Airbus ECAM Actions - Breaking Down the Wall
Join Date: Jan 2022
Location: Miami
Posts: 97
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The PF will expect it to be asked like that. He will respond, "Clear (system)"
Not yes, not go ahead, not approved, not I concur, not proceed
the proper answer is "Clear"
To IBM Junkman; The PF will be closely following the ECAM process, (while primarily flying the 'plane). So they will have heard the fault heading spoken by PM and have noticed PM performing the action lines - confirming certain switches and actions where appropriate.
So when PM finishes that section and says "Clear Green Hyd ?" for example, PF can see where PM is in the ECAM and knows that PM is asking a question.
This is partly the purpose of SOPs; so that each pilot knows what is going on and where in the process they are. Avoids confusion and errors.
So when PM finishes that section and says "Clear Green Hyd ?" for example, PF can see where PM is in the ECAM and knows that PM is asking a question.
This is partly the purpose of SOPs; so that each pilot knows what is going on and where in the process they are. Avoids confusion and errors.
Join Date: May 2024
Location: Delhi
Posts: 7
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Airbus ECAM Actions - Breaking Down the Wall
Having flown the Airbus now for some years I often find that during our sims there is a 'wall' that develops between PF and PM during ECAM Actions. The PF tends to focus on aviating, navigating, communicating while the PM is reconfiguring the aircraft. Often times as PF I find myself so absorbed by the task of doing all three (especially if the failure increases the complexity of flying e.g. alternate/direct law, AP inop etc.) that I'm honestly completely disconnected and not really watching what the PM is doing. I understand that Airbus requires the PF to cross check that all actions are completed before clearing the ECAM, but this is sometimes a little too late. Do the more experienced Airbus drivers in this forum have any specific advise on how to avoid this negative tendency, or is it just an inevitable part of how abnormal procedures are conducted in the Bus?
So they often write some simplified english. They even say it's voluntary, because most airbus users aren't native english speakers as well.
It leads to confusion for native speakers and proficient non native speakers, at least those who have an interest in the language.
For example, the callout for go around is "go around flaps".
I'm unable to say "go around flaps", which is a call for the PM to set the go around setting of the flaps, when I really mean "I'm going around". So when I flew the 320 I used to say most of the times "go around.. go around flaps".
On boeing it's "Go around, flaps xx"
.............but it's crucial to find ways to break down that "wall" for effective teamwork. Communication is key - establish clear expectations between PF and PM............Consider implementing a structured callout procedure to ensure both pilots are aware of each other's actions........
If pilots simply follow the Airbus SOPs and calls as per the FCTM; there will be no "wall" - There is no wall.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Canada
Posts: 615
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Firstly, thanks to all those who replied. There are some good tips. But to be completely honest I've just upgraded and the issue is that any ECAM naturally leads to a hundred thoughts about declaring MAYDAYs, diversions, contacting the company, cabin crew etc. Caught up in those thoughts I feel that I'm not engaged enough with the FO doing the actions and I'm not comfortable with that reality.
It's rare in my company to find any pilots, let alone FOs, that actually know the correct ECAM handling technique. Therefore simply stating that everything will be fine if the PM follows the correct ECAM handling procedures is pointless, the reality is I cannot expect that either in the sim or on the line.
Maybe what I should have asked is: is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM. I suppose the easy answer is to simply leave all decision making to after the ECAM Actions but this is easier said then done. Maybe this only comes with time and experience and it's simply part of the job on the left seat. But in the mean time in simply trying to see if there are any tips that could help me.
It's rare in my company to find any pilots, let alone FOs, that actually know the correct ECAM handling technique. Therefore simply stating that everything will be fine if the PM follows the correct ECAM handling procedures is pointless, the reality is I cannot expect that either in the sim or on the line.
Maybe what I should have asked is: is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM. I suppose the easy answer is to simply leave all decision making to after the ECAM Actions but this is easier said then done. Maybe this only comes with time and experience and it's simply part of the job on the left seat. But in the mean time in simply trying to see if there are any tips that could help me.
