off too soon. On our checklist it was about item number six or so. Gear, power, flaps, temps, fuel heat, water.
Somebody selects GFP in the air, he's sure trusting those squat switches to keep his butt in one piece, ain't he.
I'm guessing that was a Fokker machine. I've never flown that one. I believe it had a slightly different system for selecting GFP than the Fairchild.
Somebody selects GFP in the air, he's sure trusting those squat switches to keep his butt in one piece, ain't he.
I'm guessing that was a Fokker machine. I've never flown that one. I believe it had a slightly different system for selecting GFP than the Fairchild.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I sometimes feel uneasy about the Boeing advice not to take action on an engine fire until at least 400 feet after take off. This seems to imply that an engine fire in (say), a 737, is no big deal.
With a engine fire warning at V1 at a WAT limiting take off weight, it could take some time to climb to 400 ft particularly if for some reason the gear is not retracted immediately. By this I mean a PNF forgets to call positive climb and the PF is so used to hearing positive rate that when it is not verbalised he instinctively fails to call gear up.
The worst I have seen in the simulator is around one minute of fire warning before the crew take the first recall action. It seems that a dangerous false sense of security is engendered by strict adherance to a Boeing SOP that is more concerned with the possibility of wrong identification than extinguishing what may well be a blazing out of control fire.
Unless the crew get visual confirmation of severe fire from the cabin crew or outside observers, it is probable that the crew have no idea of the severity or otherwise of the engine fire. After all, all the crew can see is a red light on a fire handle and they would not know if its an itsy bitsy fire or a roaring inferno.
In the simulator I have seen the PNF have writers block when directed to carry out the recall items for an engine fire at V1. In one case the PNF hesitated an inordinate time because he was trying to remember in time of extreme stress whether the first recall item was throttle closed then auto-throttle disconnect - or the other way around. Meanwhile the PF waited impatiently while the fire burnt away vital bits and pieces. Very worrying.
With a engine fire warning at V1 at a WAT limiting take off weight, it could take some time to climb to 400 ft particularly if for some reason the gear is not retracted immediately. By this I mean a PNF forgets to call positive climb and the PF is so used to hearing positive rate that when it is not verbalised he instinctively fails to call gear up.
The worst I have seen in the simulator is around one minute of fire warning before the crew take the first recall action. It seems that a dangerous false sense of security is engendered by strict adherance to a Boeing SOP that is more concerned with the possibility of wrong identification than extinguishing what may well be a blazing out of control fire.
Unless the crew get visual confirmation of severe fire from the cabin crew or outside observers, it is probable that the crew have no idea of the severity or otherwise of the engine fire. After all, all the crew can see is a red light on a fire handle and they would not know if its an itsy bitsy fire or a roaring inferno.
In the simulator I have seen the PNF have writers block when directed to carry out the recall items for an engine fire at V1. In one case the PNF hesitated an inordinate time because he was trying to remember in time of extreme stress whether the first recall item was throttle closed then auto-throttle disconnect - or the other way around. Meanwhile the PF waited impatiently while the fire burnt away vital bits and pieces. Very worrying.
Hudson
Be assurred that Boeing took under consideration considerable experience with engine fires shared by all manufacturers data banks.
All of your "what ifs" were postulated and obvious "factuals" as well.
It was noted that the greater risk with uncontrolled engine fires was on the ground while the greater risk with crew error under stressfull situations was beyond v1.
You are probably correct in pointing out that some "what if" scenarios are not properly accounted for under the recommended procedure, but the idea was to save more lives in our imperfect world.
Be assurred that Boeing took under consideration considerable experience with engine fires shared by all manufacturers data banks.
All of your "what ifs" were postulated and obvious "factuals" as well.
It was noted that the greater risk with uncontrolled engine fires was on the ground while the greater risk with crew error under stressfull situations was beyond v1.
You are probably correct in pointing out that some "what if" scenarios are not properly accounted for under the recommended procedure, but the idea was to save more lives in our imperfect world.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Iomapaseo.
Thanks for the good advice. You have given me something to think about. I keep on thinking though, about the advice that I received at first hand from a gnarled old Boeing instructor pilot called Joe Z back in 1976, that the cockpit drills and recommendations were actually aimed at the weakest link - third world crews. Letting a fierce engine fire burn until above 400 ft before taking the first action still niggles me.
Thanks for the good advice. You have given me something to think about. I keep on thinking though, about the advice that I received at first hand from a gnarled old Boeing instructor pilot called Joe Z back in 1976, that the cockpit drills and recommendations were actually aimed at the weakest link - third world crews. Letting a fierce engine fire burn until above 400 ft before taking the first action still niggles me.
The Reverend
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Sydney,NSW,Australia
Posts: 2,020
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hudson, I also knew Joe Z. What he told us was that the Boeing training philosophy was based on the A & Ns as a common denominator. Our SOPs also required 400' before actioning an emergency or abnormal checklist. An engine fire warning, even if it is genuine does not mean power loss of that engine. Maybe if the flight engineer on the Air France Concorde had not initiated the fire drill on No.2 engine before it was called for, they may have at least cleared the hotel building they crashed into, who knows? How long does it take to climb to 400' with TO power?
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: NL
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Even if you are not sure, shut it down and pull the #$*%*# handle! Flying on one engine is not a big deal in most turbo props. And finding out that you have shut down a good engine due to a faulty warning is by far less worse than... A red fire warning means FIRE to me! (regardless of the detection system; I have shut down and extinguished a good engine on a Beech 99 (King Air) after a faulty warning; I am glad I did).
