Boeing RTO
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Boeing RTO
Sorry to rehash an old problem. With an RTO is certification with ( call STOP or REJECT) close thrust levers, Maximum MANUAL braking, speed brakes deployed, THEN reverses ? I seem to remember an alternate Boeing approved procedure of allowing the RTO braking to operate (no manual braking unless a failure) deploying the reverses, which raises the speed brakes.
The rational for that is that this is the normal stopping procedure after landing. I have seem hands confused in the simulator reaching for the speed brakes before the reverses.
Thanks in advance for your opinions.
The rational for that is that this is the normal stopping procedure after landing. I have seem hands confused in the simulator reaching for the speed brakes before the reverses.
Thanks in advance for your opinions.
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Happy to be corrected, on 737 a certification requirement to allow the engine to lose forward thrust before engaging reverse thrust hence: close thrust - engage speedbrake - select reverse thrust as a timing factor.
YES the speedbrake will engage automatically - but it is not the certified Boeing procedure.
Other Boeing types - no idea.
YES the speedbrake will engage automatically - but it is not the certified Boeing procedure.
Other Boeing types - no idea.
T7 sequence (our version, as approved by Boeing) -
Simultaneously Close Thrust levers, and disengage autothrottles.
Monitor RTO autobrake/apply max manual braking.
Reverse Thrust.
Verify speedbrake lever up.
Simultaneously Close Thrust levers, and disengage autothrottles.
Monitor RTO autobrake/apply max manual braking.
Reverse Thrust.
Verify speedbrake lever up.
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Which Boeing type are we talking about?
On the 737 the initial sequence is made of three steps which are Thrust Lever -> Speedbrake -> Reverse as galdian correctly pointed. A two step maneuver would stress the hardware beyond it certification limits. This is also valid for 744s, 767s and 757s. Refer to Boeing FOT 737-13-1 or their equivalent for other types. The No Technical Objection previously granted by Boeing to use a two step maneuver on those types is no longer valid.
On 777 and 787 the two steps sequence is Thrust Lever -> Reverse and you only have to verify the Speedbrake automatic extension. Those types are the only for which Boeing approves a two step maneuver.
Hope this helps. Flew both 737 and 777.
PG
On the 737 the initial sequence is made of three steps which are Thrust Lever -> Speedbrake -> Reverse as galdian correctly pointed. A two step maneuver would stress the hardware beyond it certification limits. This is also valid for 744s, 767s and 757s. Refer to Boeing FOT 737-13-1 or their equivalent for other types. The No Technical Objection previously granted by Boeing to use a two step maneuver on those types is no longer valid.
On 777 and 787 the two steps sequence is Thrust Lever -> Reverse and you only have to verify the Speedbrake automatic extension. Those types are the only for which Boeing approves a two step maneuver.
Hope this helps. Flew both 737 and 777.
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B744/748 FCOM:
Without delay, simultaneously:
• Close thrust levers, disconnect
autothrottles, and apply
maximum manual wheel brakes
or verify operation of RTO
autobrakes.
Note: If RTO autobrake selected,
monitor system performance
and apply manual wheel
brakes if AUTOBRAKES
message displayed or
deceleration not adequate.
Raise reverse thrust levers to idle
detent and apply reverse thrust, as
required, on symmetrical engines
consistent with conditions.
Raise speedbrake lever if not up.
Without delay, simultaneously:
• Close thrust levers, disconnect
autothrottles, and apply
maximum manual wheel brakes
or verify operation of RTO
autobrakes.
Note: If RTO autobrake selected,
monitor system performance
and apply manual wheel
brakes if AUTOBRAKES
message displayed or
deceleration not adequate.
Raise reverse thrust levers to idle
detent and apply reverse thrust, as
required, on symmetrical engines
consistent with conditions.
Raise speedbrake lever if not up.
Complex - Complexity
As the industry evolves, increasing use of automation, greater focus on procedures, and reliance on human monitoring, there is more opportunity for mistake.
From the simple RTO actions of reducing thrust, applying max brakes simultaneously, thence (airbrake / lift dump), (reverse thrust), procedures have evolved with ordered lists - because that's how they are written, reducing the already scant distance margins in RTO performance.
