Falling for Traps...the sucker hole and others
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Falling for Traps...the sucker hole and others
There have been three accidents in the US involving big jets, two deadly. I speak of SFO(asiana), LGA (southwest nose gear first landing) and most recently the UPS at Birmingham.
Did they all fall for sucker traps? When I say this, I am speaking of the ancient phrase of sucker holes...I'd like to think most pilots know what I'm talking about.
But lets just make it a discussion of basic airmanship.
SFO...airspeed...lest thy never get low and slow
LGA...pushing forward on the controls really close to the ground can work against you (not talking about reducing sink rate on mains)
and UPS...non precision approach during night time hours...this should almost always be a red flag to begin with. Especially with the odd sort of hills, small mind you, at birmingham. NEVER try too hard to get in on a Non Precision approach.
I am reminded of "Fate is the Hunter" when EKG was on fire and found a hole and went for it, and made it, and then he parked on top of a gas tank.
He spoke of this type of hole as a sucker hole and normally to be avoided...
I hope we might all talk about basic airmanship and the dangers in forgetting the traps...forgetting how those before us have given us the lessons we should remember...I'm thinking of the L1011 in the Everglades when the autopilot disengaged from holding altitude while everyone had their heads working on a landing geaR light.
hope you all get the idea here...and I hope this is the right forum.
Did they all fall for sucker traps? When I say this, I am speaking of the ancient phrase of sucker holes...I'd like to think most pilots know what I'm talking about.
But lets just make it a discussion of basic airmanship.
SFO...airspeed...lest thy never get low and slow
LGA...pushing forward on the controls really close to the ground can work against you (not talking about reducing sink rate on mains)
and UPS...non precision approach during night time hours...this should almost always be a red flag to begin with. Especially with the odd sort of hills, small mind you, at birmingham. NEVER try too hard to get in on a Non Precision approach.
I am reminded of "Fate is the Hunter" when EKG was on fire and found a hole and went for it, and made it, and then he parked on top of a gas tank.
He spoke of this type of hole as a sucker hole and normally to be avoided...
I hope we might all talk about basic airmanship and the dangers in forgetting the traps...forgetting how those before us have given us the lessons we should remember...I'm thinking of the L1011 in the Everglades when the autopilot disengaged from holding altitude while everyone had their heads working on a landing geaR light.
hope you all get the idea here...and I hope this is the right forum.
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Other than poorly trained crews or simply bad procedures, I think there is a basic fuel reason why airliners can be at risk.
Low fuel on arrival puts a lot of potentially dangerous pressure on crews. If diverting to alternate, usually lots of radio calls. ATC want endurance and intentions. Three aircraft behind declared mayday, forcing other maydays. Level and route changes, possibly no radar coverage at alternate, high number of incoming aircraft, most with low margin fuel and ATC inexperience with volume. Late change of runway due to changable wind and NPA or circling approach. On top of ****ty weather, the crew may have never operated to the alternate with its marginal length wet runway. A well rested and experienced crew, used to flying together, will understand all these matters long before diverting. They will set up and brief early, put the approach checklist behind them and generally be in the best position for their approach. A less experienced and less prepared crew will feel real pressure right from the divert point that increase as the diversion proceeds. If they are concerned about the diversion, they are more likely to push their limits at the original destination.
The other problem with minimum arrival fuel is fuel state can occupy the crew to the point where other situational awareness matters get less attention than they deserve.
Even when carrying extra fuel, I believe crews should always made an effort to make up extra margin fuel enroute. Convenient direct tracking and level choices usually can save a few minutes fuel on a 4 hour flight. Extra gas can = extra preparation time. A couple of extra minutes can really strip away the pressure.
Low fuel on arrival puts a lot of potentially dangerous pressure on crews. If diverting to alternate, usually lots of radio calls. ATC want endurance and intentions. Three aircraft behind declared mayday, forcing other maydays. Level and route changes, possibly no radar coverage at alternate, high number of incoming aircraft, most with low margin fuel and ATC inexperience with volume. Late change of runway due to changable wind and NPA or circling approach. On top of ****ty weather, the crew may have never operated to the alternate with its marginal length wet runway. A well rested and experienced crew, used to flying together, will understand all these matters long before diverting. They will set up and brief early, put the approach checklist behind them and generally be in the best position for their approach. A less experienced and less prepared crew will feel real pressure right from the divert point that increase as the diversion proceeds. If they are concerned about the diversion, they are more likely to push their limits at the original destination.
The other problem with minimum arrival fuel is fuel state can occupy the crew to the point where other situational awareness matters get less attention than they deserve.
