Autoland
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Autoland
AUTOLAND
I'm wondering if someone can help me with the following
I understand the ability for a Boeing to AL requires certain criteria. Threshold crossing height, glidelsope limits, slope limits, inbound course etc. I also understand that an AL should be certified by the company operating the aircraft - (approval) at a particular airport and particular runway.
Just wondering if during an emergency, an AL could be Carried out without operators approval e.g in poor weather conditions, as long as it subscribes to the above criteria? Signal interference aside - what would the possible dangers be?
Thank you
I'm wondering if someone can help me with the following
I understand the ability for a Boeing to AL requires certain criteria. Threshold crossing height, glidelsope limits, slope limits, inbound course etc. I also understand that an AL should be certified by the company operating the aircraft - (approval) at a particular airport and particular runway.
Just wondering if during an emergency, an AL could be Carried out without operators approval e.g in poor weather conditions, as long as it subscribes to the above criteria? Signal interference aside - what would the possible dangers be?
Thank you
In an emergency you do what you have to to get the aircraft on the ground safely. If that means an autoland with a non-approved crew into a non-approved aerodrome, then so be it.
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You are a low houred new hire pilot on a training flight and the captain is incapacitated and needs urgent medical attention. The nearest airfield is on the nose but is covered in low cloud below minimums and a bit of a cross wind to boot. So you do the sensible thing and declare a mayday and let the thing land itself and request all the available emergency services. For a gold star you will advise atc that you intend to do an auto land and to protect the localiser area - if the airfield has one.
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To add to that, just in case you're not aware. You can also perform a "practice" autoland using a CAT 1 ILS, into an unapproved airfield provided the aircraft is up for it, you are in VMC and are prepared and ready to take over. You do not need to request this from the tower or even announce a "Practice Autoland" (always a good idea to check the AIP/airport info charts to be certain).
Though, I did once hear a British charter request the "LOC area to be protected" (in bright VMC) because he was performing a practice autoland
Though, I did once hear a British charter request the "LOC area to be protected" (in bright VMC) because he was performing a practice autoland
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Contrary to what Superpilot just posted, some AFM specifically require CAT 1 ILS to be approved before use for practice.
GENERAL
The following operations are prohibited:
− MLS;
− ILS beam not coincident with the central axis of the runway;
− Autoland for an ILS CAT I, unless operators interrogate the airport
authorities on ILS ground equipment quality and on experience with
other operators. The operators should check with the authorities
that specific restrictions do not apply at airports with CAT I only
capability. Terrain profile before the runway threshold has also to
be considered.
The following operations are prohibited:
− MLS;
− ILS beam not coincident with the central axis of the runway;
− Autoland for an ILS CAT I, unless operators interrogate the airport
authorities on ILS ground equipment quality and on experience with
other operators. The operators should check with the authorities
that specific restrictions do not apply at airports with CAT I only
capability. Terrain profile before the runway threshold has also to
be considered.
It happens, here is an excerpt from an ATSB report into a Qantas jet that had prepared for a 'ditching' before deciding to carryout an autoland into Perth where no such facility existed:
The successful third attempt at landing at Perth was made when the Airbus was very low on fuel following the previous two attempts, and the only other course of action would have been to attempt a ditching at sea.
While Qantas international pilots are trained in autoland procedures at some overseas airports, they are not approved for anything other than emergency use at Australian airports because none have ground based navigational aids that are certified as reliably generating signals of sufficient accuracy for such ultra low visibility landings.
The flight had departed from Singapore without enough fuel to make a last minute diversion from Perth to the nearest suitable big jet airport which was Learmonth, 1110 kilometres to the north.
The successful third attempt at landing at Perth was made when the Airbus was very low on fuel following the previous two attempts, and the only other course of action would have been to attempt a ditching at sea.
While Qantas international pilots are trained in autoland procedures at some overseas airports, they are not approved for anything other than emergency use at Australian airports because none have ground based navigational aids that are certified as reliably generating signals of sufficient accuracy for such ultra low visibility landings.
