737-900 hard landing with both pilots on the controls at flare
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737-900 hard landing with both pilots on the controls at flare
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20180409-0
This report concerns a landing incident to a Korean Air Boeing 737-900 that occurred on 9 April 2018. The full report is available in a separate link embedded in this above report.
The first officer became concerned at what he felt was a momentarily high sink rate as the captain flared for landing. The report states the captain had selected the thrust levers to near idle before the flare and the copilot would have been conscious that low thrust levels before the flare increase the possibility of impending high sink rate. He instinctively pulled back on his own control column without telling the captain that he (the copilot) was taking over control.
The aircraft hit hard and bounced and there appears some confusion (depending how you read the report) who was actually in control on impact and during the bounce.
Maybe the copilot in a knee-jerk reaction when he thought the captain wasn't going to flare, thought he could "help" the captain land the aircraft safely.
In this incident a tail strike occurred during the hard landing and go-around.
Some may sympathize with the copilot's concern at his captain's perceived delayed flare. After all, if he sat there and did nothing to prevent the delayed flare he could be up for tea and bikkies.and asked why he failed to take over control from the captain. What was he to do? Perhaps say to the captain politely "Excuse me Captain - but I have control?." By which time the aircraft would have slammed into the deck anyway.
Many a copilot or captain have been faced with a similar situation seconds before touchdown with the other pilot as PF and a hard landing appears imminent. One has sympathy for Airbus pilots who in their aircraft have no feed-back from the other pilots control stick position.
This report concerns a landing incident to a Korean Air Boeing 737-900 that occurred on 9 April 2018. The full report is available in a separate link embedded in this above report.
The first officer became concerned at what he felt was a momentarily high sink rate as the captain flared for landing. The report states the captain had selected the thrust levers to near idle before the flare and the copilot would have been conscious that low thrust levels before the flare increase the possibility of impending high sink rate. He instinctively pulled back on his own control column without telling the captain that he (the copilot) was taking over control.
The aircraft hit hard and bounced and there appears some confusion (depending how you read the report) who was actually in control on impact and during the bounce.
Maybe the copilot in a knee-jerk reaction when he thought the captain wasn't going to flare, thought he could "help" the captain land the aircraft safely.
In this incident a tail strike occurred during the hard landing and go-around.
Some may sympathize with the copilot's concern at his captain's perceived delayed flare. After all, if he sat there and did nothing to prevent the delayed flare he could be up for tea and bikkies.and asked why he failed to take over control from the captain. What was he to do? Perhaps say to the captain politely "Excuse me Captain - but I have control?." By which time the aircraft would have slammed into the deck anyway.
Many a copilot or captain have been faced with a similar situation seconds before touchdown with the other pilot as PF and a hard landing appears imminent. One has sympathy for Airbus pilots who in their aircraft have no feed-back from the other pilots control stick position.
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Many a copilot or captain have been faced with a similar situation seconds before touchdown with the other pilot as PF and a hard landing appears imminent. One has sympathy for Airbus pilots who in their aircraft have no feed-back from the other pilots control stick position.
“Having noticed the operation of the FO, the captain kept the control column so as to follow the FO's operation.”
Whoever was flying the airplane during the go around did not establish the appropriate takeoff attitude thus causing the tail strike. Whoever was pilot monitoring during the go around not ordering the pilot flying to establish the appropriate takeoff attitude was a gross error.
In the past three years, I’ve assumed control three times during the landing phase, all during training (A320). An instructor (and line pilot, both Captain and F/O) must have a clear mental model of the requirements of a safe landing . I’m not talking about a “greaser” at 1800’. I’m taking about a basic safe landing - roll, yaw, thrust, sink rate, touchdown zone all within reasonable - safe - limits. That mental model must include clear, concise, directive commands (2-3 words maximum which are clearly directive), which if not initiated immediately by the flying pilot will result in the pilot monitoring assuming control of the aircraft.
The model must be anticipatory to the extent possible. If this happens (or doesn’t happen) by a certain point, then that most likely will happen. This “mental model”, those precise, clear, directive commands don’t just happen to pop into ones head on final. They require purposeful thought. Right now would be good for those reading this thread who haven’t given this the time it deserves.
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The captain, who was assuming that a landing would be made with a tailwind component, planned to put the thrust levers to their idle position earlier than usual when performing a flare in order to prevent that a touchdown would be long down on the runway.
