Automation dependency stripped of political correctness.
Join Date: Oct 2015
Location: Tranquility Base
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Also, these skills may not be so well practiced, and also in this sense it’s mainly a cognitive skill – knowing what to do vs how to do it; this depends on understanding the situation.
That is very well put! It needs both, but while the manual flying skills do not need to be perfect (just don't leave your flight envelope, and if you approach the edges of the envelope, stear it back into the middle of the envelope), sound judgement and decision making with good situational awareness is overall the most important.
If we think about AF447 or the Air Asia thing, it was a problem of basic flying, but not in the sense of how precisely can I fly it, but in the sense, how should my plane be flown ROUGHLY right now. You could even argue it was not about what to do, but about what surely NOT to do (pull on the stick).
If we think about AF447 or the Air Asia thing, it was a problem of basic flying, but not in the sense of how precisely can I fly it, but in the sense, how should my plane be flown ROUGHLY right now. You could even argue it was not about what to do, but about what surely NOT to do (pull on the stick).
but these aspects may be easier to understand and implement if ‘technology’ (an enabler) is considered separately from ‘automation’ (actor).
When I said...
RAAS / ROPS comes to mind. Better TO Config warnings, which include position of the aircraft. Or the whole concept of approaches with vertical guidance.
But all these technologies should and will be support for pilots, who remain in charge, have the final authority over the action, and deal with daily problems and malfunctions as they arise.
But all these technologies should and will be support for pilots, who remain in charge, have the final authority over the action, and deal with daily problems and malfunctions as they arise.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TCAS and EGPWS are not warning systems, they are directing systems and the current instruction is not to keep the crew in charge. The crew is to do what it is told without second guessing.
This is a deliberate and clear policy to remove the human from the decision making process due to the error rate in humans. I am told that various modern systems have removed the human and the autopilot is integrated thus avoiding the spectacularly high error rate of humans attempting to follow the TCAS RA.
Thread Starter
It is not about perfect manual flying
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
But the entire civil system provides no incentive for excellence, and over time I think enthusiasm wanes in the face of the rigid seniority systems.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,407
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the military combat flying is competitive because one has to be better than the other guy. The pilot has to develop the ability to push the aircraft to limits and to achieve that most of the flying they do is training flying. In commercial flying you fly to make money and for that there is a minimum standard laid down which is practiced mostly in SIM. On line the maximum you can practice is raw data instrument approaches or a visual approach and that is not such a big thing. You cannot push or bust anything that is laid down nor is it required. In AF447 or QZ8501 all that the crew needed to know was in alternate law you never apply full back stick or to the sides for that matter and the carnage would have been avoided. Especially QZ8501 was entirely crews creation.
Centaurus and vilas,
Unfortunately, in most civil flying, the lowest common denominator is sufficient. Disappointing but true.
Unfortunately, in most civil flying, the lowest common denominator is sufficient. Disappointing but true.
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Alternate places
Age: 76
Posts: 97
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Davies dealt briefly with the notion of perfection as well, in offering the thought that air transports must be realistically designed for average skill.
While the goal of perfection is entirely appropriate for the military due mission demands, commercial air transport, particularly in non-state-supported corporations, have neither (relatively) unlimited resources nor does the population base (overall, and of those with pilot licences), support a "top-gun" standard for a commercial enterprise.
As we are increasingly aware, the very opposite is now in place where just enough skill, completed by OTJ-training and MCPL licencing are the twin standards for commercial air transportation. Even that system is not supplying sufficient pilots for rapid growth we are seeing in some parts of the world. Nor is "automation" in any way a supplement for such shortages, particularly if one does not thoroughly know one's aircraft.
That said, alf5071h has, I believe, a good point that manual flying skills need not be ready or practised for rare, complex manoeuvres but should be ready for bread-and-butter operations that at least stabilize the aircraft.
Long-discussed and still relevant, the PF on AF447 certainly had that level of skill as he very quickly and successfully got the roll oscillations under control. Illustrative and in the present context of the thread, the problem was cognitive, not an inability to fly manually. The problem was not comprehending the situation the aircraft was in, which was a non-event and certainly not an emergency, as aircraft which lose airspeed indications remain stable in cruise so long as pitch and power settings do not change.
