Disagree button for engine shutdown
Joined: Nov 1999
Aviation Qualifications: ATPL
Posts: 3,150
Likes: 744
From: UK
.......Would a pilot Cut two engines at once, without CRM and a pause to make damn sure the correct engine is being cut ?....
Perhaps it is now time to change this so that cross confirmation is always required, even in a non jeopardy situation, just to ensure that the wrong "muscle memory" never gets used during flight ?
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Last edited by Uplinker; 24th July 2025 at 12:00.
Joined: May 2009
Posts: 1,060
Likes: 62
From: HKG
This is overcomplicating things. If I pilot wants to be a mass murderer there is not much that can stop them. A brisk push whilst low, roll it over and pull the wings off when the other bod is in the loo, unfortunately there is nothing other than getting rid of the pilots that can stop this, but that will open up a whole other can of worms.
There needs to be either better mental state monitoring and support, or severe consequences. If proven that one of the pilots did this their family should be held accountable and financially liable, it would destroy their future and make others think twice about this despicable road. Some may think it unfair, it was unfair to the thousands of dead and grieving this sort of tragedy effects. The family know the perpetrator better than anyone else, there should be non punitive whistleblowing to get the person support.
There needs to be either better mental state monitoring and support, or severe consequences. If proven that one of the pilots did this their family should be held accountable and financially liable, it would destroy their future and make others think twice about this despicable road. Some may think it unfair, it was unfair to the thousands of dead and grieving this sort of tragedy effects. The family know the perpetrator better than anyone else, there should be non punitive whistleblowing to get the person support.
Joined: Oct 2007
Aviation Qualifications: ATPL
Posts: 1,028
Likes: 121
From: Wherever I go, there I am
From Uplinker
"One thing though I think needs to change is airline pilot trainers examining their own pilots. There is a potential incentive for company type rating examiners, TREs, to get their pilots through their SIM exams. I personally think that SIM exams should be conducted by aviation authority examiners, who do not know the candidates. This might help reveal issues, if they existed."
I asked in the Air India accident thread if this system applied in India or if they still used the government examiners as we used to. but it was passed over without comment.
My adviser from within the industry is disappointed with our system as it stands. He feels that the authorities really have little power to control or improve the quality of airmanship when type rating checks are done by company pilots...
"One thing though I think needs to change is airline pilot trainers examining their own pilots. There is a potential incentive for company type rating examiners, TREs, to get their pilots through their SIM exams. I personally think that SIM exams should be conducted by aviation authority examiners, who do not know the candidates. This might help reveal issues, if they existed."
I asked in the Air India accident thread if this system applied in India or if they still used the government examiners as we used to. but it was passed over without comment.
My adviser from within the industry is disappointed with our system as it stands. He feels that the authorities really have little power to control or improve the quality of airmanship when type rating checks are done by company pilots...
One downside to the regulating authority doing a check ride is that their pilots are not as well versed with the airplane and company procedure as the company check pilot. I've sat in on a number of different "TC Rides" and where I would have downgraded a mark, the regulator said it was fine. They didn't know the intricacies of the company operation to know that while it may have been acceptable if you had just rented the aircraft, a number of company procedures were violated that resulted in a failure. Or, on the flip side, they would mark a pilot down because of xyz reason, not realizing that the ops specs permitted us leeway. On one ride the regulator wanted to fail a student for continuing an approach below a certain weather minimum, until it was pointed out that the company had authorization to continue the approach given our sphere of operations. In another example, the check pilot wanted to fail both me and my sim partner for not making a single correct SOP call the whole ride. I still remember his face when he opened the book to show us what we had done wrong, only for us to point out that he had referenced a different company altogether. To his credit, he admitted the mistake, but it goes to show that just because the check pilot works for the regulator does not immediately imply the checking process will be better.