Join Date: Jan 2022
Location: Miami
Posts: 97
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Firstly, thanks to all those who replied. There are some good tips. But to be completely honest I've just upgraded and the issue is that any ECAM naturally leads to a hundred thoughts about declaring MAYDAYs, diversions, contacting the company, cabin crew etc. Caught up in those thoughts I feel that I'm not engaged enough with the FO doing the actions and I'm not comfortable with that reality.
It's rare in my company to find any pilots, let alone FOs, that actually know the correct ECAM handling technique. Therefore simply stating that everything will be fine if the PM follows the correct ECAM handling procedures is pointless, the reality is I cannot expect that either in the sim or on the line.
Maybe what I should have asked is: is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM. I suppose the easy answer is to simply leave all decision making to after the ECAM Actions but this is easier said then done. Maybe this only comes with time and experience and it's simply part of the job on the left seat. But in the mean time in simply trying to see if there are any tips that could help me.
It's rare in my company to find any pilots, let alone FOs, that actually know the correct ECAM handling technique. Therefore simply stating that everything will be fine if the PM follows the correct ECAM handling procedures is pointless, the reality is I cannot expect that either in the sim or on the line.
Maybe what I should have asked is: is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM. I suppose the easy answer is to simply leave all decision making to after the ECAM Actions but this is easier said then done. Maybe this only comes with time and experience and it's simply part of the job on the left seat. But in the mean time in simply trying to see if there are any tips that could help me.
It is extremely concerning if the OP has got to the LHS without a clear idea or plan of how to deal with an emergency and how to prioritise your decision making. All pilots and TREs, TRIs in your company should be following Airbus SOPs.
You should by now have had years of practice of how to deal with emergencies correctly by following the Airbus SOPs and the Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual, the FCTM.
PF flies the plane and keeps it safe with regard to terrain and flightpath. PM announces the emergency, e.g. "engine fire".
When the aircraft is under control and on a safe flightpath PF asks PM to identify the problem - and in this case which engine - from the engine gauges, the ECAM and the overhead panel. PM will say e.g. "engine fire number two engine". PF then also checks the engine gauges and reads the ECAM and checks the overhead panel, then instructs PM to start working through the checklists by saying e.g. "My radios, your ECAM Actions please". PM works through the ECAM action lines; reading them out loud and with both pilots confirming any engine controls and other irreversible actions first. When they get to the end of the first failure section on ECAM, PM will ask "Clear Engine Fire?", or whatever the failure is.
Any other failures on ECAM are worked through this way until you get to STATUS page.
Then PF says "Stop ECAM" and you both read STATUS carefully. Then PF will say "Any OEBs or Computer resets?", at which point any relevant procedures are carried out by PM.
Then you check STATUS again and now you apply:
TDODAR.
T ime. Is there any time critical factor, e.g. low fuel.
D iagnose. What has happened? what has failed?
O ptions. Can you continue to destination, or restrict cruise flight level etc., or do you need to divert and land. PM will need to get the latest weather and operational status for diversion airfields for this step.
D ecide. Based on this and the STATUS page make a decision about what you are going to do.
A ssign tasks. When all the initial ECAM actions are complete you can swap PF and PM roles now as you see fit. Normally it is best to have the F/O be PF and you become PM leaving you freer to better manage the situation and do all the radio calls and cabin crew calls etc. without also flying the 'plane.
R eview. Go through your plan together to check it is the best course of action. Perform TDODAR again if further information prompts a re-think.
This frankly, is Airbus emergency management 101. You should all be very well used to this.
You are giving me the impression that your company does not follow Airbus SOPs or methodology, which is extremely concerning.
.
You should by now have had years of practice of how to deal with emergencies correctly by following the Airbus SOPs and the Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual, the FCTM.
PF flies the plane and keeps it safe with regard to terrain and flightpath. PM announces the emergency, e.g. "engine fire".
