The Children of Magenta / Rage against the Machine

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Dozy

Correcting in the flare is appropriate in a trainer, but Lufthansa's own regulations were violated

And what are those regs?

[DownIn3Green]

Arpster,

The situation with the UAL 727 out of LAX that IFR night, was after departing with one generator MEL'd, the other 2 tripped, due to a spike, overload or whatever...

Now remember, this was a brand new a/c at the time, no one really had any time on it...

So anyway, the remaining 2 generators tripped, and the loss of all generator ck list was called for...

At the time, the battery switch on the FE panel was unguarded and was located next to the gen sel sw...

The FE turned the batteryoff, which cancelled what they had...which was battery power, in a climb in IMC...the result was predictable...

As a result, Boeing moved the battery switch and placed a guard over it...problem solved...

[bubbers44]

We got rid of our 727's about 15 years ago so forget how all that stuff works. I enjoyed flying it even though it was a pig on climb out. I loved the 757 because you had to be really stupid to not survive an engine failure with all of it's performance. It looked very cool too. Sort of like a Corvette cruising down the highway at 120 mph.

[bubbers44]

So the FE turned the battery switch off? Why?

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Dozy

Namely allowing the F/O to continue an approach that had gusts approaching the regulation limit for F/O approaches

- why do you consider that to be poor judgement, DW? A limit is a limit, after all.

[FLCH]

So the FE turned the battery switch off? Why?

Maybe because the Galley power switch is just below the Battery switch ?

All I remember is check essential, download, cover the bus.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi DW,
Good to read you again.
Quote:
Have you ever wondered why B777 & B787 FBW give control surface position feed back via the yoke?

I don't wonder, I know - it's because offered the choice between sidesticks and yokes, the T7 launch customer (United IIRC) chose the latter. Boeing then used that as a sales differentiator against Airbus. What should be noted however is that the feedback is simulated via software, and that makes the software far more complex than the Airbus equivalent.

Please see this document:
http://www.icas.org/ICAS_ARCHIVE/ICA...PAPERS/605.PDF
Page 10
"The pilot’s awareness of the horizontal stabilizer position is of crucial importance to flight safety, especially when the automatic stabilizer function is suddenly lost in flight conditions close to the edge of the envelope."
&
"The integration of a horizontal stabilizer position indication below the PFD of the Airbus A380 is a important modification, as it is expected to enhance the crew’ awareness of the stabilizer position."

Would you agree that anything which enhances flight crew's awareness of the position of their flight controls is a good design?

[Clandestino]

Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat

This Lufthansa crew had no idea how much aileron was being applied by the FBW computers.

Poor things... if only they had outside visual reference available or at least one synthetic attitude reference (three would be even better) that would warn them they were about to land on downwind gear in wind exceeding maximum demonstrated. How could they know that squeezing out the right crab with left rudder will cause left roll? I assure you: a whole lot of PPRuNers doesn't know this.

Originally Posted by Natstrackalpha

Why is that?

As these are anonymous forums, anyone can rant around here as (s)he pleases. That's why minor and manageable issues get blown to it-will-be-demise-of-all-of-us proportions.

[Teldorserious]

Isn't this all a little pointless. Airlines aren't culling for the best pilots, nor do most of them do any real sim tests or ground testing. So what are we talking about...flying a computer? All the real problems happen when the lights go out...who's talking about the skills to deal with that? Long winded conversations about SA looking at 7 tubes is pretty silly. If you lose SA in one of these aircraft you have to be literally the dumbest, most unqualified pilot on Earth hired on pure nepotism or networking skills.

[4Greens]

Have no experience on the Airbus but one thing I like about Boeing is the you can see immediately what the FO is doing with his control column. This ability is absent on Airbus.

[vilas]

4Greens
What you noticed has nothing to do with Boeing. Right from Dakotas to all MDs, Lockheeds and also A300 B4, A300, A310 all aircrafts turbo props or jets have it. Only Airbus FBW all aircrafts it is not there.

[4Greens]

Vilas, not sure what point you are making.

[vilas]

4Greens
Ability to see what the FO is doing is in any aircraft, not only Boeing aircraft. In non FBW AC it may have been easier to duplicate controls by connecting both sides. Yes it would have been an asset if Airbus FBW could have it.

[DownIn3Green]

Bubbers and FLCH...

FLCH is correct. The "immediate action" for the F/E (at Eastern) was "Essential Power, Galley Power, Cargo Heat and Packs..."

"Check the busses, check the loads and don't exceed the MAX"

The Galley power and Packs are self explanitory, but for the non-727 guys, the Cargo Heat was a switch that closed a vent underneath the fuselage that enabled warm air to heat the cargo bin. By closing it, you can save pressure in the a/c, because you've all ready turned off the packs...