What I see as the problem is the checking process itself. Many jurisdictions use scripted rides - that is, the check pilot is given a script of exercises to give every pilot in a specific order. Depending on the jurisdiction, this script changes once or twice a year. Regardless of how often it changes, once the first pair of pilots is through, they write down the examined elements, fire it off to their buddies, and within two hours of the first ride, every pilot in the company knows what will be examined. So the rest jump into the QRH to find any gotchyas, rehearse the specific exercises, and by the time they do their ride, they're getting great marks as they're hitting all the beats. I had a few failures where the pilot turned around and would say something like "that was supposed to be a rejected takeoff" or "that was supposed to be a V1 cut." Turns out, their buddy got the order wrong and rather than reacting to the moment, the pilot reacted to what they heard was coming. If we are to continue using flight checks as the be-all-and-end-all, I think it is better to have a general script of what needs to be seen in the ride. Then, those requirements are passed through a randomizer so every ride is different, but no more or less difficult that any other. You're still going to get a rejected takeoff, a V1 cut, a major malfunction and minor malfunction, and a whole bunch of different approaches, but you'll not know the order or the specific malfunctions. One ride sees a WINDOW OVERHEAT light followed by a return to base and a V1 cut, the next sees a V1 cut, a normal takeoff to a DRIVE light. They're the same type of minor failures and V1 cuts, but the order is changed. The ride is no more hard or soft and the candidate will still check off in the their head what they've seen (RTO, V1 cut, minor malfunction, major malfunction, SE approach, etc.), but they can't prepare for it beyond a general sense ahead of time.
Now, to go back to the original thread, I don't think adding more technology to the aircraft is the answer. All that does is create yet another point of failure. If a crew is so convinced that they are shutting down the correct engine, they will bypass all the steps in the process, including the new technology. I think it is better to improve pilot training and checking with a robust system that moves away from the "box ticking" exercises our industry seems to have settled on. EBT is a good start, but in many cases this discussion needs to change the fundamental way we train all pilots at all levels. I love the NASA saying that goes along the lines that no emergency is so severe that you can't make it worse. We need to apply that type of logic into our training at a global level, and right from hour 0. Otherwise, the bad habits that are built from the start will continue to show themselves at the airline level.
Joined: Feb 2018
Posts: 800
Likes: 279
From: East of Westralia
I might agree with this sentiment on a global scale, but it was not my experience here in North America. It was made very clear that as an ACP (Approved Check Pilot) in Canada, I was a delegate of Transport Canada and NOT a company pilot while acting in my capacity as an ACP when conducting flight checks. I had annual assessments that compared my markings to all other examiners in the country. This was then segmented down to all examiners on type and all examiners at my company on that type. It was quite clear that my authority to conduct check rides would have been taken away if I deviated too far from the standard. As such, the vast majority of company check pilots I encountered either as a candidate or as an examiner were professional, and quite able to set aside any sense of loyalty to the company. Were there bad apples? Of course there were, but in over a decade of doing check work, I can count on one hand how many of those I encountered. There is one guy I have in mind who passed me on a ride that looking back I should have failed on (I set the wrong minimums for the approach). He never failed anyone, but boy do I remember that ride 20+ years later. He gave me a chewing out that I still wince at. That led me to question what I would have learned more from: a failure or a very strong reprimand in the debrief? I took that sentiment with me into my own check work. I had no problem failing a pilot if it was deserved, but if it was on the edge, I would ask myself what is the better learning opportunity for the candidate: a failure that they might blame me for instead of looking at their actions, or a strongly worded reprimand that followed a little acting on my part, leaving the pilot to wonder if they'd passed or failed? Acting in the sense that I would leave the simulator without telling them the result. Sounds harsh, but it worked.
One downside to the regulating authority doing a check ride is that their pilots are not as well versed with the airplane and company procedure as the company check pilot. I've sat in on a number of different "TC Rides" and where I would have downgraded a mark, the regulator said it was fine. They didn't know the intricacies of the company operation to know that while it may have been acceptable if you had just rented the aircraft, a number of company procedures were violated that resulted in a failure. Or, on the flip side, they would mark a pilot down because of xyz reason, not realizing that the ops specs permitted us leeway. On one ride the regulator wanted to fail a student for continuing an approach below a certain weather minimum, until it was pointed out that the company had authorization to continue the approach given our sphere of operations. In another example, the check pilot wanted to fail both me and my sim partner for not making a single correct SOP call the whole ride. I still remember his face when he opened the book to show us what we had done wrong, only for us to point out that he had referenced a different company altogether. To his credit, he admitted the mistake, but it goes to show that just because the check pilot works for the regulator does not immediately imply the checking process will be better.