When the aircraft is under control and on a safe flightpath PF asks PM to identify the problem - and in this case which engine - from the engine gauges, the ECAM and the overhead panel. PM will say e.g. "engine fire number two engine". PF then also checks the engine gauges and reads the ECAM and checks the overhead panel, then instructs PM to start working through the checklists by saying e.g. "My radios, your ECAM Actions please". PM works through the ECAM action lines; reading them out loud and with both pilots confirming any engine controls and other irreversible actions first. When they get to the end of the first failure section on ECAM, PM will ask "Clear Engine Fire?", or whatever the failure is.
Any other failures on ECAM are worked through this way until you get to STATUS page.
Then PF says "Stop ECAM" and you both read STATUS carefully. Then PF will say "Any OEBs or Computer resets?", at which point any relevant procedures are carried out by PM.
Then you check STATUS again and now you apply:
TDODAR.
T ime. Is there any time critical factor, e.g. low fuel.
D iagnose. What has happened? what has failed?
O ptions. Can you continue to destination, or restrict cruise flight level etc., or do you need to divert and land. PM will need to get the latest weather and operational status for diversion airfields for this step.
D ecide. Based on this and the STATUS page make a decision about what you are going to do.
A ssign tasks. When all the initial ECAM actions are complete you can swap PF and PM roles now as you see fit. Normally it is best to have the F/O be PF and you become PM leaving you freer to better manage the situation and do all the radio calls and cabin crew calls etc. without also flying the 'plane.
R eview. Go through your plan together to check it is the best course of action. Perform TDODAR again if further information prompts a re-think.
This frankly, is Airbus emergency management 101. You should all be very well used to this.
You are giving me the impression that your company does not follow Airbus SOPs or methodology, which is extremely concerning.
.
Last edited by Uplinker; 10th May 2024 at 10:05.
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Posts: 2,430
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is extremely concerning if the OP has got to the LHS without a clear idea or plan of how to deal with an emergency and how to prioritise your decision making. All pilots and TREs, TRIs in your company should be following Airbus SOPs.
You should by now have had years of practice of how to deal with emergencies correctly by following the Airbus SOPs and the Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual, the FCTM.
PF flies the plane and keeps it safe with regard to terrain and flightpath. PM announces the emergency, e.g. "engine fire".
When the aircraft is under control and on a safe flightpath PF asks PM to identify the problem - and in this case which engine - from the engine gauges, the ECAM and the overhead panel. PM will say e.g. "engine fire number two engine". PF then also checks the engine gauges and reads the ECAM and checks the overhead panel, then instructs PM to start working through the checklists by saying e.g. "My radios, your ECAM Actions please". PM works through the ECAM action lines; reading them out loud and with both pilots confirming any engine controls and other irreversible actions first. When they get to the end of the first failure section on ECAM, PM will ask "Clear Engine Fire?", or whatever the failure is.
Any other failures on ECAM are worked through this way until you get to STATUS page.
Then PF says "Stop ECAM" and you both read STATUS carefully. Then PF will say "Any OEBs or Computer resets?", at which point any relevant procedures are carried out by PM.
Then you check STATUS again and now you apply:
TDODAR.
T ime. Is there any time critical factor, e.g. low fuel.
D iagnose. What has happened? what has failed?
O ptions. Can you continue to destination, or restrict cruise flight level etc., or do you need to divert and land. PM will need to get the latest weather and operational status for diversion airfields for this step.
D ecide. Based on this and the STATUS page make a decision about what you are going to do.
A ssign tasks. When all the initial ECAM actions are complete you can swap PF and PM roles now as you see fit. Normally it is best to have the F/O be PF and you become PM leaving you freer to better manage the situation and do all the radio calls and cabin crew calls etc. without also flying the 'plane.
R eview. Go through your plan together to check it is the best course of action. Perform TDODAR again if further information prompts a re-think.
This is all in the Airbus manuals, and frankly, is Airbus emergency management 101. You should all be very well used to this.
You are giving me the impression that your company does not follow Airbus SOPs or methodology, which is extremely concerning.
You should by now have had years of practice of how to deal with emergencies correctly by following the Airbus SOPs and the Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual, the FCTM.
PF flies the plane and keeps it safe with regard to terrain and flightpath. PM announces the emergency, e.g. "engine fire".