The flight had departed from Singapore without enough fuel to make a last minute diversion from Perth to the nearest suitable big jet airport which was Learmonth, 1110 kilometres to the north.
Another one from Oz
Maybe incorrect, but I have in the back of my mind that the crew had no formal training in doing autolands either.
As the aircraft approached runway 23 for landing, the crew observed a bank of fog drifting toward the aerodrome from the north-east. By the time the aircraft arrived at the aerodrome, the runway threshold was obscured by the fog. As a result, the crew elected to conduct a missed approach.
During the missed approach, the crew noticed that the threshold area of runway 05 was clear, so they requested an immediate visual approach to runway 05 before the fog drifted further to the south-west. Due to other instrument flight rules traffic, Air Traffic Control (ATC) could not issue an immediate clearance for the approach. By the time that clearance was available, the remainder of the runway was obscured by fog. A B737 aircraft had been able to land on runway 05 following a VOR/DME approach, so the A320 crew attempted to conduct a similar approach. However, that attempt resulted in a second missed approach. The aircraft tracked to the north-east of the aerodrome and the crew informed ATC that they would conduct an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 23, and then land using the aircraft's autoland system. With 1,500 kg of fuel remaining, the aircraft landed without incident in the fog. Visibility was 250 to 350 m.
The aircraft was certificated for autoland approaches, but the ground equipment was not. The ILS transmitter was a Category 1 unit with a minimum visibility of 1,200 m required for landing. The crew decided to conduct an autopilot-coupled approach with automatic landing, as fog was also present at the Royal Australian Air Force base at Edinburgh, rendering that aerodrome unsuitable as an alternate. The crew considered that Whyalla, the nearest suitable aerodrome, was likely to have similar weather conditions to Adelaide.
Fog had not been forecast for Adelaide when the crew submitted their flight plan. Consequently, the aircraft did not carry fuel for holding at Adelaide or for diversion to an alternate.
However, fog had been forecast for both Edinburgh and Parafield. The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) reported that this was not unusual, as records showed that in the past 20 years, fogs formed at both Adelaide and Edinburgh on about 50% of occasions, with Edinburgh proving to be the greater risk. On the day of the occurrence, moisture levels were higher to the north of Adelaide, with fog forming at Edinburgh at 0700 Central Standard Time. What was unusual about this event was that the advection of fog from the north took place at a greater speed than the surface wind and that the onset time of fog at Adelaide Airport was 40 minutes later than any recorded onset time at that location in the past 30 years.
BoM records showed that Adelaide Airport averaged 4.9 fog events per annum. The highest annual total for events was nine, recorded in both 1956 and 1983. At the time of the incident on 20 August, there had been 11 fog events recorded at Adelaide Airport during 1999.
During the missed approach, the crew noticed that the threshold area of runway 05 was clear, so they requested an immediate visual approach to runway 05 before the fog drifted further to the south-west. Due to other instrument flight rules traffic, Air Traffic Control (ATC) could not issue an immediate clearance for the approach. By the time that clearance was available, the remainder of the runway was obscured by fog. A B737 aircraft had been able to land on runway 05 following a VOR/DME approach, so the A320 crew attempted to conduct a similar approach. However, that attempt resulted in a second missed approach. The aircraft tracked to the north-east of the aerodrome and the crew informed ATC that they would conduct an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 23, and then land using the aircraft's autoland system. With 1,500 kg of fuel remaining, the aircraft landed without incident in the fog. Visibility was 250 to 350 m.
The aircraft was certificated for autoland approaches, but the ground equipment was not. The ILS transmitter was a Category 1 unit with a minimum visibility of 1,200 m required for landing. The crew decided to conduct an autopilot-coupled approach with automatic landing, as fog was also present at the Royal Australian Air Force base at Edinburgh, rendering that aerodrome unsuitable as an alternate. The crew considered that Whyalla, the nearest suitable aerodrome, was likely to have similar weather conditions to Adelaide.
