John Farley

I have not posted this on existing threads about the A380 and B787 because what I have to say is not type dependant but applies to any new airliner (or indeed any new military type).

Engineers and pilots involved in the design, manufacture, testing, inspecting, maintenance and service entry of any aircraft know that they cannot guarantee everything is perfect. This applies to the certification authorities as well. The final stage of testing, development and proving can only be done in service. To think otherwise is not to understand the business.

So from the engineers or test pilots’ perspective when anything goes wrong in early service and nobody is hurt every such incident represents invaluable knowledge which will allow them to refine the design or procedures associated with it.

Such incidents are therefore to be welcomed not wailed about on the internet. Remember this when the first lightning strike is experienced. Hopefully nobody will be hurt but if they are then sadly that is the price of progress. If some commercial and PR folk do not see things that way then I humbly suggest they do not fully understand the business they are in.

Lyman

That is exactly the thing that is to be welcomed by the public. Sane people do not believe in the tooth fairy, and accept risk as a matter of course. Aviation is a phenomenon that is a gift, and a risk...

However. Two airborne fires that require immediate emergency landing, and one on the ground that very nearly became a hull loss needs be addressed by adults.
Likewise, a loss of control at altitude in an aircraft that disallowed manual takeover, requiring an ad hoc workaround because the manufacturer was so proud and cocky, he did not believe bad things can happen....

Duty of care in public carriage is non negotiable. So disclosure is mandatory. And, not by spin merchants, condescending with magic and nonsense.

Disclosure is the right of all who fly to judge for themselves.

KBPsen

Wise words, John Farley, but wasted on the post-fact society inhabitants that have invaded PPRuNe. You know who you are.

Slasher

So NEVER accept an assignment onto a brand new type for at least 2 years -
after which the reams of QRH and OM amendments should be sorted by then.

fantom

I seem to recall a story about a prospective customer for a radical bizz A/c who declared he would order MSN 50.

barit1

At this stage of the game (1 to 2 yrs after entry into service) the 707, DC-8, & 727 had each had a fatal airframe-ground interface (or two or three). The industry has come a long way.

Chris Scott

"The final stage of testing, development and proving can only be done in service."

Yes, and I wonder what John Farley thinks of this comment, from one of our pundit's posts on another thread (guess which!):

"...real pilots know not to fly the "A" model of anything."


Hi barit1,

I think you're right, without remembering (and too idle to research right now) the details. But, generally speaking, would it be fair to say that those accidents were less about sophisticated systems and more about the relatively new flight envelope that those airliners were operating in, the engines and the aerodynamics? The 707/720 and DC8 cruised at higher Mach than the earlier, ill-fated Comet 1, which had failed to sell in the US. The 727 was a hot ship with a T-tail. Flight crews were unaccustomed to the environment, and - unless ex-military - had no experience of the different flight characteristics associated with jet engines.

Current types fly no faster or higher than those did (sad to say). Think of the CV990...

RR_NDB

Hi,
"Infant mortality" is a fact of life. It simply happens. (in components, etc.)

In the ground fire of one 787 battery there is a probable additional problem:

The chances to learn what caused the incident seems remote.

In another thread i commented something on that.

This incident may not reveal the problem. Murphy law.

TheRobe

It would probably be prudent that new aircraft pressed into service are first put in the role of freighters or some such non passenger capacity for a little while until the kinks are worked out.

Intruder

Why? How many passengers have been injured due to such "new airplane" problems?

TheRobe

I suspect he's dancing around the Dreamliner teething problems.

barit1

TheRobe:First time I heard this proposed was five decades ago, maybe more.

First time I've seen it implemented is the B748F.

evansb

Early versions of the DC-3, DC-6, Lockheed Constellation, Lockheed Electra, and de Havilland's Comet were all grounded because of fatal design flaws.

Nothing new here. "New" always incorporates a few unanticipated problems.

So it goes...

BOAC

- do you not think it fortunate that the battery fire was on the ground? Could it have been different?

aterpster

BOAC:

Such as 2:30 or more from an oceanic diversion alternate.

GHOTI

EVANSB: Actually, the Electra was never grounded. It was slowed down to DC-6/Connie speeds instead until the flutter problem was identified and repaired. Reason for the non-grounding was that there was an airline, PSA, who had only Electras in their fleet and a grounding would have put them out of business.

DozyWannabe

Interesting take, Chris.

While you're absolutely correct in terms of specifics, my reading leads me to the conclusion that every "generation" has had its own share of problems on introduction as a result of the innovations applied to them. Going back to the infancy of civil jets, I remember reading a book some time ago that quoted a retired DH engineer as saying he was informally told by a counterpart at Boeing that if the Comet 1 had not served to identify the problems with pressurisation/metal fatigue and over-rotation with a swept-wing design, the Dash-80 would have suffered the same issues - and possibly the same fate - as the Comet 1.

A generation on, the "deep-stall" issues with T-tails were another generational issue that were first experienced on this side of the pond, but the B727 suffered a spate of crashes shortly after introduction because pilots were letting speed bleed off too quickly on approach and the tail-heavy design impeded recovery. This may have been an issue with the DC-9 as well, but I'd have to do some more research.

With the advent of widebodies came two new issues - all-hydraulic controls with no manual reversion and the simultaneous introduction of advanced INS-based autoflight. The DC-10 was the most infamous victim of the former (and arguably should have been grounded while the problematic cargo-door latching system was fixed), but the 747 was not immune if maintenance was not done properly.

Autoflight issues carried on through to the following generation, and while the introduction of FBW with that generation wasn't without problems, it was less problematic than feared at the time.

The latest generation is a case which is likely to be unusual, as the two predominant manufacturers have followed separate business cases to inform the designs. The ultimate goal is similar - i.e. reducing weight and cost, but one manufacturer has gone the way of placing unprecedented loads on their airframe and the other has utilised composite materials to an unprecedented degree. For this reason there may be underlying issues specific to one type alone from which the competition can draw little use.