Now with automation, auto-brake - because crews forget or don't apply max brake; procedure requires verification ( check annunciation ), intervention, similarly for airbrake - because its good 'airmanship', or technology is not always reliable.
If automation is installed to alleviate mistake then it should be sufficiently reliable so as not to require crew observation or action, avoiding increased workload ( and opportunity for further mistakes ).
Additional procedures, calls, actions if the automation doesn't work as expected - what should be expected, seen, felt, how are systems checked. Hands, feet, eyes, all over the place; increased mental workload, more time, reduced margins.
We do make things difficult for ourselves, and we call this progress; the advantages of automation - use it because it is 'safer', but then … we 'invent' new procedures which reduce the primary objective.
From the simple RTO actions of reducing thrust, applying max brakes simultaneously, thence (airbrake / lift dump), (reverse thrust), procedures have evolved with ordered lists - because that's how they are written, reducing the already scant distance margins in RTO performance.
Now with automation, auto-brake - because crews forget or don't apply max brake; procedure requires verification ( check annunciation ), intervention, similarly for airbrake - because its good 'airmanship', or technology is not always reliable.
If automation is installed to alleviate mistake then it should be sufficiently reliable so as not to require crew observation or action, avoiding increased workload ( and opportunity for further mistakes ).
Additional procedures, calls, actions if the automation doesn't work as expected - what should be expected, seen, felt, how are systems checked. Hands, feet, eyes, all over the place; increased mental workload, more time, reduced margins.
We do make things difficult for ourselves, and we call this progress; the advantages of automation - use it because it is 'safer', but then … we 'invent' new procedures which reduce the primary objective.
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Boeing issued an FOTB (Flight Operations Technical Bulletin) on this subject back in 01May2013.
The Rejected Takeoff (RTO) non-normal maneuvers for the 737, 747, 757 and 767 models require the Captain to simultaneously close the thrust levers, raise the SPEED BRAKE lever, and apply maximum reverse thrust consistent with conditions. This is commonly known as a three-step maneuver, i.e., thrust levers, speed brakes and reverse thrust.
The 777 and 787 are the only models approved to use a two-step RTO maneuver which allows the thrust reversers to automatically deploy the speedbrakes. With the two-step maneuver, the flight crew only verifies that the speedbrakes are extended.
Previous Boeing analysis and experience indicated that if the RTO maneuver was accomplished correctly, use of the reverse thrust levers to automatically deploy the speedbrakes (a two-step maneuver) was equivalent in effect to the manual deployment of the speedbrakes on the 747-400, 757, 767, and 777 airplanes. Based on this understanding, Boeing initially provided a No Technical Objection (NTO) statement to operators to use a two-step procedure for those models. Use of a two-step maneuver reduces the time for thrust reverser deployment and is similar to normal landing actions. Seeing the benefits of a two-step procedure, Boeing pursued a change to the published RTO maneuver that would implement the two-step maneuver across the 737, 747-400, 757, 767 and 777 models.
Since these models had not been certified using auto-deployment of the speedbrakes, Boeing conducted an in-depth investigation to confirm previous certification analyses would not be invalidated. The investigation determined the two-step procedure increased stress on the thrust reverser hardware beyond that used for certification analysis on the 737, 747-400, 757 and 767 models. As such, it is unacceptable to use a two-step maneuver for these models. Further, any previous NTO statement approving the use of a two-step maneuver for the 747-400, 757, and 767 airplanes should be considered invalid.
737-100/200, 737-300/400/500 and 737NG:
During certification tests of a CFM56-7 engine EEC software upgrade, a remote condition was identified in which rapid thrust reverser deployment after operating at high forward thrust could exceed thrust reverser design load limits.
The 737NG reverser blocker door design is such that the design load of the thrust reverser inner wall is highest when the translating sleeve is 60% deployed. To prevent exceeding the design load, the engine must be spooled down before reverse thrust is selected. Tests determined that a minimum of 3.1 seconds between high forward thrust and thrust reverser deployment was needed to ensure the thrust reverser design load limits are not exceeded. Flight tests have shown that this 3.1 second delay can be achieved by sequentially retarding the thrust levers to idle, manually raising the SPEED BRAKE lever, and then deploying the thrust reversers. Flight tests have also shown that a two-step maneuver, i.e., retarding the thrust levers to idle and deploying the thrust reversers, thus automatically raising the speed brakes, does not provide the needed time delay.
