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Moog: Boeing 737 parts safety compromised in China? Charles Shi

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Moog: Boeing 737 parts safety compromised in China? Charles Shi

Old 9th Jun 2017, 11:14
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Moog: Boeing 737 parts safety compromised in China? Charles Shi

Aviation safety whistleblower Charles Shi worked at Moog Aviation as East Asia Supply Chain Manager from 2006 to 2016 which manufactures parts for airliners.



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmBdBXKrjDw

He alleges he discovered documents certifying parts as safe were being falsified.
Apparent falsification of 'material specification' meant that some parts from NHJ and their uncertified and concealed sub-contractors used substitute materials, sub-standard Aluminium and Steel, for 20 or so 'critical parts' and one 'single point of failure' Boeing 737 spoiler part.

NHJ also failed to use traceability as specified in international aviation agreements. These aircraft part safety failings affect up to 500 Boeing 737 airliners which Charles Shi suggests people should not fly in until this issue is properly resolved.
Moog, Inc. - Precision motion control products, systems, servovalves, actuators
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Old 11th Jun 2017, 04:20
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Having listened to the video (basically an audio recording with a slideshow of images) I'm surprised that there are no comments here.

It appears to be the tale of a whistleblower revealing things about a major supplier who uses Chinese contracting to fulfill manufacturing requirements, and that contractor in turn used subcontractors who had no idea of what they were working on.

I'm hoping to stir the topic a little so wiser folks will give a listen and an opinion.
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Old 11th Jun 2017, 07:53
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You'll have to get the nmedia to pick this one up - the Daily Mail perhaps - to get any official action
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Old 11th Jun 2017, 08:28
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I see no particular reason to doubt Charles Shi's word. I don't know him, etc, but his employment and role would be easily confirmed. Presumably he's a man in a position to know.

If so, this is the kind of thing that the entire industry + regulators ought to be moving as one to investigate, assess and act on appropriately, and fast.

However, it's possible that for many it's just too big an issue to contemplate - all those aircraft, all those parts, all those airlines and operators, etc. It's potentially a problem way above almost everyone's pay grade.

It ought not be above the regulators' pay grades, except that these days they have a hard time drowning out the voices of the companies when it comes to lobbying. What aviation regulator is free of political / corporate influence these days?

Don't Discover the Implications By Waiting

The reason to get on with it is, suppose that there is a widespread problem, and that accidents do start happening as a result. What then do we think the public's reaction is going to be? "Aviation industry falls down on safety" would be the mildest of headlines...

With this "prior warning" (as the AAIB, NTSB, etc would call it) now public, a failure to respond to it could be damning the entire aviation industry to suffer the potential consequences. And that will be far more expensive than the price differential between suppliers of common parts. An airline with a downed aircraft cannot hide behind a wall of paperwork to escape public opinion, even if it turned out to be falsified.

It would be far more cost effective to start trawling through all the paperwork, follow all the supply chains back to source, and pulling parts off planes, examining them, destructively testing them, and objectively measure the scale of the problem. If there is any hint whatsoever that Charles Shi's tip-off is correct, then there is a problem, it's probably widespread, and through sheer weight of numbers / probability it'll cause an accident somewhere.

Acting on it sharpish will look good in the eyes of regulators, and the paying passenger.

Just going through one's own airline's maintenance logs and replacing all the parts from affected suppliers for new ones from an alternate supplier would cost money, but it would be a sure way of sidestepping the problem.

Above My Pay Grade

This is the kind of problem that board members / chairmen need to be aware of. They are totally dependent on "the system" producing safe operations, but they are supposed to be the ones who take decisions when there is a hint that "the system" might not be working. Not taking a decision at all, fully trusting the system, will not save their airline from being held liable... Blocking a pre-emptive investigation, refusing to spend the money on getting confirmation (or equally acceptable, assurance) could land them in jail.

However, given the amount of corporate lobbying that goes on to reduce regulatory overhead, I'm not holding my breath... "Risk" at such a high level seems to take on a different characteristic; TEPCO operated Fukushima against all advice, the Banks ran huge financial risks despite the seeds of their (our?) downfall being written in black'n'white in the t&cs of the subprime mortgage contracts, etc.