While the goal of perfection is entirely appropriate for the military due mission demands, commercial air transport, particularly in non-state-supported corporations, have neither (relatively) unlimited resources nor does the population base (overall, and of those with pilot licences), support a "top-gun" standard for a commercial enterprise.
As we are increasingly aware, the very opposite is now in place where just enough skill, completed by OTJ-training and MCPL licencing are the twin standards for commercial air transportation. Even that system is not supplying sufficient pilots for rapid growth we are seeing in some parts of the world. Nor is "automation" in any way a supplement for such shortages, particularly if one does not thoroughly know one's aircraft.
That said, alf5071h has, I believe, a good point that manual flying skills need not be ready or practised for rare, complex manoeuvres but should be ready for bread-and-butter operations that at least stabilize the aircraft.
Long-discussed and still relevant, the PF on AF447 certainly had that level of skill as he very quickly and successfully got the roll oscillations under control. Illustrative and in the present context of the thread, the problem was cognitive, not an inability to fly manually. The problem was not comprehending the situation the aircraft was in, which was a non-event and certainly not an emergency, as aircraft which lose airspeed indications remain stable in cruise so long as pitch and power settings do not change.
One of the problems in comparing airlines with the military, of course, is that in the former we are generally referring to two-pilot cockpits (or multi-crew cockpits), whereas a high proportion of military cockpits are single-pilot: a very different game.
Then there's the question of quality control and incentives for self-improvement/development. In an airline I once worked for (and with which Bergerie1 is familiar), check assessment was at that time based on the average (perceived) standard for the airline, which was defined as "Good". There was a chart of the different grades of performance, which was symmetrical top and bottom and based on a so-called percentile of the pilot force.
IIRC, the middle 80% of pilots would be graded "Good" (percentiles 11 to 90 inclusive). Above "Good", percentiles 91 to 99 inclusive graded "Very Good", and percentile 100 was "Outstanding". Below "Good", percentiles 2 to 10 inclusive graded "Satisfactory", and percentile 1 was graded "Unsatisfactory".
The only fail grade was "Unsatisfactory". In practice, however, "Satisfactory" was a euphemism for unsatisfactory, and in need of further training and/or check. The 90% of pilots above that grade were unlikely to be offered any valuable simulator time to brush up their skills. A perennial problem with the grading in practice was that trainers and checkers were inclined to award VG when Good would have been more appropriate. On some fleets more VGs were awarded than Goods, and many pilots came to expect the latter merely for a trouble-free performance. Pilots tended to justify this on the perceived grounds that their fleet was better than average in the company. Grade inflation therefore spread from one fleet to another as new types were introduced.
Of course all that was many years ago...
Then there's the question of quality control and incentives for self-improvement/development. In an airline I once worked for (and with which Bergerie1 is familiar), check assessment was at that time based on the average (perceived) standard for the airline, which was defined as "Good". There was a chart of the different grades of performance, which was symmetrical top and bottom and based on a so-called percentile of the pilot force.
IIRC, the middle 80% of pilots would be graded "Good" (percentiles 11 to 90 inclusive). Above "Good", percentiles 91 to 99 inclusive graded "Very Good", and percentile 100 was "Outstanding". Below "Good", percentiles 2 to 10 inclusive graded "Satisfactory", and percentile 1 was graded "Unsatisfactory".
The only fail grade was "Unsatisfactory". In practice, however, "Satisfactory" was a euphemism for unsatisfactory, and in need of further training and/or check. The 90% of pilots above that grade were unlikely to be offered any valuable simulator time to brush up their skills. A perennial problem with the grading in practice was that trainers and checkers were inclined to award VG when Good would have been more appropriate. On some fleets more VGs were awarded than Goods, and many pilots came to expect the latter merely for a trouble-free performance. Pilots tended to justify this on the perceived grounds that their fleet was better than average in the company. Grade inflation therefore spread from one fleet to another as new types were introduced.
Of course all that was many years ago...
