UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL
Many approaches that don't have VNAV/LNAV minimums published, are still encoded in the database....however in FBW bus...(dont know about the A300) it is prohibited to fly these in Final Approach mode
Last edited by J.O.; 15th Aug 2013 at 11:05.
If they were doing 190KTS less than 1 nm out
But that calculation is presumably based on the same dodgy FlightAware data that puts the final position of the aircraft within the airport boundary.
However if we assume that the two previous position plots are valid (granted, an equally precarious assumption) then they put the aircraft at 5.46nm from the threshold and then a minute later at 2.83nm.
That's an average GS of 158kt - a lot different from 190kt.
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Zone of Alienation
Age: 79
Posts: 9
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Referencing the 'Sooeet' vertical path someone posted above:
This was not an ILS. It is NOT a good analysis. In fact, it is almost completely irrelevant and actually looks quite reasonable for a non precision profile until the very last, if it is to be believed at all.
This was not an ILS. It is NOT a good analysis. In fact, it is almost completely irrelevant and actually looks quite reasonable for a non precision profile until the very last, if it is to be believed at all.
EDIT:
NVM, just realized there were two pages.
Analysis of interest, but taken with a grain of salt for reasons noted above.
NVM, just realized there were two pages.
Analysis of interest, but taken with a grain of salt for reasons noted above.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 15th Aug 2013 at 12:18.
Like their Asiana 214 analysis, Sooeet did a new analysis for UPS 1354, including nice plots of position and airspeed. It's darned good,
If Soooeeet's plot is to be believed, it's plainly obvious the crew couldn't see the runway because the track deviates well left from a long way out. It's claim that weather was not a factor appears itself to be a furphy. The crew either couldn't see the runway or were majorly distracted by something in/with the aircraft.
Additionally, UPS1354 flew well above the PAPI glide-slope for runway 18 until about 15 nautical miles out, at which time UPS1354 began a very rapid descent while maintaining 300 knots, likely using a combination of engine power to maintain speed, and spoilers to increase descent rate. UPS1354 attempted to intercept the PAPI glide-slope from above by means of this rapid descent between 15 and 10 nautical miles from the runway touch down zone.
"Engine power to maintain speed and spoilers to increase descent rate"? And these guys are casting judgement on a dead crew??
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 848
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Objection, speculation, assumes facts not in evidence
To add to the sub-thread here on the matter of whether any and all rumor and conjecture posted here - sometimes by members who do not possess PIC hours or even any license to operate any aircraft, and also sometimes by full-authority Four-Stripers - even amongst the posts of the cognoscenti there can be, and are, disagreements over the meaning of observations. There is something to be said, despite apparent derision or condescension offered previously, for non-pilot "enthusiasts" who ALSO are seeking to participate in or contribute to the business at hand: improved safety, or more sensible R/T protocol and compliance therewith (the R/T Standard thread on another part of the board), and perhaps even in the looming if not imminent governmental and regulatory challenge of assuring that manufacturers' automated avionics suites in new types (and retro-fits and/or upgrades) work in concert with, not in opposition to, the vast complexity of approach flying in civilian-controlled U.S. (and presumably most ICAO national jurisdictions) airspace. Was not one main impetus emerging from the SFO Asiana mishap the need to assure something like "coordination" of avionics, ATC, automation protocols, and CRM (send me back to Primary if I have omitted something critically important from said list). Stated in a little bit different terms, would not every full-authority Driver want the General Counsel of Boeing (just for example) to be pretty conversant, and to have a decent cognitive -- though OBVIOUSLY not experiential- comprehension of LNAV VNAV Wx and all the rest of the pilot talk posted here? So, what that leaves us with is, one, don't eject the enthusiasts who have something to contribute or are striving to learn so that they may do so in some other professional careerist role, and two, in a day when the masses shoot 140-keystroke messages in sheer mass numbers and widespread the world over, the pace of information-sharing is so fast, which is a good thing - and if it turns out there is a little bit of noise amidst that torrentious signal, deal with it, move on (though be glad for the incredibly fast dissemination of information).
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 15th Aug 2013 at 12:24. Reason: Speeling
We analyzed the range data (distance from the airport), and altitude data published by FlightAware.com. Our analysis suggests that UPS Flight 1354 (UPS1354) made a non-stabilized approach to runway 18.
Heavy transport aircraft such as the Airbus A300-600F, should routinely perform stabilized approaches
It clearly shows that UPS1354 flew the majority of the approach well above the PAPI glide-slope. "High energy" approaches, like this approach flown by UPS1354, are inherently risky for heavy transport aircraft such as the Airbus A300-600F.
