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STS-107, Chronicle Of A Disaster Foretold?

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STS-107, Chronicle Of A Disaster Foretold?

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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 16:57
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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The Ku (and I think the S band as well) band space-ground data is sent using geostationary TDRS (Tracking and Data Relay) satellites. Using the TDRS avoids the blackout that was the constant feature of all Mercury through early shuttle missions.
This is indeed correct.

NASA has real time data for the complete reentry phase.

Not that could *do* much

--alex
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 17:02
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airship

I apologize for the tone I used ...

<<It sounds like the builders and operators of the Titanic not only believed their vessel was unsinkable but that even when the vessel was struck, decided not to launch any lifeboats at all, and sending an SOS would have been an entire waste of effort>>
I disagree. Any book you read on something such as the shuttle will tell you there are a number of "critical" failures that are fatal - full stop.

1. The designers never considered the shuttle "unsinkable"
2. They are not able to incorporate or launch "lifeboats"
3. "and sending an SOS would have been an entire waste of effort" - frankly yes.

I think you have to remove traditional safety concepts of civil / public transportation from a vehicle such as the shuttle. If you applied these standards (lifeboats etc.) it would never fly.

You are also jumping to the conclusion that the break up had something to do with the loss of the foam on launch. I agree it is the only other "event" of note with this flight so far, but that does not mean it was the cause. Most accidents tend to have a multitude of causes, and rarely the ones that appeared obvious on day 1. I think we'll have to wait sometime longer...

If it was a tile loss / damage leading to overheating then break up I would have thought some temperature sensors would have given more warning of this? There was talk of temperature sensiors built into the body (wing underside?). Any experts out there know the point of maximum heating in the recovery?

NoD
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 17:05
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Cool

BOAC (I loved that airline!),

I would have to agree with your point. While allowing that an "abort" would have been very hard, if not impossible to "call", I also think that the obvious is being ignored. This is that manned-missions close to earth should be envisaged with the view that rescue is possible.
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 17:06
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<<NASA has real time data for the complete reentry phase.

Not that could *do* much >>

Not to save the crew of vehicle - however, hopefully does mean the full telemetry is recorded and able to be analysed for the investigation. Had there been a "black out" phase (as I initially thought) and the break up occurred then, the investigation would have had almost nothing.

NoD
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 17:20
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Cool

The last comms exchange prior to total comms/telemetry loss between Houston and Columbia was Houston acknowledging receipt of data on tire pressures. If this data indicates a pressure increase this could be due to the extreme temps on re-entry actually penetrating the heat-resistant "system" as a consequence of the integrity of the heat-resistant "system" being impaired on launch.

All total speculation at this stage.

NASA does, however, appear to be keeping the public informed this time round, after the semi-secrecy following Challenger. Let's all hope that once the data/telemetry that were subject to the contingency is married with the outcome of the NTSB/NASA investigation a cause can be established and new measures adopted for future manned missions.

There have been suggestions that an EVA was not possible, that the underside of Columbia was not able to be viewed and that there was no possibility of a dock with ISS. Let's hope future missions can incorporate some flexibility on such issues.

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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 17:54
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Some viewpoints:

"Aborting" the launch.
Once the "button" is pressed to launch, the Shuttle is committed to continue until the SRBs are jettisoned. Once these have gone, there are various "options" - however, all are hazardous. There is RTLS (Return to Launch Site) - however, I believe this has a significant chance of ending up in the sea. There is "abort to Africa" - I think this happens with 2 engines lost - again, hazardous. Then there are the safer ATO - Abort to Orbit e.g. for 1 orbit - however, this will involve a reentry. There has, I believe, been 1 abort to date for an engine failure - however, it was the mildest option, and left the shuttle in a lower than desired orbit.

I think you will find that very rarely are the Crew / Mission Control going to "call" an Abort - in practice they will be "forced" into one of the above options by onboard engine failure(s).

<<There have been suggestions that an EVA was not possible>>
Yes - the kit was not on board, nor had the training been carried out for this crew's mission.

<< that the underside of Columbia was not able to be viewed>>
Exactly - there is no mechanism, except EVA. Even the arm, when carried (it was not here) cannot "see under". I have to ask the question - if they saw damage what were they going to do?

<< and that there was no possibility of a dock with ISS.>>
A massive loss of flexibility if this is to be required. It takes a hell of a lot of energy to get into orbit. To now decide you want a different orbit is not like changing lanes on a motorway - it is like needing most of the energy supply you had at launch at your disposal again. Note when they have problems how tight the launch windows are if some rendevous if required.

<< Let's hope future missions can incorporate some flexibility on such issues.>>
I doubt it - the loss of flexibility and increase in costs would make an already dubious machine financially absolutely useless.

If you want to go down this route, I think the only way to do so is to seriously look at whether the work done by the shuttle needs to manned spacecraft. It comes down to one's moral judgements - all viewpoints of which have to be respected.