This condition is not unique to this EEC software upgrade; the same condition exists in all previous EEC software versions. The condition is, therefore, possible on all 737NG airplanes. After discussions with the FAA, it was decided that all 737NG airplanes must use the three-step RTO maneuver as published in the FCOM/QRH and in AFM Section 2, Page 14. For commonality between the 737NG, 737-300/400/500 and 737-100/200, Boeing will not approve a different maneuver for the earlier 737 models.
747-400, 757 and 767:
Boeing’s assessment of the two-step maneuver found it increased the stress/loading on the thrust reverser hardware during translating sleeve deployment in the transient condition. The two-step maneuver reduces the time from “Throttle Chop” to “Spoiler Select” and the time from “Throttle Chop” to “Reverser Deploy”. For example, on the 747-400, the time from “Throttle Chop” to “Reverser Deploy” is reduced by almost 0.5 seconds when a two-step RTO maneuver is used. This resulted in 13% greater thrust at thrust reverser deployment for 747-400 airplanes with GE CF6-80C2 engines. The load increase in the transient condition deviates from what Boeing certified for the 747-400, 757, and 767 models.
747-8:
Rapid deployment of the thrust reversers during transient conditions was considered in the design of the EEC software for the 747-8 airplanes. The 747-8 EEC does not allow the thrust reverser isolation valve to open until N1 has dropped below the necessary threshold to protect structure. As such, a two-step maneuver would be acceptable for the 747-8. But, for commonality between the 747-400 and 747-8, the three-step maneuver is used for the 747-8 model.
777 and 787:
Rapid deployment of the thrust reversers during transient conditions was considered in the design of the EEC software for the 777 and 787 airplanes. The 777 and 787 EECs are programmed to slightly delay thrust reverser deployment when the reverse thrust levers are pulled.
For the 777, this EEC feature makes an RTO maneuver that uses the reverse thrust levers to deploy the speedbrakes an acceptable alternative to an RTO maneuver that uses manual speedbrake extension before applying reverse thrust. With this feature, the FAA has agreed that using the reverse thrust levers to automatically deploy speedbrakes during an RTO maneuver, if accomplished correctly, is equivalent in effect to manual deployment of the speedbrakes. Recently, the 777 maneuver has been revised from a three-step to a two-step maneuver.
The 787 automatically extends the speedbrakes if on the ground, above 85 knots, either thrust lever has been in the takeoff range, and then both thrust levers are moved to idle. Thus, the two-step procedure is by design. Consequently, the published 787 maneuver uses a two-step maneuver.
Hope that helps.
DOG
The Rejected Takeoff (RTO) non-normal maneuvers for the 737, 747, 757 and 767 models require the Captain to simultaneously close the thrust levers, raise the SPEED BRAKE lever, and apply maximum reverse thrust consistent with conditions. This is commonly known as a three-step maneuver, i.e., thrust levers, speed brakes and reverse thrust.
The 777 and 787 are the only models approved to use a two-step RTO maneuver which allows the thrust reversers to automatically deploy the speedbrakes. With the two-step maneuver, the flight crew only verifies that the speedbrakes are extended.
Previous Boeing analysis and experience indicated that if the RTO maneuver was accomplished correctly, use of the reverse thrust levers to automatically deploy the speedbrakes (a two-step maneuver) was equivalent in effect to the manual deployment of the speedbrakes on the 747-400, 757, 767, and 777 airplanes. Based on this understanding, Boeing initially provided a No Technical Objection (NTO) statement to operators to use a two-step procedure for those models. Use of a two-step maneuver reduces the time for thrust reverser deployment and is similar to normal landing actions. Seeing the benefits of a two-step procedure, Boeing pursued a change to the published RTO maneuver that would implement the two-step maneuver across the 737, 747-400, 757, 767 and 777 models.
Since these models had not been certified using auto-deployment of the speedbrakes, Boeing conducted an in-depth investigation to confirm previous certification analyses would not be invalidated. The investigation determined the two-step procedure increased stress on the thrust reverser hardware beyond that used for certification analysis on the 737, 747-400, 757 and 767 models. As such, it is unacceptable to use a two-step maneuver for these models. Further, any previous NTO statement approving the use of a two-step maneuver for the 747-400, 757, and 767 airplanes should be considered invalid.
