Hand flying skills not a priority says Embry Riddle educator

[Tee Emm]

The corporate sector seems relatively immune so far

That is because the corporate sector are mainly private flights that keep to themselves and attract no media interest. From anecdotal evidence the crews of these long range super Global Express jets are as much automation dependant as airline operators. One difference being they are mostly highly experienced crews rather than the mish-mash of low hour cadet co-pilots who form part of many airline flight deck crews.

[Teldorserious]

Everyone seems to think this is about handflying...it's actually a culture that has come to rely on the systems to do everything for the pilot - fly, navigate, provide SA, monitor systems -

At some level in aviation, it seems I can't be the only guy who has had the equipment failures, engine outs, issues...I just don't get how everyone can just assume everything works all the time and thus plan for nothing ever going wrong.

Can aviators as a whole really just sit there in a plane all day hoping the lights never go out? That to me is a very uncomfortable way to run out a career. Funny though, just about everyone I know is nervous as hell flying aircraft, where quite frankly I was starting to get bored as hell. Maybe that's the trick to a long career, stay scared by staying stupid and lazy.

[RAT 5]

I just don't get how everyone can just assume everything works all the time and thus plan for nothing ever going wrong.

Couldn't agree more. I still say we are the last chance insurance policy and we need to pay out when needed. The industry answer to a crash is to redesign the systems and include more back-ups, more warnings, more automatics, more..... more SOP's so the human doesn't go too near the edge......

And then they tell us not to touch anything and let the automatics run the show....and then they tells us that humans, especially the over educated ones that airlines still insist in putting into flight decks, are bad monitors of automatics and how it is the interface of human-automatic gizmos that is the problem. You can't have it both ways; you design the human out of the loop and then tell us we are not good at operating outside of the loop. If you change the techno-loop you need to change the type of human you put in the loop and change their function. It has been done piece-meal and it's not too smart. Are the XAA"s smart enough to devise a solution? Surely it's on their plate how to reduce pilot error, but I haven't heard of or become aware of any shattering initiatives. Are there any?

[main_dog]

Excellent posts, Rat 5.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by RAT 5

The industry answer to a crash is to redesign the systems and include more back-ups, more warnings, more automatics, more..... more SOP's...

Well, to an extent that's understandable because while it's possible in today's data-driven world to provide verifiable improvements by making changes to systems, be they technological or procedural - it's not possible to do the same with the Mark 1 homo sapiens.

so the human doesn't go too near the edge...

But if you think about it, because most flights are automated between departure and approach/landing, is it not the case that the automatics are also capable of going too near the edge - and accidents result more often than not these days from their doing so?

As others allude to, do you not think that considering things in a respect of "human *vs.* automation" sort of sets things up to fail before we even look at the issue? For one thing, the spectre of the "pilotless airliner" has always only ever come from one place - the press - who, as we are well aware, by and large know diddly-squat about aviation or technology.

And then they tell us not to touch anything and let the automatics run the show....

Do they? I was under the impression that even the most gung-ho airlines had a policy of using automation "to the fullest extent possible". Ultimately that extent is at the discretion of the flight crew, is it not? And these are just the most extreme examples.

These are honest questions by the way - if you know differently, please let me know!

Additionally, sometimes the correct course of action *is* to leave the aircraft alone, regardless of the level of automation, because a correctly-trimmed aircraft should maintain a stable flightpath. Indeed, it seems that the broad consensus regarding the correct course of action in the AF447 scenario upon AP disconnect was to not make any immediate control inputs and observe (while of course being prepared to correct if necessary).

and then they tells us that humans, especially the over educated ones that airlines still insist in putting into flight decks, are bad monitors of automatics and how it is the interface of human-automatic gizmos that is the problem.

Again - which "they" are you referring to here? I've read the point on humans being bad monitors of automation, which is why there have been buzzers, lights, stick-shakers et al. to alert the pilot that something is amiss and usually give a clue as to where their attention should be directed.

Interfaces and ergonomics are usually a separate issue from this, and there has been a steady improvement over the decades that cannot be denied. Usually though, it's less often the case that the interface is bad than it is that the system has not been thoroughly understood and trained - not just at the pilot level, but all the way up to ops and management.