Dynamic QC Regimes

Quality control comes about from audit, and audit result assessment, and most importantly a change in audit / inspection regime. The assessment is a feedback loop, and it tells you whether or not the rate of audit / inspection is adequate to drive quality in a good direction. It's a dynamic, responsive thing.

It feels like that audit/inspection rules prevailing in the airline industry have become too settled, the prevailing rates of audit and inspection have become the norm, the commercially acceptable overhead, the established and unchanging regime from which safe operations will inevitably flow. That's fine, so long as everyone is basically aiming to do the job properly, but it's not fine if there's just one single party anywhere at all in the supply chain intent on, or unintentionally, taking short cuts.

Time to stir things up a bit? Sounds like it's time to turn the audit dials up quite high... I mean, is anyone in the industry actually going to say that we should change nothing, and ignore warnings such as this, that we shouldn't even look?

Not Perfect

The industry isn't perfect at this kind of thing. For instance, all those involved in looking at EC225 decided that a once-per-flight inspection of gearboxes would be safe. And they were fatally wrong. There's probably a quite a few people whose personal reputations are now resting on having cold, hard, objective data and analyses to back up their decisions, and it's certain that someone doesn't have that.
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Old 11th Jun 2017, 08:36
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It's not the first time Boeing has had QC issues with sub-contractors. Memories are vague, but I seem to recall 'issues' with a US based manufacturer as well. Core of the problem seemed to be two fold: 1) Boeing continually striving to push their sub-contractors on price and lead times and 2) Boeing failing to conduct proper oversight, perhaps driven by the desire to place price over quality.
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Old 11th Jun 2017, 19:33
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That would be Ducommen with early NG frame CNC joint parts I believe?
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Old 12th Jun 2017, 15:31
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on a side note, LH were the launch customer for the 737, but they are not currently flying any version of the 737
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Old 12th Jun 2017, 16:12
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Originally Posted by RVF750 View Post
That would be Ducommen with early NG frame CNC joint parts I believe?
The single point of failure parts used counterfeit material are mounting lug for B737 spoilers, the Chinese supplier is the single source for that part since early 2015 till now affecting 300-500 B737 in service including 19 sold to US Navy
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Old 13th Jun 2017, 15:00
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An Matter of FAA Oversight And Extraordinary Aircraft Safety Threat

The matter concerns a Chinese supplier knowingly in an organized way forged material certification and used substitute material in making bogus Single point of failure parts(SPOF) of Boeing B737 spoiler through Moog Aircraft Group who knowingly misrepresented the material facts and covered up the massive criminality by fraud. The Boeing airplanes affected are between 300-500 unit, 19 of them sold to US Navy.

FAA has now concluded a violation of an order, regulation or standard of the FAA related to air carrier safety occurred.

However, FAA has not worked with law enforcement agencies(LEA) according to its own internal procedure in uncovering the complete criminality despite reaching the violation finding.The FAA reported corrective actions did not recall any bogus parts from Boeing airplanes, therefore the safety threat are not removed at all.

Therefore, I am seeking US lawmakers and press intervention and weigh in FAA working with LEA getting the matter of public interest completely uncovered to ensure air traveler’s safety. I shall release to you in a Onedrive folder of a short version of rebutall to FAA investigation report once your interest in my case is advised.
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Old 13th Jun 2017, 16:35
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Follow the money!

So allegedly within the past 2 years an American contractor to the national aircraft manufacturer purchased from a Chinese supplier 1000 lots of a safety-critical part for the B737 spoiler. Of these only 300 had legitimate documentation certifying use of approved materials and quality of production. Paperwork for the others was forged. Implicitly, to hide the fact that corners were being cut by use of a suspect 2nd tier shadowy factory. To rub salt into the wound, not one of the 1000 parts is traceable, itself a violation of international standards in the industry.

Should not this concern the good people seated at the pointy end of each AC? And the company hierarchy each flies for? But as for we the public, how would we ever know?