However, at 1 nautical mile UPS1354 was still flying at 190 knots, much too fast for the final approach. It should have been flying at about 135 knots during this portion of the approach.
olasek, Capn Bloggs, Airbubber, et al,
Whilst the gist of my original question was to stimulate discussion as above, one aspect remains unanswered. Why have ‘BIDPE’ on the RNAV chart but not for LOC.
If ‘BIDPE’ pre-empts a VNAV path approach, then by not being on the desired path, albeit before the FAF (FAF is a more a check and not necessarily a start point?), it adds confusion and may encourage a step down procedure.
Alternatively if ‘BIDPE’ is just for info, ‘not below’ point, then it provides opportunity for an erroneous early descent – “Calculate a vertical speed to use from the FAF and make small adjustments to V/S as necessary for the proper path and step downs if applicable”, where flying the calculated descent path from ‘BIDPE’ - mistaken for FAF, would result in a 900ft error.
Re ‘lateral’ deviation. What is the primary navigation source on this aircraft how is it updated? Is this subject to ‘map slip? If so, then it might contribute to longitudinal / lateral path errors; the data link information discussed elsewhere might not represent ‘real world’.
Furthermore, we have yet to hear about EGPWS, which should have provided an alert, but if ‘the map’ - the assumed position from ‘NAV’ was closer to the airfield than reality, then EGPWS might not have alerted the crew (a good reason to have GPS embedded in EGPWS).
Also, if the crew focused on the computed RNAV solution then they similarly might not have been concerned until the ‘visual’ stage of the approach (=<MDA).
Whilst the gist of my original question was to stimulate discussion as above, one aspect remains unanswered. Why have ‘BIDPE’ on the RNAV chart but not for LOC.
If ‘BIDPE’ pre-empts a VNAV path approach, then by not being on the desired path, albeit before the FAF (FAF is a more a check and not necessarily a start point?), it adds confusion and may encourage a step down procedure.
Alternatively if ‘BIDPE’ is just for info, ‘not below’ point, then it provides opportunity for an erroneous early descent – “Calculate a vertical speed to use from the FAF and make small adjustments to V/S as necessary for the proper path and step downs if applicable”, where flying the calculated descent path from ‘BIDPE’ - mistaken for FAF, would result in a 900ft error.
Re ‘lateral’ deviation. What is the primary navigation source on this aircraft how is it updated? Is this subject to ‘map slip? If so, then it might contribute to longitudinal / lateral path errors; the data link information discussed elsewhere might not represent ‘real world’.
Furthermore, we have yet to hear about EGPWS, which should have provided an alert, but if ‘the map’ - the assumed position from ‘NAV’ was closer to the airfield than reality, then EGPWS might not have alerted the crew (a good reason to have GPS embedded in EGPWS).
Also, if the crew focused on the computed RNAV solution then they similarly might not have been concerned until the ‘visual’ stage of the approach (=<MDA).
Left Seat 747
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Malaysia
Age: 80
Posts: 91
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"just read the altimeter setting and it was not too far off standard, so I am thinking it wasn't altimetry...29.97 is close enough to 29.92 that it shouldn't have caused the crash... "
AHHH, I guess we should always keep our altimeters at standard - avoid many accidents.
AHHH, I guess we should always keep our altimeters at standard - avoid many accidents.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Like their Asiana 214 analysis, Sooeet did a new analysis for UPS 1354, including nice plots of position and airspeed. It's darned good, check it out:
What Happened to UPS Flight 1354 - Analysis by Sooeet.com
What Happened to UPS Flight 1354 - Analysis by Sooeet.com
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Additionally, UPS1354 flew well above the PAPI glide-slope for runway 18 until about 15 nautical miles out, at which time UPS1354 began a very rapid descent while maintaining 300 knots, likely using a combination of engine power to maintain speed, and spoilers to increase descent rate. UPS1354 attempted to intercept the PAPI glide-slope from above by means of this rapid descent between 15 and 10 nautical miles from the runway touch down zone.
However, at 1 nautical mile UPS1354 was still flying at 190 knots, much too fast for the final approach. It should have been flying at about 135 knots during this portion of the approach.
In fact, the more I read it, the more the whole article stinks.
Furthermore, we have yet to hear about EGPWS, which should have provided an alert, but if ‘the map’ - the assumed position from ‘NAV’ was closer to the airfield than reality, then EGPWS might not have alerted the crew (a good reason to have GPS embedded in EGPWS).
Join Date: Nov 2012
Location: arizona
Posts: 19
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Another reliable eyewitness report...
"It sounded like an airplane had given out of fuel. We thought it was trying to make it to the airport. But a few minutes later we heard a loud `boom,'" she said.