737-100/200, 737-300/400/500 and 737NG:
During certification tests of a CFM56-7 engine EEC software upgrade, a remote condition was identified in which rapid thrust reverser deployment after operating at high forward thrust could exceed thrust reverser design load limits.
The 737NG reverser blocker door design is such that the design load of the thrust reverser inner wall is highest when the translating sleeve is 60% deployed. To prevent exceeding the design load, the engine must be spooled down before reverse thrust is selected. Tests determined that a minimum of 3.1 seconds between high forward thrust and thrust reverser deployment was needed to ensure the thrust reverser design load limits are not exceeded. Flight tests have shown that this 3.1 second delay can be achieved by sequentially retarding the thrust levers to idle, manually raising the SPEED BRAKE lever, and then deploying the thrust reversers. Flight tests have also shown that a two-step maneuver, i.e., retarding the thrust levers to idle and deploying the thrust reversers, thus automatically raising the speed brakes, does not provide the needed time delay.
This condition is not unique to this EEC software upgrade; the same condition exists in all previous EEC software versions. The condition is, therefore, possible on all 737NG airplanes. After discussions with the FAA, it was decided that all 737NG airplanes must use the three-step RTO maneuver as published in the FCOM/QRH and in AFM Section 2, Page 14. For commonality between the 737NG, 737-300/400/500 and 737-100/200, Boeing will not approve a different maneuver for the earlier 737 models.
747-400, 757 and 767:
Boeing’s assessment of the two-step maneuver found it increased the stress/loading on the thrust reverser hardware during translating sleeve deployment in the transient condition. The two-step maneuver reduces the time from “Throttle Chop” to “Spoiler Select” and the time from “Throttle Chop” to “Reverser Deploy”. For example, on the 747-400, the time from “Throttle Chop” to “Reverser Deploy” is reduced by almost 0.5 seconds when a two-step RTO maneuver is used. This resulted in 13% greater thrust at thrust reverser deployment for 747-400 airplanes with GE CF6-80C2 engines. The load increase in the transient condition deviates from what Boeing certified for the 747-400, 757, and 767 models.
747-8:
Rapid deployment of the thrust reversers during transient conditions was considered in the design of the EEC software for the 747-8 airplanes. The 747-8 EEC does not allow the thrust reverser isolation valve to open until N1 has dropped below the necessary threshold to protect structure. As such, a two-step maneuver would be acceptable for the 747-8. But, for commonality between the 747-400 and 747-8, the three-step maneuver is used for the 747-8 model.
777 and 787:
Rapid deployment of the thrust reversers during transient conditions was considered in the design of the EEC software for the 777 and 787 airplanes. The 777 and 787 EECs are programmed to slightly delay thrust reverser deployment when the reverse thrust levers are pulled.
For the 777, this EEC feature makes an RTO maneuver that uses the reverse thrust levers to deploy the speedbrakes an acceptable alternative to an RTO maneuver that uses manual speedbrake extension before applying reverse thrust. With this feature, the FAA has agreed that using the reverse thrust levers to automatically deploy speedbrakes during an RTO maneuver, if accomplished correctly, is equivalent in effect to manual deployment of the speedbrakes. Recently, the 777 maneuver has been revised from a three-step to a two-step maneuver.
The 787 automatically extends the speedbrakes if on the ground, above 85 knots, either thrust lever has been in the takeoff range, and then both thrust levers are moved to idle. Thus, the two-step procedure is by design. Consequently, the published 787 maneuver uses a two-step maneuver.
Hope that helps.
DOG
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love all the available expertise on these posts. so informative. thanks to all. I never thought the problem with the two step was the thrust reverser design limit.
Well,
Our RTO procedure (major US carrier) across the 757/ 67 fleet has always been two step
Throttles to idle and disconnect, auto braking starts
Max reverse, spoilers deploy automatically
Verify and back up manually if necessary
Our RTO procedure (major US carrier) across the 757/ 67 fleet has always been two step
Throttles to idle and disconnect, auto braking starts
Max reverse, spoilers deploy automatically
Verify and back up manually if necessary
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Always bear in mind any restrictions/requirements will be from the engine manufacturer NOT Boeing hence variations within Boeing types.