What went wrong to allow this? And why won’t the FAA act despite evidently having been given strong leads on the culprits? It’s a big call but I say follow the money. Backwards (listen to the YT interview to sample the skullduggery in play), and forwards (that is, cost of rectification).
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Old 14th Jun 2017, 14:59
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Thank you for the message, the objective of my whistleblowing is to call the attention of US lawmakers demanding a joint investigation by FAA and law enforcement agencies that in turn should contact Chinese counterpart in completely uncovering the criminality and fraud, remove the bogus parts the Chinese supplier supplied which are still airborne in Boeing airplanes. Please spread the matter or help me contact related US lawmakers.
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Old 16th Jun 2017, 02:43
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Following the Committees\Subcommittees links on house.gov and senate.gov yields the following:

https://transportation.house.gov/sub...tee/?ID=107417

https://www.senate.gov/general/commi...SCM.htm#SSCM01

Once you have their names, you can go back to the home pages and look up their contact info. (The reps' email forms want a zip (postal) code within their district, their district office(s) address(es) helpfully provide these )
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Old 16th Jun 2017, 05:13
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Thank you so much for provding contact information which is vital to accomplish the goal.
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Old 16th Jun 2017, 05:27
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msbbarratt

This is most inside understanding of the matter on my hand. During last one and half year, I went through all the barriers and obstacles to the government agencies, rejecting, requesting, no response.... that is why I have go public disclosing. Thank you for the englighting message.
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Old 24th Sep 2017, 04:33
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Please view the breaking news by Victoria Mckenzie of The Crime Report on an extraordinary air safety threat that is not removed so far.

https://thecrimereport.org/2017/09/20/196569/

Boeing was sending misleading messages to concerned parties while FAA did not respond my latest request for re-openning the investigation in working with Law Enforcement Agencies(LEA) getting the matter of public safety completely uncovered and massive safety sensitive counterfeit parts removed to ensure air traveler’s safety. DOT OIG rejected my repeated appeal for an FAA oversight audit. Therefore more press coverage is needed to the end of compelling FAA and LEA do the job.

For more background info, please listen to:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m53B...7mFvrp&index=4
https://youtu.be/RmBdBXKrjDw
FAULTY CHINESE AIRCRAFT SOLD TO DOD with CHARLES SHI : TFR LIVE : Truth Frequency Radio
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Old 24th Sep 2017, 19:42
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"And there were a couple of airplanes that came apart in the sky, and nobody lived through that. These were all Next Generations, said Skepnek."

