Loss of Control: Flight Crew Training Conference
There are several concerns about simulator training.
There is no guarantee that post-stall simulation will be representative, and even if a good approximation it may only represent one very narrow view of a whole range of possible scenarios. One of the aircraft that I am familiar with has differing wing drop characteristics with increasing weight, thus a very benign medium-weight stall would be unrepresentative training for a rapid wing drop high-weight stall.
Any simulation training will be limited – time, money, availability (crew and equipment), thus at best a pilot will have a limited exposure to a small range of conditions. A possible negative aspect of this training might result in a false sense of confidence which is either misused, or is the mental backdrop to a greater surprise factor in a real event.
As with most aspects in safety a compromise solution has to be found. In this instance the industry should not ‘compromise’ on the belief that simulator training will solve the problem; it is not certain what all of the contributing factors in upset events are. We should consider using a range of generic solutions which address some of the dominant contributing factors – before and during the event.
Weaknesses in human performance stem from situation assessment and, with accurate assessment, decision making for the choice of action. Simulator training is focused on the end aspect – the action, whereas both pre and post loc require assessment and understanding, and a choice of action for every situation. A parallel aspect of this is that in loc accidents all crew members appeared to have a similar erroneous understanding of the situation and/or choice of action; we have to understand these aspects to ensure that any further training is to be effective.
Also, many loc accidents involve disorientation; it is not clear what if any benefit loc simulator training would provide in these events.
Whilst we hope that a small change in safety efforts might make a large difference in safety, we still have to inquire what ‘small change’ in recent normal operations might have contributed to the apparent increase in loc events; if we don’t know that, then how can we be sure that we are fixing the problem.
This is a circular argument which I believe is near exhaustion. Thus the industry needs to consider a different approach to this problem – it’s a ‘mess’ (#16). We need to have a much broader view of the contributing factors, the links between them, and parallels with other accident groups with similar influencing factors.
We are fortunate to operate in a very safe industry and seek to maintain this – hence the frustration of repetitive accidents. However to achieve this aim we might not be able to employ ‘more of the same’ training, checking, etc, (it could be those items which caused the problem), instead we really do have to change the way we think about these issues.
There is no guarantee that post-stall simulation will be representative, and even if a good approximation it may only represent one very narrow view of a whole range of possible scenarios. One of the aircraft that I am familiar with has differing wing drop characteristics with increasing weight, thus a very benign medium-weight stall would be unrepresentative training for a rapid wing drop high-weight stall.
Any simulation training will be limited – time, money, availability (crew and equipment), thus at best a pilot will have a limited exposure to a small range of conditions. A possible negative aspect of this training might result in a false sense of confidence which is either misused, or is the mental backdrop to a greater surprise factor in a real event.
As with most aspects in safety a compromise solution has to be found. In this instance the industry should not ‘compromise’ on the belief that simulator training will solve the problem; it is not certain what all of the contributing factors in upset events are. We should consider using a range of generic solutions which address some of the dominant contributing factors – before and during the event.
Weaknesses in human performance stem from situation assessment and, with accurate assessment, decision making for the choice of action. Simulator training is focused on the end aspect – the action, whereas both pre and post loc require assessment and understanding, and a choice of action for every situation. A parallel aspect of this is that in loc accidents all crew members appeared to have a similar erroneous understanding of the situation and/or choice of action; we have to understand these aspects to ensure that any further training is to be effective.
Also, many loc accidents involve disorientation; it is not clear what if any benefit loc simulator training would provide in these events.
Whilst we hope that a small change in safety efforts might make a large difference in safety, we still have to inquire what ‘small change’ in recent normal operations might have contributed to the apparent increase in loc events; if we don’t know that, then how can we be sure that we are fixing the problem.
This is a circular argument which I believe is near exhaustion. Thus the industry needs to consider a different approach to this problem – it’s a ‘mess’ (#16). We need to have a much broader view of the contributing factors, the links between them, and parallels with other accident groups with similar influencing factors.
We are fortunate to operate in a very safe industry and seek to maintain this – hence the frustration of repetitive accidents. However to achieve this aim we might not be able to employ ‘more of the same’ training, checking, etc, (it could be those items which caused the problem), instead we really do have to change the way we think about these issues.
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Safetypee - agree with your view of SIM limitations. I wonder what happened to Cranfield's FORCE idea?