On the 737 the procedure is set in concrete - IF you follow Boeing procedure which is predicated on CFM requirements this is the required procedure for the reasons outlined, individual airlines may tinker with procedures at their whim however they lose ANY legal recourse in the event of an accident/incident if they're not following the manufacturers recommended procedures.
Old timers I believe would agree that the Flight Departments of 30/40 years ago monkeyed around with procedures, doesn't generally happen these days partly for standardisation issues, primarily for potential legal ramifications.
Of course in the same time there's a whole bunch of new airlines who've started up, to them to do things as per the FCOM....well why wouldn't you?
Cheers
On the 737 the procedure is set in concrete - IF you follow Boeing procedure which is predicated on CFM requirements this is the required procedure for the reasons outlined, individual airlines may tinker with procedures at their whim however they lose ANY legal recourse in the event of an accident/incident if they're not following the manufacturers recommended procedures.
Old timers I believe would agree that the Flight Departments of 30/40 years ago monkeyed around with procedures, doesn't generally happen these days partly for standardisation issues, primarily for potential legal ramifications.
Of course in the same time there's a whole bunch of new airlines who've started up, to them to do things as per the FCOM....well why wouldn't you?
Cheers
Presumably there are time differences between the forms of procedure - different engine types / reverser logic.
Is this time - distance included in the RTO stopping distance; different engines have different distances.
Should an operator-chosen difference in the sequence of manufacturers recommended actions, taking more time, require a consequential change in RTO performance.
Is this time - distance included in the RTO stopping distance; different engines have different distances.
Should an operator-chosen difference in the sequence of manufacturers recommended actions, taking more time, require a consequential change in RTO performance.
Thanks DogSpew - I was trying to remember all the details before I responded, but your response nails it.
Although thrust reversers are tested for the 'RTO' condition during certification, those tests are done with new parts, not stuff that's been in service for a decade and done thousands of T/R cycles. Investigations after a couple reversers were left on the tarmac showed there wasn't as much margin there as we thought, and that's when the NTO was withdrawn.
It's not just the reverser structure either. During the reverser deployment, the fan exhaust goes through a period of significant over and/or under area. While not normally an issue at low fan speeds, at higher fan speeds it can cause the fan blades to go into flutter and fail very quickly. I got a call early in the development of the 747-8 - we needed the engine control to prevent the thrust reverser from starting to deploy until N1C was below XX%. If it didn't prevent it, the fan exhaust over-area could cause fan flutter. Our engine control design at the time didn't have that ability, so I pushed back - we were talking about a transient condition that would only last maybe a second. I was told the consequence of even a second of fan flutter was so dire that we absolutely needed to prevent it. The requirement drove an expensive major redesign of the engine control system - the good news being that the result was a far better engine control system than what we'd started with (I also ended up getting credit for a weight savings of about 200 lbs./aircraft due to all the wiring I was able to eliminate
).
Although thrust reversers are tested for the 'RTO' condition during certification, those tests are done with new parts, not stuff that's been in service for a decade and done thousands of T/R cycles. Investigations after a couple reversers were left on the tarmac showed there wasn't as much margin there as we thought, and that's when the NTO was withdrawn.
It's not just the reverser structure either. During the reverser deployment, the fan exhaust goes through a period of significant over and/or under area. While not normally an issue at low fan speeds, at higher fan speeds it can cause the fan blades to go into flutter and fail very quickly. I got a call early in the development of the 747-8 - we needed the engine control to prevent the thrust reverser from starting to deploy until N1C was below XX%. If it didn't prevent it, the fan exhaust over-area could cause fan flutter. Our engine control design at the time didn't have that ability, so I pushed back - we were talking about a transient condition that would only last maybe a second. I was told the consequence of even a second of fan flutter was so dire that we absolutely needed to prevent it. The requirement drove an expensive major redesign of the engine control system - the good news being that the result was a far better engine control system than what we'd started with (I also ended up getting credit for a weight savings of about 200 lbs./aircraft due to all the wiring I was able to eliminate
).
In my old mob with B744 we used a two step procedure for decades. Then the engine manufacturers said no so we transitioned to three step.