Even when carrying extra fuel, I believe crews should always made an effort to make up extra margin fuel enroute. Convenient direct tracking and level choices usually can save a few minutes fuel on a 4 hour flight. Extra gas can = extra preparation time. A couple of extra minutes can really strip away the pressure.
Last edited by autoflight; 18th Aug 2013 at 11:15.
Routine and distraction
When we do things over and over again, day in, day out, and we get used that they will work normal as every day before.
An example from my own shortcoming:
Checking out an FJ instructor pilot sitting in the back seat from the front seat, doing about 8 overhead patterns to touch and go's. The performance and quality of the patterns afforded lots of briefing in between the normal duties of before landing checks and landing checks and flying and monitoring.
On about the seventh pattern my briefing continued from downwind to final, all checks like gear down flaps half, landing light on (which all of them i had to execute from the front seat) was challenged from the trainee and acknowledged by myself as done and complete.
Final was hot, flare would not end and i decided to take the jet from trainee and went around. Raising the gear and flaps was not necessary as they were still up and stowed. Shock, horror, how could that happen to me?
The landing checklist is there to confirm that the desired configuration is in place. The horn was blazing, the red light in the landing gear handle was flashing, the indicators showed up and stowed, and the only clue that got my attention was the unusual flare, which thanks god would not end and gave me the chance to avoid a 20 million dollar sleigh.
An example from my own shortcoming:
Checking out an FJ instructor pilot sitting in the back seat from the front seat, doing about 8 overhead patterns to touch and go's. The performance and quality of the patterns afforded lots of briefing in between the normal duties of before landing checks and landing checks and flying and monitoring.
On about the seventh pattern my briefing continued from downwind to final, all checks like gear down flaps half, landing light on (which all of them i had to execute from the front seat) was challenged from the trainee and acknowledged by myself as done and complete.
Final was hot, flare would not end and i decided to take the jet from trainee and went around. Raising the gear and flaps was not necessary as they were still up and stowed. Shock, horror, how could that happen to me?
The landing checklist is there to confirm that the desired configuration is in place. The horn was blazing, the red light in the landing gear handle was flashing, the indicators showed up and stowed, and the only clue that got my attention was the unusual flare, which thanks god would not end and gave me the chance to avoid a 20 million dollar sleigh.
Last edited by RetiredF4; 18th Aug 2013 at 08:20.
Geez that's a story and a half. Good on you for putting it on the thread.
it highlights just how falable and prone to distraction the human mind is.
Sometimes when I am flying I have to make a really big effort to keep my flight discipline up as far as checking and cross checking certain things. I'll be tempted to not pick up the load sheet and double check the weight or something similar and then I remind myself that the one time I don't do it could be the one time I needed to do it. For me personal discipline is probably the greatest determinant of flight safety.
it highlights just how falable and prone to distraction the human mind is.
Sometimes when I am flying I have to make a really big effort to keep my flight discipline up as far as checking and cross checking certain things. I'll be tempted to not pick up the load sheet and double check the weight or something similar and then I remind myself that the one time I don't do it could be the one time I needed to do it. For me personal discipline is probably the greatest determinant of flight safety.
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Some aircraft give undercarriage warning light and horn whenever retarding the thrust levers sufficiently, regardless of the reason. We can get very conditioned to looking at a red light in the gear handle etc. It is just a short step to accept light and horn at other times,
… But lessons still to be learnt.
… But lessons still to be learnt.
No apologies for revisiting this report.
How many of factors / features in the report investigations can be linked with contributions to recent accidents?
What might we have learnt from these?
Do we learn?
No apologies for revisiting this report.
How many of factors / features in the report investigations can be linked with contributions to recent accidents?
What might we have learnt from these?
Do we learn?
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AA B757 CALI was a sucker hole. Everything was cool and relaxed for a VNAV/LNAV descent and circuit to an ILS, at night, over mountains, to a place the F/O = PF had never been. To try and catch up a few minutes in a rush was the ultimate sucker hole.
I saw the same thing at AMS, many times, A relaxed LNAV/VNAV approach on the southerly rwy from the SW was converted by macho pilots into a hair tingling will we/wont we? approach as a straight in on the NE rwy with the associated tail wind. ATC offered it and they accepted. Ouch.
Guys asking to keep speed up below FL100, ATC flying you on the normal route and then hauling the speed brake out and dangling the gear early.
Visual circuits at night to try and save time, but having to stay at MSA until on finals and then stuka -ering it at the TDZ point.
Any light tailwind NPA for straight in to try and save a circuit, but the tailwind at 2000' is howling and the G/A (or not) costs more time.
I saw the same thing at AMS, many times, A relaxed LNAV/VNAV approach on the southerly rwy from the SW was converted by macho pilots into a hair tingling will we/wont we? approach as a straight in on the NE rwy with the associated tail wind. ATC offered it and they accepted. Ouch.