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the civil world one has to ask the difference between satisfactory & adequate. What I have seen over the past 20 years, in some companies, is the dilution of standards. Yes there have been failures in bi-annual checks and command upgrades. For that they have to be bad, bad. Much is available in advance for self-briefing & study. The emphasis is much more on training, coaching, grooming. You have to be a muppet to fail, but still some do. The level of 'good' seems to be the norm, i.e. average. Often the next level down is low average, fair, satisfactory. They are still passes. It has to be a fail, below standard to cause retraining. The line between the 'just a pass' and a fail can be very thin. There are some who think that 'adequate' = good is good enough. For command adequate is all that is needed. Why bust a gut to be better. It is not a meritocracy. For those of us who were trainers, and as such (hopefully) above average, our own standard was the norm to us. It was very disappointing to find that there were some who were satisfied to be just adequate and expect that a command would come their way in time. The rapid expansion of airlines during the last 20 years could only have been achieved with adequate, just good enough, pilots. It's a business.
One would hope that after your driving test/PPL test/CPL test/LST a conscientious person would strive to improve their skills. I'm saddened when that is not the case. I wonder if that is expecting too much.
One would hope that after your driving test/PPL test/CPL test/LST a conscientious person would strive to improve their skills. I'm saddened when that is not the case. I wonder if that is expecting too much.
In AF447 or QZ8501 all that the crew needed to know was in alternate law you never apply full back stick or to the sides for that matter and the carnage would have been avoided.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Wanderlust
Posts: 3,407
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All that was needed was an aeroplane that flies the same regardless of what is wrong with it. You mentioned the military, Vilas. They train the way they fight. Having to fly an aeroplane differently because it's systems have had a dummy-spit is not training the way you fight. Throw in autotrim with backstick and you've set the crew up for a big fall.
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Alternate places
Age: 76
Posts: 97
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Capn Bloggs, re, "Having to fly an aeroplane differently because it's systems have had a dummy-spit is not training the way you fight. Throw in autotrim with backstick and you've set the crew up for a big fall. "
In the interests of accuracy in a serious discussion on automation which is being read by many, I beg your indulgence regarding the following:
The assumptions behind your statement are inaccurate and incorrect. As such the statement is misleading, particularly to those who are just trying to understand these issues, as they may have related to two known accidents.
It is unfair to the discussion to claim that the aircraft has to be flown "differently". It does not, and it is incorrect to claim this as fact, particularly if one has not trained on, checked-out on and flown the type.
To be clear, the aircraft requires no special handling in Alternate Law. It requires the same handling you'd give any other transport aircraft at high altitude, high Mach Number under the same circumstances.
To the contrary, there is nothing normal about pitching a transport aircraft up to 15° at FL350 and keeping it there. Every other transport aircraft would have behaved the same way, given the same treatment.
In the case brought up (AF447), the moment the airspeed information had been lost, the PF pulled the stick back and increased pitch, reducing energy & speed. The THS moves to neutralize elevator forces. In response to the up-elevator commands from the sidestick, the THS began to move only after sixty-seconds of nose-up input by which time the pitch had increased to 15°NU and the AoA to 12°. The stall warning was sounding continuously by this time with an 11,000fpm descent rate.
From that point, it took a further 45 seconds of consistent nose-up input to take the THS from normal cruise settings 2-3°NU to 13° NU by which time the aircraft had been fully stalled for two minutes and was passing FL290 in the descent.
For reasons we may never know and understand, the aircraft was severely mishandled, just as QZ8501 was.
When an ordinary line pilot enters test pilot territory there are quite possibly risks of a "big fall", but as with any other aircraft, not until. The aircraft itself performed as flown.
In the interests of accuracy in a serious discussion on automation which is being read by many, I beg your indulgence regarding the following:
The assumptions behind your statement are inaccurate and incorrect. As such the statement is misleading, particularly to those who are just trying to understand these issues, as they may have related to two known accidents.
It is unfair to the discussion to claim that the aircraft has to be flown "differently". It does not, and it is incorrect to claim this as fact, particularly if one has not trained on, checked-out on and flown the type.
To be clear, the aircraft requires no special handling in Alternate Law. It requires the same handling you'd give any other transport aircraft at high altitude, high Mach Number under the same circumstances.
To the contrary, there is nothing normal about pitching a transport aircraft up to 15° at FL350 and keeping it there. Every other transport aircraft would have behaved the same way, given the same treatment.
