Concorde trial
Joined: Aug 2009
Posts: 1,777
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From: Germany
Hi,
I think there is still a problem when you know:
The Court of Pontoise said at trial that only the coppersmith could not ignore "the potentially catastrophic consequences of the bursting of a tire" when he secured the famous strip on the Continental DC10
So a coppersmith should know the catastrophic consequences .. but not the regulators or the BEA .. even with accident investigation earlier!
A coppersmith must be smarter than the agencies and regulators involved!
I call this cynicism
I think there is still a problem when you know:
The Court of Pontoise said at trial that only the coppersmith could not ignore "the potentially catastrophic consequences of the bursting of a tire" when he secured the famous strip on the Continental DC10
So a coppersmith should know the catastrophic consequences .. but not the regulators or the BEA .. even with accident investigation earlier!
A coppersmith must be smarter than the agencies and regulators involved!
I call this cynicism
Joined: Feb 2012
Posts: 106
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From: UK
AZR
"- the fact that the runways lights taken out were impacted significantly after the aircraft caught fire, as demonstrated by the evidences on the scene.
- the fact that the aircraft maintained the centre line with no apparent difficulties until thrust was reduced (due to fire) on left hand engines"
The aircraft should be able to maintain the centreline even after reduction in power: it must be certified with engine failure at any point in the take-off run. However the engine thrust should not have been reduced if the speed was above V1, you don't shut down engines for fire until stable in flight. All engines should have been closed below V1, so whenever the fire occurred thrust imbalance should not have caused the aircraft to veer from the runway.
It seems very likely that the emergency was mishandled or the poor bogey maintenance caused the crash. The only alternative I can think of is that the fuel leak caused fuel starvation to both engines which caused an immediate drop in power to well under 50% on the left engines. Obviously I don't know the fuel system of the Concorde, but it doesn't fit with anything I had heard about the accident, and seems inherently unlikely.
"- the fact that the runways lights taken out were impacted significantly after the aircraft caught fire, as demonstrated by the evidences on the scene.
- the fact that the aircraft maintained the centre line with no apparent difficulties until thrust was reduced (due to fire) on left hand engines"
The aircraft should be able to maintain the centreline even after reduction in power: it must be certified with engine failure at any point in the take-off run. However the engine thrust should not have been reduced if the speed was above V1, you don't shut down engines for fire until stable in flight. All engines should have been closed below V1, so whenever the fire occurred thrust imbalance should not have caused the aircraft to veer from the runway.
It seems very likely that the emergency was mishandled or the poor bogey maintenance caused the crash. The only alternative I can think of is that the fuel leak caused fuel starvation to both engines which caused an immediate drop in power to well under 50% on the left engines. Obviously I don't know the fuel system of the Concorde, but it doesn't fit with anything I had heard about the accident, and seems inherently unlikely.
Joined: Nov 2009
Posts: 74
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From: USA
There is another alternative to the missing spacer and poor airmanship causing the crash. It is contained within a published report prepared by dozens of experts who had direct access to all the evidence.
The report also contains a description of the fuel system.
The report also contains a description of the fuel system.
Joined: Nov 2010
Posts: 478
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From: FR
Flaymy: I took a shortcut. BEA didn't say (IIRC) that the plane veered left of the runway because it was unable to maintain the centerline because of the thrust loss on the left side.
(by the way, I'm not aware of certification criteria, but know that the 2 left hand engine were affected -various degrees- by thrust loss).
The report said that the thrust loss made the aircraft veer to the left. That is normal. The fact that it was not fully counteracted by the crew (hence the a-bit-left-of-runway end of ground course) is attributed to the difficulty for the PF (CPT) to assess precisely the position of the aircraft relatively to the centerline with the nose high. Before anyone cries in outrage that any pilot should be able to do that, one has to read the difference in lateral acceleration mesured (or was it estimated?) between the aircraft CoG and the crew's position.