You can't have it both ways; you design the human out of the loop and then tell us we are not good at operating outside of the loop.

...

Surely it's on their plate how to reduce pilot error, but I haven't heard of or become aware of any shattering initiatives. Are there any?

For a start, there has never been an intent to "design the human out of the loop", simply to reduce the workload on the human by automating tasks that a machine tends to do better - i.e. usually the rote and repetitive ones.

I had the pleasure of visiting the Hiller Aviation Museum last week during a trip to San Carlos, and I marvelled at the size and complexity of the FE station and overhead panel on their 747-100 flight deck - I already had a ton of respect for the folks at that station and believe me it got kicked up a couple of notches seeing it in the flesh. But it did make me wonder just how much more complexity in terms of managing all that equipment the human brain could handle, and I could see why there was a drive to simplify that with technology as aircraft became even more complex.

So anyway - the intent, no matter what the press said, was not to take the human out of the loop but to make being "in the loop" require less direct action on the part of the human. This becomes even more useful, in theory at least, given that the skies were only ever going to get more crowded and the workload in terms of flight management was going to continue to increase.

I think the term "pilot error" is beginning to fall out of use - by accident investigators at least - because the evidence has shown that it's too easy to provide a 'catch-all' answer when most incidents and accidents are far more complex in nature. The problem is that such complexity doesn't lend itself well to a TV soundbite or newspaper headline, so you tend to find that if pilot action is mentioned at any point during a briefing or press conference, then the press will report "pilot error", regardless of the contents of the rest of the briefing.

Ultimately there are no easy answers or quick fixes, but speaking for myself as a regular SLF, techie and lifelong aviation devotee I hear and respect your concerns. At the same time though I'm concerned that the adversarial take on technology and pilots does more harm than good. I know, because I've got the notes and documents here, that even the A320 (and by extension her bigger sisters) was designed around the pilot and with input from pilots - and if airline management are using the existence of technology to put the pilot in the role of "last-chance saloon", then that is a flagrant misuse of what the technology was designed to do.

Technology is nothing more than a tool to be used. A complex and powerful tool, certainly - but a tool nonetheless. Your non-crew management will have been sold on the "magic box" idea by the sales guys - same as always - and the onus unfortunately then falls on you to bring that perception to somewhere nearer reality. For what it's worth, if you need a techie in your corner to help you do so one day, I'm more than happy to assist in any way I can.

[Pugilistic Animus]

You do not have to be Patty Wagstaff and be able to do perfect rolling circles
you should be able to fly straight and level climb, decend, turn, speed up, slow down, and any combination of above under IMC with turbulence...that`s it you`re done ATP-

[No Fly Zone]

I have t o agree with you that this fellow has missed the boat. Yes, modern transport aircraft ARE designed to be flown primarily with their automation on, but WTF happens when most of it fails or is otherwise unusable? The pilot with stick and rudder skills and some current practice has a chance to save the bird and lives. Those without the skills probably do not. Frankly, I don't even call them pilots anymore, but systems operators. Pilots have those skills in their back pockets and know how to use them.

[latetonite]

Blame it a lot to the industry. The average Ab Initio Cadet has a Commercial License with Instrument rating. And 200 hrs under his belt. He does not have any aviation background, and will kill himself if he would take his training aircraft solo on a real instrument flight.
Now you train him "up to standards" flying a commercial airliner from the right seat, using automatics as much as possible. A raw data approach, stabilized by the A/P and with A/T first, is a challenge. A 15 kt X-wind an emergency.
Now you want him to 'maintain hand flying skills'? What skills?

[bubbers44]

I agree no skills. If you don't get the skills after your basic ratings you will probably never get them with half the airlines. After crop dusting, instructing, charter flying and corporate jet time finally got lucky one day and got my airline job with 5500 hrs, 1000 PIC jet.

I was lucky to get hired because every one else had the same quals. My check ride was in an Electra sim I had never flown with multiple approaches with one, two and three engines shut down. All to a missed approach except the last when at 200 ft another check airman pulled the fire handle on my only engine. This was with no visual.

Now I guess you push the right buttons. By the way it had to be hand flown.

[Teldorserious]

Just a bunch of noise.

You aren't going to get much critical thought on this forum..