In the case brought up (AF447), the moment the airspeed information had been lost, the PF pulled the stick back and increased pitch, reducing energy & speed. The THS moves to neutralize elevator forces. In response to the up-elevator commands from the sidestick, the THS began to move only after sixty-seconds of nose-up input by which time the pitch had increased to 15°NU and the AoA to 12°. The stall warning was sounding continuously by this time with an 11,000fpm descent rate.
From that point, it took a further 45 seconds of consistent nose-up input to take the THS from normal cruise settings 2-3°NU to 13° NU by which time the aircraft had been fully stalled for two minutes and was passing FL290 in the descent.
For reasons we may never know and understand, the aircraft was severely mishandled, just as QZ8501 was.
When an ordinary line pilot enters test pilot territory there are quite possibly risks of a "big fall", but as with any other aircraft, not until. The aircraft itself performed as flown.
Last edited by FDMII; 1st Feb 2016 at 14:27.
Join Date: Jan 2014
Location: N5109.2W10.5
Posts: 720
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi FDMII,
Whilst I agree with most of what you have said, I would also include the accident of D-AXLA, XL Airways https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-l...a081127.en.pdf
Please see page 86 2.1.5 Loss of Control.
The common thread with these accidents is the crew were completely confused by the response of the aircraft to their control inputs when the aircraft is in ALT or Direct Law.
"The loss of control was thus caused by a thrust increase performed with a full pitch-up horizontal stabilizer position. This position and the engine thrust made pitch down control impossible. It should be noted that the PF made no inputs on the horizontal stabilizer nor reduced the thrust and that the PNF did not intervene. This seems to indicate that none of them were aware that the automatic trim system, which relieves the pilot of any actions to trim the aeroplane, was no longer available. In the absence of preparation and anticipation of the phenomenon, the habit of having the automatic trim system available made it difficult to return to flying with manual trimming of
the aeroplane."
So were they all idiots or is the man machine interface not perfect?
Whilst I agree with most of what you have said, I would also include the accident of D-AXLA, XL Airways https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-l...a081127.en.pdf
Please see page 86 2.1.5 Loss of Control.
The common thread with these accidents is the crew were completely confused by the response of the aircraft to their control inputs when the aircraft is in ALT or Direct Law.
"The loss of control was thus caused by a thrust increase performed with a full pitch-up horizontal stabilizer position. This position and the engine thrust made pitch down control impossible. It should be noted that the PF made no inputs on the horizontal stabilizer nor reduced the thrust and that the PNF did not intervene. This seems to indicate that none of them were aware that the automatic trim system, which relieves the pilot of any actions to trim the aeroplane, was no longer available. In the absence of preparation and anticipation of the phenomenon, the habit of having the automatic trim system available made it difficult to return to flying with manual trimming of
the aeroplane."
For reasons we may never know and understand, the aircraft was severely mishandled, just as QZ8501 was.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the AF447 case, the aircraft did exactly what they asked of it.
They demanded that the nose remain high and it did.
The only thing the aircraft did not do once in Direct law is protect them from their own errors.
It performed as advertised wrt control inputs.
They demanded that the nose remain high and it did.
The only thing the aircraft did not do once in Direct law is protect them from their own errors.
It performed as advertised wrt control inputs.
They demanded that the nose remain high and it did.
The auto trim stops long before the stall bloggsie. If they let go of the stick at the first stall warning (or any time really) the aircraft would have stabilised at the trimmed airspeed out of the stall (letting go too long after entering the stall may mean you run out of air to recover in...bugg@). Well that's what would happen in ALTN law. In direct law this would happen unless you push the motors up to the full noise position, in which case you may run out of stick authority (depending on how slow you got), in which case you need to go to idle, and maybe roll to get the nose down. Pretty conventional really.
To stall an Airbus you need to hold back pressure on the stick to maintain an attitude once the autotrim stops (autotrim will work into VLS, but stops prior to Alpha Prot or Alpha SW, depending in what law you are in). This is a big warning sign of what is about to happen if you continue doing what you are doing. Seems easy sitting at a desk, but add fear, startle effect, and pilots that have only experienced non-normal in a Simulator and the outcome will not always be successful, as shown by bent metal of all makes.
