Originally Posted by
RAT 5
That begs some questions. If true.
Which were addressed, up to a point, in the investigation report:
"The forecasts used in planning the flight predicted fog would occur about 1.5 hours after the aircraft’s arrival at Perth. After the aircraft’s departure, however, the forecasters identified a trend towards an earlier onset and updated subsequent aerodrome forecasts (TAF) and trend type forecasts (TTF) accordingly. Enroute, the flight crew actively sought weather information or received it from the operator’s operational support. As a result, the crew maintained an awareness of the developing meteorological situation. Significantly, it was only at 2400, after the aircraft had passed the Designated Point All Engines Operating (DPA), that the TTF predicted fog onset before the arrival time. Once the crew commenced descent they were committed to a landing at Perth.
The forecasting of fog is necessarily a complex process and the exact timing of fog formation at a particular location was difficult to predict. Had there been a more extensive local meteorological observation network in place, the Bureau of Meteorology may have been able to produce an accurate prediction of fog onset at Perth Airport before the aircraft began its descent and was committed to a landing. Although the statistics for the years 2003 to 2006 showed only one unforecast fog event at Perth, the continuing work by the bureau to improve their forecasting models and share information should increase fog forecast assurance at Perth and other major airports.
At the time of the incident, the operator’s fuel policy did not discriminate between Perth, which was relatively isolated in terms of distance from airports suitable for the A330, and other Australian airports. That meant that, in the absence of any applicable operational requirements, flights to Perth did not routinely carry additional fuel for flight from the planned destination to a suitable airport. The operator was aware of the safety risk posed by unforseen events, meteorological or otherwise, at destination airports and managed the risk through their integrated operations centre. In this case, the flight crew demonstrated their awareness of the risk in their conservative decision to carry fuel out of Singapore that was additional to the minimum fuel policy requirement. However, that extra fuel was insufficient to assure a landing at a suitable airport.
In the circumstances, the crew’s action in attempting two approaches before committing to a landing below minima was sound. Crew selection of the runway 21 ILS as an operator-approved runway for autoland, and use of the A330 autoland capability reduced the risk inherent in landing in meteorological conditions that were below the specified minima."
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24331/a...605473_001.pdf