Last week, CRM good, this week, CRM bad.
Last week, abintio good, this week abintio bad
Last week, rudders good, this week rudders bad
Last week, hand flying good, this week hand flying bad.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I have one question for Mr head of the airline Puppy Mill factory. Show me how your training program will produce a guy/gal that can land the both engine failed Airbus in the Hudson and have everyone walk away.

Human variability will ensure that not every graduate of your program will be that good, but it is a sad day when the head of the school has essentially said that for my students that level of stick and rudder skills is not even worth aspiring for.

[latetonite]

to Bubbers44:
I happen to have flown the Electra L-188.
I had several engine failures in the aircraft, and did a few three engine ferries.
Also lost one day all hydraulics, and learned to fly this thing manual.
However, if you could manage this aircraft on ONE engine, you certainly earned your airline job..
If you are talking about the sim in Seattle, it was just a procedure trainer.

[A37575]

My check ride was in an Electra sim I had never flown with multiple approaches with one, two and three engines shut down. All to a missed approach except the last when at 200 ft another check airman pulled the fire handle on my only engine. This was with no visual.

My sympathies are with you. What a dreadful indictment on the poor quality of "check??" pilots in those days. That sort of disgraceful behaviour deserves the check pilots to be thrown out of the simulator and demoted to a desk job for a few years - then re-trained properly but this time as co-pilots only.

Reminded me of a story related to me by a former RAAF C130 Hercules pilot undergoing conversion on the first C130A simulator at RAAF base Richmond.

Similar scenario to that you described. The military check pilot failed multiple engines during ILS leaving one inboard going by the time they reached the outer marker. "What are you going to do, now" screamed the instructor" - himself only 30 years old so no grizzled veteran.

The pilot under training said "THIS is what I'm going to do now" and promptly rolled the Herc simulator inverted and went in like a bomb. The simulator popped lots of circuit breakers and it took the technicians a few hours to get it going again.

Simulator instructors and airline check captains often have someone else's career in their hands. There is still no shortage of clowns that abuse that power and who should never have been promoted into the job.

[bubbers44]

Actually I felt it was a blast. The sim was at SNA and I got hired at Air California. The check airmen were great and I got hired. They were just having fun.

I was just trying to show the standards 30 years ago were much higher than now. Nobody in my class had less that 5,000 hrs and lots of jet time. When we got hired our first year pay was 700 per mo. One year FO pay was 4,000 per mo.

I am happy the way my career progressed and ended up. We had a great time and the check airmen were our drinking buddies on upgrades to captain. They were for us all the way. They also knew we could all fly before they taught us so their job was easy. Not always the case now.

[AirRabbit]

I’ve been watching this thread for a while now and it seems to me that everyone is mostly “chipping” around the edges. In effect, almost everything said here has some element of truth but no one has hit the nail on “the head” … and, of course, that’s just my opinion.

Anyone who thinks that “automation” has no place in modern jet transports just isn’t living in today’s world … but by the same token, anyone who thinks that “hand flying skills” are outmoded and unnecessary is also not living in today’s world – but both of those groups are not themselves living in the same world. Automatics provide a way for the airplane to be flown much more accurately than can be done manually. BUT automatics do not think – automatics do ONLY what they have been programmed to do. If the “ones” and “zeros” align in a particular way, the airplane banks right … if they line up in another particular way, the airplane banks left … but if the “ones” and “zeros” do not align with either direction, the probability is that the airplane will maintain wings level. Bottom line, today’s airplane control computers are vastly complex and are capable of things that the most imaginative engineer could think of … but … I am staunchly of the opinion that we’re still a long way short of full artificial intelligence that I’d put in charge of an airliner full of passengers and cargo.

The name of the game is MONEY. Dollars, Euros, Yen, or what-have-you. It is the bottom line that counts in today’s businesses … and it’s not just limited to airlines … everyone is on that same money-limited bandwagon. It’s the profit margin – the difference between the “in-come” and the “out-go,” plain and simple.