Guys asking to keep speed up below FL100, ATC flying you on the normal route and then hauling the speed brake out and dangling the gear early.
Visual circuits at night to try and save time, but having to stay at MSA until on finals and then stuka -ering it at the TDZ point.
Any light tailwind NPA for straight in to try and save a circuit, but the tailwind at 2000' is howling and the G/A (or not) costs more time.
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HI
I think we are off to a good start.
FUEL! great, if you know things might be changeable somewhere along the way and you are given, and TAKING min fuel, your decision making process later on will be compromised and not for the best.
RETIRED F4...great story...I've been in a prolonged flare with another guy flying and I've actually said outloud...don't worry, the gear IS down. I certainly know where you are coming from and we must always be on guard for complacency.
Cali 757...good one...and part of it was the crew worrying about flight attendant duty times. I was a copilot on one flight many moon ago and the captain was busy filling out an application for college scholarship for her kid. She got off course and I reminded her before ATC did...but she still didn't act in time.
IF you have the engines running and your mind is not in the flying game, you are asking for trouble.
IT IS someone elses responsibility to worry about flight attendant duty time or if the plane leaves on time for the next flight...concentrate on the current flight!
I think we are off to a good start.
FUEL! great, if you know things might be changeable somewhere along the way and you are given, and TAKING min fuel, your decision making process later on will be compromised and not for the best.
RETIRED F4...great story...I've been in a prolonged flare with another guy flying and I've actually said outloud...don't worry, the gear IS down. I certainly know where you are coming from and we must always be on guard for complacency.
Cali 757...good one...and part of it was the crew worrying about flight attendant duty times. I was a copilot on one flight many moon ago and the captain was busy filling out an application for college scholarship for her kid. She got off course and I reminded her before ATC did...but she still didn't act in time.
IF you have the engines running and your mind is not in the flying game, you are asking for trouble.
IT IS someone elses responsibility to worry about flight attendant duty time or if the plane leaves on time for the next flight...concentrate on the current flight!
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Framer,
Your comment is the be all and end all of flight safety. Airlines can throw mega-bucks at training and procedures, but if the crew decide to sit back and relax, all that money just went down the drain.
Have you read Tony Kern's book Airmanship Redefined? It'll be right up your street.
Your comment is the be all and end all of flight safety. Airlines can throw mega-bucks at training and procedures, but if the crew decide to sit back and relax, all that money just went down the drain.
Have you read Tony Kern's book Airmanship Redefined? It'll be right up your street.
Last edited by Kefuddle; 18th Aug 2013 at 15:29.
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you should have known better...ever hear that one?
unless we actively speak about ''sucker holes'' and remind the next generation of pilots they exist, the learning curve will demand more crashes.
Take the UPS crash...a non precision approach at night....unless you have the runway easily in sight prior to the missed approach point and depending on the altitude, a distance which would allow a 'normal descent to the runway' you should be thinking:
1. why did I do this?
2. missed approach will be likely.
IF an approach takes you down to 600' above the runway, and you don't spot the runway at least two nautical miles out, you probably can't comply with the NORMAL DESCENT TO THE RUNWAY part. If the visibility is reported as less than two miles in this situation (regardless of the mins published), you may not even want to try...UNLESS you have reason to think the wx is better.
It is very easy to push forward on the controls to keep things insight. Some may not even notice they are doing it. And if the copilot hasn't seen this before he/she won't comment to the captain.
One of the first things I learned about night flying was the rule...if you see more and more lights, you will clear the mountain...if you see less and less, you will hit the mountain.
We are seeing the retirement of one generation of pilots...ones that had to know how to do NDB approaches just to get an instrument rating...and a new generation who know nothing of the old ways.
Videogaming should not be counted as flying hours !!!! We should all know better.
unless we actively speak about ''sucker holes'' and remind the next generation of pilots they exist, the learning curve will demand more crashes.
Take the UPS crash...a non precision approach at night....unless you have the runway easily in sight prior to the missed approach point and depending on the altitude, a distance which would allow a 'normal descent to the runway' you should be thinking:
1. why did I do this?
2. missed approach will be likely.
IF an approach takes you down to 600' above the runway, and you don't spot the runway at least two nautical miles out, you probably can't comply with the NORMAL DESCENT TO THE RUNWAY part. If the visibility is reported as less than two miles in this situation (regardless of the mins published), you may not even want to try...UNLESS you have reason to think the wx is better.
It is very easy to push forward on the controls to keep things insight. Some may not even notice they are doing it. And if the copilot hasn't seen this before he/she won't comment to the captain.
One of the first things I learned about night flying was the rule...if you see more and more lights, you will clear the mountain...if you see less and less, you will hit the mountain.