Fog had not been forecast for Adelaide when the crew submitted their flight plan. Consequently, the aircraft did not carry fuel for holding at Adelaide or for diversion to an alternate.
However, fog had been forecast for both Edinburgh and Parafield. The Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) reported that this was not unusual, as records showed that in the past 20 years, fogs formed at both Adelaide and Edinburgh on about 50% of occasions, with Edinburgh proving to be the greater risk. On the day of the occurrence, moisture levels were higher to the north of Adelaide, with fog forming at Edinburgh at 0700 Central Standard Time. What was unusual about this event was that the advection of fog from the north took place at a greater speed than the surface wind and that the onset time of fog at Adelaide Airport was 40 minutes later than any recorded onset time at that location in the past 30 years.
BoM records showed that Adelaide Airport averaged 4.9 fog events per annum. The highest annual total for events was nine, recorded in both 1956 and 1983. At the time of the incident on 20 August, there had been 11 fog events recorded at Adelaide Airport during 1999.
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The flight had departed from Singapore without enough fuel to make a last minute diversion from Perth to the nearest suitable big jet airport which was Learmonth, 1110 kilometres to the north.
That begs some questions. If true.
That begs some questions. If true.
Which were addressed, up to a point, in the investigation report:
"The forecasts used in planning the flight predicted fog would occur about 1.5 hours after the aircraft’s arrival at Perth. After the aircraft’s departure, however, the forecasters identified a trend towards an earlier onset and updated subsequent aerodrome forecasts (TAF) and trend type forecasts (TTF) accordingly. Enroute, the flight crew actively sought weather information or received it from the operator’s operational support. As a result, the crew maintained an awareness of the developing meteorological situation. Significantly, it was only at 2400, after the aircraft had passed the Designated Point All Engines Operating (DPA), that the TTF predicted fog onset before the arrival time. Once the crew commenced descent they were committed to a landing at Perth.
The forecasting of fog is necessarily a complex process and the exact timing of fog formation at a particular location was difficult to predict. Had there been a more extensive local meteorological observation network in place, the Bureau of Meteorology may have been able to produce an accurate prediction of fog onset at Perth Airport before the aircraft began its descent and was committed to a landing. Although the statistics for the years 2003 to 2006 showed only one unforecast fog event at Perth, the continuing work by the bureau to improve their forecasting models and share information should increase fog forecast assurance at Perth and other major airports.
At the time of the incident, the operator’s fuel policy did not discriminate between Perth, which was relatively isolated in terms of distance from airports suitable for the A330, and other Australian airports. That meant that, in the absence of any applicable operational requirements, flights to Perth did not routinely carry additional fuel for flight from the planned destination to a suitable airport. The operator was aware of the safety risk posed by unforseen events, meteorological or otherwise, at destination airports and managed the risk through their integrated operations centre. In this case, the flight crew demonstrated their awareness of the risk in their conservative decision to carry fuel out of Singapore that was additional to the minimum fuel policy requirement. However, that extra fuel was insufficient to assure a landing at a suitable airport.
In the circumstances, the crew’s action in attempting two approaches before committing to a landing below minima was sound. Crew selection of the runway 21 ILS as an operator-approved runway for autoland, and use of the A330 autoland capability reduced the risk inherent in landing in meteorological conditions that were below the specified minima."
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24331/a...605473_001.pdf
"The forecasts used in planning the flight predicted fog would occur about 1.5 hours after the aircraft’s arrival at Perth. After the aircraft’s departure, however, the forecasters identified a trend towards an earlier onset and updated subsequent aerodrome forecasts (TAF) and trend type forecasts (TTF) accordingly. Enroute, the flight crew actively sought weather information or received it from the operator’s operational support. As a result, the crew maintained an awareness of the developing meteorological situation. Significantly, it was only at 2400, after the aircraft had passed the Designated Point All Engines Operating (DPA), that the TTF predicted fog onset before the arrival time. Once the crew commenced descent they were committed to a landing at Perth.