The only “Income” generator is passengers – and to some very small degree – some cargo. So, given this, how does an airline attract passengers … as there are usually more than one airline traveling between any two city pairs (except in very limited cases – and those are getting fewer and farther between)? You attract passengers by offering something other than simple transportation – and schedule is probably at the top of the list – because the most money is likely made off of the business oriented passenger (closer to or at “full fare”) presuming that the seats that are occupied are occupied something on the order of 40-60 percent by business travelers. Of course, the airline has to go from and to where the passenger wants/needs to travel – and sometimes that is on a rather extremely short notice basis. So, if you’re one of several operators serving 2 cities – and the schedules are somewhat equal … what can you provide that would drive the customer to your door? Service. Amenities. Comfort. And, what I think is most important to those business travelers … arrival time … which is directly connected to a “non-stop” operation.

Contrast this singular (or almost singular) income generator with the kinds of things that register under the “out-go” column: Airplanes, ground service vehicles, ground facilities (passengers, cargo, maintenance), office buildings, fuel, landing fees, parking fees, insurance (physical facilities and personnel), all of those other money-draining aspects of doing business (advertising, reservations, paper and ink supplies, etc.), and the biggie … personnel costs – the salaries of your employees. Oh, one other cost – training. What part of an airline personnel structure would you think has the biggest impact on training cost? Of course, there are some persons whose training can be expensive, but then you have to consider how many of those employees are necessary to do the job that needs to be done. Of course, you and I know that it is flight crew training that very likely close to the top or, in fact, leads this expense category. There only 2 requirements to train flight crews … logic (i.e., not everyone can fly a plane) and regulation. If there is any way in which an airline can reduce the cost of training the greater the potential to increase the profit margin for that airline. If there is any way to cause an airline’s profit margin to be impacted (outside of major physical facilities purchases – airplanes, corporate headquarters buildings, etc. and I'm not sure any thing would do it to the same level of impact...) is to increase the training provided to flight crews.

Being a long-time advocate of education and training – of course, I know where I would want to focus … but I also recognize that indiscriminate increases in training time or unproductive or potentially unnecessary training can have a significant impact on the highly important “bottom line.” But at the same time, there are very few things an airline can do to ensure the safety of their operation, and thereby maintain or improve their reputation with revenue sources … passengers, and, at the same time, provide an incentive for reducing insurance costs.

The difficult aspect is determining what is absolutely necessary for deciding what needs to be trained, how well, using what equipment, how to determine satisfactory training levels, how frequently should that training occur, and, well … I’ll let you add all the other aspects of training with which you are familiar. Most airline operations are governed by a regulatory agency – so … how much authority should that regulatory agency have with respect to these questions? What kind of competency should exist in personnel INSIDE that regulatory agency?

I think these questions are equally applicable to both manual and automatic flight control. Of course, I have thought about this for most of my career … and I have suggestions that I can make (and to some extent have made) … but my opinions, until heard and analyzed, are probably no better than anyone’s opinions – whether or not they have any knowledge or experience in this particular aspect of aviation.

[bubbers44]

Automation is great and has advanced technology but sometimes it fails so you always need at least one pilot who knows how to hand fly. Hand flying is quite easy if you do it once in a while.

[stilton]

What makes you think this idiot is a Captain of anything other than a 172 ?


Embry Riddle, give me a break

[GlueBall]

Industry Is seriously DEFICIENT In Manual Flying Skills...

...when A332 pilots hand fly and stall in cruise at night.
...when B738 pilots stall and crash on final approach in VMC.
...when DHC-8 pilots pull on the stick, reduce flaps when stick shaker/pusher activates.
...when B772 pilots hand fly short final approach and hit the sea wall on a clear day.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by GlueBall

Industry Is seriously DEFICIENT In Manual Flying Skills...
...when A332 pilots hand fly and stall in cruise at night.
...when B738 pilots stall and crash on final approach in VMC.
...when DHC-8 pilots pull on the stick, reduce flaps when stick shaker/pusher activates.
...when B772 pilots hand fly short final approach and hit the sea wall on a clear day.

With something like 30,000 flights per day (10,950,000 per year) in the US and 100,000 flights per day (36,500,000 per year) worldwide, I know that I would be hard-pressed to say that the 4 accidents referenced are indicative of an “industry seriously deficient in manual flying skills.” The first 3 cited occurred in 2009, with 2 of those occurring in the same month, February, and the last one occurring in 2013.