To make a long story short: Please take the time to read the report.
Then we can discuss.
For the record, once again I do agree (and can't see how one can disagree) that:
- forgetting the spacer was a mistake (and a failure to follow procedures)
- cutting of #2 engine above V1 and below 400' AGL was a mistake (and a failure to follow procedures)
Now, the question is: if these mistakes were not made, would the outcome have been different? Until proven wrong, I refer to the BEA's report whose answer is: No.
Regards.
(by the way, I'm not aware of certification criteria, but know that the 2 left hand engine were affected -various degrees- by thrust loss).
The report said that the thrust loss made the aircraft veer to the left. That is normal. The fact that it was not fully counteracted by the crew (hence the a-bit-left-of-runway end of ground course) is attributed to the difficulty for the PF (CPT) to assess precisely the position of the aircraft relatively to the centerline with the nose high. Before anyone cries in outrage that any pilot should be able to do that, one has to read the difference in lateral acceleration mesured (or was it estimated?) between the aircraft CoG and the crew's position.
To make a long story short: Please take the time to read the report.
Then we can discuss.
For the record, once again I do agree (and can't see how one can disagree) that:
- forgetting the spacer was a mistake (and a failure to follow procedures)
- cutting of #2 engine above V1 and below 400' AGL was a mistake (and a failure to follow procedures)
Now, the question is: if these mistakes were not made, would the outcome have been different? Until proven wrong, I refer to the BEA's report whose answer is: No.
Regards.
Joined: Jul 2010
Posts: 624
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From: East sussex
Rexbanner........Could be some substance in your post.
"Continental's lawyers maintain the Concorde burst into flames before hitting the metal strip.
The appeal is set to run until May 9. The first day of hearings on Thursday was devoted to procedural questions.
A lawyer for one of the accused, Henri Perrier, former head of the Concorde program at Aerospatiale, is expected to argue that his client is too frail to attend the proceedings and call for the case to be scrapped.
"Continental's lawyers maintain the Concorde burst into flames before hitting the metal strip.
The appeal is set to run until May 9. The first day of hearings on Thursday was devoted to procedural questions.
A lawyer for one of the accused, Henri Perrier, former head of the Concorde program at Aerospatiale, is expected to argue that his client is too frail to attend the proceedings and call for the case to be scrapped.
Joined: Nov 1999
Aviation Qualifications: Non-Aircrew
Posts: 313
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From: In the shadow of R101
The position of the titanium strip, tyre debris, unburnt fuel and soot deposits on the runway from burning fuel is detailed in the BEA report, things were found pretty much where one would expect them to be bearing in mind the way events unfolded. The one thing not clear is how the strip came to be bent in such a way that it would sit edges vertical on the runway surface. One would expect it to fall off the DC-10 reverser in its original shape, but there is no certainty of that.
As for the tank skin and the hydrodynamic failure, how much of it was down to a putative overfill of Tank 5 and how much due to fuel displacement towards the rear of the tank due to longitudinal acceleration is also unclear, the only thing that can be said is that had there been an air space above the fuel at the rear of the tank the hydraulic shock of the tyre impact would have applied a lower force to the wing skin. It is possible that in that case the tank would not have ruptured, but then the need for maximum fuel on the CDG-JFK Concorde route is well known and deliberately reducing the fuel quantity is not a likely decision by an AF Concorde crew.
As for the tank skin and the hydrodynamic failure, how much of it was down to a putative overfill of Tank 5 and how much due to fuel displacement towards the rear of the tank due to longitudinal acceleration is also unclear, the only thing that can be said is that had there been an air space above the fuel at the rear of the tank the hydraulic shock of the tyre impact would have applied a lower force to the wing skin. It is possible that in that case the tank would not have ruptured, but then the need for maximum fuel on the CDG-JFK Concorde route is well known and deliberately reducing the fuel quantity is not a likely decision by an AF Concorde crew.