When the aircraft is under control and on a safe flightpath PF asks PM to identify the problem - and in this case which engine - from the engine gauges, the ECAM and the overhead panel. PM will say e.g. "engine fire number two engine". PF then also checks the engine gauges and reads the ECAM and checks the overhead panel, then instructs PM to start working through the checklists by saying e.g. "My radios, your ECAM Actions please". PM works through the ECAM action lines; reading them out loud and with both pilots confirming any engine controls and other irreversible actions first. When they get to the end of the first failure section on ECAM, PM will ask "Clear Engine Fire?", or whatever the failure is.
Any other failures on ECAM are worked through this way until you get to STATUS page.
Then PF says "Stop ECAM" and you both read STATUS carefully. Then PF will say "Any OEBs or Computer resets?", at which point any relevant procedures are carried out by PM.
Then you check STATUS again and now you apply:
TDODAR.
T ime. Is there any time critical factor, e.g. low fuel.
D iagnose. What has happened? what has failed?
O ptions. Can you continue to destination, or restrict cruise flight level etc., or do you need to divert and land. PM will need to get the latest weather and operational status for diversion airfields for this step.
D ecide. Based on this and the STATUS page make a decision about what you are going to do.
A ssign tasks. When all the initial ECAM actions are complete you can swap PF and PM roles now as you see fit. Normally it is best to have the F/O be PF and you become PM leaving you freer to better manage the situation and do all the radio calls and cabin crew calls etc. without also flying the 'plane.
R eview. Go through your plan together to check it is the best course of action. Perform TDODAR again if further information prompts a re-think.
This is all in the Airbus manuals, and frankly, is Airbus emergency management 101. You should all be very well used to this.
You are giving me the impression that your company does not follow Airbus SOPs or methodology, which is extremely concerning.
Failure analysis is a PM duty. The PF should not be distracted by cross-analysis (unless the PM is unsure of what is going on and a transfer of control is required), especially in a critical phase of flight.
Unless your airline SOPs are different, the callout is: “ECAM ACTIONS”.
The OEBs if any are applied prior to the initiation of the ECAM actions
Before reading the Status we check the acceleration flow has been completed, normal checklists, comp. Resets and eng relight if any.
Sorry, but it is absolutely vital that PF makes an independent cross check of all information; ECAM, engine gauges, overhead panel and rudder etc to confirm which engine has failed or caught fire.
Shutting down the wrong engine or pushing the wrong Fire PB is a very very very bad thing, as you know.
Our airline SOPs obviously differ slightly. We dealt with ECAM down to STATUS before thinking about OEBs and computer resets.
But the main point for the OP is, there are SOPs to deal with emergencies and failures which should be followed. No captain or F/O should be unsure about how to deal with emergencies or the task sharing.
Shutting down the wrong engine or pushing the wrong Fire PB is a very very very bad thing, as you know.
Our airline SOPs obviously differ slightly. We dealt with ECAM down to STATUS before thinking about OEBs and computer resets.
But the main point for the OP is, there are SOPs to deal with emergencies and failures which should be followed. No captain or F/O should be unsure about how to deal with emergencies or the task sharing.
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Posts: 2,430
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sorry, but it is absolutely vital that PF makes an independent cross check of all information; ECAM, engine gauges, overhead panel and rudder etc to confirm which engine has failed or caught fire.
Shutting down the wrong engine or pushing the wrong Fire PB is a very very very bad thing, as you know.
Our airline SOPs obviously differ slightly. We dealt with ECAM down to STATUS before thinking about OEBs and computer resets.
But the main point for the OP is, there are SOPs to deal with emergencies and failures which should be followed. No captain or F/O should be unsure about how to deal with emergencies or the task sharing.
Shutting down the wrong engine or pushing the wrong Fire PB is a very very very bad thing, as you know.
Our airline SOPs obviously differ slightly. We dealt with ECAM down to STATUS before thinking about OEBs and computer resets.
But the main point for the OP is, there are SOPs to deal with emergencies and failures which should be followed. No captain or F/O should be unsure about how to deal with emergencies or the task sharing.