A few minutes later ?
Lacking a complete language, we Americans frequently measure intervals using the folllowing precision estimator:
'Then it went" = immediate
'Few minutes later" = greater than 'then it went'
'While later" = greater than a few minutes
'A while later" = greater then while later
'Sometime later' = 1 day to 6 weeks, used only by journalists
A few minutes later ?
Lacking a complete language, we Americans frequently measure intervals using the folllowing precision estimator:
'Then it went" = immediate
'Few minutes later" = greater than 'then it went'
'While later" = greater than a few minutes
'A while later" = greater then while later
'Sometime later' = 1 day to 6 weeks, used only by journalists
Join Date: Jun 2008
Location: Nova Scotia
Age: 55
Posts: 71
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"In fact, the more I read it, the more the whole article stinks. " - Capn Bloggs
Agree completely, including your quoted passages. It's terrible work, dressed up pretty.
Those who know accident investigation and flight data work routinely ignore such contributions as the data source used is not an investigative tool but a polished internet toy that gives the appearance of careful work that in truth just fuels uninformed internet speculation in advance of the facts.
There's no point in such work (other than for ego) because it can't possibly describe what occurred without the flight data from the recorders. Anything else is just a cartoon.
PJ2
Agree completely, including your quoted passages. It's terrible work, dressed up pretty.
Those who know accident investigation and flight data work routinely ignore such contributions as the data source used is not an investigative tool but a polished internet toy that gives the appearance of careful work that in truth just fuels uninformed internet speculation in advance of the facts.
There's no point in such work (other than for ego) because it can't possibly describe what occurred without the flight data from the recorders. Anything else is just a cartoon.
PJ2
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 848
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just a minute
@ ohnutsiforgot:
Imagine how much fun it is to take the deposition testimony of such folks - or to take their statements for NTSB field investigation purposes. I recall seeing in the NTSB interview record of some of the people who were in the JAL 787 at BOS when smoke first was observed certain references to their estimations or expressions of perceived lapse of time...and thinking 'hmmm, a tad imprecise, is it not?' Not suggesting the wiggle in those facts impacted anything material in that causality analysis, but it might matter quite a lot in some other case.
Imagine how much fun it is to take the deposition testimony of such folks - or to take their statements for NTSB field investigation purposes. I recall seeing in the NTSB interview record of some of the people who were in the JAL 787 at BOS when smoke first was observed certain references to their estimations or expressions of perceived lapse of time...and thinking 'hmmm, a tad imprecise, is it not?' Not suggesting the wiggle in those facts impacted anything material in that causality analysis, but it might matter quite a lot in some other case.
Join Date: May 2008
Location: USA
Posts: 44
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There has been discussion about Harold and Maude seeing the plane on fire or hearing sputtering, and I agree, you almost always get "witnesses" that say that. In this case, I think there may be some truth to the matter. As mentioned previously, the plane clipped the power lines (and trees) before impacting the hill. This could have ruptured a fuel tank and the impacted electrical lines could have ignited it. From the insulators I can see in the photos, it looks like that there is 12KV service in that area, so the arcing could have been significant.
I also think that the "sputtering engines" may have been the sound of high voltage arcing, spring fuses melting, or the utility recloser in operation. The recloser is a type of automated circuit breaker that attempts to "re close" the circuit several times (usually three) after a fault, the theory being that most faults are temporary, so why keep the juice off. When this operation occurs into a hard fault like downed lines, it does indeed sound like very loud "sputtering".
I also think that the "sputtering engines" may have been the sound of high voltage arcing, spring fuses melting, or the utility recloser in operation. The recloser is a type of automated circuit breaker that attempts to "re close" the circuit several times (usually three) after a fault, the theory being that most faults are temporary, so why keep the juice off. When this operation occurs into a hard fault like downed lines, it does indeed sound like very loud "sputtering".
Last edited by areobat; 15th Aug 2013 at 15:13.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Gone Flying...
Age: 63
Posts: 270
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Additionally, UPS1354 flew well above the PAPI glide-slope for runway 18 until about 15 nautical miles out, at which time UPS1354 began a very rapid descent while maintaining 300 knots, likely using a combination of engine power to maintain speed, and spoilers to increase descent rate. UPS1354 attempted to intercept the PAPI glide-slope from above by means of this rapid descent between 15 and 10 nautical miles from the runway touch down zone"
That sentence could not have been written by a credible author...
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
because it can't possibly describe what occurred without the flight data from the recorders. Anything else is just a cartoon.
A number of people carried out 'reconstructions' after the Asiana 214 crash using published radar data for altitude and ground speed which turned out to be surprisingly accurate once the DFDR information was released.