Flight safety takes centre stage
Flight safety takes centre stage
I’m embarrassment to admit not knowing about this work, although I know of or am aware of many of the individuals in the linked press release.
I suspect that as a commercial organisation dependent on funding, current financial restrictions might not help with the start-up of new safety initiatives. Also, guessing that the UK CAA would be a prime source of funding – they are also suffering cutbacks; and I am not sure where CAA research work fits in with EASA.
The EASA view on this subject appears to be following the progress of industry initiatives and aligning more with the FAA. This would to produce a much needed ‘world-wide’ solution, even if the FAA appears to be doing its own thing.
The latest from the UK CAA appears to be in their document ‘Significant Seven’ in the 'loc task force report' (I had overlooked the reference to FORCE in this document).
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/2011_03.pdf
I suspect that as a commercial organisation dependent on funding, current financial restrictions might not help with the start-up of new safety initiatives. Also, guessing that the UK CAA would be a prime source of funding – they are also suffering cutbacks; and I am not sure where CAA research work fits in with EASA.
The EASA view on this subject appears to be following the progress of industry initiatives and aligning more with the FAA. This would to produce a much needed ‘world-wide’ solution, even if the FAA appears to be doing its own thing.
The latest from the UK CAA appears to be in their document ‘Significant Seven’ in the 'loc task force report' (I had overlooked the reference to FORCE in this document).
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/2011_03.pdf
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Whilst we hope that a small change in safety efforts might make a large difference in safety, we still have to inquire what ‘small change’ in recent normal operations might have contributed to the apparent increase in loc events; if we don’t know that, then how can we be sure that we are fixing the problem.
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With the very low number of crashes and accidents that occur nowadays it is difficult to make statistics and put the blame on this or that.
Just two crashes of one kind will reverse all statistics...
Just two crashes of one kind will reverse all statistics...
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A37575 - mixed messages
You say:
Competence and confidence in dealing with LOC requires aerobatic training in real aeroplanes with real vestibular and other sensory cues. The reason that ab initio students don't do it is because regulators won't mandate it and most barge arse S&L pilots haven't believed that it was necessary (despite the growing and contrary evidence). Bit like Airbus stall training, really! Trying to solve the problem in the simulator is just a band-aid, sort of convenient and a bit expensive.
But then, perhaps not:
If it was that bluddy easy, we wouldn't have a problem.
What we are looking for in LOC protection is resilience - deepseated, confident and measured response to a very rare event. Most people these days would take more than 15 minutes just to fully understand what the attitude indicator was telling them, let alone the performance indicators!
But I get the impression that you sort of know that it isn't a 15 minute solution, because you later say:
But how many sim exercises do you think it takes before they actually start to develop some resilience?
Some other posters were quite gentle, but I was actually startled by:
Most of your modern 'children of the magenta' wouldn't even see a UA developing if they were watching the attitude indicator, because their expectation is simply that the autopilot will be doing its job and they are commonly incapable of seeing past the flight director bars to see the true attitude. They have, for all intents and purposes, their eyes shut. And the reality is that they need the ability to rapidly and accurately interpret raw attitude information on a flash card basis - because when they finally wake up to the fact that something is wrong, they have to see it as it is right now.
I absolutely agree with:
but I am cautiously curious about your passion for:
Is that your "instrument interpretation" silver bullet? 
... it all boils down to lack of basic UA recovery training in simulators.
...Ab initio students should be learning this stuff during PPL training...
...Ab initio students should be learning this stuff during PPL training...
But then, perhaps not:
...It takes only 15 minutes at the most, of simulator time to teach pilots how to recover from loss of control (unusual attitude recovery)...
What we are looking for in LOC protection is resilience - deepseated, confident and measured response to a very rare event. Most people these days would take more than 15 minutes just to fully understand what the attitude indicator was telling them, let alone the performance indicators!
But I get the impression that you sort of know that it isn't a 15 minute solution, because you later say:
...Doing a couple of UA's once every three years as part of cyclic training is a waste of time. It should be done at least three times a year...
Some other posters were quite gentle, but I was actually startled by:
... One thing I cannot understand is why instructors say "close your eyes while I put you in a UA, then recover" There is no way a pilot is flogging around in an aeroplane with closed eyes and so that practice is unrealistic...
I absolutely agree with:
... I have always maintained that instrument interpretation is the key to prompt recovery...
...Thank goodness for Sky Pointers...