Yes but one thing is to analyze the failure, and another thing is to cross check mandatory actions on controls and switches such as Thrust levers, masters, guarded switches, IRs, and so on, as per Airbus STD.
Point is when an ECAM triggers the PM must (unless busy with something more important, I.e. monitoring the flight path) announce the failure and confirm it with SD and overhead indications. The PF flies, especially if it’s hand flying. I have seen on several occasions both heads up to the overhead or down to the SD whilst hand flying. Doesn’t look so good from the back. Mandatory items confirmation is another topic, that’s a must to avoid Messing up, regardless of the usage of autopilot or not of course.
We know more that we can explain
"… is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM"
This question may involve the delicate issue of trust.
How do new P1s develop an appropriate sense of trust with P2. CRM pundits have good theoretical ideas, but in practice they are difficult to implement.
Without justification, which suggest aspects of tacit knowledge, it may help to first trust yourself - confidence.
Second reflect on your position when P2 with a new P1, consider the other person's viewpoint.
From experience these aspects are influenced both by national and organisation culture, thus compare views with other operators - heeding unsubstantiated advice via Pprune.
Practice, experience, thinking, updating beliefs and knowledge; the transition from novice type behaviour to expertise.'
Novices don’t feel comfortable going with the first option— they don’t have the experience to trust the first option, or to gauge its quality except by contrasting it to others. : novices tend to deliberate about which option to select, whereas experts deliberate about what is going on in the situation.'
'… the experts primarily relied on a single type of information, whereas the novices tried to use all the data'
- from must read book - 'Street lights and Shadows' G Klein, available via Safety, CRM forum: Websites #27
This question may involve the delicate issue of trust.
How do new P1s develop an appropriate sense of trust with P2. CRM pundits have good theoretical ideas, but in practice they are difficult to implement.
Without justification, which suggest aspects of tacit knowledge, it may help to first trust yourself - confidence.
Second reflect on your position when P2 with a new P1, consider the other person's viewpoint.
From experience these aspects are influenced both by national and organisation culture, thus compare views with other operators - heeding unsubstantiated advice via Pprune.
Practice, experience, thinking, updating beliefs and knowledge; the transition from novice type behaviour to expertise.'
Novices don’t feel comfortable going with the first option— they don’t have the experience to trust the first option, or to gauge its quality except by contrasting it to others. : novices tend to deliberate about which option to select, whereas experts deliberate about what is going on in the situation.'
'… the experts primarily relied on a single type of information, whereas the novices tried to use all the data'
- from must read book - 'Street lights and Shadows' G Klein, available via Safety, CRM forum: Websites #27
Last edited by safetypee; 10th May 2024 at 14:56.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Canada
Posts: 615
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"… is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM"
This question may involve the delicate issue of trust.
How do new P1s develop an appropriate sense of trust with P2. CRM pundits have good theoretical ideas, but in practice they are difficult to implement.
Without justification, which suggest aspects of tacit knowledge, it may help to first trust yourself - confidence.
Second reflect on your position when P2 with a new P1, consider the other person's viewpoint.
From experience these aspects are influenced both by national and organisation culture, thus compare views with other operators - heeding unsubstantiated advice via Pprune.
Practice, experience, thinking, updating beliefs and knowledge; the transition from novice type behaviour to expertise.'
Novices don’t feel comfortable going with the first option— they don’t have the experience to trust the first option, or to gauge its quality except by contrasting it to others. : novices tend to deliberate about which option to select, whereas experts deliberate about what is going on in the situation.'
'… the experts primarily relied on a single type of information, whereas the novices tried to use all the data'
- from must read book - 'Street lights and Shadows' G Klein, available via Safety, CRM forum: Websites #27
This question may involve the delicate issue of trust.
How do new P1s develop an appropriate sense of trust with P2. CRM pundits have good theoretical ideas, but in practice they are difficult to implement.
Without justification, which suggest aspects of tacit knowledge, it may help to first trust yourself - confidence.
Second reflect on your position when P2 with a new P1, consider the other person's viewpoint.