However, please, do not take these comments to mean that I do not think a problem is becoming evident – because, I think that a problem does exist and I think it is growing – not diminishing. What is that problem? I think it’s pilot competency – many call it “awareness” or “CRM” – others say it’s probably a lack of “realism” in training … but I think those are somewhat easily applied terms which, in turn, drives a good share of the proposals for correction. Clearly, it’s hard to address a problem when it’s not clear as to what the problem really is; and I believe it is THAT … not being able to clearly recognize THE problem … that is the real problem – and I believe it is more than likely that the industry is throwing what they believe to be “corrective actions” into the mix and remain puzzled as to why things still go wrong. May I say it this way … when driving along the highway you notice that your car seems to be “decelerating” quite abruptly and then accelerating to the speed you had – and this happens every once in a while … perhaps twice in 1 month and then not reoccurring for 6 months. The mechanic at the local repair shop says that he’s heard from the manufacturer that it is likely that one of the brake cylinders is apparently activating, and causing the results you see and feel. After changing all the brake cylinders, changing the brake pads, replacing the brake lines and changing brake fluid a couple of times over a couple of years – you still occasionally experience the same problem. Wouldn’t you get the impression that the cause of the problem is elsewhere? Or would you opt for changing to a different brand of tires? Check the tire pressure? Perhaps fill the tires with that “fix-a-flat” compound that seals small leak from inside the tire?

OK … maybe that’s not a really good analogy … but my point is that if we continue to make the kinds of training changes that we’ve made in the past, we’re likely not going to get any difference from what those changes have provided in the past. I think it’s fair to say that most pilots know what training is necessary to operate a jet transport airplane the way we do around the world. We have to know how the darn thing works – and putting more gizmos aboard, merely means more training on what those gizmos do and what happens when they don’t. Add another gizmo, add more training. Right? Well, maybe not more; maybe we can just pick what training is most important. OK – who picks that? Are there time ceilings on the amount of time we train pilots? We’ve already gone from classroom training to CBT, and CBT from home or the hotel, and we’ve bought less expensive training aids to keep the need for full flight simulation to the minimum when we have to visit the training center. Well, how’s that working out? We’re talking about training … physical and mental training. We all recognize that there are a lot sports teams that depend on physical and mental training to get their teams ready to play during “the season.” Do we see these professional sports teams putting a “cap” on the amount of training those players receive? No, certainly not. The pre-season training sessions are long and demanding. But it doesn’t stop there – in US football (no, not soccer, guys) there are week-long training sessions prior to each game. In baseball there is batting practice and field training for a bit prior to each game, and pitchers always practice before they enter the game. Why is this? Sure, it's good to get the muscles warm, but it goes beyond this as well … repetitive psychomotor training, repetitive practice for physical and mental coordination are integral components of training for successful performance – and that’s true for all positions on the team.

I think it is time – actually, past time – to take a look at how airline crews are trained … what they are trained on … how often … to what standards. Fortunately, in my mind anyway, there are a couple of international working groups that are working NOW, as we speak/write, that are attempting to address those questions – as well as questions about what is required for the major pieces of training equipment used in pilot training programs … flight simulation equipment. They are also addressing the background, experience, and training for both flight instructors and evaluators as well. These groups are made up of regulators, airlines, pilots, groups representing airline unions and pilot unions, professional trainers and educators, providers of pilot training, manufacturers of pilot training equipment – flight simulation training devices, and a host of other professionals and interested parties. I think THESE efforts are the BEST bet to finally get to an understanding of what is required. Anyone who passes on the opportunity to participate or provide information to these groups, is saying that they don’t care what occurs, because they have their own interests. How do YOU feel? What do YOU think? What do YOU want? ...and don't tell ME ... take your experience and your opinions directly to and get involved in one of those groups!

[GlueBall]

..."How do YOU feel? What do YOU think? What do YOU want?"

I don't want to be chastised by new-schooled, senior check airman, for having come off the A/P & A/T too soon at 4000' during a vectored ILS in VMC; that I should have waited until after intercept of localizer; that company SOP calls for maximum use of automation in all phases of flight.

As far as I'm concerned, (20K hrs), the training industry is going to the dogs with rabid automation.