Anyway, the Battery Switch was located next to the Cargo Heat Outflow Switch, both of which were located just to the left of the Galley Power switch (only one of these in the 100).

The cockpit went dark, and reacting on training the F/E accidently turned off the Battery instead of the Cargo Heat.

As a result, Boeing redesigned the F/E Panel, moving the Battery Switch, and Guarding it so before it could be switched off, the guard would have to be raised...

Wow...surprised I still remember this stuff...

[DozyWannabe]

Hi RRR,

Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat

Hi DW,
Good to read you again.

Likewise - hope you're well!

Please see this document:

Cheers, I'll give it the once-over when I get a decent bit of time to study it properly!

Would you agree that anything which enhances flight crew's awareness of the position of their flight controls is a good design?

I'd say it depends on the context. If we're talking about the stab trim wheels (as in that document) then the issue in the case they're describing is not that the information is unavailable - it's that the indications are referred to so infrequently in the day-to-day workload that when abnormal situations present themselves crews may forget to check the indications as a possible factor in the problem. The A380 layout moves the display from just inboard of the pilot's waist to directly in front of them - but this is not in response to the issue, as the A380's layout was finalised well before the AF447 accident. Correct me if I'm wrong, but does the 744's stab trim interface not work in a similar fashion?

Now if we're talking about primary flight controls, again context is all-important. In the Airbus FBW setup, PFC deflection commands rate, not flight surface deflection - except in the case of Direct Law. That leaves the aspect of duplicating the input of the opposite seat, which will probably still be debated for a long time to come. In a trainer, such a setup is vital - however in an airliner which is only ever supposed to be controlled by one pilot at a time it becomes more optional. Interestingly, the Airbus FBW approach and the 767 "split elevator" function* I mentioned earlier are both predicated on the assumption that the crew will be working together as a unit and follow procedure. Both AF447 and EgyptAir 990 provide examples of how those design decisions can cause problems when that assumption is violated, whether accidentally or deliberately. In short, there are benefits and drawbacks to both approaches.

* - Is 767 elevator split possible? - Yahoo! Answers

Originally Posted by Natstrackalpha

As for Children of the Magenta - like most people with tiny brains, I am facinated by colour and light so the mere inkling of something electric and potentially blue describing a modern day young technocrat with an ATPL and flying in conjunction with an A320 was +ively fascinating (again).

Small point of order - the magenta-coloured line is actually used on Boeing's FMS displays. Airbus FMGS uses a line which if I recall correctly is either white or green.

[Capn Bloggs]

Instead of pontificating about the colours of magenta lines, Dozy, where are those violated Lufthansa regs you mentioned earlier?

[DozyWannabe]

I'm only going on memory from the thread on the subject - I'm sure you can find it with the search function.

And with all due respect, how about playing the subject, not the person?

[Capn Bloggs]

Dozy, I am not going to use the search function. You were the one stating that the crew violated LH procedures; back up your claim with facts or withdraw it.

If you consider holding you to account for your claims as "playing the man", then I will continue to do so.

[DozyWannabe]

Report: Lufthansa A320 at Hamburg on Mar 1st 2008, wing touches runway in cross wind landing

After the Airbus established on the localizer and after handoff to the tower, the tower controller reported winds from 300 at 28 knots gusting 47 knots. Upon query by the captain the tower reported, about 50% of the preceding aircraft had gone around in the last 10 minutes repeating the wind data 300 at 28 knots gusting 47 and offering runway 33. The captain decided to attempt runway 23 first. The tower subsequently cleared the flight to land reporting winds from 290 at 29 knots gusting 47.

The Lufthansa documentation said, that their limit was 30 knots of cross wind on dry and wet runways. The highest cross wind component demonstrated by Airbus was 33 knots gusting 38 knots.

So while technically within Lufthansa minima, it was only just - and trending stronger. Coupled with the gust component which was well outside Lufthansa's minima I maintain that it was a very poor judgement call on the part of the Captain to allow the F/O to continue the approach.

[DownIn3Green]

Well, just checked DozyWANNABEE's profile....Can you believe it! A "former" Air Cadet who hopes one day to afford a PPL...

Working as a software engineer...

While his comments may have value, I lean towards Bloggs and others...

IF ONE WASN'T THERE on the given day, in the LEFT SEAT of the cockpit on that or any other day, (as in Dozy)...One can spout all the "theory" one wants...

Those of us who Have been there, Done that, and proudly wear the T-Shirt" very well know that "Theory" isn't ALL that matters, and DOES NOT apply to every simulated computer problem...

Sorry Dozy...you lose this one...

Upon rereading the link provided and quoted by Dozy, I realize it is NOT the actual report....It leads you to an article in the AvHerald, quoting the ACTUAL REPORT...as translated into English...

In other words, journalist license...