What I see as the problem is the checking process itself. Many jurisdictions use scripted rides - that is, the check pilot is given a script of exercises to give every pilot in a specific order. Depending on the jurisdiction, this script changes once or twice a year. Regardless of how often it changes, once the first pair of pilots is through, they write down the examined elements, fire it off to their buddies, and within two hours of the first ride, every pilot in the company knows what will be examined. So the rest jump into the QRH to find any gotchyas, rehearse the specific exercises, and by the time they do their ride, they're getting great marks as they're hitting all the beats. I had a few failures where the pilot turned around and would say something like "that was supposed to be a rejected takeoff" or "that was supposed to be a V1 cut." Turns out, their buddy got the order wrong and rather than reacting to the moment, the pilot reacted to what they heard was coming. If we are to continue using flight checks as the be-all-and-end-all, I think it is better to have a general script of what needs to be seen in the ride. Then, those requirements are passed through a randomizer so every ride is different, but no more or less difficult that any other. You're still going to get a rejected takeoff, a V1 cut, a major malfunction and minor malfunction, and a whole bunch of different approaches, but you'll not know the order or the specific malfunctions. One ride sees a WINDOW OVERHEAT light followed by a return to base and a V1 cut, the next sees a V1 cut, a normal takeoff to a DRIVE light. They're the same type of minor failures and V1 cuts, but the order is changed. The ride is no more hard or soft and the candidate will still check off in the their head what they've seen (RTO, V1 cut, minor malfunction, major malfunction, SE approach, etc.), but they can't prepare for it beyond a general sense ahead of time.
Now, to go back to the original thread, I don't think adding more technology to the aircraft is the answer. All that does is create yet another point of failure. If a crew is so convinced that they are shutting down the correct engine, they will bypass all the steps in the process, including the new technology. I think it is better to improve pilot training and checking with a robust system that moves away from the "box ticking" exercises our industry seems to have settled on. EBT is a good start, but in many cases this discussion needs to change the fundamental way we train all pilots at all levels. I love the NASA saying that goes along the lines that no emergency is so severe that you can't make it worse. We need to apply that type of logic into our training at a global level, and right from hour 0. Otherwise, the bad habits that are built from the start will continue to show themselves at the airline level.
One downside to the regulating authority doing a check ride is that their pilots are not as well versed with the airplane and company procedure as the company check pilot. I've sat in on a number of different "TC Rides" and where I would have downgraded a mark, the regulator said it was fine. They didn't know the intricacies of the company operation to know that while it may have been acceptable if you had just rented the aircraft, a number of company procedures were violated that resulted in a failure. Or, on the flip side, they would mark a pilot down because of xyz reason, not realizing that the ops specs permitted us leeway. On one ride the regulator wanted to fail a student for continuing an approach below a certain weather minimum, until it was pointed out that the company had authorization to continue the approach given our sphere of operations. In another example, the check pilot wanted to fail both me and my sim partner for not making a single correct SOP call the whole ride. I still remember his face when he opened the book to show us what we had done wrong, only for us to point out that he had referenced a different company altogether. To his credit, he admitted the mistake, but it goes to show that just because the check pilot works for the regulator does not immediately imply the checking process will be better.
What I see as the problem is the checking process itself. Many jurisdictions use scripted rides - that is, the check pilot is given a script of exercises to give every pilot in a specific order. Depending on the jurisdiction, this script changes once or twice a year. Regardless of how often it changes, once the first pair of pilots is through, they write down the examined elements, fire it off to their buddies, and within two hours of the first ride, every pilot in the company knows what will be examined. So the rest jump into the QRH to find any gotchyas, rehearse the specific exercises, and by the time they do their ride, they're getting great marks as they're hitting all the beats. I had a few failures where the pilot turned around and would say something like "that was supposed to be a rejected takeoff" or "that was supposed to be a V1 cut." Turns out, their buddy got the order wrong and rather than reacting to the moment, the pilot reacted to what they heard was coming. If we are to continue using flight checks as the be-all-and-end-all, I think it is better to have a general script of what needs to be seen in the ride. Then, those requirements are passed through a randomizer so every ride is different, but no more or less difficult that any other. You're still going to get a rejected takeoff, a V1 cut, a major malfunction and minor malfunction, and a whole bunch of different approaches, but you'll not know the order or the specific malfunctions. One ride sees a WINDOW OVERHEAT light followed by a return to base and a V1 cut, the next sees a V1 cut, a normal takeoff to a DRIVE light. They're the same type of minor failures and V1 cuts, but the order is changed. The ride is no more hard or soft and the candidate will still check off in the their head what they've seen (RTO, V1 cut, minor malfunction, major malfunction, SE approach, etc.), but they can't prepare for it beyond a general sense ahead of time.