Pretty hefty statement that if not accurate, does not help your case.
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Old 25th Sep 2017, 12:45
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Unless qualified further, then DC-10 does come to mind.
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Old 26th Sep 2017, 05:04
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Recently, Boeing sent a misleading message to concerned parties in disregard of safety to airlines and pilots, crew as well as all flying public who don’t have the first hand information on the FAA fatal oversight and Moog criminality and fraud.
”The safety of the flying public is our primary concern, and we take all such allegations seriously. The FAA investigated these allegations per their process. The supplier, working with Boeing, took corrective actions on two issues and FAA confirmed they had been addressed. I would refer additional questions to the FAA and Moog.”
See CX 10(Exh. E), out of 9 allegations FAA investigated reluctantly the 2nd time after 08/17/2016 my submitting compelling evidences NHJ falsified material certification and used substitute material on Moog business, FAA substantiated violation on 2 allegations but FAA abusively manipulated and minimized the violation to misinform airlines, flying public or whoever goes to find truth as non professionals.
#1 CX 10(Exh. E), P7. P.8.Allegation 3 The violation substantiated by FAA was illicitly outsourcing Moog parts of Boeing by NHJ to unknown 2nd tiers. FAA accepted Moog lie that only first operation was outsourced for one Part Number, The fact is: I reported with evidence to Moog and FAA a few times that NHJ outsourced complete machining processed Moog parts to unknown sources, see CX 26(Moog65). P3. Point 10. CA81706 was not made in house by NHJ. See CX 18(Moog56), the audit report was attached with the 12th internal and 13th Jan FAA whistleblowing, P.7. Mr. S’s finding” P/N CA81706, P689A0091,P689A0118 are completely machined by 2nd tiers (of NHJ) without Moog knowledge. Total 11 part numbers,thousands of piece parts, all production operations were completely outsourced without Moog knowledge even before August 2015 I first whistle blew to Moog Aircraft Group Global Supply Chain management. So far no single piece of counterfeit SUP had been recalled by Moog or Boeing due to FAA abusive oversight.
#2. Allegation 8. B777 Cad Plating Issue. The violation substantiated was concerning 4 part number of safety sensitive parts for B777 spoiler. These parts were not baked after cadmium plating which was causing embrittlement that may cause plane to crash when taking off or landing. CX 10(Exh. E). P.9. FAA stated “Hydrogen embrittlement...(baking) was performed only 4 hours....” but as the chief investigator on this matter myself, I wrote to Mr. Robert Fortune on 19/09/2016, see EXh. RF52, P. 1. “The baking record from Shenghai was for other customers, not for Moog. Shenghai did not do any baking for Moog parts, neither did they have baking records. I took the pictures myself and submitted to you and FAA only to demonstrate Shenghai can do the baking for any customers, but they did not perform the baking for Moog, Shenghai told us they baked 4 hours which was written on the forged process sheet by hand that is not right. The statement was untrue and false. Moog did not obtain any baking records from Shenghai but fraudulently misrepresented the matter to Boeing and now probably to FAA.” I attached in the email the objective evidence of photos as well,
See Exh.52 P.1. Mr. Fortune acknowledged that he understood there was no baking record issued to Moog. However, see CX 10(Exh. E), P.9. he later FABRICATED statement in his November 4th,2016 report completely by himself that “....The following day, the original record was shown to Moog”. This is another grave abuse of authority.
The Tribunal,on its 08/18/2017 Order took note P.34 “Moog performed stress tests on such materials and Boeing accepted recommendation to use as is”. The fact is, CX 31(Exh.RF66), p. 7 the stress tests carried out by 09/24/2015 was ONLY a simulative C-ring test, Moog only picked up 6 parts and cut them into a tiny C-ring since the parts are very small themselves, irregular shaped, even smaller than the required size of specimen, the simulative test is compromised testing, not representative of the aerospace specification of ASTM F519. Moog and Boeing did plan a specimen test per ASTM F519 with date TBD which never took place because NHJ did not have stock of the same lot material, Moog required NHJ to provide similar material which was not representative at all considering the fact NHJ using fake material and loss of traceability of those lots. In the end, the action did not take place!!!
According to ASTM F519 specification, the specimen is a Notched Round Tension Specimen(NRTS) from lot material of production,see below diagram. Moog and Boeing failure of having the same lot of material making NRTS, there was no way the so called C-ring testing was justified in relation to those bogus parts already mounted in B777 planes.

According to FAA,there were 273 pcs unbaked parts on B777 planes even today, No recall due to FAA deliberate oversight. The FAA corrective action was most appalling of all:See CX 10(Exh. E) page 10.