From experience these aspects are influenced both by national and organisation culture, thus compare views with other operators - heeding unsubstantiated advice via Pprune.
Practice, experience, thinking, updating beliefs and knowledge; the transition from novice type behaviour to expertise.'
Novices don’t feel comfortable going with the first option— they don’t have the experience to trust the first option, or to gauge its quality except by contrasting it to others. : novices tend to deliberate about which option to select, whereas experts deliberate about what is going on in the situation.'
'… the experts primarily relied on a single type of information, whereas the novices tried to use all the data'
- from must read book - 'Street lights and Shadows' G Klein, available via Safety, CRM forum: Websites #27
Hi,
Yes but one thing is to analyze the failure, and another thing is to cross check mandatory actions on controls and switches such as Thrust levers, masters, guarded switches, IRs, and so on, as per Airbus STD.
Point is when an ECAM triggers the PM must (unless busy with something more important, I.e. monitoring the flight path) announce the failure and confirm it with SD and overhead indications. The PF flies, especially if it’s hand flying. I have seen on several occasions both heads up to the overhead or down to the SD whilst hand flying. Doesn’t look so good from the back. Mandatory items confirmation is another topic, that’s a must to avoid Messing up, regardless of the usage of autopilot or not of course.
Yes but one thing is to analyze the failure, and another thing is to cross check mandatory actions on controls and switches such as Thrust levers, masters, guarded switches, IRs, and so on, as per Airbus STD.
Point is when an ECAM triggers the PM must (unless busy with something more important, I.e. monitoring the flight path) announce the failure and confirm it with SD and overhead indications. The PF flies, especially if it’s hand flying. I have seen on several occasions both heads up to the overhead or down to the SD whilst hand flying. Doesn’t look so good from the back. Mandatory items confirmation is another topic, that’s a must to avoid Messing up, regardless of the usage of autopilot or not of course.
Fundamentally with a two crew Airbus FBW cockpit; certain failures MUST be independently analysed and cross checked.
Those talking about trusting the PM are missing the point. It's nothing to do with trust, it is to do with being human and potentially making mistakes. This is why we check each other.
If PM announced "ENG 2 fail/fire" but actually ENG 1 had failed and PF did not independently look and check and confirm which engine was in fact the faulty engine, PM might shut down the only good engine they had left !
PF flies the 'plane, PM runs the ECAM - on command from the PF. When something needs to be crosschecked, confirmed or analysed, PM waits and PF does it when they can. These were our SOPs.
It only takes a few seconds to look at the overhead panel to see which warning lights are showing, and confirm that those warning lights; the ECAM; and your feet on the rudder pedals all confirm which engine has failed. OR if PM has actually spoken or nominated the wrong engine.
PF must not take PMs word for it. They must check for themselves.
Like other regular line pilots, I have practised this hundreds of times, both as PM and as PF while hand flying. I am no Chuck Yeager but I have no difficulty looking up at the overhead panel to confirm which Fire PB was illuminated, and reading the instrumentation and the ECAM while I was hand flying. This only takes a few seconds to do, and there is no desperate rush.
When you are driving a car on the motorway and you look in your mirrors every 20 seconds or so, you don't crash every time you look away from the road.
During a flying emergency; if we were turning or happened to be just levelling at MSA or there was a radio call when I was asked to confirm, I would say "stand by" and look to confirm as soon as I could after my primary job of flying the aircraft.
The notion that PF and PM remain in their separate spheres while dealing with an emergency is a potential problem and the theme of this thread. Emergencies in Airbus FBW aircraft are initially commanded by PF until the aircraft systems are secured and STATUS has been read. If PF is busy while some vital cross check is needed then PM should wait or be told to wait.
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Posts: 2,430
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The PM cannot act on the trust lever and master switch without prior PF confirmation, I.e. the PF must confirm that the correct engine is been shut down. Failure analysis is the PM job. There are barriers in place to catch a wrong analysis, I.e critical switches confirmation.
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Posts: 2,430
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is all about exchanging point of views, as we all know there are multiple ways to reach safely and efficiently the same goal, just like EBT shows us.