Now, to go back to the original thread, I don't think adding more technology to the aircraft is the answer. All that does is create yet another point of failure. If a crew is so convinced that they are shutting down the correct engine, they will bypass all the steps in the process, including the new technology. I think it is better to improve pilot training and checking with a robust system that moves away from the "box ticking" exercises our industry seems to have settled on. EBT is a good start, but in many cases this discussion needs to change the fundamental way we train all pilots at all levels. I love the NASA saying that goes along the lines that no emergency is so severe that you can't make it worse. We need to apply that type of logic into our training at a global level, and right from hour 0. Otherwise, the bad habits that are built from the start will continue to show themselves at the airline level.
My company, and most of the others in my region have moved away from scripted sim checks for the reasons you outlined and have moved to evidence based training (EBT).
Much more leeway to train and allows candidates to actually see where they’re at in regards to their knowledge and skills in an environment conducive to learning. I believe it has been widely regarded as a much better system than the “old” way we used to do it.
Last edited by ScepticalOptomist; 25th July 2025 at 07:44.
Joined: Dec 1998
Aviation Qualifications: ATPL
Posts: 581
Likes: 412
From: UK
One of the best posts I’ve read for a while +TSRA. I’d given up on this thread but thank you for restoring my faith that there are people worth listening to still on this forum.
It would be impossible for a regulator to recruit, train and maintain the services of the number of examiners (at least of equal quality to the current trainers) required anyway. We also now do more training and less checking. Used to be 50/50 and now 75/25. Much more value. And crews are still trained to proficiency. And finally, at least in my company there has always been a “separation between church and state” that most trainers are unionised pilots and not managers. We all rely on the company for our livelihoods and our reputation depends on not having an accident that would ruin the company. No trainer is going to let a pilot back onto the line if they didn’t feel comfortable with them flying their family.
It would be impossible for a regulator to recruit, train and maintain the services of the number of examiners (at least of equal quality to the current trainers) required anyway. We also now do more training and less checking. Used to be 50/50 and now 75/25. Much more value. And crews are still trained to proficiency. And finally, at least in my company there has always been a “separation between church and state” that most trainers are unionised pilots and not managers. We all rely on the company for our livelihoods and our reputation depends on not having an accident that would ruin the company. No trainer is going to let a pilot back onto the line if they didn’t feel comfortable with them flying their family.
Joined: Dec 1998
Aviation Qualifications: ATPL
Posts: 581
Likes: 412
From: UK
Although I do remember being in a meeting once when a manager said “if there’s any doubt before you sign someone’s licence always imagine your wife is on their next flight”. Someone wise-cracked “I’d buy her a ticket” 🤣
Joined: Jul 2013
Aviation Qualifications: Non-Aircrew
Posts: 5,682
Likes: 3,345
From: Everett, WA
Sim sessions have an inherent issue that the pilots 'know' something is coming, so they're already 'on the ball'. Running to a 'script' just makes it worse if they already know what's coming.
If there are specific events that they want tested, put in some sort of randomizer that gives them different event scenarios in a random order (the trainer could have a tablet or similar that lets him know what's coming without alerting the pilot being tested).
When Boeing wanted to test some failure scenario, they'd recruit a bunch of random pilots (perhaps pilots that were already there for some sort of sim training) - then hit them with the specific event scenario to see how they reacted. They needed a relatively large number of pilots, since once a pilot had experienced the event once, it was no longer a complete surprise.
If there are specific events that they want tested, put in some sort of randomizer that gives them different event scenarios in a random order (the trainer could have a tablet or similar that lets him know what's coming without alerting the pilot being tested).
When Boeing wanted to test some failure scenario, they'd recruit a bunch of random pilots (perhaps pilots that were already there for some sort of sim training) - then hit them with the specific event scenario to see how they reacted. They needed a relatively large number of pilots, since once a pilot had experienced the event once, it was no longer a complete surprise.