We are seeing the retirement of one generation of pilots...ones that had to know how to do NDB approaches just to get an instrument rating...and a new generation who know nothing of the old ways.
Videogaming should not be counted as flying hours !!!! We should all know better.
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Don't get yourselves into a position where you are rushed. Whether it be pre take-off, or in the air.
The Cali accident taught us a lesson. If I'm getting fatigued, briefed up and have a mind-set for a particular approach I will not accept an offer of a different approach. Not worth the few minutes you might save as the risk can be too great. At runway change, the crew should give themselves to prepare and brief. This also goes for a change in departure runways.
The Cali accident taught us a lesson. If I'm getting fatigued, briefed up and have a mind-set for a particular approach I will not accept an offer of a different approach. Not worth the few minutes you might save as the risk can be too great. At runway change, the crew should give themselves to prepare and brief. This also goes for a change in departure runways.
Last edited by doubleu-anker; 19th Aug 2013 at 01:44.
Have you read Tony Kern's book Airmanship Redefined? It'll be right up your street.
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Re: sucker hole...
It's complacency and press-on-itis that can get us in a tight spot. I keep telling some of the newer pilots that we have , a little paranoia is a good thing in flying. If everything's going great, that's the time to start asking questions to yourself.
Like a previous poster said , a non-precision approach, a landing on a slight tailwind rainy smallish runway , not having normal approach and landing aids,shortish vectors accepted etc. are some of the times when one needs to be very alert and slightly paranoid....
Lessons learnt from our and others mistakes is why "experience" is important in the flight deck.....
Like a previous poster said , a non-precision approach, a landing on a slight tailwind rainy smallish runway , not having normal approach and landing aids,shortish vectors accepted etc. are some of the times when one needs to be very alert and slightly paranoid....
Lessons learnt from our and others mistakes is why "experience" is important in the flight deck.....
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then, there is automation.
just read that the UPS crash had the autopilot and autothrottles ON at impact.
anyone remember how the L1011 in the everglades was on altitude hold and then descended into the ground?
we must be on guard to make sure the automation is working right.
just read that the UPS crash had the autopilot and autothrottles ON at impact.
anyone remember how the L1011 in the everglades was on altitude hold and then descended into the ground?
we must be on guard to make sure the automation is working right.
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Indeed, experience is crucial inside cockpits. But experience gradient shouldn't be too steep so as to cause the lesser experienced pilot to not speak his mind..
Last edited by Skyblade; 20th Aug 2013 at 11:42.
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"anyone remember how the L1011 in the everglades was on altitude hold and then descended into the ground?"
Altitude hold was not selected, certainly not engaged, at the particular time in question and no one on the flight deck picked it up either. That was the problem.
Any change of course, in any auto settings, should have the change announced to the other crew member(s) Not a bad Idea even so often, is to review out loud what auto settings are engaged and confirm the indications.
Altitude hold was not selected, certainly not engaged, at the particular time in question and no one on the flight deck picked it up either. That was the problem.
Any change of course, in any auto settings, should have the change announced to the other crew member(s) Not a bad Idea even so often, is to review out loud what auto settings are engaged and confirm the indications.
Last edited by doubleu-anker; 21st Aug 2013 at 07:32.
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We are seeing the retirement of one generation of pilots...ones that had to know how to do NDB approaches just to get an instrument rating...and a new generation who know nothing of the old ways.
Here's what two very experienced pilots can do...I'm always reminded of the aviation adage that my old flying instructor used to drill into me 'It's not what do I do if x happens. It's what do I do when x happens, because happen it surely will.'
Last edited by thing; 21st Aug 2013 at 04:26.
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thing
some airlines have removed NDB approaches (and a circling approach) from their operations specifications and therefore do not have to test for them in the simulator sessions.
getting an instrument rating...quite frankly I don't know if you need to demonstrate an NDB apch. I got mine over 30 years ago...my atp too.
flying is flying and the mind must know what has come before it to prevent something from happening again.
some airlines have removed NDB approaches (and a circling approach) from their operations specifications and therefore do not have to test for them in the simulator sessions.
getting an instrument rating...quite frankly I don't know if you need to demonstrate an NDB apch. I got mine over 30 years ago...my atp too.
flying is flying and the mind must know what has come before it to prevent something from happening again.
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Yes I maybe mistaken on the alt hold. Apologies if I am.
It wouldn't surprise me if that were the case. I never flew the L1011 but a particular, first generation jet powered aircraft, was notorious for the very nonintrusive warning, if the altitude hold was knocked out.
It wouldn't surprise me if that were the case. I never flew the L1011 but a particular, first generation jet powered aircraft, was notorious for the very nonintrusive warning, if the altitude hold was knocked out.