Personally, looking at the slim margins and design fundamentals of the shuttle, 2 losses in over 100 missions is probably par for the course, if not better than expected. There have been a number of VERY close shaves, and all of these are still Criticality 1 items - if they happen = total loss.

NoD
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 17:56
  #27 (permalink)  
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Cool

NoD,

No problem, but thanks for your message!

It is true that I am guilty of jumping to conclusions. There could not be a discussion if we were to wait for the official declarations...

Regarding the sensors, I understood from the NASA press conference that there were 12 or more temperature sensors in the left wing area, all of which operated normally until moments before the accident. There was also some mention that simultaneous "failure" of sensors can also be due to malfunction of the signal processor or multiplexer unit through which their signals are processed. However, I understand that not all of these sensor's signals went through the same "avionics box". Needless to say, it was probably by far too late to abort re-entry by the time these anomalies occurred? If there had been significant damage to the heat-shield after launch, would these same sensors have not registered anomalies during the shuttle's orbits, when the underside would have been (repeatedly) exposed to wide fluctuations in temperature from exposure to the sun?

Your comments concerning:

1. The designers never considered the shuttle "unsinkable" - granted.
2. They are not able to incorporate or launch "lifeboats" - just as the lunar module on one of the Apollo missions provided relief (or was that just a film?!), an EVA airlock and docking system are both valid and pre-requisite for would-be rescues of near-Earth missions.
3. "and sending an SOS would have been an entire waste of effort" - frankly yes. - in this case there was no "Houston, we have a problem" message because Houston didn't think it had a problem. In space, nobody cries "Wolf"!
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 18:14
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Interesting synopsis of possible cause is to be found

here at this link.

Takes a different perspective and looks at some of the critical factors that can affect re-entry.....or cause catastrophe.
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 18:20
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airship...

<<Regarding the sensors, I understood from the NASA press conference that there were 12 or more temperature sensors in the left wing area, all of which operated normally until moments before the accident>>
This is an area that is interesting. NASA have commented in detail on how numerous temp (and other) in the left wing were progressively lost, and small mention of how some showed temp rises - this from Sky's site:
_________________________________________
1356: Temperatures in the housing of the left main landing gear rise. At this point the shuttle is 207,135ft or 39 miles up and travelling at 12,500mph - 18 times the speed of sound.

1358: Temperature sensors in the left wing, embedded in the structure of the vehicle, stop working.

1359: Pressure and temperature sensors for both tyres on the left main landing gear go offline
_________________________________________

What I'd really like to know is what the << Temperature sensors in the left wing, embedded in the structure of the vehicle>> showed prior to stopping working. Presumably these sensors are there to monitor the renetry, if only "after" the event.

<<Needless to say, it was probably by far too late to abort re-entry by the time these anomalies occurred?>>
They start 1 (of 3) APUs (1 needed to power flight controls and landing gear) in orbit prior to "deorbit" (a long burn to slow the shuttle down). Once deorbit starts, its coming to earth whatever! It has no fuel to regain all that energy - in fact, what little fuel it has remaining is "dumped" after the deorbit burn. But again, even if any anomolies had been seen, what to do? All one can really do is recover to earth and "hope for the best".

<<there had been significant damage to the heat-shield after launch, would these same sensors have not registered anomalies during the shuttle's orbits, when the underside would have been (repeatedly) exposed to wide fluctuations in temperature from exposure to the sun?>>
Interesting - but doubt it. The Heat Shield / Tiles protect against a short / sharp rise during renetry. In orbit things take longer, so probably expect to see fluctuations?

<<just as the lunar module on one of the Apollo missions provided relief (or was that just a film?!), >>
The Apollo missions had an escape rocket attached to the manned capsule. From Prior Launch to not too long after (it was then jettisoned) it could be used to drag the capsule away, and let them come down be parachute. Not suitable for the shuttle because its (only) way of landing is using the whole thing as a glider. They put some pole in with parachutes after Challenger, but I think the circumstances it can be used are very limited!

<<an EVA airlock and docking system are both valid and pre-requisite for would-be rescues of near-Earth missions. >>
It has a dead standard airlock into the cargo bay. However, any EVA system needs something to EVA into. What?

<<3. "and sending an SOS would have been an entire waste of effort" - frankly yes. - in this case there was no "Houston, we have a problem" message because Houston didn't think it had a problem. In space, nobody cries "Wolf"!>>
Some Prof on Sky making possible suggestion Mission Contorl knew all along recovery would be / may be fatal:
_______________________________________
Pressed by Jeremy Thompson, Prof Balogh said he was satisfied that NASA had been fully aware of the problem and had, in all probability, known all along it was potentially fatal
_______________________________________

I note from the NASA brief yesterday they only became aware of the bit falling off the day after launch - so no possibility of any decisions to be taken during the launch phase.

NoD
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 18:23
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.