To stall an Airbus you need to hold back pressure on the stick to maintain an attitude once the autotrim stops (autotrim will work into VLS, but stops prior to Alpha Prot or Alpha SW, depending in what law you are in). This is a big warning sign of what is about to happen if you continue doing what you are doing. Seems easy sitting at a desk, but add fear, startle effect, and pilots that have only experienced non-normal in a Simulator and the outcome will not always be successful, as shown by bent metal of all makes.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So what?
The simple fact is that if they had done the same thing in a Boeing they would have held it in the stall into the water as well.
If you hold the controls full back and never attempt to push the nose forwards then you stall and die.
I am also anti auto-trim by the way, I think it removes some SA from the pilot, but I don't think this incident should be blamed on the aircraft. It was pilot incompetence all the way.
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: last time I looked I was still here.
Posts: 4,507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It was pilot incompetence all the way.
I agree, from all we know, that the crew did not understand some of the basics; and it is even said that letting go would/could have saved them.
What I also reflect on is knowledge. Reading the posts from various AB pilots (I'm not one) it seems there is a varied amount of knowledge & understanding of all the possibilities, laws and handling characteristics on AB a/c. There will be pilot geeks, trainers and others who know everything and can recite it all. There will be the average, and even below average, line pilot who operates every day in an ideal world where nothing goes wrong, radically, and does not understand all the nuances. This then cause me to ask about the 'competence' of the initial TR training and regular recurrence training.
Perhaps people in the know can inform us. There will be readers who themselves know if they have an in-depth knowledge of all that has been discussed; and they will know why they might feel ignorant. Is it due to lack of training or lack of self application? Equally there will be those who now it all and can tell us how & why? What is the difference in airline training syllabi? If it can be identified that some operators deal only in the ideal basics then a review of training regimes can be made and corrected.
I agree, from all we know, that the crew did not understand some of the basics; and it is even said that letting go would/could have saved them.
What I also reflect on is knowledge. Reading the posts from various AB pilots (I'm not one) it seems there is a varied amount of knowledge & understanding of all the possibilities, laws and handling characteristics on AB a/c. There will be pilot geeks, trainers and others who know everything and can recite it all. There will be the average, and even below average, line pilot who operates every day in an ideal world where nothing goes wrong, radically, and does not understand all the nuances. This then cause me to ask about the 'competence' of the initial TR training and regular recurrence training.
Perhaps people in the know can inform us. There will be readers who themselves know if they have an in-depth knowledge of all that has been discussed; and they will know why they might feel ignorant. Is it due to lack of training or lack of self application? Equally there will be those who now it all and can tell us how & why? What is the difference in airline training syllabi? If it can be identified that some operators deal only in the ideal basics then a review of training regimes can be made and corrected.
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Alternate places
Age: 76
Posts: 97
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So were they all idiots or is the man machine interface not perfect?
Capn Bloggs, the point regarding the auto-trim and the absence of stall warning in NCD conditions is not to excuse them but to understand them.
It is not as though the design was without thought, and certification both in Europe and North America.
If I recall, the stall-warning issue is being addressed. The auto-trim appears, to me anyway, more complex because it is part of a FBW system with other performance requirements. That it should cease moving during a stall warning appears on the surface to be obvious, (and I think it should stop), but reversion to manual trimming, (which makes the aircraft an ordinary aircraft), didn't prevent Perpignan, (which had other, serious antecedents as you would know from reading the report). For AF447, there was sufficient elevator authority to get the nose down and unload the wing. The THS would have followed sidestick commands towards the ND position, but the crew also had the option of rolling the trim wheels forward as well, notwithstanding the huge demands being made on these crews by LOC circumstances.
Last edited by FDMII; 1st Feb 2016 at 15:05.
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by Tourist
You are little hung up on the fact that a very old aircraft is not flawless, as if this is somehow a searing indictment of the concept.
But as money leads the way, you don't need to insist how pilots are terrible to justify the move.
The simple fact is that if they had done the same thing in a Boeing they would have held it in the stall into the water as well.
In the A, once stalled, you could leave the stick alone and the auto will trim all the way to comfortably maintain the bird in a fully developed and pronounced stall.