Many of us suggested that maybe the engine manufacturers could allow the two step with an inspection of the stressed engine parts after an RTO. Our logic was and is that an RTO doesn't happen every day, in fact it's likely to be once in a career for a pilot and maybe once in a decade for the airline so lets work around it.
TDRacer's input is, I must say, an eye opener coz the exposure times are very short.
Bottom line, many Cpt decided that in the sim do 3 step but on "that day" do two step and apologise profusely. The logic is that groping around for the speed brake lever in the middle of a highly stressful situation has so much potential to go bad so why take your hands off the relevant controls, the thrust levers??
Many of us suggested that maybe the engine manufacturers could allow the two step with an inspection of the stressed engine parts after an RTO. Our logic was and is that an RTO doesn't happen every day, in fact it's likely to be once in a career for a pilot and maybe once in a decade for the airline so lets work around it.
TDRacer's input is, I must say, an eye opener coz the exposure times are very short.
Bottom line, many Cpt decided that in the sim do 3 step but on "that day" do two step and apologise profusely. The logic is that groping around for the speed brake lever in the middle of a highly stressful situation has so much potential to go bad so why take your hands off the relevant controls, the thrust levers??
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Thanks DogSpew - I was trying to remember all the details before I responded, but your response nails it.
Although thrust reversers are tested for the 'RTO' condition during certification, those tests are done with new parts, not stuff that's been in service for a decade and done thousands of T/R cycles. Investigations after a couple reversers were left on the tarmac showed there wasn't as much margin there as we thought, and that's when the NTO was withdrawn.
It's not just the reverser structure either. During the reverser deployment, the fan exhaust goes through a period of significant over and/or under area. While not normally an issue at low fan speeds, at higher fan speeds it can cause the fan blades to go into flutter and fail very quickly. I got a call early in the development of the 747-8 - we needed the engine control to prevent the thrust reverser from starting to deploy until N1C was below XX%. If it didn't prevent it, the fan exhaust over-area could cause fan flutter. Our engine control design at the time didn't have that ability, so I pushed back - we were talking about a transient condition that would only last maybe a second. I was told the consequence of even a second of fan flutter was so dire that we absolutely needed to prevent it. The requirement drove an expensive major redesign of the engine control system - the good news being that the result was a far better engine control system than what we'd started with (I also ended up getting credit for a weight savings of about 200 lbs./aircraft due to all the wiring I was able to eliminate).
Although thrust reversers are tested for the 'RTO' condition during certification, those tests are done with new parts, not stuff that's been in service for a decade and done thousands of T/R cycles. Investigations after a couple reversers were left on the tarmac showed there wasn't as much margin there as we thought, and that's when the NTO was withdrawn.
It's not just the reverser structure either. During the reverser deployment, the fan exhaust goes through a period of significant over and/or under area. While not normally an issue at low fan speeds, at higher fan speeds it can cause the fan blades to go into flutter and fail very quickly. I got a call early in the development of the 747-8 - we needed the engine control to prevent the thrust reverser from starting to deploy until N1C was below XX%. If it didn't prevent it, the fan exhaust over-area could cause fan flutter. Our engine control design at the time didn't have that ability, so I pushed back - we were talking about a transient condition that would only last maybe a second. I was told the consequence of even a second of fan flutter was so dire that we absolutely needed to prevent it. The requirement drove an expensive major redesign of the engine control system - the good news being that the result was a far better engine control system than what we'd started with (I also ended up getting credit for a weight savings of about 200 lbs./aircraft due to all the wiring I was able to eliminate
).
). However I have no doubt my efforts on the 747-8 resulted in my getting a 're-grade' (basically a promotion, although my job responsibilities didn't change) which came with a hefty raise in pay.I've done some back of the envelop calculations - ~200 lbs per 747-8 works out to a reduced fuel burn - fleet wide - of ~500 gallons/day. So when anyone ever gives me any $hit about my carbon footprint, I have a really good response
.
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Bottom line, many Cpt decided that in the sim do 3 step but on "that day" do two step and apologise profusely. The logic is that groping around for the speed brake lever in the middle of a highly stressful situation has so much potential to go bad so why take your hands off the relevant controls, the thrust levers??