Happy Flights
(Off course no drill below 400' (500')...
Happy Flights
(Off course no drill below 400' (500')...
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Arizona USA
Posts: 8,571
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
<even if you are not sure, shut it down and pull the *!^%#@* handle>
Hmm, I wonder.
Scenario to consider.
On departure JED (bound for JFK) a B747SP developed high vibs from engine #2 at 400agl. Captain retarded the throttle, vibs reduced. When the throttle was once again advanced (bad idea), vibs returned (bigtime) and the engine came apart, pieces of which entered the intake of number one engine.
The number one fire pull handle illuminated (along with the fire bell), bell was silenced, and climb continued, with engine #1 still producing full rated thrust. RR engines, so would expect nothing less.
The Flight Engineer, not being content with the situation, without saying a word, reached up and pulled the number one fire pull handle.
The aircraft was now at 900agl, on two engines, at heavy weight.
Superb flying by the Commander (PF) prevented a disaster.
APU was started, fuel dumping was commenced immediately, and the aircraft returned for an overweight landing, pronto.
Sometimes, engine shut down too soon is a very bad idea.
Hmm, I wonder.
Scenario to consider.
On departure JED (bound for JFK) a B747SP developed high vibs from engine #2 at 400agl. Captain retarded the throttle, vibs reduced. When the throttle was once again advanced (bad idea), vibs returned (bigtime) and the engine came apart, pieces of which entered the intake of number one engine.
The number one fire pull handle illuminated (along with the fire bell), bell was silenced, and climb continued, with engine #1 still producing full rated thrust. RR engines, so would expect nothing less.
The Flight Engineer, not being content with the situation, without saying a word, reached up and pulled the number one fire pull handle.
The aircraft was now at 900agl, on two engines, at heavy weight.
Superb flying by the Commander (PF) prevented a disaster.
APU was started, fuel dumping was commenced immediately, and the aircraft returned for an overweight landing, pronto.
Sometimes, engine shut down too soon is a very bad idea.
Last edited by 411A; 2nd Aug 2003 at 12:14.
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: Australia
Posts: 146
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
411A
Do you know what the Commander said to the FE afterwards? I suspect it might have been in French!
I believe a similar thing occured with the Concorde crash a few years ago, FE shutdown an engine without being instructed to, leaving the heavy aircraft on two!
I believe a similar thing occured with the Concorde crash a few years ago, FE shutdown an engine without being instructed to, leaving the heavy aircraft on two!
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Arizona USA
Posts: 8,571
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Oddly enough Dan, the Commander was asked this very same question next day by the equipment manager, and his reply...
'too darn busy at 900 feet descending to hold ground school...'
They were very lucky. Fortunate in that this was the -SP model, good performance.
And you won't find this incident in any data base, kept very quietly in house.
'too darn busy at 900 feet descending to hold ground school...'
They were very lucky. Fortunate in that this was the -SP model, good performance.
And you won't find this incident in any data base, kept very quietly in house.
Paxing All Over The World
Thanks for some interesting stories, as always. I shall pass on the accidental selection 'on' of water/meth, to my nephew who drives J41s, many of them 'wet' equipped.
One example of a damaged engine still pulling strongly is the unfortunate Brit Midland 734 diverting into EMF. IIRC, the engine with the fire showed no other signs and operated as normal?
If I may, a fire-related question. When you discharge the bottle, where does it go?
Reason for question is: If airborne, and the bottle discharges into the core, then I would imagine that the extinguishant will be blown out of the back a split second later and not have time to have an effect?
One example of a damaged engine still pulling strongly is the unfortunate Brit Midland 734 diverting into EMF. IIRC, the engine with the fire showed no other signs and operated as normal?
If I may, a fire-related question. When you discharge the bottle, where does it go?
Reason for question is: If airborne, and the bottle discharges into the core, then I would imagine that the extinguishant will be blown out of the back a split second later and not have time to have an effect?
One example of a damaged engine still pulling strongly is the unfortunate Brit Midland 734 diverting into EMF. IIRC, the engine with the fire showed no other signs and operated as normal?
If I may, a fire-related question. When you discharge the bottle, where does it go?
Reason for question is: If airborne, and the bottle discharges into the core, then I would imagine that the extinguishant will be blown out of the back a split second later and not have time to have an effect?
If I may, a fire-related question. When you discharge the bottle, where does it go?
Reason for question is: If airborne, and the bottle discharges into the core, then I would imagine that the extinguishant will be blown out of the back a split second later and not have time to have an effect?
I believe the Brit Midland 734 you are relating was the one that started with a flutter fatigued and relase of a fan blade in flight followed by surge sparks and vibration which greatly diminished as the pilot pulled this engine back a mite. Unfortunately he shut down the other engine feeling it was the bad un.
Subsequently when he tried using the broken engine during landing with throttle dithering the vibration broke a fuel line and it caught fire
The fire extunguisher bottles are there to protect the pylon and wing not the engine and as such they discharge outside of the engine within the nacelle area while at the same time shuting off fuel to the engine.
Does this answer your question or have I missed it?
Paxing All Over The World
lomopeso: Many thanks for putting me right on the BD 734, obviously way out of touch on that.
As to the extinguishant - thanks, yes that is what I had presumed.
As to the extinguishant - thanks, yes that is what I had presumed.