Feeding information helps the OP pickup whatever might be of interest, keeping in mind that the most important aspect is to always comply with company policies (good or bad as they can be) which might differ from advices given herein.
Feeding information helps the OP pickup whatever might be of interest, keeping in mind that the most important aspect is to always comply with company policies (good or bad as they can be) which might differ from advices given herein.
I am not confusing anything - we practised this every recurrent SIM. Our SOPs and our methodology were quite clear and specific:-
PF must make an independent analysis of an engine failure and NOT take PMs word or analysis.
Our SOPs stated that before calling for "ECAM actions", PF must independently check the ECAM, the engine gauges, the overhead panel warning lights and their rudder pedals to ensure that both pilots and the ECAM all agree about which engine has failed.
I did not write those SOPs, but they seem very sensible to me.
ECAM might be wrong because engine sensor inputs could have been cross-wired. Or PM might accidentally state the wrong engine number.
It is very concerning if any airlines do not have both pilots independently analysing and confirming which engine has failed before shutting one down. There are sadly many instances of crews shutting down the only good engine they had remaining; leading to accidents with fatalities.
PF must make an independent analysis of an engine failure and NOT take PMs word or analysis.
Our SOPs stated that before calling for "ECAM actions", PF must independently check the ECAM, the engine gauges, the overhead panel warning lights and their rudder pedals to ensure that both pilots and the ECAM all agree about which engine has failed.
I did not write those SOPs, but they seem very sensible to me.
ECAM might be wrong because engine sensor inputs could have been cross-wired. Or PM might accidentally state the wrong engine number.
It is very concerning if any airlines do not have both pilots independently analysing and confirming which engine has failed before shutting one down. There are sadly many instances of crews shutting down the only good engine they had remaining; leading to accidents with fatalities.
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Posts: 2,430
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I am not confusing anything - we practised this every recurrent SIM. Our SOPs and our methodology were quite clear and specific:-
PF must make an independent analysis of an engine failure and NOT take PMs word or analysis.
Our SOPs stated that before calling for "ECAM actions", PF must independently check the ECAM, the engine gauges, the overhead panel warning lights and their rudder pedals to ensure that both pilots and the ECAM all agree about which engine has failed.
I did not write those SOPs, but they seem very sensible to me.
ECAM might be wrong because engine sensor inputs could have been cross-wired. Or PM might accidentally state the wrong engine number.
It is very concerning if any airlines do not have both pilots independently analysing and confirming which engine has failed before shutting one down. There are sadly many instances of crews shutting down the only good engine they had remaining; leading to accidents with fatalities.
PF must make an independent analysis of an engine failure and NOT take PMs word or analysis.
Our SOPs stated that before calling for "ECAM actions", PF must independently check the ECAM, the engine gauges, the overhead panel warning lights and their rudder pedals to ensure that both pilots and the ECAM all agree about which engine has failed.
I did not write those SOPs, but they seem very sensible to me.
ECAM might be wrong because engine sensor inputs could have been cross-wired. Or PM might accidentally state the wrong engine number.
It is very concerning if any airlines do not have both pilots independently analysing and confirming which engine has failed before shutting one down. There are sadly many instances of crews shutting down the only good engine they had remaining; leading to accidents with fatalities.
When PM calls “Thrust lever number 2…. IDLE” the PF looks at the engine parameters before asking confirmation to move back the THR LEVER. Same goes again for the Engine Master; the PF before granting confirmation to the PM to switch off the Master will look at the engine parameters. Same goes again for the fire push button; the PF will look at the engine parameters and where the hand of the PM is placed before granting confirmation. This is what avoids shutting down the wrong engine. You can chat with the PF as long as you want before initiating the ECAM and still shut down the good one if the crew lacks discipline in those steps.
Airbus Standard does not require the PF to independently analyze the failure before calling out the appropriate actions (ECAM, QRH, whatever) unless the PM analysis is not appropriate or effective.
It is required to have a shared mental model (I.e. shares situational awareness) by appropriate task sharing (Workload management) and act accordingly.