“The FAA's Certificate Management Office that oversees the Boeing Aircraft Company has issued a Formal Compliance Action 2016CA41035 to track this issue. All corrective actions have been taken. No further corrective action is required.”
At this point nobody could find anything in Moog or Boeing SEC filings or reports to airlines, shareholders and flying public in which any of this has been disclosed.
#3 CX 10(Exh. E), P . 10-11 Allegation 9 NHJ forging material certification and using substitute material.(Compelling evidence was rejected.)
Both Moog and FAA refused to verify material facts before FAA closed the Case without violation finding by 1st June,2016 (Exh. R14). Both of them did not find any discrepancies of material facts since they did not even verify material facts or conduct any investigation. I took myself on 14th August,2016 investigating based on CX 17(Moog54) Mr. S’s 7th August,2015 audit report by verifying with GMT Material Technology(GMT) that at least Material Heat Lot: SD1850B2-10G was falsified by NHJ adding quantities from 112pcs to 612pcs, 500pcs suspicious cheap, substitute material was used to make multiple lots of Moog SPOF parts. See CX17(Moog54). P.2. Shawn’s audit Report: PN: P665A0039-02 and CX 21(Exh. RF39-1T), GMT Mr Sun Testimony(Translated by Associated Press).
Only after FAA re-opened investigation upon my submitting compelling evidence of crime on 08/17/2015,did FAA do a superficial”Investigation” FAA stated (CX 10(Exh. E) P.10)
“The MIDO investigator found that (7th Sept,2016 )Moog discovered an accounting error...during a 2015 (before May 27,2015) audit....first, a single billet...was large enough to produce two finished parts, second,multiple raw material certifications were reported under a single material certification number. ” (This is the most abusive statement by FAA)
NHJ and Moog was telling FAA quantity was 612pcs while GMT only sold NHJ 112pcs, to double is 224pcs, not making 612pc. So Moog added other lot number elsewhere to fill up the shortage. By so doing,it violated the rule of traceability of US aviation system, GMT and all aerospace approved material vendor lot is Heat Lot based. The rest lots are different heat lots, they could be quoted under same “certificate number”, but they did not belong to lot SD1850B2-10G. that is the standard, order and regulation of FAA. It is like King’s family, you have 3 kids, all sir named King, but each child has different name and ID, you can call them King 1, King 2, King 3, but King 1 does not include King 2 and 3.

I verified one more time on 13th Feb 2017 with GMT China Sales manager, Mr Mr. X, he called me back on 2017/02/15, I took a recording while he said GMT might issue a certificate of One certificate number with multiple heat lot of material with different lot numbers. But for particular heat lot number, the quantity and weight is fixed. For SD1850B2-10G, the heat lot had total 2 pc bar, 8 Meter/each, total weight is 330kg. they sold to NHJ 112pcs total weight 262kg. even there were remaining pcs, it could only make less than 30pcs,in no way make another 500pcs. I have a phone recording on this conversation as Exh. Sunyongjun-GMT rm_007 released to main media outlets and independent journalists who have been investigating on the matter.
#4 CX 10(Exh. E), P.9 Allegation 7. Moog leaked my confidential whistleblowing information to Joe Zou who conspired with the verified criminal counterfeiter NHJ tampering and destroying evidences

See CX 26(Moog65), P. 4. Despite my solemn warning two days earlier to Moog CEO requesting keep me safe , on 14th January,2016,one day after job termination, at 19:50 Beijing time, Mr. Scalled me saying Moog top executives leaked my FAA whistleblowing information to Joe Zou, the very internal suspect I whistleblew against and the executive asked Joe to lead a “RE-INVESTIGATION” before FAA was coming. See CX 42(Exh.RF11-1) phone conversation transcript translated by Associated Press.
It is absolutely not acceptable that FAA determination “This allegation is beyond the scope of this investigation” without passing on the information to Law Enforcement Agencies per FAA own protocol. FAA reaching “No violation substantiated” is a grave oversight that set free the organized Chinese criminal counterfeiter and endorsed Moog criminal act and fraud of cover-up.
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Old 26th Sep 2017, 13:16
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The US have found counterfeit parts getting in to weapon systems, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...=.0855c0731fbd it doesn't surprise me to find these in commercial systems. Reducing cost is a primary driver for everyone.

These things tend to follow a sawtooth pattern, a high profile accident leads to investigations, tightening of regulations etc. Over time these are relaxed as industry demands lower cost, enforcement weakened due to "regulatory capture". It has been seen time and again in rail transport, nuclear power, food supply, finance, construction, auto industry. I don't expect air transport to be an exception.

It is obviously sensible to reduce risks before accidents occur, but history shows nothing is likely to be done until a trend of serious accidents leads to public awareness and demands for action.
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Old 26th Sep 2017, 21:29
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It is obviously sensible to reduce risks before accidents occur, but history shows nothing is likely to be done until a trend of serious accidents leads to public awareness and demands for action.
I worked this for years. It's too hard to police until/unless the result is more major (Obvious) and more often. Even then the policing is more economical in impact to the suspected cause then punnishiable against a violation of a law.

The reason it doesn't attract much attention is because the results get lost in the everyday minor failure reports for all causes.
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