The forecasting of fog is necessarily a complex process and the exact timing of fog formation at a particular location was difficult to predict. Had there been a more extensive local meteorological observation network in place, the Bureau of Meteorology may have been able to produce an accurate prediction of fog onset at Perth Airport before the aircraft began its descent and was committed to a landing. Although the statistics for the years 2003 to 2006 showed only one unforecast fog event at Perth, the continuing work by the bureau to improve their forecasting models and share information should increase fog forecast assurance at Perth and other major airports.
At the time of the incident, the operator’s fuel policy did not discriminate between Perth, which was relatively isolated in terms of distance from airports suitable for the A330, and other Australian airports. That meant that, in the absence of any applicable operational requirements, flights to Perth did not routinely carry additional fuel for flight from the planned destination to a suitable airport. The operator was aware of the safety risk posed by unforseen events, meteorological or otherwise, at destination airports and managed the risk through their integrated operations centre. In this case, the flight crew demonstrated their awareness of the risk in their conservative decision to carry fuel out of Singapore that was additional to the minimum fuel policy requirement. However, that extra fuel was insufficient to assure a landing at a suitable airport.
In the circumstances, the crew’s action in attempting two approaches before committing to a landing below minima was sound. Crew selection of the runway 21 ILS as an operator-approved runway for autoland, and use of the A330 autoland capability reduced the risk inherent in landing in meteorological conditions that were below the specified minima."
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24331/a...605473_001.pdf
Originally Posted by Ollie Onion
While Qantas international pilots are trained in autoland procedures at some overseas airports, they are not approved for anything other than emergency use at Australian airports because none have ground based navigational aids that are certified as reliably generating signals of sufficient accuracy for such ultra low visibility landings.
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In the sim, 737-800 lands just fine on a cat1 runway with only one AP engaged.
We had a crew forced to autoland due to flight control issues.
We had a crew forced to autoland due to flight control issues.
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In the sim, 737-800 lands just fine on a cat1 runway with only one AP engaged.
We had a crew forced to autoland due to flight control issues.
We had a crew forced to autoland due to flight control issues.
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I would have thought that Flight control issues would be a great reason not to use the autopilot let alone try an auto land.
AP was the only thing they had available for pitch, what would you have done?
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While Qantas international pilots are trained in autoland procedures at some overseas airports, they are not approved for anything other than emergency use at Australian airports because none have ground based navigational aids that are certified as reliably generating signals of sufficient accuracy for such ultra low visibility landings.
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It happens, here is an excerpt from an ATSB report into a Qantas jet that had prepared for a 'ditching' before deciding to carryout an autoland into Perth where no such facility existed:
They made two go-arounds, and on the third approach said "we're landing off this one". As you would.
Megan post indicated:
We are approved to do practice auto lands on many Cat 1 ILS systems within Australia. Many ILS' however are specifically not approved for auto land practice as indicated in company manuals.
An example that comes to mind off the top of my head is Sydney 25 and 07, so if there is a choice of ILS setup within reach of fuel, I would get some advice if it is not readily available in your company manuals before just assuming that an auto land is a great idea.
I know that Launceston 32L and Johannesburg are specifically not to be used for auto land under any circumstances.
Notwithstanding, it may still be the smarter course of action, in an emergency, to take the aircraft below the minima and then disconnect when you are visual.
Crew selection of the runway 21 ILS as an operator-approved runway for auto land, and use of the A330 auto land capability reduced the risk inherent in landing in meteorological conditions that were below the specified minima
An example that comes to mind off the top of my head is Sydney 25 and 07, so if there is a choice of ILS setup within reach of fuel, I would get some advice if it is not readily available in your company manuals before just assuming that an auto land is a great idea.
I know that Launceston 32L and Johannesburg are specifically not to be used for auto land under any circumstances.
Notwithstanding, it may still be the smarter course of action, in an emergency, to take the aircraft below the minima and then disconnect when you are visual.