Divert to the ISS was never possible, changing plane of orbit takes *a lot* of fuel, far more than Columbia had.
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 18:27
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TheShadow

Some interesting stuff in that link, but a lot of speculation - particularly about pilots and autopilot.

I think in yesterday's brief, NASA said 3 launches ago a similar section of tank detached. The next launch it did not, and then this launch it did. An investigation was ongoing which was to report prior to the next launch. Maybe some material change in the tank construction recently?

NoD

NB NASA news conference 2130Z tonight I think. Given the detail they gave last night - I don't think anything significant has come out since - should be interesting.
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 18:35
  #32 (permalink)  
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Were NASA (or certain elements within) aware that STS-107 Columbia was doomed shortly after launch?

I have the following proposals:

1) We drink a toast to SOYUZ. Those on the ISS will be grateful that there is an alternative space program.

2) That a shuttle be permanently positioned at the ISS in order to perform SAR missions in near-Earth orbit.

3) That all future missions incorporate "crew" escape modules allowing for evacuation to another shuttle in space or re-entry under their own means.

4) That future missions rigourously incorporate the ability to "proceed by their own means to the ISS".

If future space missions are to be pursued, then it is high time that these cease to be regarded as a "dice with death".
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 18:54
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airship...

<<That a shuttle be permanently positioned at the ISS in order to perform SAR missions in near-Earth orbit>>
<<That future missions rigourously incorporate the ability to "proceed by their own means to the ISS". >>

I think you are not understanding the problems of "orbit". It is massively difficult to rendevous when it is the aim of the mission. To do so on an ad hoc basis, particularly when something has gone wrong = degraded capability is just impractical.

If you persue this line, the best place for the "lifeboat" is on earth. At that point it has the potential to be launched into the desired orbit - i.e. match that of the "stricken" craft. If you go this route, then a criteria for launch is that this lifeboat is "ready to go".

<<If future space missions are to be pursued, then it is high time that these cease to be regarded as a "dice with death".>>
IMHO you've summed it up here. What value do you place on human life, particularly when those whose lives are at risk know far better than you and I the risks, and accept them.

Interesting website:
http://nasaproblems.com

In the 2 shuttle accidents to date, I do not think an escape capsule would have been of any value...

NoD
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 19:06
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1) "...one of the tasks assigned to the STS-107 crew was to take photographs of the External Tank immediately after tank separation to see just what broke off, where it broke loose, and how big it really was. Those photos were taken, but sadly they will probably not be recoverable."
Airship, the photography requested was apparently done because of foam insulation coming off the external tank and striking the SRM cowling during the Atlantis launch in October, 2002. It was likely done to see whether the Atlantis problem was a one-of or something recurring.
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 19:18
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Any Shuttle Experts out there...

Was the "tiling system" used in Columbia standard across all shuttles? I seem to recall something about later shuttles using a better matting system?

I note from C4 news that the original tile repair kits used on Columbia have been discontinued due "cost cutting". Just the sort of thing airship has been suggesting, although even if tile loss caused this after being hit by the tank section, no guarantees such a kit would have coped with whatever damage might have occurred....

NoD
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 19:43
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Finding the debris

One news report mentions an observer in Owen Valley, California who noted flashes as the shuttle passed overhead which raises the possibility that pieces/tiles could have started coming off at that point.

Any such early pieces that came off would be important to the investigation, but what are the odds of finding them when they could have landed in snow, forest, desert, mountain or water after the winds have blown them off course?

The apparent intense fragmentation over a wide area makes it unlikely that all the pieces in the main debris field will be recovered, which will add to the difficulty of identifying by elimination which pieces came off first.

If a substantial span of the the left wing failed, the right wing would end up acting almost as a rudder and the left fuselage side would be exposed to beyond design aerodynamic forces at M18
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 19:46
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Sally Ride said on the news this am that even if they had gone outside to inspect, they wouldn't have been able to see the area where the tiles would have been missing, and there would have been no way to replace them.
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 19:58
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Lots of talk in the press about escape pods and how people like Buzz Aldrin have been pressing NASA for years to integrate one into the shuttles. It would be some escape pod which could work in all phases of shuttle launch and re-entry, including at Mach 18 at 200,000 feet. That has to be fantasy, doesn't it?

QDM
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 20:01
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Angry

Crikey Firewall - no scientific benefit/publications from shuttle based missions !!.

Three letters, HST !

I may be biased as I work
at NASA GSFC but I think anyone would agree that the scientific value to mankind of Hubble (Entirely dependent on STS launch and servicing) has been considerable.

NASABOY
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Old 2nd Feb 2003, 20:06
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Was the "tiling system" used in Columbia standard across all shuttles? I seem to recall something about later shuttles using a better matting system?
Endevour, the shuttle that replaced Challenger uses a different system. Not too sure of the exact details but I think the white low (lower!) temperature tiles were replaced with matting but the black high temp. tiles and the ceramic leading edge on the wing are the same.
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